moral factors and rights are on our side as well as might.— (Militaerische Rundschau of Vienna, official organ of Austrian Army, before ultimatum to Serbia.)

German Industrial Mobilization Planned June 9, 1914 (Before Assassination of the Archduke)

To "Bezirks Kommandanten" (Military District Commanders). Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of this circular you are to inform all industrial concerns by wire that the documents, with industrial mobilization plans and with registration forms, be opened, such as are referred to in the circular of the Commission of Count Waldersee and Caprivi, of June 27, 1887.-(No. 421, Mobilization Section, G. General Staff. Central Abtheilung, Sect. M. NO. . . . Berlin-among the Russian documents published by the U. S. Bureau of Information.)

CHAPTER II.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. THE 13 DAYS German Claim of a Defensive War.-The official German claim was that the war was forced on Germany and that for her it was a defensive war, to protect the Fatherland and its sacred rights. The blame was placed by the German government mainly on both England and Russia-France not being considered as so guilty. England was blamed for trying to stifle Germany by her policy of "encirclement," whatever that may mean, for preventing Germany from attaining to her "place in the sun," and for joining Russia and France in the war when Germany had not expected her to. Russia was blamed as representing the "Slav Peril" and as being the immediate cause of the war by mobilizing her army against Austria, when Austria after complete mobilization attacked Serbia. The German people were consistently fed on these two catch phrases; “the defensive war” and “the brutal attack of the Allies who forced the war on peaceful and unprepared Germany."

Its Falsity. This misstatement of the facts was concocted to make the German people fight uncomplainingly for the Pan-German plan of world domination. All the intelligent German leaders knew it was false. Representative Germans-such as the radical Socialist Liebknecht, the leading publicist Harden, the industrial magnate Muehlon, the steel king Thyssen, Grelling, the author of the remarkable books "I Accuse" and "The Crime," the author of "The Near East From Within," and even Lichnowsky, Germany's ambassador in London-all acknowledged, during the war, the government's guilt in planning and bringing it on. Now that the war is over, the official documents published by the Bavarian premier, Eisner, and other German documents, give the final proof. The 13 Days, July 23-August 4, 1914.-We know of the secret diplomacy of the 13 days from the official documents published by the various governments: the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, the British Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the Austrian Red Book, the Belgian Grey Book. The German and Austrian Books are not complete, as the others are, and omit many documents that would show the war guilt of the Central Powers. The new revolutionary Bavarian government has published suppressed documents proving Germany's guilt, and others are promised by the new Austrian and German governments.

The first phase extended from the First Potsdam Conference on July 5, up to the ultimatum to Serbia on July 23.

The 13 days themselves may be divided into two parts. In the first part Austria was allowed by Germany to play the leading role in her provocation of Serbia and Russia, until the attack on Serbian territory had actually begun on July 29-30.

The Second Potsdam Conference on July 29 marks the beginning of the second stage, with Germany taking the lead out of Austria's hands. Of course we understand that, even during the first week, Germany was secretly dictating Austria's every move, while professing that she could not meddle, and officially standing rigidly aside.

On July 30, Germany's iron hand took open (as well as secret) charge and she then decided to declare war immediately on both

Russia and France, in order to strike before they could prepare, and before Austria could change her mind.

Her plan was to strike rapidly at France through Belgium, to take Paris by a rapid march and bring France to her knees in about a month. She would then turn her whole army against Russia in the second month of the war, before that slow-moving country should have had any chance to strike.

This need for haste in delivering first one knock-out blow and then another, explains why Germany went through Belgium. As the German chancellor said, rapidity of action was an absolute necessity, if her ambitions were to be achieved. The French frontier next to Germany was too strongly fortified and Germany thought she could not break through there. France relying on Belgium's neutrality had not fortified her Belgian frontier.

Let us consider the events leading up to these thirteen days which began with the ultimatum of Austria tc Serbia on July 23, and ended August 4, with the entrance of England into the war.

Germany's Plan in 1913.-We have seen that the destruction of Serbia was the first necessity for Germany if she was to carry out her Pan-German plan of dominating the world by the conquest of the East. It is now known that Austria, with Germany's approval, had planned to present to Serbia, in August, 1913, an ultimatum similar to the one she actually presented in July, 1914. Italy's refusal to take part in 1913 caused a delay of a year. But already the German staff during 1913 had circulated a document that showed war was near and that Germany intended to attack France through Belgium, whose neutrality she planned to violate. Both the Kaiser and Moltke warned King Albert, in November, 1913, that war was at hand, hoping to terrorize him into allowing Germany to push through Belgium unopposed. Every conceivable step was taken by German to prepare for war by laying in enormous stocks of provisions, of raw materials, of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. Every country was flooded with advance agents, of whom 130 were sent to America. In May and June reservists were called back from abroad. On June 9 the German General Headquarters issued orders to all factory owners to open their mobilization papers.

The Serajevo Murders.-The Kaiser accompanied by Admiral Tirpitz early in June visited the Austrian Crown Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Konopisht, to plan the war. Then came the sending of the Archduke and his wife on a triumphal visit to Serajevo, where the Austrians were hated by the oppressed Slav natives. It was fixed for the very day of what was the great national festival of the Serbs, the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo (where the Serbs defended their independence in the fourteenth century). Into this ferment the archduke came. The route he followed was not guarded by troops. He and his wife were attacked first unsuccessfully by bomb, and later after a ceremony at the city hall, successfully by pistol. The two assassins were both Austrian, not Serbian subjects. It was never proved that they were in relation with the Serbian government. They were never executed. Others-so-called accomplices—were.

Here, at just the right time, was the "God-given pretext." In a public speech in the Reichstag that caused a great uproar, the

socialist leader Liebknecht stated that to many people in Germany the murder of the archduke was a gift from heaven.

Preparing the Ultimatum. First Potsdam Meeting.-What did Austria do? She let almost a month elapse-from June 28 to July 23 without taking any overt action. In fact she took pains to assure France, England, and Russia, that while she expected to protest to Serbia, her action would be exceedingly mild and harmless. She lulled these powers into a false sense of security while she was concocting with Germany an ultimatum to Serbia so severe that it could not possibly be accepted and which would make war inevitable. The despatches of Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian representative in Berlin, prove that this was the plan. The last arrangements of the plot were perfected at the historic conference in the Kaiser's palace at Potsdam on July 5. The Kaiser, the military leaders, the diplomatic leaders-including the Austrian-and the financial and industrial magnates are reported to have formed this council of war. All the wolves were gathered together. The ultimatum was drafted. The military leaders reported that all was ready. The financial and industrial magnates asked for a delay of two weeks to arrange big financial affairs, and the two weeks were given them. This explains why the ultimatum was not sent until the 23rd. This explains the big German transactions on the New York Stock Exchange during the two weeks, and the general closing up of big business affairs before that date (see "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story"). This explains Austria's anxiety that no power should guess the character of the ultimatum. The final preparations for war were made by Germany when on July 21-two days before the ultimatum-the German General Staff sent out secret orders preliminary to mobilization, including the movement of troops toward the French frontier. The Kaiser helped to produce the delusion of safety by going on a yachting cruise to Norway, though keeping in constant communication with Germany. Serbia herself was so unsuspecting that her premier, Pashitch, was away from the capital, Belgrade, and France's President and Prime Minister were on a visit to Russia and the British Fleet on a visit to Kiel.

The Ultimatum Presented to Serbia.-The bomb burst July 23d. Austria presented the ultimatum to Serbia and gave her only 48 hours to answer it. What was the nature of it? The German newspaper Vorwaerts declared, July 25th: "The demands of that (the Austrian) government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized state in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." Sir Edward Grey held the same opinion: "I have never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character." It contained the following demands: That the Serbian government should issue an official condemnation of all propaganda against Austria-Hungary and its territorial integrity, condemning any Serbians who conduct such "criminal proceedings." That it should (1) suppress all propagandist literature, (2) dissolve the propagandist society Narodna Odbrana, (3) dismiss all propagandist teachers and prohibit such teaching, (4) dismiss all Serbian officers and functionaries guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda, as specified by the Austrian government, (5) admit the collaboration of Austrian representatives in all such investigation and action, (6) bring to judgment, with the assistance of Austrian delegates,

all accessories to the plot to murder the archduke, (7) arrest two persons in particularly whose names were specified, (8) stop traffic in arms and explosives across the Austrian frontier and punish those officials guilty of allowing it, (9) give explanation of hostile utterances of Serbian high officials after the murder, (10) answer in the affirmative before 6 p. m. July 25th.

The 48 Hours Grace.-It is said that Vienna was in deadly fear lest Serbia should accept unconditionally, and therefore went wild with joy when Serbia's refusal to agree to point (6) gave the meagre excuse for war. The next day, July 24th, the various powers received notice of the ultimatum and at once perceived that the peace of Europe was at stake, with hardly more than a day to arrange for keeping war out of Europe. Both Russia and England begged Austria to grant a few more days before requiring an answer, so as to give the Powers a chance to take steps toward straightening out the complications. Not getting any answer from Austria, they asked Germany to intervene, but without success, Germany declaring, July 25th, that she refused to interfere. The Austrian Foreign Minister appears to have purposely gone from Vienna out of reach. Finally, at the last moment, an absolute refusal was sent by Austria. It was on the 24th that Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, squarely proposed to England that she join Russia and France in warning Austria. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, refused to do so. At the same time the German Secretary of State ingenuously disclosed the state of affairs to the British Ambassador in Berlin when "he admitted quite freely" that the Austro-Hungarian Government wished "to give the Serbians a lesson," and that they "mean to take military action." He also "admitted that the Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands." This statement of Germany was made before Serbia's reply. It showed that Germany considered an attack by Austria on Serbia a foregone conclusion, no matter what Serbia's answer might be. Did Germany realize that this meant war with Russia also? She says so herself in her official White Book: "We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war in accordance with our duty as allies." This consequence had long been known to both Germany and Austria. The British Blue Book states that "during the Balkan crisis he (the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia."

Germany has denied that she was consulted by Austria before the sending of the note. This denial has been generally disbelieved, and its falsity has been proved by the disclosures of Dr. Muehlon, the director of Krupps, and Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian minister. On July 17th, six days before the presentation of the note, Muehlon had a conversation in Berlin with Dr. Helfferich, since then Vice-Chancellor, who told him about the ultimatum and all its demands in detail, and the same information was given him by Krupp von Bohlen himself, who said that the Kaiser had declared to him that he (i. e., Germany) would declare war at once if Russia mobilized.