unreal, the more bitter faction became. Men of real ability, to whatever party they belonged, thought at heart very much alike. They knew that they could not stand still in a world of change, and they knew that if they let the horses run away there was risk of an overturn. When there was no longer any question of principle, the contention of parties in the Legislature degenerated into a struggle for power, and the chiefs on both sides were driven forward by a fatal necessity to raise new questions, to excite new hopes, and to appeal to passion to decide on problems which required the coolest reason. However able a man was, he could not do his ability justice. His duty was to his party-his party first, his country after. Statesmen might see the truth, but they dared not act upon it. They were arranged in opposite camps, each advocating one set of opinions only, and denouncing their rivals as public enemies. They had often to thwart what they knew to be good, and to advocate what they really disapproved. If the result was music, the music was made out of discord. A genuine patriot could only exclaim, ‘A plague o' both your houses."—(Address by James Anthony Froude, Nov., 3, 1882, on "A Lesson on Democracy," before the Birmingham Institute.)

The peril of this condition of things described by Mr. Froude, is greatly increased in this country by the fact that here this division of parties is

to such a great extent a sectional division. No patriot can view with other than feelings of regret the array of the virtuous and intelligent in one section against those of the same character in another section, not because of any vital difference in belief or patriotic purpose, but by reason of the passions of a war ended nearly a quarter of a century ago, and by reason of the distrust kept alive by political leaders of both sections for partisan ends. The division, as has been said, is an unnatural one. Twenty-five years of political strife have left every Southern State in the Democratic column, and every Northern State, excepting Connecticut, in the Republican column. (Election of 1888.) Such a division is fraught with opportunities for mischief, especially when played upon by political demagogues. Questions of finance and of political economy have failed to obliterate the dividing lines left by the war. Is it not hopeless to expect that anything short of a readjustment of voters along new lines will accomplish the desired result? There is certainly no issue now in politics so likely to accomplish this new alignment of parties as Prohibition.

So far, then, from it's being too soon for the new party, the time is really over-due. The opportunity is ripe, and has been for years. A more favorable conjunction of circumstances it would be difficult to conceive. The yearly surplus in the Federal Treasury just about equals the revenue from the Federal tax on liquors. The

removal of this tax, therefore, instead of requiring new methods of taxation, would relieve the Nation of a heavy incubus and a constant temptation to extravagance and corruption. No interests of the Nation would suffer from a new readjustment of voters; some of its dearest interests would derive therefrom inestimable gain.

Nos. 19 and 20. PETER MUGLER, plaintiff in error, ".

KANSAS.

THE STATE OF

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.

No. 934. THE STATE OF KANSAS EX REL. J. F. TUFTS. Assistant Attorney-General of the State of Kansas for Atchison County, Kan., appellant, v. HERMAN ZIEBOLD and JOSEPH HAGELIN, partners as ZIEBOLD & HAGELIN.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases involve an inquiry into the validity of certain statutes of Kansas relating to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. The first two are indictments charging Mugler, the plaintiff in error, in one case, with having sold, and in the other, with having manufactured spirituous, vinous, malt, fermented and other intoxicating liquors, in Saline County, Kansas, without having the license or permit required by the statute. The defendant, having been found guilty, was fined in each case $100, and ordered to be committed to the county jail until the fine was paid. Each judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas, and thereby it is contended, the defendant was denied rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Con stitution of the United States.

The third case-State of Kansas, ex rel., etc., v. Ziebold, etc.—was commenced by petition filed in one of the courts of the State. The relief sought is:

1. That the group of buildings constituting the brewery of the defendants, partners, as Ziebold & Hagelin, in Atchison County, Kan., be adjudged a common nuisance, and the sheriff, or other proper offcer, directed to shut up or abate the same.

2. That the defendants be enjoined from using or permitting to be used, the said premises as a place where intoxicating liquors may be sold, bartered or given away, or kept for barter sale, or gift, otherwise than by authority of law.

The defendants answered, denying the allegations of the petition, and averring:

1. That said buildings were erected by them prior to the adoption by the people of Kansas of the Constitutional Amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for other than medicinal, scientific, and mechanical purposes, and before the passage of the prohibitory liquor statute of that State.

2. That they were erected for the purpose of manufacturing beer, and cannot be put to any other use; and, if not so used, they will be of little value.

3. That the statute under which said suit was brought, is void under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The facts necessary to a clear understanding of the questions common to these cases are the following: Mugler, and Ziebold & Hagelin were engaged in manufacturing beer at their respective establishments (constructed specially for that purpose) for several years prior to the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment of 1880. They continued in such business in defiance of the statute of 1881, and without having the required permit. Nor did Mugler have a license or permit to sell beer. The single sale of which he was found guilty occurred in the State, and after May 1st, 1881-that is, after the Act of February 19th, 1881, took effect—and was of beer manufactured before its passage.

The buildings and machinery constituting these breweries are of little value if not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer; that is to say, if the statutes are enforced against the defendants the value of their property will be very materially diminished.

The general question in each case is whether the foregoing statutes of Kansas are in conflict with that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that,

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."