Many statutes have been declared not obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment, which in some degree infringe upon personal freedom of action, or restrict rights of commerce and contract. The Act of April 29, 1897, P. L. 30, prohibiting employment of women and children beyond certain hours in manufacturing establishments was one of that character. (Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Sup. Ct., 5).

The reasons which permit the legislature to appoint the maximum time for daily employment, in various pursuits, and thus limit the power of the citizen to contract because the impairment of health in the individual subject by longer or exposed service is an injury to the state (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366), must be applicable in a larger sense to the right of the Commonwealth to exact public education for the general welfare. In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S., it was said, "But neither the amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people." (p. 31.) In this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary to protect them. (Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 131. In Prentice on Police Powers, at p. 76, it is declared that as education concerns the public welfare, the right to make it compulsory is within the recognized authority of the state.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently given firm expression to the doctrine that in the consideration of cases where the provisions of the XIV amendment are invoked, it must not be forgotten that the law is a progressive science which must always construe a settled principle with such expansive interpretation that it will meet advancing and changing conditions; that what was once sufficient for the public safety or welfare may no longer meet that requirement; and

just as the necessity grows, by the development of science and creation of new agencies, so does the occasion for additional sanctions by legislation. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S., pp. 385-9.

The Acts of Assembly which established the House of Refuge, where children within a certain age might be committed and taken from parental custody for their interests and education, were not in conflict with the bill of rights. "It is to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members, and that of strict right the business of education belongs to it. The right of parental control is a natural but not an unalienable one. It is not excepted by the declaration of rights out of the subjects of ordinary legislation. As to abridgement of indefeasible

rights by confinement of the person, it is no more than what is borne to a greater or less extent in every school; and we know of no natural right to exemption from restraints, which conduce to an infant's welfare." (Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Wh., 11.)

Whenever the state in the exercise of its judgment determines that a system of compulsory education is essential for the welfare of the community at large, it is not forbidden by Federal restraint.

The Act of 1901 is not special and local legislation regulating the affairs of school districts, nor their management, It is general and makes no discrimination other than classification by age of those whose attendance is to be enforced. (Sugar Notch Boro'., 192 Pa. 356.) Indeed it is doubtful if any legislation at all upon appropriate subjects of the police power are within the operation of Article 111, Section 7, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. (Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Sup. Ct., p. 371; Commonwealth v. Brinton, 132 Pa., 69.)

Whenever subjects of legislation may be properly classified, laws which affect equally every person within such division are not forbidden. The act which established the Juvenile Court was declared unconstitutional because of non-compliance with

this requirement. It divided children of the same age into two classes for the purpose of criminal procedure. (Mansfield's case, 22 Sup. Ct., 324.)

It does not offend against Article III, Section 3. The act contains but one subject, which is expressed in its title, by a full index. The word "Compulsory" is not specifically employed to describe the kind of attendance regulated, but penalties for truancy and for violation of any of its provisions are therein declared to be its purpose. It gives notice that part of the state appropriations are to be withheld from school districts that do not enforce its provisions, and repeals "all compulsory acts" inconsistent herewith. It would be definite enough, if the infliction of penalties was not embraced in the title. (Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Sup. Ct., p. 370 and cases cited.)

The unity of subject to which this section of the Constitution applies was intended to exclude various unrelated matters of proposed legislation which had previously been embodied in one bill, and after the particular designation of one, included the remainder under the general description "and for other purposes." When the title defines the object of the act, "details leading to the accomplishment of that object are cognate to the subject of legislation, and therefore form a part thereof." (Road in Phoenixville, 109 Pa., p. 48; Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Sup. Ct., p. 368.)

The Act of May 13, 1887, P. L. 108; was entitled "An act to regulate the sale of vinous and spiritous, malt and brewed liquors, or any admixtures thereof." It contains nineteen sections, embracing penalties for violation of its provisions, and many other subordinate features. In Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa., it was sought to have it declared unconstitutional for the same reason as now suggested. Judge Sterrett said (p. 35), "There is not a single section or clause of any section that is not clearly germane to the subject expressed in the title."

If any part of this statute is not referable to the index of

its contents, the remainder is not void if susceptible of execution without it. (Dewhurst v. Allegheny, 95 Pa. 437; Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa., 250.) The section which supports this conviction must by this rule pass unchallenged.

The attendance of the pupil at school is to be continuous, unless excused by the boards of control upon satisfactory evidence. They are by the statute constituted the judges of what are sufficient "mental, physical or other urgent reasons," not the parents. Commonwealth v. Hammer, 9 Dist., 251.

All legislation creating new systems of local government is at first incomplete, and this Act of Assembly has some apparent incongruities, but it is not unconstitutional.

Now, October 12th, 1903. The motion in arrest of judgment is denied.

IN RE INSOLVENT ESTATE OF VICTOR S. SACKS. Insolvency-Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404-Conflict Between State Insolvency Act and National Bankruptcy Act.

While the National Bankruptcy Act is paramount, proceedings under the State Insolvency Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404, in any particular case are valid until the jurisdiction of the Federal Court attaches by proceedings therein.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. In re Estate of Victor S. Sacks, an insolvent. No. 29 June Term, Petition for receiver and rule granted to show cause why receiver should not be appointed and fi. fa. vacated and set aside. Rule made absolute.

1904.

Reuben J. Butz for rule.
Harry G. Stiles contra.

Trexler, P. J., June 6, 1904. The question arising in this case is, whether the Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 404, relating

to insolvency is suspended by the National Bankrupt Act, or whether its provisions can be invoked.

In the estate of Moritz Silberstein, No. 18 April Term, 1902, my predecessor decided that the Act of 1901 'was not suspended. A number of the county courts have held that it is suspended. Bogg's Estate, II Dist. Rep. 188; Dolhenty's Estate, 11 Dist. Rep. 187; McCurdy vs. Gantz, 11 Dist. Rep. 534; Pannebaker vs. Bitting et al., 11 Dist. Rep. 537.

In Hull's Estate, Ioth Dist. Rep. 661, Judge Stewart holds that the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404, is not suspended during the operation of the National Bankrupt Act but that proceedings must first be instituted in the Federal Courts before the state act is superseded. I share his views in this matter and can add nothing to what he has so well said in the above case. I consider that the National Bankruptcy Act is paramount to the state act but that the state act, in any particular case falling within its operations, is valid until proceedings are instituted in the Federal Courts, and the jurisdiction of said court attaches.

Now, June 6th, 1904, the rule to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed for the Estate of Victor S. Sacks is made absolute and the writ of fi. fa. issued in the above matter is vacated and set aside.

See next case.

IN RE INSOLVENT ESTATE OF MORITZ SILBERSTEIN. Insolvency-Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404-Conflict Between State Insolvency Act and National Bankruptcy Act.

The Pennsylvania Insolvent Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404, is not suspended while the United States Bankrupt Act is in force.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. In re Estate of Moritz Silberstein, an insolvent. No. 18, April Term, 1902. Petition for receiver and rule granted to show cause why receiver should not be appointed. Rule made absolute.