Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945Cornell University Press, 15. 2. 2013. - 304 страница The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation. |
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... March, had been Pershing's chief of artillery in France before returning to the United States at Baker's request. March was vigorous and efficient, if somewhat tactless, and rapidly gained control of the bureaus. By August 1918, using ...
... March made the new arrangement work by ruthless—many said high— handed—tactics. He made some powerful enemies, particularly in Con— gress, and ultimately came into conflict with Pershing over the relationship between the War Department ...
... March were the key players in the congressional hearings on Army reorganization. Pershing's perspective on the lessons of the war was largely informed by the proceedings of a board of officers he had appointed at his headquarters in ...
... March believed that the haphazard mobilization in 1917 required a reorganization of the Army. Since the Armistice, a group of officers in the War Plans Division had been working on a project to determine the structure of the postwar ...
... March Bill strengthened the General Staff, emphasized officer education, enhanced industrial mobilization ... March 1920.34 Pushing a major Regular Army bill through Congress would have been difficult for a chief of staff on the best of ...
Садржај
1 | |
17 | |
Part II Inertia and Insurgency 19211930 | 61 |
Part III Alternatives and Autonomy 19311942 | 105 |
Part IV Dying for Change 19421945 | 185 |
Conclusion | 218 |
Notes | 231 |
Primary Sources | 277 |
Index | 285 |
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Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 David E. Johnson Ограничен приказ - 2013 |
Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 David E. Johnson Ограничен приказ - 2003 |
Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 David Eugene Johnson Ограничен приказ - 1998 |