business. He should not ask the County of Lehigh to relieve him from his loss in any particular case. Now May 26th, 1905, the petition is dismissed. BUTZ vs. Zucker. Contract-Note-Husband and Wife. Where a note is signed by husband and wife, the note is prima facie valid and if the wife desires to be relieved from the consequences of affixing her signature, she must show that the contract was one of the kind which she is prohibited from making. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Peter A. Butz vs. Leo Zucker and Lena Zucker. No. 92 April Term, 1904. Appeal from judgment of alderman in favor of the plaintiff. Jury trial and verdict for plaintiff. Rule for new trial. Rule discharged. Reuben J. Butz for Plaintiff. M. C. Henninger for Defendants. Trexler, P. J., May 26, 1905. This was a suit upon a joint note of Leo Zucker and his wife, Lena. The question referred to the jury was whether the wife was the surety on the note or a joint maker. Further, as to whether the money was required for subjects which a married woman is allowed to contract. And lastly, the above being found against the plaintiff, whether the defendant was estopped from denying her liability on the note by reason of absence of good faith in her dealing. I held that the note was prima facie valid and that it was incumbent upon the defendant, Lena Zucker, to show that the contract was one of the kind prohibited by the Act of 1887. There was no error in this. Children's Aid Society vs. Benford, 26 Pa. Sup., 555. As to the question of fraud, I think the case was fairly tried and within the line laid in Grim's Appeal, 185 Pa., 382; Buckner's Estate, 136 Pa., 23; Bingham's Appeal, 123 Pa., 269; Thomas vs. Butler, 16 Pa. Sup., 269. Now, May 26th, 1905, motion for a new trial is overruled. COMMONWEALTH vs. MENGES. Criminal Procedure-New Trial-Evidence. In order to secure a new trial in the criminal courts, (where no error on the part of the Court is alleged) the verdict of the jury must appear to the Court to be inherently wrong, the Court feeling sure that through some fault or other the jury has misapprehended the facts in the case as to their legal bearing. Under the facts in this case a new trial was refused. In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lehigh County. Com. vs. Henry K. Menges. No. 52 April Sessions, 1905. Sur charge nuisance. Verdict of guilty and rule for new trial. Rule discharged. The indictment charged the defendant with maintaining a nuisance by keeping a large number of hogs. Horace W. Schatz, District Attorney. Clinton A. Groman, with him, for Commonwealth. M. C. Henninger, A. G. Dewalt and W. LaMonte Gillette for Defendant. Trexler, P. J., May 26, 1905. All of the reasons for a new trial are directed against the verdict, no error on the part of the Court being complained of. The only inquiry therefore is was there enough evidence submitted by the Commonwealth to sustain the verdict? I have no doubt on this subject. A number of witnesses testified to the state of facts which would constitute a nuisance. There are cases in the criminal court in which the Court will grant a new trial, because the verdict of the jury seems to be inherently wrong, the Court feeling sure that through some fault or other the jury has misapprehended the facts in the case as to their legal bearing but this is not one of them. The defendant secured a continuance of the case upon the agreement that the nuisance should be abated and for four terms the case was on the list and not tried. He evidently thought it better to take the chance of an acquittal than to go to the trouble of abating the nuisance. The event proved that he did not make a wise choice. Now May 26th, 1905, motion for a new trial is overruled. NEELY US. Fell Justice of the Peace-Appeal-Act of March 25, 1903. Unless the requisites of the act of March 25, 19:3, are complied with the courts have no power to allow an appeal from a justice. In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. No. 120 November Term, 1904. Rule to show cause why transcript of appeal from judgment of a justice of the peace should not be stricken from the record. Parker, McIlvaine and Clark for rule. 1905. The plaintiff in this case obtained judgment October 1, 1904, against the defendant before S. V. Kimberland, a justice of the peace, for $137 and costs for wages. The defendant paid costs of suit and asked for transcript of appeal, which was given by the justice, to which was attached for the "affidavit in writing" that the "appeal is not for delay, etc." as required by the act of March 25, 1903, P. L. 61, certificate of the justice, certifying that the appellant solemnly swore before him that the appeal was not taken for delay, but because he thought justice was not rendered, and further that he is the owner of real estate unencumbered by debt to the amount of $300 in the county. The plaintiff moves the Court to strike from the record the appeal entered by the defendant in the Common Pleas for he following reason, to wit: "1. The appellant, at the time of taking his appeal, did not make affidavit in writing that the said appeal is not for delay, but because he verily believed that injustice had been done. "2. The appellant has not given bail with sufficient sureties in any sum, conditioned for the payment of all costs accrued or that may be legally recovered against him. "3. The appellant did not give bail in double the amount of the judgment recovered against him and the probable amount of costs accrued and likely to accrue in the case, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned for the payment of the amount of the debt, interest and costs that shall be legally recovered against him in this case. "4. The judgment in this case is for the wages of manual labor, and the defendant was not required to give, and did not give a sufficient bail for the payment of the debt and costs, to be paid when finally adjudged to be due the plaintiff by the Court." The second, third and fourth reasons for striking off this transcript of appeal we could dispose of by allowing the defendant to perfect the same in a given time by entering the security required, and prior to the passage of the act of March 25, 1903, P. L. 61, under a decision of this court in Dunlap vs. Chipps, 12 Dist. Rep. 147, we could allow the appellant to cure the defect in his appeal complained of in the first reason for striking from the record this appeal. The opinion in Dunlap vs. Chipps, McIlvaine, P. J., seems to us to contain the common sense and justice that should be applied to these questions raised to imperfect transcripts of appeal, when we consider they are made up by those not learned in the law and often by the appellants themselves in ignorance of the requirements. The lower courts have almost universally refused to strike the transcript from the record, and in cases where the justice is evidently responsible for the irregularity in taking the appeal, and not the appellant, the proper practice is to grant a rule, not to strike off the appeal, but to show cause why the appellant should not perfect his appeal, or, in default thereof, why the same should not be stricken from the record under the equitable powers of the court. But the case of Dunlap vs. Chipps supra, which we should like to follow here, as well as the decisions of the courts cited by the defendant's counsel in this case, were rendered prior to the passage of the act of March 25, 1903, P. L. 61, and which was evidently passed by the legislature in express terms, and language mandatory upon the courts to strike from the records transcripts of appeals on motion, in all cases where its provisions are not literally complied with. The act is as follows: "That from and after the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and three, no appeal shall be allowed from the judgment of a justice of the peace or alderman unless the appellant, or his attorney or agent, at the time of taking said appeal, shall make affidavit in writing that the appeal is not for delay, but because he verily believes that injustice has been done.' There are no decisions of the appellate courts on this act, but in Musser vs. Dout, 29 Pa. C. C. R. 41, Biddle, P. J., alllowed the affidavit required by this act to stand which the appellant had filed at the time he filed his appeal in the common pleas, which should have been filed with the justice at the time the appeal was taken for the reason it was a case arising before the justice a few months after the passage of this act, and the appellant had required affidavit on file at the time the motion to strike off was made, on the ground that it was not made "at the time of taking said appeal." From the decisions of the lower courts we have been able to find construing this act, which are few in number, we find them adhering to it in strictness: Searle, P. J., in Brown vs. Chandler, 3 Justice Reporter, 9, and Walling, P. J., in McCrea vs. Pittsburgh, Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad Co., 2 Justice Reporter, 115, holding that the act of 1903 amends the act of 1897, and in express terms requires that after July 1, 1903, the affidavit shall be made in writing, and that no appeal shall be allowed unless this is done. This language is plain and its meaning clear, and courts have no power to allow an appeal from a justice, unless the prerequisites determined by the law-making power have been complied with. The very object of the act of 1903 was to change the practice, and to require such affidavit to be made in writing before the justice who tried the case, in order that written evidence might be preserved that the appeal was not taken for delay, and in order to take away from the courts the power to allow these defective appeals to be perfected nunc pro tunc by the application of equitable principles. In Harris vs. Mercer, 202 Pa. 313, Justice Mestrezat, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, says: "In all cases in the courts where the authority to proceed is conferred by statute, and where the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by statute, the mode of proceeding will be mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. "When a statute fixes the time within which an act must be done, the courts have no power to enlarge it, |