The contention is, on the part of the state, that the police jury's action is authorized by the first act—that is, Act No. 207-which delegates to that body the authority to regulate the shipment of game.

As relates to regulation and the authority it confers, the following definition is in point: "A power to regulate does not properly include the power to suppress or prohibit; for the very essence of regulation is something to be regulated."

If the local authority prohibits the shipping of the owner's birds, it amounts to a prohibition at any rate to the number 13 of the 25. If the police jury has the right to limit the number to 12, it has the right to limit it to 1. Indeed, why not repeal the statute?

But the power to regulate does not invest a subordinate political division with authority to adopt ordinances to prevent the shipment in packages after the packages have been clearly marked with the names of the consignor and consignee and the other requirements have been complied with. No ordinance can be valid which, under the guise of regulation or an attempt at regulating, superadds interfering rules with the execution of a state statute.

Now, as relates to shipping the birds: The statute provides in one place by direct implication that, after compliance with its requirement, birds may be shipped. To quote the words of the statute, "And whenever any person 'kills' and 'ships' any of the birds mentioned in this act at any time or in any manner prohibited by this act," loss is the result if the ordinance of the police jury remains in force. See section 11 of the act, and paragraph 1 of section 1.

subdivisions to curtail or prohibit the right. Such is the conflict between the ordinance and the last statute, No. 277, cited supra, that we cannot do otherwise than to declare the ordinance illegal, and, as it is the basis upon which the prosecution was presented, the sentence and judgment must be annulled.

As relates to the repeal of the first statute by the second, we have this to say: Act No. 207 certainly has every appearance practically of relating to the same subject-matter as statute No. 277. Very little can be done under the former which does not fall within the terms of the second statute. Such is the conflict of the first statute with the second that it can only prove a discordant element if an attempt is made to enforce it, particularly by the adoption of such an ordinance as the one now before us.

Furthermore, it is elementary that a statute has the effect of repealing a repugnant statute by implication. Further, that provisions destructive the one of the other cannot both stand; that conflicting penalties are at times confusing. The last law covers the subject entirely, the whole purpose, as we think. It expresses the legislative intent, and, to our thinking, takes all vitality from the first statute.

The following on the subject of repeal of statutes are pertinent: Sedgwick, p. 125; Endlich, p. 269; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 1 Sup. Ct. 312, 27 L. Ed. 60; State ex rel. Jarvo v. Judge, 37 La. Ann. 581; Sedgwick, pp. 100, 104; State v. Henderson, 120 La. 542, 45 South. 430; State v. Burns, 45 La. Ann. 35, 11 South. 878; Sheriff v. Gall & Pharr, 43 La. Ann. 961, 10 South. 5.

In another part of the act it is stated "that any package otherwise shipped may be confiscated by any warden or duly authorized officer." (Italics ours.)

These words have a meaning. If they are shipped otherwise than as provided, the act is a misdemeanor. But if shipped as provided by the act, it is entirely different in its effect.

The statute prohibits any one from shipping the birds beyond the confines of the state. There is no prohibition of shipment within the state, provided the statute is complied with. To have the authority to prohibit such shipment, the police jury would have to be more directly empowered than it is, and the statute, No. 277, upon the subject, far less expressive than it is.

It was not the intention of the Legislature to accord a right and at the same time place

have not discovered that the object can be accomplished under discordant and conflicting statutes. The last must prevail.

That leaves very little usefulness, if any, to be accomplished under the first statute.

For reasons stated, the sentence and judgment of the lower court are annulled, avoided, and reversed. The defendant is discharged, and his bond canceled.

LAND, J. I concur in the decree.

PROVOSTY, J. (dissenting). The two statutes went through the Legislature and the Governor's hands together, and do not conflict. One deals with the shipment of birds, and leaves the matter to be regulated locally; the other has no bearing on that subject. The rule is to harmonize statutes, if it can possibly be done, especially sister or twin statutes.

(123 La.) No. 17,581.

DUBUISSON et al. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS
OF ELECTION OF PARISH OF
ST. LANDRY et al.

In re SOILEAU et al.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 10, 1909. On Motion to Amend Decree, April 12, 1909.) INJUNCTION (§ 80*)-ELECTION-CREATION OF NEW PARISH.

An election being held under an act of the Legislature (Acts 1908, p. 53, No. 53) submitting the question of the creation of a new par ish to the vote of the people interested cannot be enjoined by individual taxpayers on the ground of the unconstitutionality of some of the provisions incorporated in the statute. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. 151; Dec. Dig. § 80.*]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

were had on March 19, 1909, and on the next day the members of the board of supervisors answered, submitting the issues raised by the petition to the determination of the court, and O. E. Guillory and other residents, taxpayers, and electors intervened, with leave of the court, and prayed that the writs of injunction be dissolved as having been issued without warranty of law, improvidently, and prematurely.

On March 27th the sheriff answered, adopting the allegations and prayers of the said intervention. Later, the interveners filed an application to dissolve the injunction on bond, alleging collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendants to prevent the holding of the election on April 13, 1909, as fixed by the legislative act in question.

LAND, J. The plaintiffs in the above-entitled suit, as residents and taxpayers of the parish of St. Landry, enjoined the holding of an election under Act No. 53, p. 53, of 1908, entitled "An act to create the parish of Evangeline," etc., on the ground that the portion of said statute, reading;

"If a majority of the votes cast at said election be in favor of the parish of Evangeline, the Governor shall issue his proclamation declaring that the said parish has been created" -contravenes and violates article 278 of the Constitution of 1898, which provides as follows:

"All laws changing parish lines, or removing parish seats, shall, before taking effect, be submitted to the electors of the parish or parishes to be affected thereby, at a special election held for that purpose, and the lines or the parish seat shall remain unchanged unless twothirds of the qualified electors of the parish or parishes affected thereby vote in favor thereof at such election."

On the presentation of plaintiff's petition with affidavit to the clerk of the court, the judge being absent, an injunction was granted as prayed for, on plaintiff's furnishing bond in the sum of $1,000, inhibiting and restraining the board of supervisors of election, the sheriff, and the publisher of the St. Landry Clarion from performing any official duties or doing any acts with reference to the holding of said election and the proclamation of the result. These proceedings

Plaintiff's filed an amended and supplemental petition setting forth that Act No. 53, p. 53, of 1908 is unconstitutional in assigning a representative in the General Assembly to the parish to be created under the name of "Evangeline," for the reasons that the constitutional limit of representation had already been reached, and that no new apportionment can be made until after the next census shall have been taken.

Plaintiffs answered the application of interveners to bond the injunction by specially denying their right to such relief, and by averring that the dissolution of the injunction would work an irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs answered the intervention by a general denial, and for further answer reiterated and reaffirmed the allegations contained in their original and supplemental petition, and assigned additional grounds of unconstitutionality.

The judge declined to dissolve the injunction on bond, and overruled the plea to the jurisdiction of the court filed by Emilie Soileau et al. Whereupon the said interveners filed the present application for writs of certiorari and prohibition.

The relators in their petition set forth the passage of Act No. 53, p. 53, of 1908, entitled "An act to create the parish of Evangeline and providing for the organization thereof," etc.; that by the provisions of said act it was made the duty of the Governor to direct the board of supervisors of the parish of St. Landry to order an election to be held on the second Tuesday in April, 1909, for the purpose of taking the sense of the legal voters of the parish of St. Landry in regard to

rected and instructed said board to call and order said election; and that said board did meet and order said election, and did cause the publication and proclamation of the said order to be published in the St. Landry Clarion in its issue of March 13, 1909. lators then recite the filing of the suit and the injunction proceedings already mentioned, and their vain efforts to have the injunction dissolved and the suit dismissed.

Re

Relators further aver that the clerk of said court and the judge thereof were without jurisdiction, ratione materiæ, to issue said injunction, and to entertain a suit of this character, in the absence of statute permitting the enjoining of an election ordered and directed to be held by express legislative act.

Relators further aver that the issuance of said injunction was an illegal, arbitrary, high-handed, and unlawful act, and the clerk of said court was without jurisdiction to issue the same; and that the object in obtaining said injunction was to prevent the holding of said election, and to deprive the people of the parish of St. Landry of the opportunity of expressing their will at the polls on the 13th April, 1909, pursuant to the mandates of the General Assembly of the state.

Relators aver that all the contentions and claims of the plaintiffs, if well founded in law, could be settled in an orderly manner after the holding of said election; but, on the contrary, unless said election is permitted to be held, all the provisions of said act will be nullified and frustrated.

Relators show that as voters, taxpayers, and residents of said parish they are vitally interested in the result of said election; that they and others similarly situated have a right to vote at said election; and that it is absolutely impossible for them to obtain judicial relief except by an appeal to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The respondent judge for answer submits a duly certified copy of the record in said injunction suit.

All of the provisions of the act are prospective, and made dependent on the result of an election to be held at a particular date.

The plaintiffs herein, as residents and taxpayers, obtained an ex parte injunction from the clerk of the court inhibiting and restraining the board of supervisors and the sheriff from performing their duties as election officers, and the proprietor of the official journal from publishing the proclamation of election. The ground for injunction was that the provision that the result should be determined by "a majority of the votes cast" is contrary to article 278 of the Constitution, requiring a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of the parish or parishes to change the parish lines or remove parish seats. This grave constitutional question was submitted ex parte to the clerk of the court, and this official without delay granted the injunction as prayed for.

Relators cite Roudanez v. Mayor and Administrators of the City of New Orleans, 29 La. Ann. 271. In that case 43 citizens and property holders sought to enjoin the municipal officers from holding an election to decide whether or not a special tax should be levied and collected for the use and benefit of the New Orleans & Pacific Railroad Company. The alleged grounds for injunction were that the legislative act authorizing the elections and the tax proposed therein were violative of sundry articles of both the federal and state Constitutions. The railroad company intervened in the suit, and moved to dissolve the injunction on the face of the papers, as being prematurely and improvidently sued out. This motion was sustained in the lower court, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Inter alia, the court said:

"We think that the danger apprehended is too remote and too contingent to form a basis for a proceeding in court to avert it."

One among the reasons assigned is that "the tax proposed may be voted down."

April, 1909

"and if a majority of the votes cast at said election be in favor of the creation of the parish of Evangeline, the Governor shall issue his proclamation declaring that the said parish has been created; that the organization thereof shall remain in abeyance until a full set of officers shall have been chosen, in accordance

ed election had was null and void in law The gist of the decision is shown in the following excerpt from the opinion:

"Can an action be maintained to enjoin eler

tion proceedings before the result of the election has been proclaimed?

"We have no reason to answer otherwise than in the negative."

Relators also refer to the following cases as holding that in matters of election the jurisdiction of courts are purely statutory: State ex rel. Rees v. Foster, Judge, 111 La.