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statute in chancery though incapable of holding lands in question.

A bill was filed in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York, by the heirs of John Haberdinck, claiming certain real estate in the city of New York, and an account of the rents and profits thereof; the estate having been devised, in 1696, to the Ministers, Elders and Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York. To this bill, the respondents, among other matters, pleaded that they had been in actual adverse possession of the premises for forty years next before the filing of the bill. If the complainant by his bill, or the respondent by his plea, sets forth facts from which it appears that the complainant, by the statutes of the State, has no standing in court, and for the sake of repose and the common good of society is not permitted to sue his adversary, it is the rule of the court not to proceed further, and dismiss the bill. chancery, it is not necessary that there shall be an In pleading the statute of limitations to a bill in express reference to the statute of the State in which the proceeding is instituted. The court is Judicially bound to take notice of the statutes of Ilmitations, when the facts are stated and relied on as a bar to further proceedings, if they are found One tenant in common may hold adversely to and bar his co-tenant.

sufficient.

tions prescribed by the second section of the Act entitled "An Act in addition to an act entitled 'An Act to amend the judicial system of the United States'," approved the 3d of March, 1803, as far as said regulations shall be practicable, shall be observed in respect to all writs of error and appeals from the said Court of Appeals in the said territory to the Supreme Court of the United States. And the Act of 1803 thus referred to in the law of 1832, gives the right of appeal in cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and prize or no prize; but leaves the cases of law to be brought up by writ of error as provided for by the Act of 1789. And it has always been held that a case at law cannot, under the Act of 1803, be brought here by appeal. 2 Wheat. 141, 142. The question, then, is whether the proceedings in the Florida courts were in a case at law. They certainly differ from the ancient common law proceedings by writ of dower; and, indeed, they necessarily differed from it, because the widow's share of the negroes and personal property were united in the same proceeding that was instituted to recover her dower in the real estate; and it certainly does not strictly conform to any of the modes of proceeding known to the common law. But in many of the States and territories the ancient common law remedy for the purpose of obtaining an allotment of dower, as well as the remedies for other mere legal rights, has been changed for others more convenient and suitable to our situation and habits. Yet they are regarded as cases at law, although they are not carried on according to the forms of the common law in 454*] the case of *Parsons v. Bedford et al. 3 Peters, 447, the court, when speaking of remedies of this description, said that all suits brought to settle legal rights which were not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might be their peculiar forms, were cases at law, within the meaning of those terms, as used in the Constitution and acts of Congress.re that all the parts of the lands sold had The second part of the plea of the defendants In a case like the present it is true that although been conveyed and the moneys received by the dethe right is strictly a legal one, yet the Court fendants more than forty years before the plea was of Chancery possesses concurrent jurisdiction filed. This is deemed a conclusive bar. The bill with the courts of law. But the proceeding in seeks the money, and six years barred the relief; this being a concurrent remedy with the action at question is obviously not according to the prin- law. ciples or established practice of courts of equity, The defendants had disclaimed the own. [*456 and was not intended to be such. It could not ership of certain lots which were described in the be sustained in any court acting upon the rules, and of which they were chared with being

of a court of chancery, and must therefore be regarded as a proceeding at law. And being a case at law it cannot, under the acts of Congress before mentioned, be brought here except by writ of error.

The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

455*] *SMITH HARPENDING et al., Appellants,

V.

THE MINISTER, ELDERS and DEACONS OF
THE REFORMED PROTESTANT DUTCH
CHURCH OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
et al., Appellees.

Pleading-statute of limitations, construction by State court followed by this practice religious corporation-can make defense of

After the elapse of twenty years from the commencement of adverse possession of the property claimed, the defendants had a title as undoubted as if they had produced a deed in fee-simple from the true owners of that date; and all inquiry into their title or its incidents was effectually cut off. The Supreme Court of the United States are bound to conform to the decisions of the State courts, in relation to the construction of the statute of limitations of the State in which the controversy has arisen. Such is the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court. Cited, Green v. Neal, 6 Peters, 291.

No distinction is made by the courts of the State claiming to hold under the statute of limitations of of New York, between a religious corporation, the State, in regard to capacity to hold by force of the statute; therefore none can be taken by the Supreme Court of the United States. same as that of 21 Jac. I. That such a possession as is set forth in the plea in this case is protected by the statute, has been the settled doctrine of the courts of that State for more than thirty years, if it ever were doubted.

The statute of New York is in substance the

owners. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill as to

these lots. Held, that this was proper. There was bill, to obtain an account from the respondents. no probable cause for retaining this part of the Obviously, no claim exists that can be made available for the complainants, in regard to this portion of the property.

ON

N appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

NOTE. As to adverse possession, what necessary to constitute, and requisites of, see notes to 5 L. ed. U. S. 398 40 L. ed. U. S. 215; 53 L.R.A. 941. As to disclaimer by tenant of landlord's title, and adverse possession, see notes to 7 L. ed. U. 8. 596; 21 L. ed. U. S. 779.

As to the occupancy necessary to constitute adverse possession, see note to 9 L. ed. U. S. 624.

As to statute of limitations in equity cases, see notes to 6 L. ed. U. S. 287; 12 L. ed. U. S. 928; 36 L. ed. U. S. 135; 39 L. ed. U. S. 1037; 42 L. ed. U. S. 711.

tation of actions, govern United States Courts, see note to 6 L. ed. U. S. 290.

That State decisions and laws, in regard to limi

The bill states that John H. Haberdinck made leases of part of the lands for ninety-nine or more years, and some of the leases so granted did not expire until after 1829. The Dutch Church have, for some time past, had possession of the lands allotted to John H. Haberdinck by the partition; and have claimed that they took such possession in virtue of some will or devise of John H. Haberdinck to them. They also obtained possession of the undivided parcel, and allege title to some shares of it by deeds from the other tenants in common; and have demised parts of the same, etc.

On the 25th of March, 1839, the appellants | spective lots, pieces, and parcels of land, I, the filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United said testator, do hereby give, devise, and be States for the Southern District of New York, queath unto the said minister, elders and deathey being citizens of other States than the cons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church State of New York; stating that, prior to Sep- of the city of New York, and to their lawful tember, 1696, John H. Harberdinck, of the city successors forever, with all and singular the of New York, with four others, was seized in buildings, messuages, edifices, improvements, fee of the "Shoemaker's fields or lands," a tract emoluments, profits, benefits, reversions, adof about sixteen acres in the city of New York; vantages, hereditaments, and appurtenances and that in the same year partition of the same thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertain was made, and Haberdinck became seized in ing, or reputed or esteemed as part, and belong. severalty of divers parcels of the land described ing to the same; to have and to hold all the in the bill. Haberdinck died seized of the land aforesaid several and respective lots, pieces, in January, 1722, leaving a widow, who died and parcels of land, with the several and rein 1723; and John Haberdinck, Jun., of New spective premises and appurtenances, unto the York, was his only heir, and inherited his said minister, elders and deacons of the Relands. The bill states that the complainants formed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of are the heirs of John Haberdinck, Jun., their New York, and their lawful successors, to the names having been varied to Haberding. It sole and only proper use, benefit, and behoof states that they are seized, with Peter Haber- of the said minister, elders and deacons of the ding, a citizen of New York, of these lands as Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city heirs as aforesaid; and that no sale or devise of of New York, and their lawful successors forthe lands has been made by them, or by any of ever, *for to be received and employed [*458 their ancestors. by the said minister, elders, and deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York, immediately after my decease and the decease of my wife, Mayken Haberdinck, and only to the proper use, benefit, and behoof, and for the payment and satisfaction of the yearly stipend, salary, or maintenance of the respective minister or ministers, which, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, shall be duly and legally called to the ministry of the said church, and to no other use or uses whatsoever. And I, the said testator, do here. by further order and direct, that the sole management, direction, administration, and government of the same, after my decease and the decease of my wife, Mayken Haberdinck, shall only be and remain in the hands, care, management, direction, and administration and government of the elders of the said church, for the time being, or whom they shall nominate, constitute, and appoint to act in their stead or place, and without being subject or bound to render any account of the same, but only to the minister or ministers, elders and deacons of the said Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York, for the time being. Provided, always, that it shall not be lawful, nor in the power of the said minister, elders and deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York, nor their successors, nor the said elders or managers for the time being, nor in the power of any other person or persons whatsoever, forever hereafter, to make sale, dispose, or alienate any part of the said lands and premises, nor any of the profits, benefits, revenues, or advantages accruing or arising out of the same to any use or uses whatsoever; but that the same shall be forever and remain to the only proper use, benefit, and behoof as is above recited, declared and expressed."

The bill alleges that the church is a religious corporation in the city of New York, incorporated under the laws of New York. The complainants have applied to the church for a 457] statement of the title under which they claim the property, and for a list of papers, and the inspection of their rent-roll, and an account of the rents and profits.

In March, 1822, the bill alleges that the defendants returned to the Chancellor of New York an inventory, in which they set forth that these lands are held by them as "sundry lots devised to the church by John Haberdinck, called the Shoemakers' land, as mentioned in a former inventory, situated in the second and third wards of the city of New York;" and the defendants alleged the said will is valid.

The parts of the will set out in the bill of the complainants relating to the property claimed by the complainants are as follows: "Item. I, the said John Haberdinck, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath unto the minister, elders and deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of the city of New York, and their successors forever, all my, the testator's, right, title, and interest, and property, in and to an equal fifth part, share, and proportion of all that tract or parcel of land, situate, lying, The complainants charge that the will and and being upon Manhattan Island, within the the devise to the church was, at the date of the city of New York, called or known by the will, at the testator's death, and is, at this time name of Shoemaker's field, or land, on the wholly and absolutely void, illegal, and inop north side of Maiden Lane, or path, etc.; the erative at law. "The church could not and which tract or parcel of land contains, by esti- did not acquire any right or estate under the mation, sixteen acres." The will then describes will; and the possession of the premises was in the different lots, according to the partition, subordination to the title of the complainants and proceeds, "all of which several and re-and their ancestora. The church took posses.

sion of five of the lots that were on Broadway, although only a part of two were devised to them."

The bill further states that the church was 459*] incorporated on the 11th of May, 1696, then having a church in Garden Street, and certain tracts of ground, and were authorized "to have, take, acquire and purchase" lands, etc., and not exceeding the yearly value of two hundred pounds, New York currency, equal to five hundred dollars. That the property held by them was considerable, and has ever since been actually, and for twenty years past has been worth at least ten thousand dollars. The yearly value of the lands devised by Haberdinck has ever since greatly exceeded the amount which the church was from time to time by law authorized to hold; and from 1780 to 1800 the yearly value thereof was ten thousand dollars; from 1800 to 1820 at least twenty thousand dollars; and to this time at least thirty thousand dollars. In order to keep down the "annual income," the church has given leases for long terms at a low rent, and then sold such terms for large sums, and used the money to buy other lands for other purposes.

thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine, until and at the time of the filing of this plea, these defendants were and have been, and are by themselves and tenants holding under them, in the sole and exclusive possession of all and singular the lands in the bill of complaint mentioned (excepting the lands above described as hereinafter disclaimed), during all which time of possession, all and singular the said lands have been improved by buildings, and inclosed with a substantial inclosure, excepting that the land twenty-five feet in width from John Street to Fair Street, now Fulton Street, between the side of lots 84 and 86, and a continuation thereof, having been during all that time enjoyed as a public street for access to the lands upon the same, and as a public street then, ever since, and now used by all good citizens of this State as a public street and highway, without rents, issues, or profits thence accruing, and excepting a piece of land twenty-five feet in width, extending from the rear of lot 62 in the said bill mentioned, seventy-five feet along the rear of lots 41, 42, and 43, and excepting the two pieces of land, the one extending along the southwesterly side of lot No. 68, and the rears The church has always held those lots under of lots 77, 78, 79, and 80; the other extending claim of title subordinate to the title of the com- along the northeasterly side of lot 66, and the plainants and their ancestor; it was always in rears of lots, 32, 33, 34, and 35, from Nassau capable, in law, of acquiring or holding a valid Street to the rear of the said lots; and during title thereto by adverse possession; and was at all that time these defendants have by themthe time of Haberdinck's death incapable, in selves and their tenants holding under them, law, of acquiring and holding the lands by de-actually occupied and possessed all and singular vise. If it should appear that the lands were the said lands, claiming and enjoying the same, actually devised to the church by the will, yet during all the time aforesaid, as being seized such devise will appear to have been made on thereof in their demesne as of fee, in severalty, the "express condition" that the lands were to and in their own sole and exclusive right as the be held by the church for the payment and sat- sole and exclusive owners thereof in their own isfying the yearly stipend, salary, or mainte- right in fee-simple, and to their own sole and nance of the respective minister or ministers exclusive use and not otherwise; and [*461 which should be from time to time duly and during all that time these defendants have been lawfully called to the ministry of the said in the sole and exclusive receipt and enjoyment church, and to no other use whatever; and on of the rents, issues, profits, avails, and prothe express condition, that it should not be law-ceeds thereof, to the sole and exclusive use of ful for the ministers, elders and deacons, to sell the said corporation claiming the right to reor dispose of any part of the property, or to ap-ceive and enjoy the same to their own use and ply any of the profits, revenues, etc., to any not otherwise. use whatever, other than those mentioned.

The following points, relating to the matters decided by the court, were submitted by the counsel for the appellants:

1. The plea is defective in regard to the allegations in the bill, as to the defendants entering and holding under leases from Haberdinck.

At the time of the making of his will by Haberdinck, the only church was in Garden Street. They have since built two others, and abandoned that as a place of worship. The income of the church from these lands has annually, for fifty years, greatly exceeded the yearly sal- 2. The plea does not make out a complete aries paid or which could be paid to their min- and absolute title in the defendants to the isters, and they have used the large surplus an-premises in question; and it is therefore no nually for other purposes, etc. defense, either to the discovery or the relief 460] The bill prays for a discovery, wheth-sought by the bill. er the church holds under the will of Haber- 1. The defendant were incapable of taking dinck; and if so, a full account of the same, and lands by devise; and they are chargeable in law of all matters relating to the property; and for with a knowledge of this incapacity. an account, etc.

The defendants, after various exceptions to the bill of the complainants, and to the relief sought in the same, and the denial of many of the allegations in the bill, and disclaiming the ownerships of certain lots described in the bill, and in the answer filed, say:

2. The devise to the defendants by the will of John Haberdinck was absolutely void; and the defendants knew of its nullity.

3. The entry of the defendants was made, and their possession commenced under the void devise to them in the will of John Haberdinck, and was continued and held under that devise to the time of filing the bill in this cause.

These defendants do plead in bar, and by way of plea say, that for all the time commencing 4. The possession and claim of the defendforty years prior to the filing of the bill of com ants were not, in their inception, hostile to the plaint, namely, commencing on the twenty-title of the heir-at-law, but were consistent fifth day of March, in the year of our Lord one

there with and in subordination thereto.

5. The plea does not show when or by what | leases, which were as often met by other cormeans the possession then commenced, and responding legislation on the part of the British held, was changed into an adverse holding. Parliament. Uses and trusts had been placed And, although it sets up a claim of title in sev- upon the same footing as devises, and made eralty from 1799 down, it does not show on subject to the laws of mortmain by statute of what title, or color of title, that claim was 15 Rich. II. ch. 15. Leases for a longer founded. On the contrary, by not negating the period than twenty years were forbidden also charges in the bill in respect to their claiming by the British Parliament. Statute 23 Hen. under the will, it is admitted that since 1799, as VIII. ch. 10; 1 Vesey, Jun. 218; 6 Vesey, 404; 9 well as before, their claim has been founded Ves. 535. on the void devise in the will of Haberdinck. 6. The defendants' possession and claim of title, from the time of their first entry to the filing of the bill, having been at all times exclusively under and by virtue of a void devise, known to them to be such, are unavailing for any purpose.

They do not, therefore, show an adverse pos

session.

7. The views taken of the defendants' pos462*] session, are more "especially applicable to this case, as otherwise the policy of the prohibition contained in the statute of wills will be defeated, and the defendants allowed to do indirectly what they are expressly prohibited by law from doing directly.

The decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the plea overruled.

The case was argued by Mr. Eaton and Mr. Coxe for the appellants, and by Mr. D. Lord, Jun., and Mr. Wood for the defendants.

Mr. Eaton explained in detail the various statements and facts presented on the record, and the grounds upon which the matter was to be considered by the court; contrasting the numerous circumstances set forth in the bill, an swer and plea, in the review.

That the complainant's ancestor, as tenant in common, was seized of a tract of land called Shoemakers' Field, at present situated in the most populous part of the city of New York; of which, partition having been made, he had seisin in severalty, and continued in undisturbed possession till his death, in 1723. That he devised this portion of his estate in trust, etc., to this church, the defendant. That it was a religious corporation. That complainants are the heirs-at-law, and have never parted with any portion of this estate. That in pursuance of the trust created in favor of the church, the minister, elders, deacons, etc., entered into the possession, and have ever since retained that possession.

None of these special averments contained in the bill were denied; and hence, by the acknowledged rules of law, they are to be taken as confessed. He argued, that by the rules of equity proceedings every material allegation contained in a bill which failed to be controverted by the plea and answer, in support of it, was to be taken as true. Mitford's Pleadings, 299, 300; Story's Eq. Pleading, sec. 38, 694; 4 Paige's Ch. Rep. 195.

By the laws which from time to time had been enacted, usually termed the statutes of mortmain, of wills, etc., and which being in force in England, were alike in force within the colonies, no devise of real property to a religious corporation could be available to pass an estate; such devise was void. Various stratagems at different times had been resorted to by the 463*] clergy to defeat *these enactments, by a resort to the creating of uses, trusts, and long

The statutes referred to were in force in the colony of New York to the year 1788. 4 Paige Ch. Rep. 198. Being in force, as the authority shows, a colonial act of legislation was incapable to repeal, alter, or change them. Not even the British Parliament could change them, so as to affect a right which had become vested before. It is not a prerogative right of the king to make dispensation of an express statute. He cannot do it. The king cannot do any act forbidden by law.

The charter of incorporation under which the defendants allege a right to take the estate in question can be of no avail whatever; because it was not in the power of the sovereign to permit that to be done which the laws of the kingdom prohibited. As the laws prohibited a devise of real estate to religious houses, no sanction on the part of the king could legalize any such bequest, to the prej udice of the rights of third persons; such was not a regalia privilege.

Against the right of the complainants to recover, a plea in bar is interposed, setting forth that this church, for a period of forty years before the filing of the present bill, had enjoyed quiet and undisturbed possession; that it had received to its own use the rents and profits. An answer in support of the plea is also offered, with a disclaimer as to a part of the property claimed.

A plea may be good in part and bad in part. That which is good is only to be regarded, the rest is to be set aside; but an established rule of equity practice is, that a plea to be good must be clear, definite, precise, and full, as to all the matter which is offered as a bar to the relief sought. 4 Paige Ch. Rep. 195.

The plea under consideration was not of that description and character. The admissions made upon the record are that the defendant's first entry was under, and in pur suance of a devise of claimant's ancestor, which at the time was void, as being adverse to existing laws; and they fail to show [*464 either by the plea or answer, that their possession ever assumed anything of adverse character; then it was nothing more than a permissive, silent, acquiesced in possession, subordinate to, and not adverse to the title of complainants.

He who enters upon lands by permission of another is estopped to urge an outstanding title in another person, for the reason that the possession of the tenant is the possession of the lessor; and that cannot be called in question until some act of ouster or of open disclaimer be made. 4 Wheat. 213; 5 Wheat. 124; 7 Wheat. 59; 9 Wheat. 288.

In these decisions, made by the Supreme Court, the principle is asserted and maintained that to make the statute of limitations available the possession must be adversary; not per

missive, or subordinate to the title of complain- lapse of more than a century, the matter ought ants. The pleadings admit that from 1723, the to be weighed as though it were to be consid time of the first entry under this void devise, ered apart from the long intervening time. to the year 1799, a period of more than seventy The statute of limitations, under such circumyears, the possession by the church was under stances, should not afford protection. The and in pursuance of this very devise about possession of this church was merely a trust which we are inquiring, and hence was in for the benefit of the cestui que trust-the subordination to it; and as such, not being heirs-at-law; and by legal interpretation should adverse, the statute of limitations is wholly in no otherwise be understood." insufficient to cure the deficiencies of the title. The authorities referred to refuse such a privilege.

Under the devise made to the deacons and elders of this church possession was taken. It was a void devise, being contrary to the statutes of mortmain. Their possession was that of the complainants; the church merely holding in trust, not in fee. From lapse of time a perfect title may be created by presumption. The law will, after a possession of twenty years, presume the existence of a deed; but if the facts adduced are found to be insufficient to warrant a belief of title, then the presumption fails of its effect. A tenant who has lived on his farm for twenty years may defend himself on the presumption of a deed; but if he produce an insufficient and void deed or title, then the force of the presumption is taken from him; and for this most obvious reason, that the weight and force of presumption ever fails where facts interpose to put aside the presumption.

The rule of law is, that the title relied on must be of such a description and character that in view of legal consideration it must appear to be prima facie a good title; and hence 465] arises the difference between a void and voidable title. In the one, not the other, the statute of limitations may be relied on. Authorities are wanted to show that upon an admitted void title, or upon a trust, any benefit can be derived from a resort to lapse of time. Ten Eyck v. Frost, 5 Conn. 346; 6 Wheat. 497; 1 Peters C. C. Rep. 361.

Judicially it had been pronounced that the statute of limitations was a plea that ought favorably to be received. It would not be proper to controvert the correctness of that opinion; but the present case did not fall under the reason of that decision-cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex. With innocent buyers without notice, the rule might apply; but here the original wrong-doers and violators [*466 of the law were still the holders of the property in controversy, the use and benefit of which they have enjoyed for a century without having any legal title whatever. It was not for them to talk of hardships, after that they had held for so long a period possession of a large estate, for which not a cent of consideration was ever paid. It was a wrong originally practiced, and that wrong was insisted to be carried out upon no better pretext than a reliance on the statute of limitations, which was wholly inapplicable under all the circumstances that belonged to the case under consideration.

statute of limitations is incapable to perfect it into a title. The elders of the church entered into the possession of this estate in their own wrong, which the law holds shall never constitute a right; and in violation of the existing statutes of the country; and when at last the heir comes to demand his right he is told, as the plea sets forth, "We have had the property of your ancestor so long that we cannot surrender it."

Statutes of limitations were intended for the guiltless-the weak, and the helpless-for imperfect colorable titles, and not for the protection of a corporation; which, as this record shows, has thrown itself into open rebellion against all the mortmain laws which were then in force in the country. The church can sustain no injury, never having paid anything for this past property, and hence cannot justly complain. It was received into their possession under a devise which the laws, as the defendants well knew, did not authorize; and hence No authority could be found to give sanc-is void; and being thus void, a mere trust, the tion to so pretended a defense as the present. The title relied upon was void at its incipiency, and no circumstance has since arisen to change its original defective character. Even the stale idea of innocent purchasers did not come to its aid. An old man, led away by superstitious apprehensions, gave his all away from his relations, to propitiate his hopes through the church. The wardens and elders, well knowing that his indulged feelings were at war with what the laws of the country authorized, encouraged him to the act, and received this bequest. They entered into the possession under that devise, and in that way still hold it. Nothing, then, of innocent purchaser could interpose in their favor; the wrong originally practiced is the wrong which still remains, and for which the successors of this church should be answerable, precisely as if they were now brought back to the year 1723 when this will was introduced for probate and registration. Then it was a void devise; and remaining so to this time under unchanged circumstances, it is void still as regards the heirs-at-law. With this religious corporation the wrong commenced, and with it the wrong has continued. No change of the original parties having taken place after the

The policy of the English statutes of mortmain, of uses and trusts, was to prevent religious corporations from holding real estate. To argue that the statute of limitations may give title to that which positively the law forbade to be holden, is to affect an object indirectly which could not be done directly; it would be a solecism in terms. The devise being repugnant to law, was a nullity-was void. Theirs is to be considered exclusively as the possession of the heirs.

The statutes of New York now in force in that State, after a lapse of twenty-five years, gives title to a mere possessio pedis right; it was passed in 1830. This statute could only have a prospective bearing, it could not act retrospectively. It changed the law as it had before been, and consequently should have no

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