same. be our privilege but our duty to revoke the dick, v. Burdick, Id. 622, where at the time the causes for divorce arose the parties were resiWe shall, therefore, consider the question of dents of other States, and in neither of which jurisdiction. Proponents rely on the cases of Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 349, and Davis v. Davis, 2 Dist. Rep. 621, in support of their proposition that we did not have jurisdiction to enter the decree. As to Dorsey v. Dorsey, supra, decided September, 1838, it is to be noted that this decision was rendered prior to the Act of April 26, 1850, P. L. 590, which empowered the Courts of Common Pleas to entertain jurisdiction of all cases of divorce for the cause of desertion or adultery, notwithstanding the parties were at the time of the commission of the offense domiciled in any other State. A similar enactment for the cause of personal abuse or cruel and intolerable treatment was effected by Act of March 9, 1855, P. L. 68, but these did not reach a case where the offense was committed in a foreign country: Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. 412. was personal service had on respondent, nor was the respondent at the time of granting the divorce a resident of this Commonwealth, to which might be added the cases of Austin v. Austin, 4 P. C. C. R. 368, and Nigh v. Nigh, 2 Pa. C. C. R. 574, where the facts were similar, and in each of which a divorce was refused because it was held that there was lack of jurisdiction in the court to make the decree, as they did not have jurisdiction of respondent, and he could not be affected thereby. All of these cases are decided on the authority of Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375, and Reel v. Elder, 62 Id. 308. Do these authorities determine the question in these cases or the one at bar? The State has the power to change the status of its own citizens without regard to the laws of other States, the place where the cause of divorce arose, or the place of the marriage: 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 742–43. Where the parties have acquired domiciles in different States each State has the power to of the married parties to which it has jurisdiction: Id. 343-44. By the supplement to said last mentioned Act of April 22, 1858, P. L. 450, jurisdiction was ex-regulate the status or grant a divorce to the one tended to such cases where either of the parties were or might be, at the time of the occurring of said cause, domiciled in another State or country. The sole purpose of these acts was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts, and to meet the decision of Dorsey v. Dorsey, supra (Gordon v. Gordon, 48 Pa. 226), which cannot longer control us, if the said acts were effective for the pupose of their enactment. The Act of June 20, 1893, P. L. 471, recognizes the right of our courts to entertain jurisdiction in certain cases, where the offenses were committed outside of the Commonwealth, and where constructive notice only is given respondent. We must, therefore, determine whether, notwithstanding said legislation, the jurisdiction attaches when personal service is not had, and the offenses were committed in another State. It will be borne in mind that these acts relate solely to jurisdiction, and do not provide for any manner of service. It seems to us that the procedure would, therefore, be the same as in other cases, excepting as modified by these acts as to the time when the application may be made, etc., for without specific enactments, we see no reason why the procedure should not be the same in all cases of which the court has jurisdiction. We have had our attention called to the cases of Davis v. Davis, 2 Dist. Rep. 621, and Bur Where the divorce is obtained in one State upon constructive service where respondent is a resident of another, it is effective to dissolve the marraige bond but not to adjust property rights or determine the question of alimony: Id. 783. A divorce suit may be a proceeding in personam or in rem. Where the respondent is a non-respondent, and cannot be personally served with summons the proceeding is in rem. and such proceeding is valid as to the status of complainant and dissolves the marriage as to both parties, within that jurisdiction at least. In such proceedings the court acquires jurisdiction over the status of the plaintiff only, and has no jurisdiction to render judgment in personam as to costs, alimony, or the custody of children located in another State, or a prohibtion against marraiage: Id. 745; Bishop, Mar. and Div., Vol. 2, 2 155-56, 169; Colley, Const. Lim. 401; Loker v. Gerald, 31 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 709; Garner v. Garner, 56 Md. 127; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenleaf (Me.) 140; Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Doughty v. Doughty, 28 N. J. Eq. 581; Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200; Shafer v. Bushnell, 24 Wis. 372. The condition of marriage is a status, and therefore a thing, but the condition appertains to two, and exists in a status wherever each is. Proceedings in rem. dispose only of the rem. within the jurisdiction of the court: Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill. Ap. 498. In the case of Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, it is held that the assembly of a territory may dissolve the marriage by divorce, and change the status of the husband, who was a resident of said territory, even though the cause arose without the same, and no notice of such action was given to the wife. The court says, however: "If the act declaring the divorce should attempt to interfere with rights of property vested in either party, a different question would be presented." If the Legislature may decree a divorce under such circumstances it may delegate that power to the courts. "The proceedings for divorce may be instituted where the wife has her domicile. The place of marriage, of the offense, and the domicile of the husband are of no consequence:" Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 108. U. S. Treasury Department. DECISION RESPECTING THE INTERNAL Rewards for information leading to the detec·· tion and punishment of persons violating internal revenue laws. [Circular No. 147.-Int. Rev. No. 99, 4th revision.] 2 Treas. Dec. 814. No. 21,856, Dec. 18, 1899. TREASURY DEPARTMENT. OFFICE OF COM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Washington, D. C., December 18, 1899. Under and by virtue of the provisions of section 3463 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which authorize the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to pay such sums as he may deem necessary, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum appropriated therefor, for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue We are of opinion that this Commonweatlh has the right to, and by proper and effective legislation has authorized proceedings to deter-laws, or conniving at violations of the same, in mine the status of one of its own citizens toward a non-resident, and that the same is every where binding within this Commonwealth, though made without personal notice to or service of process on said non-resident: Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 Id. 714. But while it may, by proper judicial proceed-| ings, adjudge the status of its citizens toward a non-resident, it may not extend the effects thereof beyond its own boundaries and fix a status upon a non-resident, without notice or consent, nor may it without notice or jurisdic tion of the person affect vested property rights of said non-resideut: People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78; Cheever v. Wilson, supra. The cases of Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375, and Reel v. Elder, 62 Id. 308, each relate to the property rights of the wife in this Commonwealth, where divorces had been procured in other States without notice to or jurisdiction over the wife, and hold that said foreign courts did not have jurisdiction to affect her property rights in this Commonwealth. This seems very clear, but in no way decides or rules the question in the case at bar. It should also be observed that the evidence in this case discloses the fact that the defendaut removed from the State of Ohio, where the cause of complaint arose long before application for divorce was made here, and it would seem that Reel v. Elder, supra, would under such circumstances determine this case in favor of plaintiff. The rule to show cause is discharged. | cases where such expense are not otherwise provided for by law, I do hereby, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, offer for information given by persons other than officers of interal revenue, or persons appointed or employed in, or acting in connection with, the Internal Revenue Service, that shall lead to the detection and punishment of persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws, or conniving at the same, whether such punishment be by fine or other pecuniary mulet or penalty, or by forfeiture of property, such reward as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may deem suitable, but in no case exceeding 18 per cent. of the net amount of the fines, penalties, forfeitures, and taxes, which, by reason of said information, shall be recovered by suit or otherwise and actually paid to the United States, or of any sum which shall be accepted in compromise by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and received by the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained is intended, or shall be held, to refer to information concerning special taxes, nor taxes on legacies, unless under special arrangement authorized by the Com-. missioner of Internal Revenue: And provided further, That nothing herein contained is intended, or shall be held, to relate to information concerning illicit distillation of spirits in the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, Arkansas, Missiouri, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia, other and more effective methods for the suppression of illict distillation in those localities being now in operation there. The reward hereby offered will be paid in cases which are settled in court, upon the duly authenticated certificate of the United States district attorney having charge of the case or cases, that the person claiming is the person who furnished the information which led to the detection and punishment of the violations of law for which the recovery was had, upon such other and additional proofs as the Commissioner may require. Appeal. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. In re Beechwood Avenue, Pittsburgh-Ober's Appeal. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dissmissed and appellant's costs. In re Beeck wood Avenue, Pittsburgh-Mellon's Appeal. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. In re Beechwood Avenue, Pittsburgh-Ziegler's Appeal. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. Mathews v. Rising. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. It is therefore ordered that the above entitled case be remitted at appellant's expense, to the Superior Court for hearing and determination. BY MITCHELL, J.: Schenkel v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Bingler v. Bowman. C. P. No. 1, of A legheny Co. In cases in which property seized, being of the appraised valne of $500 or less, if disposed of by the collector under the provisions of section 3460 of the Revised Statutes, the certificate of the collector to that fact will be received, and Judgment affirmed. also to the fact that the person claiming the reward is the person who furnished the information leading to such a forfeiture. The rewards hereby offered must be understood to be limited in their aggregate to the sum appropriated therefor. Claims for reward under the provisions of this circular should be made on Form No. 211, which will be furnished by collectors of internal revenue on request therefor. Approved: L. J. GAGE, G. W. WILSON, Secretary of the Treasury. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. Sitting in the Eastern District. The following orders and judgments for the Western District were filed at Philadelphia on Saturday, December 30, 1899: PER CURIAM: Perret's Estate. O. C. of Allegheny Co. Petition to advance the cause for hearing in the Eastern District. Prayer of the petitioner granted, and ordered that the case be advanced for hearing in the Eastern District, the time to be hereafter fixed by the court. BY STERRETT, C. J.: Jack, Executor, etc., v. Forsyth. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. Irwin v. Hill et al. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. The decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. Scott v. Bryan. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed and judgment directed to be entered for the plaintiff on the case stated. McCormick v. McCormick et al. C. P. No. 2, of Alle gheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Beilstein v. Beilstein. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Colgan v. Forest Oil Co. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Decree reversed and bill directed to be dismissed with costs. Young v. Forest Oil Co. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Decree reversed and bill directed to be dismissed with costs. DEAN, J., dissents, Boyd et al. v. Weber. C. P. of Greene Co. Judgment affirmed. BY DEAN, J.: McNeil Co. v. Nimick et al., etc. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Todd et al. v. Wheeler and the Sterling Steel Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed. Thompson v. McCready. C. P. No. 1, 01 Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded. Wallace v. The Trustees of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church of North America. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. The decree dismissing the bill is reversed, the bill reinstated and defendants are directed to make answer thereto. City of Pittsburgh v. Anderson. C. P. No. 1. of Allegheny Co. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Kerrigan v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed. Risher et al. v Risher et al. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Bamford v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Co. Vandevort & Co. v. Wheeling Steel and Iron Co. C. P. Co. Judgment reversed and judgment is entered for the No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Harvey v. Knapp, C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. The decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. Union Storage Co., to use of Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Speck, trading as Economy Distilling Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment is affirmed. In re Beechwood Avenue, Pittsburgh-O'Mara's ApAppeal. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at appellant's costs. In re Beechwood Avenue, Pittsburgh-Harrison's defendant. Semple v. Semple. C. P. of Beaver Co. Decree affirmed. North Shore Railroad Co. v. The Pennsylvania Co., Lessee of the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railway Co. C. P. of Beaver Co. The decree is reversed, perpetual injunction is dissolved and the bill dismissed at costs of appellee. Goodwin v. McMinn. C. P. of Greene Co. Decree reversed, the demurrer is overruled, the bill reinstated and defendant is ordered to answer over. Hamilton et al. v. The Pittsburgh, Bessemer and Lake Erie R. R. Co. C. P. of Butler Co. Judgment affirmed. BY FELL, J.: McKeever v. Westinhouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment is affirmed. Iron City National Bank v. Anderson, DuPuy & Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment is affirmed. Harper v. O'Neill. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is reversed. McAbee v. Cribbs. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment is affirmed. Colvin v. Vensel. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judg. ment is affirmed. Witherow v. Tannehill et al. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment is affirmed. Brice's Estate-Kevan's Appeal. O. C. of Allegheny Co. Decree is affirmed at the costs of the appellant. Cannon v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Co. C. P. No. 2 of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. BY BROWN, J.: Herron et al., Executors, v. Wampler. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of appellants. Lewis v. Borough of Homestead. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Tufts v. Park et al. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Burgoon v. Johnson. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded. Little Sawmill Valley Turnpike or Plank Road Co. v. Federal Street and Pleasant Valley Passenger Ry. Co. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Kern v. Second Avenue Traction Co. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed and judgment is now entered in favor of the defendant. Harlow & Co. v. Borourgh of Homestead. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed with a venire facias de novo awarded. Iams et al. v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Mononghala Navigation Co. v. The McKin'ey Coal Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Rodgers et al., Partners as the Tide Coal Co, v. Monongahela Navigation Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is affirmed. Woodward v. City of Pittsburgh. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded. Fleming v. Dixon. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is affirmed. Levin et al. v. The Second Avenue Traction Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Rodgers, doing business as the Tide Coal Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Moren et al., doing business as the Advance Coal Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is affirmed. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Jutte et al., doing business as Jutte & Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is therefore affirmed. Burton et al. v. Monongahela Navigation Co. C. P. No. 3, of Alleghe y Co. The judgment is affirmed. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Wood et al., doing business as Wood & Son. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment aflirmed. Tuesday, January 2, 1900. PER CURIAM (G.): Peoples National Bank et al. v. Lentz, for use. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Gilchrist v. Empfield. C. P. of Indiana Co. Judgment affirmed. The Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Diamond National Bank. C. P. No 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. The City of Pittsburgh v. The Epping Carpenter Co. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. Harrold v. McDonald. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Reighard et al v. Flinn et al. C. P. No. 1, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. Greenawalt et al. e. Dixon. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Jones v. The Forest Oil Company. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed. Zug v. The City of rittsburgh. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Jndgment affirmed. BY GREENE, J.: Darlington v. De Wald et al. C. P. No. 1 of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Carothers et al. v. Sims et al. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Boehmer v. The Pittsburgh, Allegheny & Manchester Traction Co. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. STERRETT, C. J., dissents. Zeck v. The Mercantile Trust Co., Guardian, &c. C. P. No. 2, of Allegheny Co. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellant. O'Brien and Wright v. Schenley Park and Highland Railway Co. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. Mead v. The City of Pittsburgh. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. Judgment affirmed. McCombs v. The City of Pittsburgh. C. P. No. 3, of Allegheny Co. The judgment is affirmed. Reiter v. McJunkin. Appeal from the Superior Court. Judgment affirmed. Smith's Estate-Stevenson's Appeal. O. C. of Washington Co. The decree of the court below is affirmed at the costs of the appellant and record remitted. STERRETT, C. J., and MITCHELL, J., dissent. Hoysradt et al. v. Tionesta Gas Co. C. P. of Forest Co. Judgment affirmed. Braun v. Braun. C. P. of Butler Co. The decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. Smith et al. v. Wildman. C. P. of Greene Co. Judgment affirmed. Monday, January 8, 1900. PER CURIAM: Staib's Estate-Bender's Appeal. O. C. of Beaver Co. Rule to show cause why an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court should not be allowed. Appeal refused. In re Brewery License-Davis, Appellant. Q. S. of Allegheny Co. Application for an allowance of an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court. Appli. cation refused. In re Wholsale Liquor License-Davis, Appellant. Q. S. of Allegheny Co. Application for an allowance of an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court. Application refused. Fritchie, now for use of Maria Fritchie, v. Miller's Pennsylvania Extract Company, with notice to the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York. C. P. of Westmoreland Co. Rule to show cause why the Lonsuit should not be taken off and the case restored to the list. Rule absolute. RULE 38. The following rule of court has recently been enacted: This is a bill in equity by lessor against lessee for specific performance of covenants, or in the alternative for forfeiture of the lease and also for an account. As the covenants are merely implied and their extent depends altogether on oral "Every applicant for registration as a student evidence of opinions, the case for relief is wholly wanting in precision and certainty of contractat law, and every applicant for admission to ual duty which is necessary to sustain the ordipractice law without prior registration, shall nary chancery decree for specific performance. at the time of filing his application pay to the The jurisdiction of equity in a similar case was, Secretary of the Board of Examiners a registra- however, sustained in Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 tion fee of five dollars, to be expended in pay-But that decision was on the ground of fraud, Pa. 502, and we do not now propose to question it. ment of the salary of a clerk and other necessary expenses of the Board of Examiners." Supreme Court, Penn’a. COLGAN v. FOREST OIL COMPANY. the majority of the court being of opinion that the defendant was fraudulently evading his obligations to plaintiff while draining the oil from plaintiff's land through wells on adjacent territory. "The findings show," says WILLIAMS, J., "that it is the expressed purpose of the defendant to secure Kleppner's oil through his wells on the Garlach and Stotler tracts of Oil and gas lease-Right of lessor to compel | land." The basis necessary to sustain the bill, lessee to drill. Defendant contracted by his lease to put down one oil well on plaintiff's farm, the duration of the lease being as long as oil or gas should be found in paying quantities. Defendant put down five wells on different parts of plaintiff's farm, but plaintiff averred that defendant neglected to develop the western part of his farm, which was being unduly drained by wells of the latter on an adjoining farm, and sought to compel defendant to test the western part of the farm or surrender his lease therefor. Held, that defendant could not be com pelled to test the land unless it was shown that the adJoining territory was being fraudulently used to drain plaintiff's land, the true test of this being whether the wells of defendant on the adjoining farm were draining the wells on plaintiff's farm to such an extent that if In a case of a mere difference of judgment between the Appeal of Forest Oil Company et al., defendants, from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Allegheny county, wherein William Colgan was plaintiff. Bill in equity to compel defendant to drill for oil. Reversed. For the opinion and decree of the court below therefore, is fraud, and that of course must be affirmatively and clearly proved. There is no relation of special trust or confidence between lessor or lessee, in gas or oil leases, any more than in any other. Like all other contracting parties they deal at arm's length, each for his own interest. So long as the question is one of business judgment and management, the lessee is not bound to work unprofitably to himself for the profit of the lessor, and the parties must be left as in other cases to their own ways. It is ouly when a manifestly fraudulent use of opportunities and control is shown, that courts are authorized to interfere. The defendant contracted by its lease to put down one well on the plaintiff's land, it has in fact put down five. The bill charges, however, that the five were put kown on the eastern half of the farm, to the neglect of the development of the western half, and further, that although five wells were sunk on the eastern side, yet defendant was unduly draining that part of the land by wells on adjoining territory leased from other owners. As to this latter complaint the bill asked that such outside wells "be decreed to be wells taking and draining the oil from plaintiff's said land," and that an account and |