trict officer who kept a record of mining claims.2 Nor would the record itself, in the absence of a law or rule requiring the record to be made, be admissible in evidence to prove the location or transfer of interest.3 But when the location notice or certificate, or a written transfer of the claim has been recorded pursuant to district rules, such record is admissible in evidence; and where the original records were destroyed and new ones made by the same authority, they have been held admissible.4 It has been held that the requirement to file a certificate of location for record within a prescribed time was obligatory upon the locator in order to secure the claim from the date of discovery against intervening claimants seeking to locate the same ground; but that a failure to record within the time would not invalidate the location, provided the law were complied with before any conflicting rights to the same ground had been acquired.5 Elsewhere it has been held by high authority that the effect of recording claims, or a failure to record, cannot be greater than under the registration laws-notice of the right claimed — which may be communicated by actual possession, or other means. If the inference drawn from the ruling in this case is correct, the only one who could avail himself, as a subsequent claimant, of a failure to record a prior location, would be a subsequent bona fide purchaser or locator.7 In a still later case it was held that where the location itself was notice to all the world, an error in the record, committed by the recorder, would not affect the rights of the locator.8 The record does not necessarily disclose the title, so that a purchaser may safely rely thereon, as in the purchase of ordinary real estate. The record of claims is held to serve a double purpose. As between the claimant and e government, it preserves a memorial of the lands appriated, after monuments, in their nature perishable, are swept away. It also supplements the surface marking, in giving notice to third persons.10 1 Rev. Stat. U. S., § 2324, ante, p. 15. 2 Golden Fleece Co. vs. Cable Co., 12 Nev. 312. 3 Atwood vs. Fricot, 17 Cal. 37. 4 McGarrity vs. Byington, 12 Cal. 426. 5 Faxon vs. Barnard, 1 Col. Law Rep. 145. 6 Campbell vs. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261. 7 See Pollard vs. Shively, 1 Col. Law Rep. 230 (to be reported in 5 Col.) 8 Myers vs. Spooner, 55 Cal. 257. 9 Patterson vs. Hitchcock, 3 Col. 533. 10 Pollard vs. Shively, 1 Col. Law Rep. 230 (citing Golden Fleece, &c. Co. vs. Cable Co., 12 Nev. 312; Gleason vs. Martin White M. Co., 13 Nev. 471). § 145. Amount of work necessary to hold possession. This includes (1) location work, and (2) annual labor and improvements, with the qualification that the latter shall not be less than one hundred dollars annually on all lode claims located since May 10, 1872, and ten dollars for each one hundred feet of all such claims located prior to that date.1 As the local legislatures have, for the most part, prescribed the character and amount of work necessary to complete the location of claims, as well as the time within which such work should be done, the old district rules, which were almost as diverse in their requirements as the districts were numerous, have become obsolete, except in determining the validity of old locations. But some of the early decisions as to the amount of work necessary to hold the claim will apply to the construction of the statutes, both federal and local. It was held where labor on the claim two days out of every ten should be performed in order to hold it, that labor employed in getting necessary machinery on the ground, and in digging a drain on adjoining land so as to facilitate the work, should be accredited as work done on the claim.2 But such outside work, to have such effect, must have direct reference to the claim to be held thereby.3 Forfeiture, which is the consequence of failure to perform annual labor, is never presumed, but the law is construed strictly against such result. It must be specially pleaded when relied on in an action.5 And it has been held that the failure to perform annual labor does not authorize any one to invade a claim in the actual possession of the delinquent and oust him therefrom.6 1 Rev. Stat. U. S., § 2324 and Amendment, ante, pp. 15-16 2 Packer vs. Heaton, 9 Cal. 568. 3 McGarrity vs. Byington, 12 Cal. 426. 4 Waring vs. Crow, 11 Cal. 366; Dutch Flat, &c. Co. vs. Mooney, 12 Cal. 534; Coleman vs. Clements, 23 Cal. 245. 5 Dutch Flat, &c. Co. vs. Mooney, supra. 6 Brady vs. Lee, 38 Cal. 362. § 146. How boundaries defined. The manner in which boundaries are required to be defined is left by the federal law to local regulation, with the proviso that "the location must be distinctly marked on the ground so that its boundaries can be readily traced." It has been held that a line of stakes running lengthwise through the center of a lode claim, with the lateral ground claimed on each side marked thereon, is sufficient to satisfy the law in this respect.2 But the local requirements are more specific. And the mere posting of a notice on a tree at each end of a claim has been held insufficient compliance with the act of Congress above cited. Whatever the local regulations are, whether prescribed by state or territorial legislatures or by district rules, there should be a substantial compliance in order to secure the full protection of the law.5 Marking the boundaries as required by statute is one of the first steps toward location. It serves a double purpose. It determines the right of the claim+ as between himself and the general government, and notifies third persons of his rights. It was accordingly held under the provisions of a statute requiring side posts to be set in the center of the side lines,6 that though placing such posts within 150 feet of the center was not a substantial compliance with the statute, still it would be an unnecessarily harsh and unreasonable construction of a beneficent statute to hold that, the claim being otherwise marked as required by statute, so that the boundaries might be readily traced and the requisite notice thereby given, the omission would invalidate the location. In this case the importance of boundary stakes as actual notice is insisted upon with special reference to such an emergency as a misdescription in the location certificate or an error in the record, for the reason, as is inferrable from the language of the decision, that the staking, if done so as to clearly define the boundaries, will serve as actual notice and thus cure the defective constructive notice by the record.8 But where there was a conflict between the boundaries as described in the record, and those which had been erected on the ground, it was held that parol evidence was not admissible to contradict the record after the visible monuments had been removed.9 However, parol evidence has been accepted to prove what was meant by the word "north" as used in the description.10 Where, in an action of trespass, defendants owned, adjoining claims, lying west of plaintiff's ground, and the north line of plaintiff's claim was agreed to, and it was also agreed that their east and west lines were parallel, but the parties disagreed as to the location of these lines, and it was shown that W. owned claims adjoining plaintiffs' on the east, and that H. owned claims adjoining W. on the east, evidence of the west line of H. was held not pertinent, unless it was shown that the east line of W. and the west line of H. were coincident.11 Where adjoining claimants agree upon their boundaries, owners and subsequent purchasers, with notice, are estopped from disputing their correctness as agreed upon.12 But the doctrine of estoppel as to boundaries will probably only apply as in cases of estoppel in pais generally.13 When one of the boundaries given is another claim, it does not follow that the claim referred to is of the same extent, or that it lies in the same direction as the one described.14 Where corner "posts" are required by statute to define the boundaries, there seems no objection to any other kind of monument of an equally permanent nature which will serve the purpose as a stump.15 1 Rev. Stat. U. S., § 2324, ante, p. 16. 2 North Noonday M. Co. vs. Orient M. Co., 9 Rep. 601 (U. S. Cir. Ct., Dist. Cal., March 4, 1880). 3 See post, Ch. XV. 4 Holland vs. Mount Auburn, &c. Co., 53 Cal. 149. 5 Myers vs. Spooner, 55 Cal. 257. 6 Post, Ch. XV., "Colorado." 7 Pollard vs. Shively, 1 Col. Law Rep. 230 (citing Finley vs. Williams, 9 Cranch. 168). 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Jenny Lind Co. vs. Bower, 11 Cal. 194. 11 Stokes vs. Monroe, 36 Cal. 383. 12 McGee vs. Stone, 9 Cal. 600. 13 Ante, § 65. 14 Lone Yankee Co. vs. Oregon Co., 7 Cal. 40. 15 Pollard vs. Shively, 1 Col. Law Rep. 230. § 147. Limitation of Actions. - The time within which actions may be brought affecting the right of possession of mining claims on the public domain, is fixed entirely by local statutes, and where such limitation applies expressly to mining claims, will be found in the compilation of local statutes.1 Otherwise, the limitation of actions affecting real estate will apply.2 Whatever time may be fixed by statute, the right to hold under its |