portion of the property comprised a nursery plant, or to mention and describe the buildings and appurtenances. 3. Paragraph 6. Failure to state upon what lots the buildings and improvements were located. 4. Paragraph 7. Omitting from advertisements and bills certain buildings, structures, improvements, etc., consisting of a bulb-house, propagating house, cold house, potting-house, hot beds, and fumigating-house. 5. Paragraph 8. Boiler-house described as "frame," whereas it is of stone; no mention of separate tank used in connection with a wind-mill for pump; failure to mention on what lots or streets dwelling-houses are erected; failure to mention on what street or lot a stable and green house are erected; failure to mention on which lots certain structures are erected, or that a store property is located on a certain lot and describing it in the hand-bills as a dwelling house. 6. Paragraph 10. Certain lots were offered as a whole, though one is separated from the remainder; also inadequacy of price. The sheriff's levy and advertisement follow the description contained in the mortgage, to wit: Four different lots of land with improvements, if any. In her mortgage the defendant did not divide the property into separate building lots, nor is there any testimony that she submitted to the sheriff any plan of lots. The property is used as a nursery, and the buildings necessary for the purpose are located on different parts or, as defendant calls them, lots. The first and second exceptions are entirely without merit. It was not necessary for the sheriff to divide the property into lots and to place a hand-bill upon each one. The advertisement describes the property as "green houses," which would imply that there were buildings and structures for that purpose. Third exception. As the property was not sold by town lots, it was not necessary to state upon which particular town lot a building was located; to have sold the lots separately would have destroyed the unity of the property as a nursery plant or green house. As all the buildings mentioned in the exceptions as constituting the plant were used for one purpose, they could not be separated. Fourth exception. The advertisement mentions boiler-house, hot-houses, storage building, frame shed, wind-pump, artesian wells, etc. According to defendant's contention, the omitted structures are necessary parts of a nursery plant or green-house; and it follows that an intended purchaser would assume that under the description of hot-houses these omitted parts were included. Fifth exception. The error in describing the stable as frame, when it was stone, does not appear to have had any effect on the bidders. The description of No. 2 in the advertisement describes the property as located on Tulpehocken avenue 60.22 feet southeast of Cypress street, and mentions the dwelling house, etc. No. 4 describes the property as situate on Cypress and Forest avenues, and describes the buildings with particularity. Sixth exception. The different properties were offered separately and then as a whole, and sold as one for the higher price. There is no exception because of an omission to mention a stone quarry. The person who now offers to bid more was present at the sale as a bidded, and bid within a dollar of the selling price; and having failed then to bid what he now considers the property worth, is entitled to but little consideration. In addition, no bond is offered that he will bid more. In Landis & Crisman vs. Lewis, 3 Dist. Rep., 241, it was held that the description of a stone slaughter-house as a frame one was not such a material misdescription as would of itself warrant setting aside the sale, especially in the absence of evidence that it affected or was calculated to affect the sale disadvantageously. Bills were properly posted by the sherff, but the storm removed some of them. There is no evidence that any person neglected to attend the sale for want of notice. The building alleged to be a store property at time of levy and sale, was used as a dwelling-house. The purchaser insists upon his rights to have the sale confirmed; and inadequacy of price alone will not justify us in setting aside the sale as against his protest. Under the circumstances we see no good reason why another sale should be ordered. And now, April 1, 1905, the exceptions are dismissed and the sale confirmed. NADIG, ET. AL., US. NATIONAL SCHOOL SLATE CO. A statement should show whether the suit is founded on a quantum meruit or an express agreement and should not contain lumping charges. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Charles H. Nadig and Lawrence F. Nadig, partners trading as C. H. Nadig and Brother Manufacturing Company vs. The National School Slate Company, a corporation. No. 25 April Term, 1905. Demurrer to Plaintiff's statement. Demurrer sustained with leave to amend. The statement was demurred to because "it did not give the date or time of the delivery of the material or the performance of the labor and is in other respects uncertain, informal and insufficient." Erdman and Diefenderfer for Plaintiffs. Trexler, P. J., June 5, 1905. The Act of 25th day of May, 1887, P. L. 271, provides: The plaintiff's declaration. shall consist of a concise statement of the plaintiff's demands. It has been held that this should show whether the plaintiff's sut is on a quantum meruit or an express agree ment. I think a number of the items in plaintiff's demand. fall short of the requirements of the act. The item of October 20th "Expressage on steam cylinder" should more definitely indicate between what points the cylinder was sent. "Nov. 14-Work on Sander-$2.80," should either show a nexpress contract or sufficient data to show what the work was worth or what time was employed on the work. Though the amount is small, it is in fact a lumping charge. "Jan. 19-Repairing Spindle" is open to the same objection. "Freight on Spindle" should also he more definite. "Jan. 25-Work at Slatington-$5.00" is a lumping charge and "Car fare" should indicate between what points. The item without date "Use of 25 horse power steam engine--$35.00" is not concise or definite. "Freight and hauling same" should indicate the points between which the hauling was done. "Making Wire Machine-$169.52" is a lumping charge. See Corr vs. Sellers 100 Pa. 169. Now June 5, 1905, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. COMMONWEALTH US FERGUSON ET. AL. Ammendment-Swearing of formeman of Grand Jury-Oath of schoo directors. The omission of the word "foreman" in the endorsement on a bill of indictment is amendable. The manner of swearing the foreman of the Grand Jury is a matter of practice. If school directors neglect to be sworn before entering upon their duties, they canỉ not escape criminal libility because of such negligence. In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill County. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Ferguson et al. No. 1740, September Sessions, 1897. Motion in arrest of judgment. Bechtel, J., January 3, 1898. The reasons assigned and urged in support of the motion are practically the same as were presented to the court upon the motion to quash. The motion to quash was denied on the 15th of November, 1897, as per order filed upon that day by Judge Koch, to which action the defendants have excepted and bill has been sealed. In view of this state of the record we can hardly be expected to consider the same questions or in any way to review the action as found in order of Judge Koch. Besides the action of the jury and trial judge, disposes of all the counts in the indictment save the 29th, and therefore removes the greater portion of the reasons assigned in support of the motion to quash. We will therefore consider briefly the allegation, that the failure to attach the word "foreman" to the name Benj. Kauffman, is fatal. The indictment is not a printed form, but one specially prepared, hence the endorsemnt is not printed but written and the word "foreman" is omitted. We regard this as of form and clearly amendable, and an order has been filed directing an amendment in this respect, and also as to the swearing of the Grand Jury, so as to make the record show the truths as to the appointment of Kauffman as foreman and the form pf oath administered and how it was administered. In Commonwealth vs. Lenox, 3 Brewster 249, an indictment was left unsigned and the Grand Jury presented it a true bill in that condition. It charged the defendant with murder, yet the District Attorney was permitteed to sign it, and the motion to quash was overruled; defendant was convicted of the second degree and served eight years in the Western Penitentiary. It needs no argument, much less citation of authorities, to show that a bill without the signature of the District Attorney is more defective than one which fails to have the word foreman upon it. In Commonwealth vs. Sparks, 9 Pa. 354, the word "true" was omitted, C. J. Gibson held it was not fatal; that the bill was sufficient without it, and if it were necessary, it certainly was amendable. In Hopkins vs. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 9, the defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree. It was contended the record did not show a finding of a true bill by the Grand Jury. An examination of the record showed the number and term, the crime charged, name of the party, and "true bill," and this was held sufficient. In Brown vs. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 122, also charge of murder, the caption in the indictment was "Court of Over and Terminer," the venue for Grand Jury was issued from the Quarter Sessions, the indictment was not certified into the Oyer and Terminer before trial and the entire record of the proceeding was in the Quarter Sessions. All this was amended after trial, conviction, sentence and writ of error, but before the record had been returned; there are other authorities equally strong, but we do not regard it as necessary to make any addidtional citations. In Commonwealth vs. Noonan, 15 Philadelphia 372, a bill was presented by a foreman pro tem.. who appears to have been appointed by the Grand Jury during the illness of the foreman, and this was held sufficient. Burgess vs. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. 483, the endorsement appears to have been placed upon a separate paper or envelope, and this was sustained. Under language of Sectioins 497 and 498 Whart. Crim. Law and the authorities referred to it as doubtful whether the word "foreman" is necessary at all. But it if is, there can be no |