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in arriving at a new agreement with the consignee for the acceptance of the short cargo at its actual weight.-Doherty v. Peal, Peacock & Kerr, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1054, 25 Misc. Rep. 487.

4. Liability of Consignee.

[a] (U. S.) A bill of lading provided that "48 hours after arrival in port, and notice thereof to the consignee, there shall be allowed for receiving cargo at the rate of one day for every 75 tons thereof, after which the cargo consignee shall pay demurrage at the rate of six cents per ton. * After arrival and notice as aforesaid, and the expiration of said 48 hours, said vessel shall have precedence in discharging over all vessels arriving, or giving notice, after her arrival; and for any violation of this provision she shall be compensated in demurrage," etc. Held, that the consignee has control of the ship hereunder as regards time and place of discharge, and is liable in demurrage for delay beyond the stipulated time on account of his failure to provide her a berth.-(C. C. A., N. Y., 1893) Smith v. M. Block Co., 5 C. C. A. 672, 56 Fed. 527; (D. C., N. Y., 1892) Smith v. Block Co., 56 Fed. 525.

[ы(U. S. C. C., Ill., 1883) Where the shipper of coal on a schooner expressed some doubts as to the depth of water at a certain dock at the port of delivery being sufficient to admit of the delivery of the coal at that dock on account of the size of the schooner, but the captain took the chances of there being sufficient depth of water there, and on arrival it was discovered that delivery could not be made at such dock, the captain can lay no claim for demurrage for delay caused by the necessity to proceed to another dock, or for expenses in consequence of the delay.-One Hundred Tons of Coal, 14 Fed. 878.

[c] (U. S. D. C., Pa., 1887) When the duty of providing a wharf at which to unload is on the consignee, he is entitled to reasonable notice of the time when the vessel will be ready to unload; otherwise, demurrage will be allowed only after the lapse of a reasonable time from actual notice.-The Rocky City, 33 Fed. 556.

[d] (N. Y. Sup. 1896) A consignee of lumber, shipped to him under an executory contract to purchase, is not liable for demurrage, where the delay was due to his refusal to accept the lumber without an abatement of price, because it was not of the specified quality.—Conkling v. Lumber Co., 41 N. Y. Supp. 801, 10 App. Div. 404.

5. Delay in Loading or Sailing.

[a] (Ů. S. C. C. A., Ill., 1900) Libelants contracted to carry, in their own or substituted vessels, from Escanaba to South Chicago, the ore required by respondent for its iron furnaces during the season, not to be less than 90,000 tons, and to be divided as evenly as possible during the season of navigation. Respondent contracted to do the unloading at its dock, and for dispatch therein, but the contract contained no provision for dispatch at the port of shipment; it being understood that respondent was obliged to procure the ore there from other parties. It subsequently contracted with two companies, operating mines connected by rail with Escanaba, to supply the ore at that port, and notified libelants to ascertain from them when cargoes were ready for shipment. Held, that there was no implied term of such contract requiring respondent to supply cargoes for loading at any particular time, or which rendered it liable for demurrage because of the delay of libelants' vessels while waiting for cargoes.-Corrigan v. Furnace Co., 41 C. C. A. 102, 100 Fed. 870.

[b] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1880) A vessel was loaded with laths in New Brunswick for New York under a charter specifying that she was to be loaded "with all possible dispatch." She was compelled to await her turn for cargo, and was thereby detained five days, and was also detained by tide and also at the place of discharge. Held, that demurrage could be allowed only for the detention in loading.-Moody v. Five Hundred Thousand Laths, 2 Fed. 607.

[e] (U. S. D. C., Pa., 1899) The Pennsylvania statute relating to holidays (Act 1893; P. L. 188) does not make them obligatory, and, where it is not shown that the stevedore or men engaged in loading a vessel refused to

work on holidays, such days are not to be excluded in computing demurrage. -Uren v. Hagar, 95 Fed. 493.

6. Delay in Unloading.

[a] (U. S. C. C. A., Minn., 1896) Where the charter or bill of lading is silent as to the time of unloading and discharge, there is an implied contract to discharge the vessel within a reasonable time.-Empire Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 23 C. C. A. 564, 77 Fed. 919, 35 L. R. A. 623, affirming (D. C. 1895) 70 Fed. 268.

[b] (U. S. C. C. A., Minn., 1897) Where, by the bill of lading, the cargo is to be delivered "free of handling" at the private dock of a consignee known to have special facilities for unloading, the vessel will be entitled to demurrage for unnecessary delay of the consignee in beginning the discharge, although the total time consumed, including the delay, is not longer than would have been occupied in discharging at a public dock of the same port with the inferior facilities there afforded.-Fuel Co. v. McBrier, 28 C. C. A. 466, 84 Fed. 495.

[c] (U. S. C. C. A., N. Y., 1896) The master or shipowner cannot recover demurrage, under a charter party, for delay in discharging caused by the master's absence from the vessel, so that she could not be moved to another dock upon the purchaser of the cargo refusing to receive it on the ground that it was in bad condition.-Whitman v. Vanderbilt, 21 C. C. A. 422, 75 Fed. 422.

[d] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1898) Where a bill of lading for a cargo requires its delivery to the consignee "or assigns," the master knows that the wharf of discharge may not have been selected; and the fact that the consignee sells the cargo before its arrival, and designates the wharf of the buyer as the place for its discharge, does not change the rule as to demurrage for delay in being provided a place to discharge.-The Viola, 90 Fed. 750; Forsyth v. Stetson, Id.

[e] (U. S. D. C., N. J., 1898) If the master, after beginning to unload, intends to discontinue until security is given for demurrage, he should give such timely notice thereof as will enable the charterers to furnish the required security without delaying the progress of the work, or adopt a means by which prompt discharge can be made and the lien of the vessel retained. -In re Ten Thousand and Eighty-Two Oak Ties, 87 Fed. 935.

[f] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1881) A captain is not entitled to demurrage for time lost in waiting to avail himself of a consignee's special facilities for unloading.-McLaughlin v. Steel Co., 8 Fed. 447.

[g] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1896) Libelant's vessel reached Ogdensburg December 4th, with a cargo of grain. December 9th was Sunday, and the canal through which she had to pass to reach the Upper Lakes was closed on the 11th. The only elevator at Ogdensburg was blocked, and five other vessels were ahead of libelant's, rendering it impossible to unload the latter before the canal closed. Held, that there was no negligence on the part of the charterers in detaining the vessel until the canal had closed.-Green v. Cargo of the Lewiston, 77 Fed. 321.

[h] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1896) Where the discharge of a scow laden with 252,500 brick was commenced on the 12th, and continued at the rate of 2,000 daily until the 20th, held, in the absence of a bill of lading or agreement for demurrage, that the master was justified in giving notice on that date that the discharge must be completed by the 25th, and that demurrage would be claimed thereafter.-Young v. One Hundred and Forty Thousand Hard Brick, 78 Fed. 149.

[i] (U. S. D. C., Va., 1882) For delay in unloading not occasioned by any insufficiency of carts to receive the cargo, but by reason of the vessel delivering from but one hatch, when she might have used two, no demurrage is recoverable.-Ewan v. Tredegar Co., 88 Fed. 703.

[j] (N. Y. City Ct. 1899) The freighter is liable to the owner of a vessel for unreasonable delay in discharging the cargo, on failure of the consignee to pay therefor, notwithstanding an agreement between the consignor and consignee that the latter should unload.-Jameson v. Sweeney, 61 N. Y. Supp. 498, 29 Misc. Rep. 584.

in arriving at a new agreement with the consignee for the acceptance of the short cargo at its actual weight.-Doherty v. Peal, Peacock & Kerr, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1054, 25 Misc. Rep. 487.

4. Liability of Consignee.

[a] (U.S.) A bill of lading provided that "48 hours after arrival in port, and notice thereof to the consignee, there shall be allowed for receiving cargo at the rate of one day for every 75 tons thereof, after which the cargo consignee shall pay demurrage at the rate of six cents per ton. ** * After arrival and notice as aforesaid, and the expiration of said 48 hours, said vessel shall have precedence in discharging over all vessels arriving, or giving notice, after her arrival; and for any violation of this provision she shall be compensated in demurrage," etc. Held, that the consignee has control of the ship hereunder as regards time and place of discharge, and is liable in demurrage for delay beyond the stipulated time on account of his failure to provide her a berth.-(C. C. A., N. Y., 1893) Smith v. M. Block Co., 5 C. C. A. 672, 56 Fed. 527; (D. C., N. Y., 1892) Smith v. Block Co., 56 Fed. 525.

[b (U. S. C. C., Ill., 1883) Where the shipper of coal on a schooner expressed some doubts as to the depth of water at a certain dock at the port of delivery being sufficient to admit of the delivery of the coal at that dock on account of the size of the schooner, but the captain took the chances of there being sufficient depth of water there, and on arrival it was discovered that delivery could not be made at such dock, the captain can lay no claim for demurrage for delay caused by the necessity to proceed to another dock, or for expenses in consequence of the delay.-One Hundred Tons of Coal, 14 Fed. 878.

[c] (U. S. D. C., Pa., 1887) When the duty of providing a wharf at which to unload is on the consignee, he is entitled to reasonable notice of the time when the vessel will be ready to unload; otherwise, demurrage will be allowed only after the lapse of a reasonable time from actual notice.-The Rocky City, 33 Fed. 556.

[d] (N. Y. Sup. 1896) A consignee of lumber, shipped to him under an executory contract to purchase, is not liable for demurrage, where the delay was due to his refusal to accept the lumber without an abatement of price, because it was not of the specified quality.-Conkling v. Lumber Co., 41 N. Y. Supp. 801, 10 App. Div. 404.

5. Delay in Loading or Sailing.

[a] (U. S. C. C. A., Ill., 1900) Libelants contracted to carry, in their own or substituted vessels, from Escanaba to South Chicago, the ore required by respondent for its iron furnaces during the season, not to be less than 90,000 tons, and to be divided as evenly as possible during the season of navigation. Respondent contracted to do the unloading at its dock, and for dispatch therein, but the contract contained no provision for dispatch at the port of shipment; it being understood that respondent was obliged to procure the ore there from other parties. It subsequently contracted with two companies, operating mines connected by rail with Escanaba, to supply the ore at that port, and notified libelants to ascertain from them when cargoes were ready for shipment. Held, that there was no implied term of such contract requiring respondent to supply cargoes for loading at any particular time, or which rendered it liable for demurrage because of the delay of libelants' vessels while waiting for cargoes.-Corrigan v. Furnace Co., 41 C. C. A. 102, 100 Fed. 870.

[b] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1880) A vessel was loaded with laths in New Brunswick for New York under a charter specifying that she was to be loaded "with all possible dispatch." She was compelled to await her turn for cargo, and was thereby detained five days, and was also detained by tide and also at the place of discharge. Held, that demurrage could be allowed only for the detention in loading.-Moody v. Five Hundred Thousand Laths, 2 Fed. 607.

[c] (U. S. D. C., Pa.. 1899) The Pennsylvania statute relating to holidays (Act 1893; P. L. 188) does not make them obligatory, and, where it is not shown that the stevedore or men engaged in loading a vessel refused to

work on holidays, such days are not to be excluded in computing demurrage. -Uren v. Hagar, 95 Fed. 493.

6. Delay in Unloading.

[a] (U. S. C. C. A., Minn., 1896) Where the charter or bill of lading is silent as to the time of unloading and discharge, there is an implied contract to discharge the vessel within a reasonable time.-Empire Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 23 C. C. A. 564, 77 Fed. 919, 35 L. R. A. 623, affirming (D. C. 1895) 70 Fed. 268.

[b] (U. S. C. C. A., Minn., 1897) Where, by the bill of lading, the cargo is to be delivered "free of handling" at the private dock of a consignee known to have special facilities for unloading, the vessel will be entitled to demurrage for unnecessary delay of the consignee in beginning the discharge, although the total time consumed, including the delay, is not longer than would have been occupied in discharging at a public dock of the same port with the inferior facilities there afforded.-Fuel Co. v. McBrier, 28 C. C. A. 466, 84 Fed. 495.

[e] (C. S. C. C. A., N. Y., 1896) The master or shipowner cannot recover demurrage, under a charter party, for delay in discharging caused by the master's absence from the vessel, so that she could not be moved to another dock upon the purchaser of the cargo refusing to receive it on the ground that it was in bad condition.-Whitman v. Vanderbilt, 21 C. C. A. 422, 75 Fed. 422.

[d] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1898) Where a bill of lading for a cargo requires its delivery to the consignee "or assigns," the master knows that the wharf of discharge may not have been selected; and the fact that the consignee sells the cargo before its arrival, and designates the wharf of the buyer as the place for its discharge, does not change the rule as to demurrage for delay in being provided a place to discharge.-The Viola, 90 Fed. 750; Forsyth v. Stetson, Id.

[e] (U. S. D. C., N. J., 1898) If the master, after beginning to unload, intends to discontinue until security is given for demurrage, he should give such timely notice thereof as will enable the charterers to furnish the required security without delaying the progress of the work, or adopt a means by which prompt discharge can be made and the lien of the vessel retained. In re Ten Thousand and Eighty-Two Oak Ties, 87 Fed. 935.

[f] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1881) A captain is not entitled to demurrage for time lost in waiting to avail himself of a consignee's special facilities for unloading.-McLaughlin v. Steel Co., 8 Fed. 447.

[g] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1896) Libelant's vessel reached Ogdensburg December 4th, with a cargo of grain. December 9th was Sunday, and the canal through which she had to pass to reach the Upper Lakes was closed on the 11th. The only elevator at Ogdensburg was blocked, and five other vessels were ahead of libelant's, rendering it impossible to unload the latter before the canal closed. Held, that there was no negligence on the part of the charterers in detaining the vessel until the canal had closed.-Green v. Cargo of the Lewiston, 77 Fed. 321.

[h] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1896) Where the discharge of a scow laden with 252.500 brick was commenced on the 12th, and continued at the rate of 2,000 daily until the 20th, held, in the absence of a bill of lading or agreement for demurrage, that the master was justified in giving notice on that date that the discharge must be completed by the 25th, and that demurrage would be claimed thereafter.-Young v. One Hundred and Forty Thousand Hard Brick. 78 Fed. 149.

[i] (U. S. D. C., Va., 1882) For delay in unloading not occasioned by any insufficiency of carts to receive the cargo, but by reason of the vessel delivering from but one hatch, when she might have used two, no demurrage is recoverable.-Ewan v. Tredegar Co., 88 Fed. 703.

[j] (N. Y. City Ct. 1899) The freighter is liable to the owner of a vessel for unreasonable delay in discharging the cargo, on failure of the consignee to pay therefor, notwithstanding an agreement between the consignor and consignee that the latter should unload.-Jameson v. Sweeney, 61 N. Y. Supp. 498, 29 Misc. Rep. 584.

[k] (N. Y. City Ct. 1900) Where a bill of lading of a vessel's cargo was silent as to who was to furnish discharging facilities, no action for demurrage for delay in securing proper dockage would lie against the consignors, since the owner took the risk of finding such facilities.-Jameson v. Sweeney, 66 N. Y. Supp. 494, 32 Misc. Rep. 645.

7.

Customs and Usages.

[a] (U. S. C. C. A., Minn., 1896) The charterer is not bound to discharge the vessel in the customary time, regardless of unforeseen obstacles and unusual circumstances.-Empire Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 23 C. C. A. 564, 77 Fed. 919, 35 L. R. A. 623, affirming (D. C. 1895) 70 Fed. 268.

[b] (U. S. D. C., Md., 1880) The custom of a port to stop discharging cargoes of brimstone when there is a high wind is not unreasonable.-Bertellote v. Part of Cargo of Brimstone, 3 Fed. 661.

[c] (U. S. D. C., Md., 1880) The owner of a vessel is bound by the customs of a port to which he contracts to carry a cargo, where the charter provides that "the cargo is to be brought alongside the vessel and taken away at the expense and risk of the charterers, according to the use and customs of the place of loading and discharging."-Bertellote v. Part of Cargo of Brimstone, 3 Fed. 661.

[d] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1898) A custom of a port as to the rate of discharging a certain kind of lumber from a vessel, to govern the rights of parties under a contract otherwise indeterminate, must not only be established and reasonable, but also certain and definite. Such a custom cannot be found on testimony that the rate is "from 17,000 to 20,000" feet per day, or "from 25,000 to 30,000" feet. Such testimony can only establish the usual or average time for unloading, and is valuable only as showing the limits, under ordinary circumstances, of a reasonable rate of discharging lumber of that kind at such port, and does not obviate the necessity of considering the particular circumstances of each case.-The James Baird, 90 Fed. 669; Cottingham v. Abbott, Id.

[e] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1898) Where the wharves at a port are not all equally convenient for the discharge of every sort of cargo, in the absence of a custom establishing a uniform rate, a reasonable rate of discharge is not necessarily the same at all wharves, and, while a wharf may be so inconvenient as to render the consignee responsible for the delay in discharging thereat, the reasonable convenience required is not the highest degree of convenience either imaginable or actually existing.-The James Baird, 90 Fed. 669; Cottingham v. Abbott, Id.

[f] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1898) While, in the absence of qualifying circumstances, it is usual and customary at the port of Boston for a consignee to have a berth provided at which a vessel may discharge her cargo within 24 hours after her arrival, by the custom of the port the presence at the designated wharf of other vessels, which arrived earlier, is considered such qualifying circumstance, and in such case vessels are required to wait their turn to discharge without demurrage for the delay so caused. Held, that such custom was a reasonable one within reasonable limits, and under ordinary circumstances, and that a vessel loaded with lumber was not entitled to demurrage because of a delay of 15 days, caused by so waiting her turn to discharge, it not appearing that the wharf was too small for the ordinary business of the owner, nor that he willfully or negligently permitted a large number of vessels to collect for discharging at the same time.-The Viola, 90 Fed. 750; Forsyth v. Stetson, Id.

[g] (U. S. D. C., N. J., 1898) In a charter of a vessel to carry railroad ties a provision that from the time the vessel is reported ready not less than 1,500 ties shall be furnished per running day "for loading at port of loading, and prompt dispatch for discharging at port of discharge," entitles the ship to demurrage for delay in unloading caused by other vessels being previously at the consignee's dock, though, by the custom of the port, vessels are obliged to take their turn.-In re Ten Thousand and Eighty-Two Oak Ties, 87 Fed. 935.

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