had been born in lawful wedlock.

The third section provides that each illegitimate shall be considered as of the half blood to each and every other child of said mother, legitimate or illegitimate.

The Legislature did not leave to conjecture the purpose it had in mind when it made the enactment. The intent of the act is expressly stated in the fourth section. It is to legitimate an illegitimate child and its heirs as to its mother and her heirs. But it was not intended to change the existing law with regard to the father of such child or their respective heirs and legal representatives. The legal relation of an illegitimate child with the mother and her heirs, the purpose of the act as stated in the title, is to legitimate it as to the mother; as to the father, the legal relation remains unchanged. An illegitimate is placed on the same footing with a legitimate child of the mother, and both have the same capacity to take or inherit personal estate from or through each other as next of kin. An illegitimate child and its heirs, and the mother and her heirs, now enjoy all the rights and privileges in the same manner and to the same extent as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock. As between it and other illegitimate or legitimate children of the same mother, it is of the half blood: but as to the mother and her heirs, the act legitimates it. Not only is such child made heir of the mother and she of it, with capacity to take and inherit from each other, but with the capacity also to inherit through each other as next of kin and heirs under the intestate laws, subject, nevertheless, as regards real estate, to the distinction of half bloods. There is no distinction of blood as to personal estate: Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 315. The distinction of blood is preserved as regards real estate. The law remains unchanged as to the capacity of an illegitimate to inherit real estate under the intestate law.

The act of July 10, 1901, enlarges the capacity of an illegitimate to take or inherit. It can now not only take or inherit from its mother but also through her. It is legitimated as to her and her heirs. Such child can take or inherit through her from maternal uncles and aunts and more remotely on the mother's side under the intestate law. The act changed the law as laid down in Rees's Estate, supra, and that case is no longer authority.

David Simmons is entitled to the share of his deceased mother, one of the children of Noah Umstead, a deceased brother of Reuben Umstead.

BRITTAIN, REeder & Coffin vs. Monroe County.

Change of venue-Act of March 30, 1875, P. L 35-Iuterest of judge. Article 1 of section 1 of act March 30, 1875, P. L. 35, which provides that "Whenever the judge, who by law is required to try or hear the same, shall be personally interested in the event of such cause or in the question to be determined thereby" a change of venue shall be made, does not contemplate, as falling within its purview, the interest of a president judge, as a property owner and taxpayer, in the result of a suit against the county in which he resides. It is too remote and contingent.

Upon application for a change of venue under the act of March 30, 1875, P. L. 35, the applicant having made oath that "local prejudice exists and a fair trial cannot be had," it is not mandatory upon the court to order a change of venue. The proper practice, where the allegations of the applicant are denied by answer, is to hear the parties on the issue raised either by depositions submitted or by oral testimony in open court.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. Brittain, Reeder & Coffin vs. Monroe County. Application for change of venue. No. 18, December Term, 1904.

Reeder for application.

Eilenberger & Huffman contra.

Staples, P. J., July 10, 1905. The plaintiffs in this case brought an action of assumpsit against the county of Monroe, to December term, 1904, No. 18, alleging that the county of Monroe was indebted to them for fees for professional services, and had neglected and refused to pay the same, although often requested so to do

On May 8, 1905, the said plaintiffs presented a petition to this court alleging "that a strong local prejudice exists against the claim of your petitioner, and that the inhabitants of said county, as taxpayers, have a direct, personal and pecuniary interest, prejudicial to the claim of the plaintiffs, and a fair trial cannot be had in said county," and praying for a change of venue, whereupon a rule was granted upon the defendant to show

cause, returnable May 23, 1905, at which time the hearing was continued to May 29, 1905, when both parties, plaintiffs and defendants, appeared with counsel, each having had prepared and filed a number of affidavits in support of the contention existing, viz.: upon the part of the plaintiffs, that local prejudice existed and a fair trial could not be had, and upon the part of the defendant, it having filed an answer, that no local prejudice existed and a fair trial could be had. At this hearing, the plaintiffs, the petitioners, contended that under the act of March 30, 1875, P L. 35, by virtue of the provisions of which the application was made, the applicants having made oath that local prejudice existed and that a fair trial could not be had in the county, it was mandatory upon the court to order a change of venue, and that it had no power to decide this question by a hearing.

Neither of the parties laid any particular stress upon the affidavit filed. The court did not assent to the contention of the plaintiffs, but held that it must be satisfied of the truth of the facts alleged, by a hearing, and directed that the case should be set down for further hearing on June 12, 1905, at which time and place the plaintiffs and defendant might produce before the court, for oral examination, such witnesses as they deemed necessary to sustain the allegations of the petitioners or the denials of the defendant.

On June 12, 1905, both parties again appeared, represented by counsel, and testimony was taken upon the question of local prejudice existing, the same being taken under the exception of the plaintiffs, they still contending that upon the oath of the applicants the court should have directed a change of venue, and the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant.

At this hearing, before any evidence was taken, the petitioners presented a supplemental petition for change of venue, viz.: "That the president judge of said county, who by law is required to try and hear the same, is, as a property owner and taxpayer in said county of Monroe, personally interested in the event of the trial of said cause, and in the question to be determined thereby."

It was not necessary for any evidence to be produced to convince the president judge that he was a property owner and taxpayer. Being a taxpayer goes without say

ing, and the president judge is conscious of the fact that he is a property owner. If this reason should prevail it would be unnecessary to discuss the question of whether local prejudice existed, and the change of venue should be had on that ground.

Section 1 of the act of May 30, 1875, P. L. 35, relating to the judge, who by law is required to try or hear, and in same, if strictly construed and applied, would include every trial which he was required to try or hear, and in the result of which, as a taxpayer, he might be interested; that is to say, in every trial where either the plaintiff or defendant was the county or a municipality in which the judge resided or owned property. The class of cases which would thus be included are so familiar as to need no enumeration, and so numerous as to make an argument against such interpretation almost unnecessary. If such interest is included in the intention of the legislature, it would place it within the power of parties so disposed to practically stop or block a large part of the business of the courts over which such judge is necessarily obliged to preside and decide. The intention of such a provision in the statute is best arrived at by reason for it. A change of venue certainly was not necessary in order to prevent a judge from trying a cause in which he was interested. The act of April 26, 1856, P. L. 500, provides "that whenever a president judge shall be a party in any suit, prosecution or proceeding, in any court over which he presides, such suit. prosecution or proceeding shall be tried and heard before the president judge residing nearest the place of such trial who shall be disinterested."

This is directory, and leaves no discretion in the judges so interested, and, if the contention of the plaintiffs is correct, a president judge would, by this act of assembly, be obliged to call in a president judge to try every case in the result of which he might be interested as a taxpayer. Surely no one would contend for any such interpretation of the law, and the act of March 30, 1875, could not have been intended to have provided for any such interest. Also, no principle of legal ethics has been more fully enunciated and promulgated by word and by practice than that no judge should for a moment hesitate to refuse to preside in the trial of a case where he was personally interested, whether challenged or unchal

lenged, and it needed no statute to enforce the principle "nemo debit esse judex in propria causa." Under the old common law the court could not be challenged, but the same principle was in force and adopted as a matter of conscience and propriety, the people always having as a means of correction therefor, in its abuse, proceedings by impeachment.

The act of April 22, 1856, was not intended to point out to the judge his duty, but to provide for his disability. Under this line of thought, it appears to us that the provision of the act of March 30, 1875, had as its intent to avoid the influence that would be unconsciously exerted in favor of a judge whose own cause would be tried in his own court. While this would not always operate to his advantage, yet it is a fair conclusion that the fact becoming known to the jury that the judge was personally interested in the result of the cause tried might influence rome of the jurors in arriving at a verdict, although it is cur belief that this would only happen in very exceptional cases. The only other intention, that seems a probable one, may have been to provide for those cases where the rearest president judge would not be called in, and to send the case as a matter of convenience for trial to some other county. The pecuniary interest of the president julee as a taxpayer certainly could not have been contemplated by the legislature, and if its attention had been called to it, it would very likely have distinguished it nder the principle of de minimis non curat lex. It has been argued that the act of April 16, 1840, P. L. 410, which provided that "no person shall be excluded from being a witness or juror in any suit, prosecution or proceeding in which any couty, state, etc., is a party, or is interested by reason of such person being or having been an officer, rated citizen or inhabitant in such county, etc., or owning assessable or taxable property or being liable to the assessment of any taxes thereon," is a fact in favor of the contention that such interest applies to judges upon the principle of "inclusio unius exclusio alterius."

There is no opinion or decision of the courts of this state to sustain any such contention, and in order that it should have any force, there should be something to make it evident that the legislature placed the judges of the courts upon the same plane as laymen. This position has