on a policy issued by the company, it was sued in a court of the State. It filed its petition in proper form for the removal of the suit into the Federal court. The State court refused to allow the removal, and, after a trial, gave a judgment for the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The company brought the case into this court, which held these propositions: First, The agreement made by the company was not one which would bind it, without reference to the statute; second, The agreement acquired no validity from the statute. The general proposition was maintained, that agreements in advance to oust the courts of jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void, and that, while the right to remove a suit might be waived, or its exercise omitted, in each recurring case, a party could not bind himself in advance, by an agreement which might be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case might be presented.

In regard to the second question, the proposition laid down was, that the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, under art. 3, § 2, of the Constitution, depends upon and is regulated by the laws of the United States; that State legislation cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, nor limit or restrict the authority given to them by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution; and that a corporation is a citizen of the State by which it is created, and in which its principal place of business is situated, so far as its right to sue and be sued in the Federal courts is concerned, and within the clause of the Constitution extending the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to controversies between citizens of different States. The conclusions of the court were summed up thus: (1) The Constitution of the United States secures to citizens of another State than that in which suit is brought an absolute right to remove their cases into the Federal court, upon compliance with the terms of the removal statute; (2) The statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to this right, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and is illegal and void; (3) The agreement of the insurance company derives no support from an unconstitutional statute, and is void, as it would be had no such statute been passed. For these reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was reversed, and it was directed that the prayer of the petition for removal should be granted.

The case of Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, is relied on by the defendant in error. In that case, this court said that it had carefully reviewed its decision in Insurance Co. v. Morse, and was satisfied with it. In referring to the second conclusion in Insurance Co. v. Morse, above recited, namely, that the statute of Wisconsin was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and was illegal and void, the court said, in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., that it referred to that portion of the statute which

required a stipulation not to transfer causes to the courts of the United States. In that case, which arose under the same statute of Wisconsin, the foreign insurance company had complied with the statute, and had filed an agreement not to remove suits into the Federal courts, and had received a license to do business in the State. Afterwards, it removed into the Federal court a suit brought against it in a State court of Wisconsin. The State authorities threatening to revoke the license, the company filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States, praying for an injunction to restrain the revoking of the license. A temporary injunction was granted. The defendant demurred to the bill, the demurrer was overruled, a decree was entered making the injunction perpetual, and the defendant appealed to this court. This court reversed the decree and dismissed the bill. The point of the decision seems to have been, that, as the State had granted the license, its officers would not be restrained by injunction, by a court of the United States, from withdrawing it. All that there is in the case beyond this, and all that is said in the opinion which appears to be in conflict with the adjudication in Insurance Co. v. Morse, must be regarded as not in judgment.

In both of the cases referred to, the foreign corporation had made the agreement not to remove into the Federal court suits to be brought against it in the State court. In the present case, no such agreement has been made, but the locomotive engineer is arrested for acting as such in the employment of the corporation, because it has refused to stipulate that it will not remove into the Federal court suits brought against it in the State court, as a condition of obtaining a permit, and consequently has not obtained such permit. Its right, equally with any individual citizen, to remove into the Federal court, under the laws of the United States, such suits as are mentioned in the third section of the Iowa statute, is too firmly established by the decisions of this court to be questioned at this day; and the State of Iowa might as well pass a statute to deprive an individual citizen of another State of his right to remove such suits.

As the Iowa statute makes the right to a permit dependent upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the statute requiring the permit must be held to be void.

The question as to the right of a State to impose upon a corporation engaged in interstate commerce the duty of obtaining a permit from the State, as a condition of its right to carry on such commerce, is a question which it is not necessary to decide in this case. In all the cases in which this court has considered the subject of the granting by a State to a foreign corporation of its consent to the transaction of business in the State, it has uniformly asserted that no conditions can be imposed by the State which are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. La Fayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18

How. 404, 407; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, 415; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 456; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 356; Phila. Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 120.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with an instruction to enter a judgment discharging the plaintiff in error from custody.

d. By Habeas Corpus Proceedings.

WHITTEN v. TOMLINSON.

160 United States, 231. 1895.

THIS was a petition, filed March 26, 1895, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, and addressed to the Honorable William K. Townsend, the district judge, as a judge of the Circuit Court, for a writ of habeas corpus to the sheriff of the county of New Haven in the State of Connecticut.

[The petition and return show that petitioner was detained in custody by the sheriff under commitment after having been brought from Massachusetts to Connecticut in consequence of extradition proceedings on the application of the governor of the latter State.]

The petitioner moved to quash the return, as insufficient to justify his detention.

The Circuit Court, upon a hearing, denied the motion, and discharged the writ of habeas corpus, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to renew the motion; and filed an opinion by the district judge (67 Fed. Rep. 230) in which the grounds of decisions were stated.

[Petitioner appealed from the decree of the Circuit Court.]

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the judicial system of the United States, established by Congress under the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States has not been controlled or interfered with, except so far as necessary to secure the supremacy of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.

With this end, three different methods have been provided by statute for bringing before the courts of the United States proceedings begun in the courts of the States.

First. From the earliest organization of the courts of the United States, final judgments, whether in civil or in criminal cases, rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision in the case could be had, against a right specially set up or claimed under the Con

stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed by this court on writ of error. Acts of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85; February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 386; Rev. Stat. § 709; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. Such appellate jurisdiction is expressly limited to cases in which the decision of the State court is against the right claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, because, when the decision of that court is in favor of such a right, no revision by this court is necessary to protect the national government in the exercise of its rightful powers. Gordon v. Caldeleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129; Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 56, 58; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 500, 501.

Second. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, the only other way of transferring a case from a State court to a court of the United States was under section 12, by removal into the Circuit Court of the United States, before trial, of civil actions against aliens, or between citizens of different States. 1 Stat. 79. Such right of removal for trial has been regulated and extended to cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, by successive acts of Congress, which need not be particularly referred to, inasmuch as the present case is not one of such a removal.

Third. By section 14 of the old Judiciary Act, the courts of the United States were authorized, in general terms, to issue writs of habeas corpus and other writs necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions; "provided that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless when they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify." 1 Stat. 81. Under that act, no writ of habeas corpus, except ad testificandum, could be issued in the case of a prisoner in jail under commitment by a court or magistrate of a State. Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103; In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593. By subsequent acts of Congress, however, the power of the courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus of prisoners in jail has been extended to the case of any person in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order or process of a court or judge thereof; or in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States; or who, being a subject or citizen of and domiciled in a foreign State, is in custody for an act done or omitted under any right or exemption claimed under a foreign State, and depending upon the law of nations. Acts of March 2, 1833, c. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634; August 29, 1842, c. 257, 5 Stat. 539; February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; Rev. Stat. § 753.

By the existing statutes, this court and the Circuit and District Courts, and any justice or judge thereof, have power to grant writs

of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of restraint of liberty of any prisoner in jail, who "is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States; " and "the court or justice or judge, to whom the application is made, shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus, unless it appears from the petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto;" and "shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice may require." Rev. Stat. §§ 751-755, 761.

The power thus granted to the courts and judges of the United States clearly extends to prisoners held in custody, under the authority of a State, in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. But in the exercise of this power the courts of the United States are not bound to discharge by writ of habeas corpus every such prisoner.

The principles which should govern their action in this matter were stated, upon great consideration, in the leading case of Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, and were repeated in one of the most recent cases upon the subject, as follows:

"We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in State courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require,' does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." "Where a person is in custody, under process from a State court of original jurisdiction, for an alleged offence against the laws of such State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court has a discretion, whether it will discharge him, upon habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in which he is indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action. When the State court shall have finally acted upon the case, the Circuit Court has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is re