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debts of Joshua Mauran, Jun., whatever the ence that that instrument can be correctly unamount might be. Whereas, the case shows derstood and construed. In the construction that such a liability was proposed to the de-of all instruments, to ascertain the intention of fendant by Edward Bullus, and rejected by the the parties is the great object of the court; and defendant; this simple indemnity against un- this is especially the case in acting upon guaravoidable injury being substituted in its stead. The letter being addressed to Edward Bullus before the copartnership of Mauran & Bullus, and in contemplation thereof, cannot be considered as a contract with any other person than Edward Bullus. That the plaintiff so considers it by bringing the action in the name of Bullus; and that in order to support the action it is necessary to prove a payment and advance of money by said Bullus individually. Consequently, that a payment from the funds, of Mauran & Bullus, by the authority of Mauran & Bullus, will not support said action in the name of Edward Bullus. Story on Partnership, p. 350 to 355, and authorities there cited.

533*] *Under the second exception, Mr. | Whipple contended that Mauran & Bullus, by taking the whole property of Joshua Mauran, Jun., into their possession, and upon their failure assigning the uncollected debts and other property to their assignees, instead of placing it under the management of the defendant, have assumed the ownership of the debts and other property, and discharged the defendant from any liability, if any liability ever existed.

Mr. Z. Collins Lee and Mr. Southard, for the defendants in error, contended,

1. That the letter of guaranty in question was an absolute and unequivocal indemnity to Edward Bullus against all loss and damage in settling up the old concern of Joshua Mauran, Jun., and could be construed in no other way, and must be liberally interpreted according to the fair intentions of the parties to it.

2. That being a guaranty to Edward Bullus, individually, and he alone being the party to the contract, he was alone injured, and therefore the suit was properly brought in his own name, and not that of the firm-and it made no difference in principle, whether he paid the advances out of the partnership fund or not. As in point of fact he had furnished all the capital to the new firm, and it was therefore his own fund.

The following cases as to the first point (Construction of letters of guaranty) were cited: Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East, 227; Flagg v. Upham, 10 Pick. 147; Drummond v. Prestman, 12 Wheat. 519; Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Peters, 117; and Lee v. Dick, 10 Peters, 490.

The guaranty under consideration, in the first place, refers to the fact that Bullus, to whom it was addressed, was about to form connection in the mercantile business in the city of New York, with the son of guarantor. And from the evidence, it appears that he was well acquainted with the nature and extent of that partnership, for he had read the articles of "opartnership, or the memoranda from which they were drawn. As it appears from the statement of Bonney, that the articles were drawn in August, and placed in the hands of Bullus, who returned them with the blanks filled and some alterations, there can be little doubt that the defendant below read them while at New York. That he was well acquainted with the conditions of the partnership his son testifies.

With this knowledge we come to the next sentence in the guaranty, which is, "And as the said Joshua Mauran, Jun., having been, and is at this time prosecuting mercantile business in that city on his own account."

It will be recollected, that in the articles of copartnership, Joshua Mauran, Jun., covenanted that he would give to his partner satisfactory security that he would pay all the debts which he then owed, and all the responsibilities incurred by him, in carrying on his former business, without drawing upon the partnership fund. Of this covenant the defendant below not only had full notice, but it was proved that on his return from New York to Providence, he took with him a bond drawn by the person who drew the articles of copartnership, binding him to pay the debts of his son. This bond he did not execute, but wrote to Bullus the letter of guaranty.

With these facts in view, after stating the fact that his son had been in business in New York as above, and that Bullus was about commencing a partnership with him, the defendant says, "Now, therefore, in consideration of the same, and at the request of Joshua Mauran, Jun., I hereby agree to bear you harmless, in regard to the closing up and settlement of the said Joshua Mauran, Jun.'s former business. And I hereby guaranty you against *any [*535 loss you may sustain from the former business of said Joshua Mauran, Jun."

On the 2d point cited: Collyer on Partner- Now, looking at the facts connected with the ship, 446, 447; Gow on Partnership, 123; Story guaranty, and the circumstances under which on Partnership, 354. Also the cases of Alexan-it was given, there would seem to be no doubt der v. Barker, 2 Cromp. & Jervis, 133, 138; Robson v. Drummond, 2 Barn. & Adol. 83, and the counsel referred generally to the cases named in the note to Story on Partnership, 354.

Mr. Justice M'Lean, delivered the opinion of the court:

The questions in this case arise on the instructions of the court; and they, very properly, as we think, refer the jury to the facts and circumstances under which the guaranty was given. It is only by such refer- [*534

of the understanding and intention of the parties. Bullus having a capital of nearly thirty thousand dollars, he was unwilling to advance it as the stock of the new firm unless he should be indemnified against the debts which had grown out of the former business of his partner. And Joshua Mauran, Sen., with the view of securing so considerable a capital, and so advantageous a connection in business for his son, was willing to indemnify Bullus against these debts. And he preferred the guaranty to the bond which was prepared. The latter would have imposed an unconditional obligation to pay these debts, whilst the

former only required him to pay Bullus the sum | bear Bullus "harmless in regard to the closing advanced by him in discharge of them.

But it is earnestly contended that as these debts were paid by the firm, and not by Bullus only, he cannot maintain an action in his own name on the guaranty. It is very clear that the firm could not maintain an action on this instrument. The indemnity was personal and limited to Bullus.

up and settlement of the said Joshua Mauran, Jun.'s former business." Here is a strong recognition of an agency by Bullus in the settlement of these debts. To sustain the credit of the firm it was necessary to pay the debts in question; and we find that in a very short time after the firm commenced business the payments of these debts were commenced, and such payments were made from time to time by the firm until near the time of its failure. The moneys received from the debts due to the previous concern were credited on the books of the firm, and the payments made by it on the same account were charged. But [*537 the mode of keeping the account by the firm can have no bearing in the case, as the facts found by the jury obviate all objections on this

But the best answer to this argument is the finding of the jury, under the instruction of the court. They were instructed "that if, from the evidence, they should find at the time of signing the letter of guaranty, it was understood both by the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff was to be at liberty to pay the debts of Joshua Mauran, Jun., either out of his own private funds, or out of the partnership funds; and in either case the plain-ground. tiff was to be entitled to indemnify therefor, under the letter of guaranty," etc., they should find for the plaintiff. They did so find, and consequently the facts hypothetically stated in the instruction are established. And the only question that can arise on this part of the instruction is, whether the facts found were properly submitted to the jury.

Now, out of what fund these debts were to be paid could not be a matter of any importance, it would seem, to the guarantor. The objection that Bullus cannot recover, because the debts were paid with the partnership funds, under the circumstances, is purely technical. Every dollar of the money thus paid, though 536*] used in the partnership name, was in fact the money of Bullus. To meet this technical objection, and carry out the intention of the parties, we think the instruction was proper. The facts on which it was founded did not contradict the written agreement, nor, in any degree, affect the liability of the party beyond the clear import of the guaranty.

Suppose Bullus had been charged on the books of the firm with the moneys paid in discharge of the debts, the objection as to the partnership interest could not in that case be made. But the money thus applied would have been no more the money of Bullus than that which was paid by the firm. The facts found by the jury present the case in its true character, and give a strong equity to the plaintiff below. Generally, all instruments of suretyship are construed strictly as mere matters of legal right. The rule is otherwise where they are founded on a valuable consideration. But in the present case the relationship of Mauran, the partner, and the guarantor, connected with the other circumstances, constitute as clear a case for indemnity as could well be imagined. That the debts of Mauran, Jun., were paid by Bullus or with his assent, in virtue of the guaranty, there is no reason to doubt. Indeed, this fact is substantially found by the jury.

The assignment by the firm of the uncollected By the articles of copartnership either part-debts of Joshua Mauran, Jun., to Robinson ner, with the consent in writing of the other, does not release the guarantor. In this respect might withdraw from the firm any amount of the instruction of the court was correct. The money. This was known to the guarantor. jury were directed if they should find for the And also the fact that the whole capital of Bul- plaintiff to deduct from the amount thus found lus was paid into the firm. If this be admitted, the full value of the debts of Joshua Mauran, it followed that any payments made by Bullus Jun., which had been assigned by the firm, and in discharge of the debts, could only be paid render a verdict for the balance. out of the firm.

The jury also found in pursuance of the latter part of the same instruction, that Bullus was a creditor of the firm to the full amount of its capital stock.

These facts, found by the jury, disembarrass the case from the technicalities thrown around it by the counsel of the guarantor. They show that it was the understanding of the guarantor that Bullus should be indemnified against the previous debts of his partner, whether he paid them out of the partnership fund or otherwise.

The construction that the guarantor is only bound to indemnify, in case payment of these debts had been enforced against Bullus by legal measures, is not sustained by the words of the instrument.

In the first place, he was not and could not be made legally responsible for these debts. The guarantor, then, must have contemplated a voluntary payment, or at least not a payment by legal compulsion. The guarantor agrees to

The debts of Mauran, Jun., assigned by the firm were proved to be bad, with but one exception; and that appears to have been deducted by the jury from the sum paid by the firm, in discharge of those debts.

Upon the whole, we are satisfied that substantial justice has been done between the parties, by the judgment of the Circuit Court; and we think there is no principle of law arising out of the instructions which require a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.

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whenever and wherever he can do so without, breach of the peace-act of Pennsylvania forbidding removal of colored persons from the State for the purpose of enslaving them, unconstitutional and void.

A writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, brought under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to revise the judgment of that court, on a case involving the construction of the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

Edward Prigg, a citizen of the State of Maryland, was indicted for kidnapping, in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of York County, Pennsylvania, for having forcibly taken and carried away from that county, to the State of Maryland, a negro woman, named Margaret Morgan, with the design and intention of her being held, sold, and disposed of as a slave for life, contrary to a statute of Pennsylvania, passed on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1826. Edward Prigg pleaded not guilty, and the jury found a special verdict, on which judgment was rendered for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The case was removed to the Supreme Court of the State, and the judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer was, pro forma, affirmed: and the case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, the constitutionality of the law under which the indictment was found, being denied by the counsel of the State of Maryland; which State had undertaken the defense for Edward Prigg, and prosecuted the writ of error. The cause was brought to the Supreme Court, with the sanction of both the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, with a view to have the questions in the case settled. Margaret Morgan was the slave for life, under the laws of Maryland, of Margaret Ashmore, a citizen of that State. In 1832 she escaped and fled from the State into Pennsylvania. Edward Prigg, having been duly appointed the agent and attorney of Margaret Ashmore, and having obtained a warrant from a justice of the peace of York County, caused Margaret Morgan to be taken, as a fugitive from labor, by a constable of the State of Pennsylvania, before the magistrate, who refused to take cognizance of the case; and thereupon Edward Prigg carried her and her children into Maryland, and delivered them to Margaret Ashmore. The children were born in Pennsylvania; one of them, more than a year after Margaret Morgan had fled and escaped from Mary. land.

By the first section of the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 25th March, 1826, It is provided, that if any person shall by force and violence take and carry away, or shall by fraud or false pretense attempt to take, carry away, or seduce any negro or mulatto from any part of the Commonwealth. with a design or intention of selling and disposing of, or keeping or detaining such negro or mulatto as a slave or servant for life, or for any other term whatsover, such person, and all persons alding and abetting him, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall forfeit and pay a sum not less than five hundred nor more than three thousand dollars, and shall be seatenced to undergo a servitude for any term or terms of years, not less than seven years, nor exceeding twenty-one years; and shall be confined and kept at hard labor, etc. Other provisions are contained in the act; and it was passed in 1826, as declared in its title, to aid in carrying into effect the Constitution and laws of the United States, relating to fugitives from labor; and on the application to the Legislature, by commissioners from the State 540] of Maryland, with a view to meet the supposed wishes of the State of Maryland on the subJect of fugitive slaves; but it had failed to produce the good effects intended.

BY THE COURT: It will, probably be found. when we look to the character of the Constitution of the United States itself, the objects which it seeks to attain, the powers which it confers, the duties which it enjoins, and the rights which it secures as well as to the known historical fact that many of its provisions were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions: that no uniform rule of interpretation can be applied. which may not allow, even if it does not posi tively demand, many modifications in its actual application to particular clauses. Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be found

to be to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the light and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed. It is historically well known that the object of the clause in the Constitution of the United States relating to persons owing service and labor in one State escaping into other States, was to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property, in every State in the Union into which they might escape from the State where they were held in servitude. The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in all the slaveholding States; and, indeed, was so vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines and principles prevailing in the non-slaveholding States, by preventing them from intermeddling with or obstructing or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves. By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognize the state of slavery as to foreign slaves within its territorial dominions, when it is opposed to its own policy and institutions, in favor of the subjects of other nations where slavery is recognized. If it does it, it is as a matter of comity, and not as a matter of international right. The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and lim ited to the range of the territorial laws.

The clause in the Constitution of the United States relating to fugitives from labor, manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualified right, on the part of the owner of the slave, which no State law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. Any State law or regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the rights of the owner to the immediate command of his service or labor, operates pro tanta, a discharge of the slave therefrom. The question can never be how much he is discharged from, but whether he is discharged from any, by the natural or necessary operation of the State laws, or State regulations. The question is not one of quantity or degree, but of withholding or controlling the incidents of a positive right.

The owner of a fugitive slave has the same right to seize and take him in a State to which he has escaped or fled, that he had in the State from which he escaped; and it is well known that this right to seizure or recapture is universally acknowledged in all the slaveholding States. The court have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that under and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of the slave is clothed with the authority in [*541 every State of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, wherever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or illegal violence. In this sense, and to this extent, this clause in the Constitution may properly be said to execute itself, and to require no aid from legislation, State or national.

The Constitution does not stop at a mere annun. clation of the rights of the owner to seize his absconding or fugitive slave in the State to which he may have fled. If it had done so, it would have left the owner of the slave, in many cases, utterly without any adequate redress.

The Constitution declares that the fugitive slave shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom service or labor may be due. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable, to read this language, and not to feel that it contemplated some further remedial redress than that which might be administered at the hand of the owner himself. "A claim" is to be made.

"A claim," in a just, juridical sense, is a demand of some matter as of right, made by one person upon another to do or to forbear to do some act or thing, as a matter of duty.

It cannot well be doubted that the Constitution requires the delivery of the fugitive on the claim of the master; and the natural inference certainly Is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle applicable to all cases of this sort would seem to be, that where the end is required, the means are given; and waere the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is intrusted.

The clause relating to fugitive slaves is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any State. It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that the States are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the necessary conclusion is, that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, executive, or judiciary, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the right and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution.

A claim to a fugitive slave is a controversy in a case, "arising under the Constitution of the United States," under the express delegation of judicial power given by that instrument. Congress, then, may call that power into activity, for the very purpose of giving effect to the right; and if so, then it may prescribe the mode and extent to which it shall be applied, and how and under what circumstances the proceedings shall afford a complete protection and guaranty of the right.

Union. The owner has the same security, and the same remedial justice, and the same exemption from State regulations and control, through however many States he may pass with the fugitive slaves in his possession, in transitu, to his domicil. The court are by no means to be understood, in any maner whatever, to doubt or to interfere with the police power belonging to the States, in virtue of their general sovereignty. That police power extends over all subjects within the territorial limits of the States, and has never been conceded to the United States. It is wholly distinguishable from the right and duty secured by the provision of the Constitution, relating to fugitive slaves; which is exclusively derived from the Constitution, and obtains its whole efficiency therefrom.

The court entertain no doubt whatsoever that the States, in virtue of the general police power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and to remove them from their borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against their depredations, and evil example, as [543 they certainly may do in cases of idlers, vagabonds, and paupers. The rights of the owners of fugitive slaves are in no just sense interfered with or regulated by such a course; and in many cases they may be promoted by the exercise of the police power. Such regulations can never be permitted to interfere with or obstruct the just rights of the owner to reclaim his slave derived from the Constitution of the United States, or with the remedies prescribed by Congress to aid and enforce the

same.

The act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania upon which the indictment against Edward Prigg is founded, is unconstitutional and vold. It purports to punish as a public offense against the State the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold.

IN error to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl

The provisions of the sections of the Act of Congress of 12th February, 1793, on the subject of fugitive slaves, as well as relative to fugitives from Justice, cover both the subjects; not because they exhaust the remedies, which may be applied by Congress to enforce the rights, if the provisions shall be found, in practice, not to attain the objects of the Constitution; but because they point out all the modes of attaining those objects which Congress have as yet deemed expedient and proper. If this is so, it would seem upon just principles of construction that the legislation of Congress, if constitutional, must supersede all State legislation upon the same subject; and by necessary implication prohibit it. For if Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and they do actually regulate it in a given manner, and 542*] in a certain form, it cannot be that the State Legislatures have a right to interfere. This doctrine was fully recognized in the case of HousThe defendant in error, Edward Prigg, with ton v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 1, 21, 22. Where Congress have exclusive power over a subject, it Nathan S. Bemis, Jacob Forward, and Stephen Is not competent for State legislation to add to Lewis, Jun., were indicted by the Grand Jury the provisions of Congress on that subject. Congress have, on various occasions, exercised of York County, Pennsylvania, for that, on the powers which were necessary and proper, as means first day of April, 1837, upon a certain negro to carry into effect rights expressly given, and du- woman named Margaret Morgan, with force tles expressly enjoined by the Constitution. The and violence they made an assault, and with end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary implication that the means to accomplish force and violence feloniously did take and It are given also; or, in other words, that the pow-carry her away from the County of York, wither flows as a necessary means to accomplish the in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to the The constitutionality of the act of Congress re- State of Maryland, with a design and intention lating to the fugitives from labor has been affirmed there to sell and dispose of the said Margaret by the adjudications of the State tribunals, and by Morgan, as and for a slave and servant for life. those of the courts of the United States. If the Edward Prigg, one of the defendants, having question of the constitutionality of the law were one of doubtful construction, such long acquies- been arraigned, pleaded not guilty. cence in it, such contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and uniform recognitions, would, in the judgment of the court, entitle the question to be considered at rest. Congress, the executive, and the judiciary, have, upon various occasions, acted upon this as a sound and reasonable doctrine.

end.

The provisions of the act of 12th February, 1793, relative to fugitive slaves, is clearly constitutional in all its leading provisions: and, indeed, with the exception of that part which confers authority on State magistrates, is free from reasonable doubt or difficulty. As to the authority so conferred on State magistrates, while a difference of opinion exists, and may exist on this point in different States, whether State magistrates are bound to act under it. none is entertained by the court, that State magistrates may, if they choose, exercise the authority, unless prohibited by State legislation.

The power of legislation in relation to fugitives from labor, is exclusive in the national Legisla

ture.

The right to seize and retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in whatever State of the Union they may be found, is under the Constitution recognized as an absolute positive right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by State sovereignty, or State legislation.

The right and duty are co-extensive and uniform In remedy and operation throughout the whole

The cause was tried before the Court of Quarter Sessions of York County, on the 22d day of May, 1839; and the jury found the following special verdict:

"That at a session of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, holden at the city of Philadelphia, on the first day of March, 1780, the following law was passed and enacted, to wit: "An Act for the gradual abolition of slavery:

"1. Sec. III. All persons, as well negroes and mulattoes as others, who shall be born within this State, shall not be deemed and considered as servants for life, or slaves; and all servitude for life, or slavery of children in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all children born within this State from and after the passing of this act as aforesaid, shall be, and hereby is, utterly taken away, extinguished, and forever abolished.

"2. Sec. IV. Provided always, that every negro and mulatto child born within [*544 this State after the passing of this act as aforesaid (who would, in case this act had not been

made, have been born a servant for years, or life, or a slave), shall be deemed to be, and shall be, by virtue of this act, the servant of such persons, or her or his assigns, who would in such case have been entitled to like relief in case he or she shall be evilly treated by his or her master or mistress, and to like freedom, dues, and other privileges, as servants bound by indenture for four years are or may be entitled; unless the person to whom the service of any such child shall belong, shall abandon his or her claim to the same; in which case the overseers of the poor of the city, township, or district respectively, where such child shall be so abandoned, shall by indenture bind out every child so abandoned, as an apprentice, for a time not exceeding the age hereinbefore limited for the service of such children.

of death shall be pronounced against a slave, the jury before whom he or she shall be tried, shall appraise and declare the value of such slave; and in case such sentence be executed, the court shall make an order on the State Treasurer, payable to the owner for the same, and for the costs of prosecution; but in case of remission or mitigation, for the costs only.

"7. Sec. IX. The reward for taking up runaway and absconding negro and mulatto slaves and servants, and the penalties for enticing away, dealing with, or harboring, concealing or employing negro and mulatto slaves and servants, shall be the same, and shall be recovered in like manner, as in case of servants bound for four years.

"9. Sec. XI. (Repealed 25th March, 1826.) "Sec. XII. And whereas attempts may be made to evade this act, by introducing into this State negroes and mulattoes bound by covenant to serve for long and unreasonable terms of years, if the same be not prevented. Therefore,

"8. Sec. X. No man or woman, of any nation or color, except the negroes and mulat"3. Sec. V. Every person who is or shall be toes who shall be registered as aforesaid, shall the owner of any negro or mulatto slave or at any time hereafter be deemed adjudged or servants for life, or till the age of thirty-one holden, within the territories of this Commonyears, now within this State, or his lawful at- wealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as torney, shall, on or before the first day of No- free men and free women; except the domestic vember next, deliver or cause to be delivered slaves attending upon delegates in Congress in writing to the clerk of the peace of the from the other American States, foreign mincounty, or to the clerk of the Court of Sessionsisters and consuls, and persons passing through of the city of Philadelphia, in which he or she or sojourning in this State, and not becoming shall respectively inhabit, the name and sur-resident therein, and seamen employed in ships name and occupation or profession of such not belonging to any inhabitant of this State, owner, and the name of the county and town-nor employed in any ship owned by any such ship, district or ward wherein he or she resid- inhabitant; provided, such domestic slaves eth; and also the name and names of any such shall not be alienated or sold to any inhabitant, slave and slaves, and servant and servants for nor (except in the case of members of Congress, life, or till the age of thirty-one years, within *foreign ministers and consuls) retained [*546 this State, who shall be such on the said first in this State longer than six months. day of November next, from all other persons; which particulars shall by said clerk of the sessions and clerk of the said city court, be entered in books to be provided for that purpose by the said clerks; and no negro or mulatto now within this State shall from and after the said first day of November, be deemed a slave or servant for life, or till the age of thirty-one "10. Sec. XIII. No covenant of personal years, unless his or her name shall be entered servitude or apprenticeship whatsoever, shall as aforesaid on such records, except such negro be valid or binding on a negro or mulatto for or mulatto slaves and servants as are herein a longer time than seven years, unless such serafter excepted; the said clerk to be entitled to vant apprentice were, at the commencement of a fee of two dollars for each slave or servant such servitude or apprenticeship, under the age so entered as aforesaid, from the treasury of of twenty-one years; in which case such negro the county, to be allowed to him in his accounts. or mulatto may be holden as a servant or ap"4. Sec. VI. Provided always, that any per-prentice, respectively, according to the cove545*] son in whom the "ownership or right to nant, as the case shall be, until he or she shall the service of any negro or mulatto shall be attain the age of twenty-eight years, but no vested at the passing of this act, other than longer. such as are herein before excepted, his or her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, and all and every of them, severally, shall be liable to the overseer of the poor of the city, township, or district to which any such negro or mulatto shall become chargeable, for such necessary expense, with costs of suit thereon, as such overseers may be put to, through the neglect of the owner, master, or mistress of such negro or mulatto, notwithstanding the name and other descriptions of such negro or mulatto shall not be entered and recorded as aforesaid, unless his or her master or owner shall, before such slave or servant obtain his or her twentyeighth year, execute and record in the proper county, a deed or instrument securing to such slave or servant his or her freedom.

"6. Sec. VIII. In all cases wherein sentence

"Sec. XIV. That this act or anything herein contained shall not give any relief or shelter to any absconding or runaway negro or mulatto slave or servant, who has absconded himself or shall abscond himself from his or her owner, master or mistress, residing in any other State or country; but such owner, master or mistress shall have like right and aid to demand, claim, and take away his slave or servant, as he might have had in case this act had not been made; and that all negro and mulatto slaves now owned and heretofore resident in other States, who have absconded themselves or been clandestinely carried away, or who may be employed abroad as seamen, and have not absconded or been brought back to their owners, masters, or mistresses before the passing of this act, may within five years be registered as

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