To this question we have the answer of this court. It was for a long time doubted whether the mere grant to Congress of the power to make bankrupt laws did not exclude the States from the exercise of any power over the same subject. In the case of Green v. Sarmiento, 3 Wash. C. C. R. Judge Washington decided that it did. In the cases of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat., and Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., this court decided that it did not; but with more dissenting voices than are to be found to any decision ever made by this court, the number of judges considered. But in the first case the counsel on both sides admitted, and in the last two all the judges either took it for granted or expressly declared, that if Congress had legislated upon the subject, there would have been an end to all State legislation upon it. It is asked, where is the difference in the principle between that case and this? But it is said that the plea in this case opposes nothing to the record. It admits the original validity of the judgment, but says that by presumption of law it has been satisfied. operate only upon the administrator appointed in that State. 2. The judgment could claim no priority in the order of payment by Florence's administrator, because Florence was not dead when the judgment was obtained. 3. The order of distribution is not an effect of the judgment, but is the result of an independent provision of law, which might, or might not, benefit the judgment creditor upon the contingency of the debtor's dying before the judg. ment was satisfied. It is not disputed that, as a general rule, the validity of pleas is to be determined by the law of the place where the suit is brought, and not by the law of the place where the action originated. But in this instance the State of Georgia has surrendered her right to control the pleadings to Congress, who have forbidden the plea here urged. The law of Congress is, therefore, the law of the place where the suit is instituted. All this, the plea of nil debet admitted in Mills v. Duryee. The defendant did not deny that a judgment had been obtained; that it had been fairly obtained, and that it had never been satisfied; but he contended that it had lost its force by his change of residence, as it is said this has, by lapse of time. But this court over-putting judgments in one State upon a footing ruled the plea. By "presumption of" what "law" is the judgment satisfied? The law of Georgia. But where does Georgia get the authority to pass a law that shall in any manner affect a judgment of South Carolina? She confided this authority to Congress, and Congress has said that the law of South Carolina shall govern it everywhere. It is idle, therefore, to argue from the harmony of two laws, one of which can have no operation, whether good or bad. Again, it is answered that the argument would make it the duty of the courts of Georgia to issue execution upon the judgments of South Carolina; would give them a lien upon property in Georgia; and would require administrators to distribute intestates' effects, according to the laws of South Carolina. As to the first branch of the objection, it has been answered by this court in Mills v. Duryee. As to the second: a judgment which binds property in South Carolina ought to bind it everywhere. It is thought the law of Congress goes thus far. Why do mortgages made in one State bind property in another? Because the lex loci governs the contract, and the States cannot impair the obligation of contracts. Why should judgments bind property in like manner? Because the lex loci (under the act of Congress) governs judgments, and the States can not impair their force. As to the third: the argument leads to no 818*] such conclusion. Giving to the judg ment the same force and effect which it would have in South Carolina, does not involve the consequence that the statute of distributions of that State must be executed in Georgia, for several reasons. 1. That statute could operate only on effects of a deceased person, and Florence was in life while he remained in South Carolina. It could apply only to the effects of one who died in South Carolina. It could 180 If all the courts of the United States are bound to consider a judgment in one State as conclusive in every other; if before all courts of justice in the Union such a judgment is a domestic judgment, and nothing will be heard against it which goes to devest it of that character, surely an executor or administrator will not be permitted to degrade it. The cases referred to have been generally considered as with judgments in every other; as transforming them, in other words, into domestic judgments. 3 Story's Com. 509; Story's Confl. Laws, 509; Clarke's Administrator v. Day, 2 Leigh, 172; Wyman v. Mitchel, 1 Cow. R. 319. Are they domestic judgments for one purpose, and not for another? Domestic judgments in court, and foreign judgments out of court? In England, debts take rank in the course of administration, according to the character which the courts of justice give them. Thus, in Walker v. Wilter, 1 Doug. 1, and Dupleix v. Dekrovin, 2 Vern. 540, it was determined that foreign judgments were merely simple contract debts. Accordingly, Williams cites these authorities to show that they are to be so considered in the course of administration. 2 Williams's Ex. 658. The Supreme Court have decided that a judgment in one State, is to be considered as domestic judgment in every other. May not this authority be appealed to, to show what is its rank in the order of administration? Had the Legislature of Georgia expressly declared that judgments in the sister States should, to all intents and purposes, be considered as domestic judgments, there can be no doubt that they would then be admitted upon parity with domestic judgments in the distribution of assets. But Georgia has confided to Congress the power of making this dec- [*819 laration, and Congress has made it. Must not the consequences be the same? By the laws of Georgia, debts of a deceased person are to be paid in the following order: debts due by him as executor, administrator or guardian, Price Dig., p. 161, sec. 5; funeral expenses and other expenses of last sickness, Ibid. 157; charges of probate, or letters of administration; judgments, mortgages, and executions, the eldest first; rent, bonds, and other obligations; and lastly, open accounts. Promissory notes are not mentioned in these Peters 13. Mr. King, for the defendant: acts; but the Act of 1799, Prince, 211, declares | would be entitled to under like circumstances.” that "all bonds and other specialties and prom- 3 Story's Com. 675. issory notes, and other liquidated demands, etc., whether for money or other thing, shall be of equal dignity, and shall be negotiable by indorsement," etc. The judges of the State of Georgia have held, without a dissenting voice, it is believed, that this act places promissory notes on a footing with bonds and other specialties, in the order of distribution. The term "equal dignity" could not be satisfied without such a decision. Now, the record in this case shows, and the case stated shows, that the judgment here sued on was founded on a promissory note. Were the note here then alone, it would be considered a debt by specialty. And can it be possible that it is degraded by being carried into judgment? If the judgment be considered only a simple contract debt, this follows as a necessary consequence. The note, as has been often ruled, has been extinguished by the judgment. It would be a good defense to a suit upon it that a judgment has been rendered upon it in South Carolina. Hughes v. Blake, 1 Mason, 515; Green v. Sarmiento, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 17; 1 Pet. C. C. R. 74; Field v. Gibbs et al., 1 Pet. C. C. R. 155; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. R. 508. These decisions presuppose the judgment to be of higher dignity than the note; but if, as is contended, the judgment actually degrades the note, the position of the plaintiff is peculiarly unfortunate. His note is placed forever beyond his reach, and his dignified judgment is worth less. The plaintiff's counsel evidently mistakes the force and application of the authorities upon which he relies. The case of Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, decided nothing but a question of pleading, which depended on the "faith and credit" to be attached to the judgment, as evidence. Nil debet was a bad plea, because it contradicted the record, against which nothing could be averred. The defendant did owe, unless he could avoid the debt by some special plea perfectly consistent with the original debt. The plea of limitation admits the truth of the record. The case of Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheaton, 334, is only a short confirmation of the principle of the case cited. Though the language of the judge is more general, he clearly intended to decide nothing but the case before him, which was precisely similar to Mills v. Duryee, and involved no other question but the "faith and credit" due to the judgment as evidence, which decided the validity of the plea. The case in 2 Dallas is a similar case; and though the authority of all these cases, and others to the same point, is fully admitted, yet their application to this case is denied. We propose to make no issue with the plaintiff that would falsify his record. We give to that all the faith and credit to which it is entitled in the courts of Carolina. We give to it the dignity of the highest record proof. The plaintiff would have a right to insist on the same favor for his record, if barred by limitation laws in both States. In Toller's Law of Executors, 4th American edition, with notes by Ingraham, p. 262, there The case most in point cited by the plaintiff, is a note of a case in point, to this question, is the case of Morton & Co. v. Naylor, in 1 though no reference can be made to the book Hill's South Carolina Reports, 439. This is that contains it; indeed, it seems doubtful from the only case of the kind to be found; and its the note to the case, whether it has ever been authority is much weakened from the fact that reported. There it was held that judgments the point decided (so far as authority in this of a sister State stand upon a footing with case) was not necessarily before the court. The judgments in Pennsylvania, in the course of ad-only question there was as to the character of ministration. In Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 the debt: on that depended the application of Johns. R. 162, it was ruled that assumpsit the statute of limitations of South Carolina to would not lie in one State upon a judgment in it. In giving it its proper dignity, it was decidanother, because such a judgment is not a simple ed that there was no statute of limitations of contract debt, but a debt of record. Here the South Carolina which, in terms, applied to it. question is settled in terms, but not more ef- The decision was right in its results, but too fectually in principle, than by the decisions of general in its reasoning on points not necessarithe Supreme Court already cited. ly embraced in it. The judge says, "it would seem that, when authenticated, a recovery in another State should be regarded, for all purposes of evidence, as if the case were trying in the court where the judgment was recovered." But when the judge, from such prem- [*321 ises, came to the conclusion that no defense or plea could be insisted on, which would not have been good in the State where the judgment was rendered, he contradicted the decision in 4 M'Cord, 278, to which he referred, with approbation; a great variety of decisions on the subject of lien, distribution, judgments of discharge under local insolvent laws; and, in fact, overturned the fundamental principles govern It can hardly be considered as settled, even in England, that a foreign judgment is not conclusive between the parties to it and privies. Martin v. Nichols, 3 Simons, 458; 5 Cond. Eng. Ch. Rep. 198, and note to that case; Story's Confl. Laws, 506. 320*] To have one rule of pleading for citizens of Georgia and another for citizens of other States; to give creditors of the State an advantage over creditors of another State in the distribution of assets, is to violate the second section of the 4th article of the Constitution, which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and iming the application of the lex fori, not only recmunities of citizens in the several States." "The intention of this clause was to confer on the citizens of each State a general citizen ship, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State ognized by this court, but in the tribunals of nearly or quite all the States of the Union. It is a singular fact that after this broad position laid down by the judge, he does not dissent from the decision in 4 M'Cord; which, in the distribution of assets, places such judgments on a footing with simple contract debts. If, after a distribution on such principles, the defendant were to plead plene administravit to an action on the judgment, would the only question be whether such a plea would be good in the courts of the State where the judgment was rendered? It would be a waste of time to point out, by references and illustration, wherein the broad position, unnecessarily assumed in this case, is inconsistent with established principles and adjudged cases. Judge Harper, in concurring, showed his usual sagacity in saying, "I concur in the result." Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the acts of limitations of the several States form a rule of decision in this court, 3 Peters, 277; and the statute of limitations is clearly a law of the forum. Ibid., and Story's Conflict of Laws, 468, and 482, etc. In the case of The Bank of the United States v. Donnelly, 8 Peters, 372, the court says: "Remedies are to be governed by the laws of the country where the suit is brought." "The nature, validity, etc., of the contract may be admitted to be the same in both States; but the mode by which the remedy is to be pursued, and the time within which to be brought, may essentially differ." "The laws of Virginia must govern the limitation of suits in its own courts." not inconsistent with this deference for the record of a sister State. There can be no difference whatever in the application of the lex fori to actions brought on judgments, and actions brought on any other demand, except upon the mere question of proof. The record proves itself, instead of requiring other aids to verify it; but, when thus established, the State in which a remedy is pursued on it, is released from all further constitutional obligation to respect it, and the lex fori fully applies to it. Accordingly, in Gulick v. Lodges, 1 Green's Reports, 70, in an action upon a judgment obtained in Pennsylvania, Justice Ewing says: "We need make no inquiry into the rules for the limitation of actions in the State of Pennsylvania, where this judgment was obtained, since remedies are to be pursued," etc. Yet this judge sustained throughout the decisions cited by the plaintiff's counsel that the judgment was conclusive of everything verified by it. In the case of Jones v. Hook's Administrator, 2 Randolph Rep. 303, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that, in action of debt on a judgment obtained in North Carolina, the statute of limitations in North Carolina was no bar; but that the Act of Limitation of Virginia, if applicable, governed the remedy. The case receives additional weight by being cited with approbation by the court in the case of The United States Bank v. Donnelly, above cited. It cannot be necessary to pursue this branch of the subject. The doctrines of the plaintiff's The same principle is established and enforced with much clearness by the court in 2 Massachusetts Reports, 84, and 17 Mass. Rep. 55: where it is shown that the encroachment upon the lex fori insisted on, is altogether in-counsel would truly introduce "confusion and consistent with the necessity and convenience of every State in controlling remedies in its own courts. It is there decided that though the statute of limitations of New York, where the parties resided, and where the debt was contracted, had barred the remedy, yet, when resort was made to the courts of Massachusetts, the statutes of the latter State govern the remedy. Here the remedy is enlarged by a change; in other cases it may be contracted: but no other principle can be admitted, "otherwise great confusion and irregularity would be introduced in judicial proceedings," as properly remarked by Mr. Chief Justice Parker, in 13 Massachusetts Reports, 4. It was never the intention, nor, fairly interpreted, is it the effect of the Constitution, materially to interfere with the essential attributes 322*] *of the lex fori, so necessary to the administration of justice in every State. irregularity into judicial proceedings," altogether intolerable; and force upon the State courts as many different measures of justice as there are States in the Union. No representative of an estate could ever safely settle an estate and obtain letters dismissory. The State law limiting the time within which all claims should be presented, would amount to nothing unless there should be a similar law applicable to said judgments in other States, which would justify a similar protection against the judgment in the courts in the States where the judgment was obtained. To the authorities before cited, the decision of Judge Holt, judge of the Superior Court for the Middle Circuit of Georgia, on this very claim, sustaining the defendant fully on both pleas, [*323 will only be added. The record copy of this decision, provided for this court, has become mislaid. Confidence in the first plea will induce but By one clause, no law can be passed impair- limited attention to the second. If the plea ing the obligation of contracts; yet, if the be good, there is an end of the case. If the validity of the contract be recognized accord- plea be bad, the principle which condemns it ing to a fair interpretation of it, the good faith would send the plaintiff to Carolina for his intended to be enforced by this clause is se- law of priority; for no plea upon the laws of cured, and an act of limitation of the State priority in the State of Georgia would be good where the action is brought governs the remedy, "unless a similar plea could be pleaded in though in that State the obligation, in one sense, may be much impaired by it; so the Carolina." The absurdity of such a proposibenefits of the clause securing full faith and tion needs no comment. "The right of priorcredit in each State, to the records of every ity is extrinsic, and rather a personal privilege, other State, are fully enforced, when we admit dependent on the law of the place where the them as incontrovertibly true, or allow them property lies, and where the court sits which is to sustain all the averments proved by them in to decide the cause." Mr. Chief Justice the courts where obtained. This may be done Marshall, 5 Cr. 289. The plaintiff's counsel without infringing upon the right of every seems sensible to this, and therefore repudiates State to regulate the remedy by any limitations, the laws of Georgia in the one case, but adopts them in the other; though both are equally leges fori. The authorities cited by plaintiff's counsel on the second plea are not applicable. If the debt were not barred, it should claim under the laws of Georgia; and the question is, what rank it would hold. Does it rank as a domestic judgment? The courts of Georgia have uniformly not; and so did the Circuit Court, as will be seen from the statement of Judge Cuyler. The same decision has been made in South Carolina. Cameron v. Murtz, 4 M'Cord Rep. 278. The plaintiff's counsel says this decision is inconsistent with the cases in 7 Cranch and 3 Wheaton. Judge Nott did not think so; for he expressly recognizes those decisions. He also says that the decision in Carolina would now be different, as it is virtually overruled by the case of Morton and Naylor. Judge O'Neale did not think so, for he seems to agree with it and says, "that case does not touch the question to be decided in this;" and seems to think it also consistent with the decisions in 7 Cranch and 3 Wheaton. The plaintiff's counsel, then, in sustaining himself on the second plea, has to discredit the only authority that sustains him on the first. If, in the marshaling of assets and payment of debts in Georgia, under the laws of that State, this claim rank as a domestic judgment, it must be on the principle of lien, and would claim priority according to age. Thus, a demand discredited by the strongest presumptions, not upon the records of the State, and of which the people of the State could have no notice, would take precedence of judgments and mortgages recovered and recorded according to its own laws. The Constitution never imposed such absurdity and injustice upon the States. The most that can be possibly claimed for a judgment not barred under the laws of Georgia, is to rank it as a "liquidated demand," that will require no other proof than an authentication under the act of Congress. The second section of the fourth article of the Constitution has no application. The limitation acts on the subject matter of the suit, without regard to the citizenship of the parties interested. 324"] There is no hardship in allowing each State to control remedies in their own courts, with the admitted modifications; whilst endless confusion and injustice would arise from a refusal of this power. The lex loci contractus, and lex fori, forever remain with the contracting parties, in the State where the contract was made. The Bank of the United States v. Donnelly. But, if they resort to the courts of other States, they must subject themselves to the laws of the forum, which may extend or contract their remedy. The framers of the Constitution had confidence in the judgments of all the State tribunals, and therefore they extended to them "full faith and credit." They had confidence, also, that the remedies provided in each State would be reasonable, and they therefore mainly left them as they were. But the construction insisted on by the plaintiff's counsel would overrule the lex fori of one State by the lex fori of another; for his argument would have been the same if all the parties had lived in Georgia, and the debt had been contracted there. Mr. Justice Wayne delivered the opinion of the court: This cause has been brought to this court upon a certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the sixth Circuit Court, upon the following points: 1. Whether the statute of limitations of Georgia can be pleaded to an action in that State, founded upon a judgment rendered in the State of South Carolina. 2. Whether, in the administration of assets in Georgia, a judgment rendered in South Carolina upon a promissory note against the intestate, when in life, should be paid in preference to simple contract debts. Upon neither of these points does the court entertain doubt. Upon the first of them, we observe, though a judgment obtained in the court of a State is not to be regarded in the courts of her sister States as a foreign judgment, or as merely prima facie evidence of a debt to sustain an action upon the judgment, it is to be considered only distinguishable from a foreign judgment in this, that by the first section of the fourth article of the Constitution, and by the Act of May 26th, 1790, section 1, the judgment is a record, conclusive upon the merits, to which full faith and credit shall be given, when authenticated as the Act of Congress has prescribed. It must be obvious, when the Constitution declared that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State, and provides that Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof, that the latter clause, as it relates to judgments, was intended to provide the means of giving to them the conclusiveness of judgments upon the merits, when it is sought to carry them into judgments by suits in the tribunals of another State. The authenticity of a judgment and its effect, depend upon the law made in pursuance of the Constitution; the faith and credit due [*325 to it as the judicial proceeding of a State, is given by the Constitution, independently of all legislation. By the law of the 26th of May, 1790, the judgment is made a debt of record, not examinable upon its merits; but it does not carry with it, into another State, the efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by execution. To give it the force of a judgment in another State, it must be made a judgment there, and can only be executed in the latter as its laws may permit. It must be conceded that the judgment of a State court cannot be enforced out of the State by an execution issued within it. This concession admits the conclusion that, under the first section of the fourth article of the Constitution, judgments out of the State in which they are rendered are only evidence in a sister State that the subject matter of the suit has become a debt of record, which cannot be avoided but by the plea of nul tiel record. But we need not doubt what the framers of the Constitution intended to accomplish by that section, if we reflect how unsettled the doctrine was upon the effect of foreign judgments, or the effect, rei judicatæ, throughout Europe, in England, and in these States, when our first confedera record may be; and, consequently, are conclusive upon the defendant in every State, except for such causes as would be sufficient to set aside the judgment in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. In other words, as has been said by a commentator upon the Constitution: "If a judgment is conclusive in the State where it is pronounced, it is equally conclusive, everywhere, in the States of the Union. If reexaminable there, it is open to the same inquiries in every other State." Story's Com. 183. It is, therefore, put upon the footing of a domestic judgment, by which is meant not having the operation and force of a domestic judgment beyond the jurisdiction declaring it to be a merits of the claim, or subject matter of the suit. When, therefore, this court said, in Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481, "If it be a record, conclusive between the parties, it cannot be denied; but by the plea of nul tiel record," this language does not admit of the interpretation that a plea not denying the judgment, but which resists it upon the ground of a release, payment, or a presumption of payment, from the lapse of time, whether such presumption be raised by the common law prescription, or by a statute of limitation, may not be pleaded, any more than where this court, in Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheaton, 334, says: "The judg ment of a State court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the State court where it was pronounced; and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such State, and none others, could be pleaded in any court in the United States," is intended to exclude such defenses as have just been stated, or such as inquire into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment was given, to pronounce it as the right of the *State [*327 itself to exercise authority over the persons or the subject matter. It has been well said, "The Constitution did not mean to confer a new power of jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within the State." Story's Com. 183. tion was formed. On the Continent it was then, and continues to be, a vexed question, determined by each nation, according to its estimate of the weight of authority to which different civilians and writers upon the laws of nations are entitled. In England, it was an open question, having on both sides her eminent equity, common law, and ecclesiastical jurists. It may still be considered, in England, a controverted question, so far as jurists and elementary writers on the common law are concerned; though the adjudications of the English courts have now established the rule to be that foreign judgments are prima facie evidence of the right and matter they purport to decide. In these States, when colonies, the same un-judgment, but a domestic judgment as to the certainty existed. When our Revolution began and independence was declared, and the confederation was being formed, it was seen by the wise men of that day that the powers necessary to be given to the confederacy, and the rights to be given to the citizens of each State, in all the States, would produce such intimate relations between the States and persons that the former would no longer be foreign to each other in the sense that they had been, as dependent provinces, and that, for the prosecution of rights in courts, it was proper to put an end to the uncertainty upon the subject of the effect of judgments obtained in the different States. Accordingly, in the articles of confederation, there was this clause: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State." Now, though this does not declare what was to be the effect of a judgment obtained in one State in another State, what was meant by the clause may be considered as conclusively determined, almost by contemporaneous exposition. For when the present Constitution was formed, we find the same clause in 826*] troduced into it with but a slight variation, making it more comprehensive; and adding, "Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof;" thus providing in the Constitution for the deficiency which experience had shown to be in the provision of the confederation; as the Congress under it could not legislate upon what should be the effect of a judgment obtained in one State in the other States. Whatever difference of opinion there may have been as to the interpretation of this article of the Constitution in another respect, there has been none as to the power of Congress under it, to declare what shall be the effect of a judgment of a State court in another State of the Union. Here, again, we have contemporaneous legislative interpretation of the first section of the fourth article of the Constitution; for by the Act of 1790, May 26th, it was declared, "That the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or shall be taken. What faith and credit, then, is given in the States to the judgments of their courts? They are record evidence of a debt, or judgments of record, to be contested only in such way as judgments of Such being the faith, credit, and effect, to be given to a judgment of one State in another, by the Constitution and the act of Congress, the point under consideration will be determined by settling what is the nature of a plea of the statute of limitations. Is it a plea that settles the right of a party on a contract or judgment, or one that bars the remedy? Whatever diversity of opinion there may be among jurists upon this point, we think it well settled to be a plea to the remedy; and, consequently, that the lex fori must prevail. Higgins v. Scott, 2 Barn. & Adol. 413; 4 Cowen R. 528, note 10; Id. 530; Van Ramsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gillis R. 371; Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason R. 351; British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 Barn. & Cress. 903; De La Vega v. Veanna, 1 Barn. & Adol. 284; De Couche v. Savalier, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 190; Lincoln v. Battalle, 6 Wend. R. 475; Gulick v. Lodes, Green's New Jersey Rep. 68; 3 Burge's Com. on Col. and For. Laws, 883. The statute of Georgia is "that actions of debt on judgments obtained in courts other than the courts of this State, must be brought within five years after the |