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reconvention to be stricken out, to which Wil: offer on the part of the defendant to prove, un. cox excepted. This plea is authorized by the der the plea of general denial, a violation of Louisiana Code of Practice, which was adopted the contract sued on, by the plaintiffs, before by statute subsequent to the passage of the Act the commencement of the suit; and a failure of Congress of the 26th of May, 1824, regulat on their part to comply with its stipulations. ing the practice in the District Court of the This evidence was objected to by the plaintiffs, United States for the Eastern District of Loui- and excluded from the jury by the court. The siana, and which at the time of the trial had general rule is that the allegations in the annot been adopted as a rule of practice of that swer or plea and the proof must agree, and as court. It being a plea not authorized by the there were no averments in the plea to authorrules governing the practice of the court, it ize the proof, it was properly rejected by the was properly stricken out.
court. From the best consideration we have Three other bills of exceptions were taken been able to give to this case, it seems to us at the trial to the rulings of the court. By the there is no error in the record and proceedings first, it appears the plaintiffs offered to prove of the District Court. the signatures of the defendant Wilcox, and of The judgment is therefore affirmed with costs. the plaintiffs to the deed sued on. The defendant, Wilcox, objected to this evidence, because
This cause came on to be heard on the tran. it appeared by the deed that there were two script of the record from the District Court of subscribing witnesses to it. But the court the United States for the Eastern District of overruled the objection, and admitted the evi: | Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on condence upon the ground that as the deed was by this court that the judgment of the said
sideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged executed in the State of New York, it was fairly presumable that the subscribing witnesses hereby affirmed, with costs and damages at the
District Court in this cause be, and the same is resided there; and which was a sufficient reason for letting in secondary evidence to prove the rate of six per centum per annum. execution of the deed. When a contract is proved to have been made out of the State of Louisiana, having subscribing witnesses to it, the State courts presume that the witnesses
*ANN LUPTON, Appellant, [*881 reside at the place where the contract was made, and are not subject to the process of the PHINEAS JANNEY, Executor of David Lupcourt. They therefore allow secondary evidence ton, the younger, Deceased, Appellee. to prove the execution of the contract. 7 Martin's Rep. N. S. 542; 8 Martin's Rep. N. Stability of settlement of accounts in Orphans' S. 379, 12 Martin's Rep. 539. This being the
Court. settled doctrine of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the court below very properly permitted The executor of L. Aled his accounts in the Or the evidence to go to the jury.
phans' Court of Alexandria in 1816 and 1818, and
settled his final account in 1821. No exceptions But it is contended by the plaintiff's counsel were taken to the accounts. In November, 1831, a here that the contract having been made subpæna, was issued against the executor, and in in the State of New York, it ought, in all re
June, 1833, a bill was filed by the devisee and leg.
atee against the executor, the object of which spects, to be governed by the laws of that State.
was to surcharge and falsify the accounts filed and There is a material difference between the settled in the Orphans'. Court. The bill did not laws of New York and those of Louisiana, in charge the executor with fraud, but imputed neg. relation to the dignity of the instrument sued Ligence, which was alleged to amount to a devas:
No reason was given or facts stated to exon in the court below. Contracts made before cuse the long delay and laches in bringing the bill. a notary and two witnesses, called authentic Held, that the lapse of time from the settlement of
the accounts of the executor was a bar to this proacts, are, by the laws of the latter State ele. ceeding: vated above all others. A contract under seal Nothing is more clear than the general rule that does not appear to be of greater dignity there ex parte, settlements of accounts by executors in than one without seal. And those who sue in knowledged jurisdiction of the court in the adtheir courts must abide the consequences of ministration of estates, are prima facie evidence of these rules. The validity and interpretation their correctness, and the onus probandi is upon of contracts are to be governed by the laws of impeach them, it should be by a suit brought, re
If they seek to the country where they are made; but the rem centi facto, within a reasonable time, and at farth. edy must be according to the laws of the est within the period prescribed by the statute of
limitations for actions at law on matters of accountry where the suit is brought. 8 Peter's count; or else assign some ground of exception or Rep. 361.
disability within the analogy of the statute, to
Otherwise it will be By the second of these bills of exceptions, it justify or excuse the delay.
imputed to their voluntary laches, and relief will appears the plaintiffs offered to read the notes
not be given by a court of equity. included in the deed of trust, as evidence of the amount of debt due from the defendant Wid: 0 Number States for the County of Alexancox; to which he objected, because they had not been assigned to the plaintiffs by the payees. dria, in the District of Columbia. The objection was overruled by the court, and A bill was filed on a subpena which had 880*] the notes *read to the jury. If the ac-issued from the Circuit Court on the fifth day tion properly lay upon the deed of trust, to of November, 1831, by Ann Lupton, the sole which there appears to have been no objection devisee and legatee of David Lupton, the made, it was proper that the notes, which younger, for the purpose of surcharging and were included in the deed, and made a part of falsifying the accounts of the executor, Phineas it, should have been read to the jury. The Janney, which had been settled in three acthird and only remaining exception is, to the I counts rendered by him to and allowed by the
Orphans' Court of Alexandria. The first ac- on weighing the circumstances, to say if they count was rendered and was settled on the will grant or deny the relief. There is not and 26th of October, 1816. The second account there cannot be in the mere lapse of time a was settled on the 16th of April, 1818, and on peremptory bar, where no express statute of the 5th of January, 1821, the executor ren limitations governs the case. In discouraging dered and settled his final account. The bill stale demands for the peace of society, courts of the complainant was filed on the 4th day of of equity have established a necessary rule, but June, 1833.
that necessary rule is still a plastic one, suitThe complainant alleged that the executor able to cases as courts may judge it proper, the was chargeable with certain debts due to the necessity of its application depending on many estate of the testator, which he had failed to circumstances extrinsic and independent of the collect, and for goods of the estate sold by him, lapse of time. Thus equity will not close its the amount of which sales had not been paid doors in favor of a fraud, though time may to him. Certain credits had been given in the have long passed since it was committed. accounts of the executor to parties not entitled Where an executor's or administrator's accounts to them; and, in an amended bill, facts are have been settled in the proper court, ex-parte, charged which amounted to a devastavit, without notice to legatees or parties in distribuwhich it was alleged were not satisfactorily tion, the time within which a bill to contradicted by an amended answer. There *surcharge and falsify will be enter. ["383 was no imputation or charge of fraud in the ex- tained, is extended. Whether the original par. ecutor, but it was asserted that gross negligence ties to the transactions sought to be opened be was to be imputed to the executor, for which alive or dead, is another material considerahe was answerable de bonis propriis.
tion; in the former case the remedial functions The answers of the defendant denied all the of the Chancellor being more easy, and in the allegations in the complainant's bill, material latter case, less easy of access. to charge him as executor of David Lupton, the Notwithstanding, however, the pliability of younger.
the rule, and its adaptation to cases according 382*] *The defendant also pleaded in his to their exigency and inherent equity, the answer, an amended answer, as follows: courts have, in many cases where there were
"This respondent admits that the complain- no rebutting circumstances of presumption, in. ant was not present at, nor summoned to at timated, if not expressly fixed, a terminus to tend the said settlements. But he is advised this lapse of time. Thus they will in general and avers that the said settlements were legally presume the payment of a bond, the extinguish. made before a court having full jurisdiction in ment of a trust, and the surrender of a deed, the matter, in the due and regular exercise of after an acquiescence of twenty years by the its jurisdiction; and the respondent relies on parties in interest. A mortgage will be prethe said settlements in bar of the jurisdiction sumed discharged after the same lapse of time, of this court, as a court of original jurisdiction, and an adverse possession of twenty years will in the case stated by the complainant, in the bar a bill in equity for the conveyance of the same manner as if the same were specially legal title. Yet even this rule, if rule it strictpleaded."
ly be, is not inflexible. Courts frequently step Also, “This respondent is advised that an beyond its limits, in cases where an obvious Act of the General Assembly of the State of equity invokes its exception. Virginia, passed the 8th day of March, 1826, Should this rule apply to the case at bar! entitled 'An Act for the limitation of actions The appellant shows that at the time these acagainst persons acting in a fiduciary character, counts were settled in the Orphans' Court, she and their sureties, and other purposes,' is a resided out of the jurisdiction of the courts in complete bar to any proceedings against him in the District of Columbia ; that she was the sole that State, and was so when the said amended legatee of her husband the testator; that the bill was filed.”
executor whom she now seeks to charge was a In November, 1838, the Circuit Court made brother-in-law of the testator, and that she had & decree dismissing the complainant's bill, unbounded confidence in him; that his execu. from which decree this appeal was prosecuted. torial accounts were all settled ex-parte, and
The case was argued by Mr. Semmes for the without notice of any kind to her. She shows appellant, and by Mr. Jones, with whom was acts of gross omission to collect debts, and cul. Mr. Coxe, for the appellee.
pable negligence on the part of the executor Mr. Semmes argued the cause on all the mat. amounting to a devastavit. She shows that he ters contained in the bill; but the court having has lost from ten to fifteen thousand dollars to decided the case on the limitation imposed by her husband's estate by his neglect. More. time on the complainant's right to recover, the over, the original parties are all alive—the ap: srgument on the point decided is alone given. pellant, the legatee, and cestui que trust, and Mr. Semmes, for the appellant:
the appellee, the executor, and trustee. The In reference to the ground of defense as- lapse of time, from the settlement of the final sumed in the amended answer—that the lapse account to the issue of the subpæna, is ten of time intervening between the settlement of years and ten months—to the filing of the bill the respondent's accounts and the institution of about twelve years. The lapse of time, from this suit is a bar to any decree for opening the devastavit charged to the filing of the bill, those accounts—it may be observed that the is about sixteen years. general rule under which equity denies a stale It is not necessary to cite authorities in redemand is not indiscriminate or universal in gard to the defense against stale demands, nor its application; time is not alone sufficient. to show the various modifications that doctrino Every case is to be decided on its own basis, has undergone in its application to different and it is in the sound discretion of the court, cases. One or two cases from Virginia may,
however, be quoted, as ruling the present ques. All the matters set up in the complainant's tion. The courts of that State allow an exec- bill were proper for examination on exceptions utor's accounts to be opened after a much to the accounts of the executor in the Orphans' greater lapse of time than twenty years, and Court; and will the court, after twelve years of even after the death of the original parties. In silence, allow a party--passing by the Orphans' Burwell's Executors v. Anderson's Administra- Court, and neglecting to use the means of retors, etc., 3 Leigh, 348, the court held lapse of dress which that court would have afforded for time no bar, though thirty-one years had passed any misfeasance or omissions of the executorsince the first testator's death. The executor to come into the Circuit Court by an original of the distributee of the testator's widow was bill, and set up these matters? When a techallowed to file his bill against the representa- nical *devastavit is charged against an (*385 tives of the executor of the first testator, sur- executor, without an allegation of fraud, it is a charging and falsifying the accounts which tort, and there is a limitation. This is not had been settled, after a la pse of thirty-one claimed to be the rule in cases of fraud. years, and time was held no bar. The cases of The court declined hearing Mr. Coxe for the 384*] Hudson *et al. v. Hudson's Executor, appellee. 3 Rand. 117, and Todd et ux. v. Moore's Administrator, 1 Leigh, 457, though the relief prayed Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of was denied under the peculiar circumstances, the court: establish the general principle for which we This is a case of an appeal from a decree of contend.
the Circuit Court of the County of Alexandria, Mr. Jones, for the appellee, contended that dismissing a bill in equity brought by the apeven if the matter of the bill came at all with. pellant, Ann Lupton, the widow and devisee of in the cognizance of the Circuit Court for orig: the testator, David Lupton. The bill was first inal relief in equity, yet neither the bill itself
, filed in June, 1833, although a subpæna was nor anything disclosed in the progress of the issued in November, 1831, and it seeks to open cause lays any sufficient foundation for the in the accounts of the administration, upon the terference of equity in the matter; but, on the allegation of certain errors and omissions therecontrary, all the pretenses for charging the ex- in, as they were settled in three successive acecutor by surcharging and falsifying the past counts of the executor, rendered ex parte, and settlement in the Orphans' Court, are strictis. allowed in the Orphans' Court of Alexandria, simi juris, at best; and it is positively uncon in October, 1816; in April, 1818; and in Januscientious and inequitable for the complainant ary, 1821. The bill charges, among other to set up after her long acquiescence, with things, that the estate was charged by the exec. actual notice and knowledge of the circum. utor with the payment of a supposed debt of stances that give color to the principal objec- $4,459.43, to one Peter Saunders, without any tions now raised against the past settlement. sufficient or legal evidence that it was in fact
2. That far less than the actual length of due. It also charges that the executor omitted time during which she implicitly acquiesced in to collect of John M'Pherson & Son a debt due the settlement before she filed her bill, would, to the estate of $4,083.50, upon their note, under the circumstances of the case, have pre- and also specifies certain credits which have sented a positive bar in equity to charges been omitted to be given by the executor; and against the executor, so strictly penal in their contains a general allegation that other debts grounds and their consequences, calling for for. have been lost to the estate by the negligence feiture rather than restitution; and so of the executor. The prayer of the bill is in tirely clear of all imputation of fraud, as those effect to open the accounts, with general liberty upon which alone she has founded her claims. to surcharge and falsify. There is no charge
The settlements in the Orphans' Court, made in the bill that the executor has been guilty of by the executor, are prima facie evidence of any fraud, nor any reason given, nor facts their correctness. This is on the supposition stated, to excuse the long delay and laches in that the parties interested in them had notice bringing the bill. The answer denies all of the settlements. If they had not notice, or it equity, and insists upon the correctness of the was not supposed they had had notice, the ac accounts as settled, and contains a full explacounts would not have been allowed to be filed. nation, in reply to the specific charges of the There was notice. The time of settlement of bill. It also relies on the settlement of the acthe accounts of an executor is fixed and limit- counts in the Orphans' Court, and the lapse of ed. This is sufficient to show that every one time, as a bar to the suit. who had an interest in the accounts had a The opinion which we have formed upon knowledge of them, or might have known of this last point renders it wholly unnecessary their having been filed. At all times the ac for us to consider several others which have counts were open to the inspection of anyone been discussed at the bar; and especially the who might think proper to examine them. objection that the Orphans' Court has exclu
Sixteen and a half years from the settlement sive jurisdiction over the matters in controof the first account, and twelve and a half from versy. We place this case wholly upon the the filing of the final account, had elapsed be ground of the lapse of time since the accounts fore the bill in this case was exhibited. While were settled in the Orphans' Court, a period it is admitted that as to persons acting in a from twelve to sixteen years before the filing fiduciary character there is no limitation in of the bill; the total omission of the bill to cases of fraud, this principle does not apply state any facts or circumstances to account when no fraud is charged; and none is charged for or excuse this long delay; and the absence or imputed in this case. It is contended that of any suggestion of fraud in the settlements. after a reasonable time, the settlement in the Nothing is more clear than the general rule Orphans' Court, by the executor, is a bar. that ex-parte settlements of accounts of this
sort, in the Orphans' Court, being matters with stranded vessel, exists also as to her rigging and in the acknowledged jurisdiction of the court in salls, which he may have stripped from her, after the administration of estates, are prima facie the vessel in his own judyment, and that of those evidence of their own verity and correctness; competent to form an opinion and to advise, can. and the onus probandi is upon those who seek not be delivered from her peril.
If the master sells without good faith, cr with. to impeach them. If they seek to impeach out a sound discretion, the owner may, against the them, it should be by a suit brought recenti purchaser, assert his right of property in the sails 386*] facto, within a reasonable time; *and and figging; as be may in the case of a st:anded at furthest, within the period prescribed by pressen, akhich has been sold without good falth in the statute of limitations for actions at law The court do not think the case of Smith v. upon matters of account; or else to assign Briddle, 2 Washington c. c. R. 150, sound law.
It is expressed in terms too broad. some ground of exception or disability, within the analogy of the statute, to justify or ex: cuse the delay. Otherwise it will be imputed A Ped States for the District of Massachu
of . to their own voluntary laches, and courts of
setts. equity, are never active in lending their aid to stale and neglected claims, for the known the United States for the District of Massachu
In September, 1834, in the District Court of maxim of such courts is, vigilantibus, non dor. mientibus leges subveniunt. We do not deem setts, the New England Insurance Company it necessary to refer to any authorities on this filed a libel stating that they were the true point, as it has been so long and so fully rec.
owners of the brig Sarah Ann, then in the ognized in this court; and upon this short of Obadiah Woodbury and others, claiming to.
district of Massachusetts, and in the possession ground, we are all of opinion that the decree be the owners of the said brig, and who are of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill ought about to carry her to sea without the consent to be affirmed with costs.
of the libelants. This cause came on to be heard on the transscript of the record from the Circuit Court of
A summons was issued to Obadiah Wood. the United States for the District of Columbia,
bury and others, commanding them to apholden in and for the County of Alexandria, pear and show cause why process should not and was argued by counsel; on consideration issue against the brig, as prayed for in the whereof, it is ordered and decreed by this libel; and they appeared, and gave stipulations court that the decree of the said Circuit Court to abide by the final decree of the court, on in this cause be, and the same is hereby af- an appeal, and put in an answer to the libel. firmed with costs.
The case was proceeded in by the libelants and the respondents in the District Court, and after testimony had been taken to the matters in controversy, a pro forma decree for the re
spondents, dismissing the libel, was given by 387') "THE NEW ENGLAND INSUR- the district judge, by the consent of the counANCE COMPANY,
sel of both parties; and the libelants appealed
to the Circuit Court of the United States for THE BRIG SARAH ANN,
the District of Massachusetts.
Further evidence was taken in the Circuit Woodbury et al, Claimants.
Court by the appellants, and the defendants,
and at May Term, 1835, the Circuit Court gave Power of master to sell stranded vessel.
*a decree in favor of the defendants [*388
from which the New England Insurance ComThe right of the master to sell a vessel stranded, depends on the circumstances under which It is pany prosecuted this appeal. done to justify it. The master must act in good
The facts of the case were as follows: faith, and exercise bis best discretion for the bene On the first day of March, 1828, the appel. At of all concerned ; and a sale can only be made lants, at Boston, underwrote a policy of insuron the compulsion of a necessity, to be determined in each case by the actual perll to which the vessel ance on the brig Sarah Ann, valued at four Is exposed, and from which it is probable, in the thousand dollars, in port, and at sea, during opinion of persons competent to judge, the vessel | the term of one year, from the 22d of Febru. cannot be saved.
The true criterion for determining the authority ary, 1828. On the 25th of March, 1828, the of the master to sell a vessel stranded near a for- brig was stranded on the shore of the island of elgo port, or in a port of the United States, or of a Nantucket, and on the following day an aban. ditterent state than that to which the vessel belongs, or in which the owners may be or reside donment was made by the owners for a total when the necessity occurs, is the distance of the loss by the perils of the sea. The abandonment owners or insurers from the scene of stranding. If by the ordinary means to convey intelligence of
was expressly refused by the assurers, but it the situation of the vessel the master can obtain
was not withdrawn by the owners of the vesdirections as to what he should do, he should re- sel; and on the third of October, 1828, a com. sort to those means. But if the peril is such that promise was made between them and the as. there is a probability of loss, and it is made more hazardous by every day's delay, the master may surers, and all the right and title of the assur. act promptly to save something for the benefit of ers in the brig was assigned to the appellants. all concerned, though but little can be saved. There The claimants of the brig, the appellees, asis no way of doing so more effectual than by exposing the vessel to sale ; by which the enterprise serted a title derived under a sale made by the of such men is brought into competition as are ac master after the stranding, on the ground of customed to encounter such risks, and who know from experience how
an absolute necessity for such a sale. to estimate the probable proats of such adventures.
In May, 1828, the brig was brought into Bos. The power of the master to sell the bull of the ton, after having been gotten off from the shore NOTI.-Power of master to sell vessel, see note
at Nantucket, and having been repaired. The to 15 L ed. U. 8. 618
repairs of the brig, and her cost at the sale
made by the master, amounted to twenty-four master, at public auction where she lay, for hundred and ninety-four dollars and sixty- $127; at the same time the spars, sails, and seven cents, and she was sold in Boston, in rigging were sold for $422.40. "No efforts ap. July, 1828, for $2,736.41. On the 14th of May, peared to have been made to get the brig off 1828, the president of the insurance company the shore, though she had not then sustained wrote to the agent of the former owners of the any serious injury. Three intelligent survey. brig, the assured, stating that the brig was ors, at a subsequent period, estimated the rethen in Boston, and saying, “As she is now pairs of her hull as not exceeding $492.25. The within your own control, as agent for the brig was got off by the purchasers soon after owners, if you do not take possession of her in the sale, and was carried to the port of Nantheir behalf, the company must consider the tucket and there repaired. The whole cost of sale of her at Nantucket as affirmed by them; the brig to the purchasers including the repairs, and that she is sold for their account. We, of and out fits to Boston, was represented to have course, shall contest the validity of the sale been, $2,494.67; and she was sold under the as it regards ourselves, and we think the own order of the purchasers, as stated, at Boston, ers ought to contest it themselves."
in July, 1828, for $2,736.41." At this time the title to the brig was in con- The case was submitted to the court, on test between the assured and the assurers. The printed arguments, by Mr. Pickering for the abandonment was denied to be good, and appellants, and by Mr. Saltonstall for the apneither party was in a situation to assert a title pellees. without compromitting rights then actually in
The argument for the appellants stated: contestation. There were no allegations or proofs in the cause that after the final accept- not such as to require or justify a sale of the
The appellants contend that this case was ance of the abandonment, in October, 1828, the vessel by the master, upon the alleged ground brig had been within the ports of Massachu: of necessity, as the owners' agent and the un. setts, and within the reach of the process of derwriters were in Boston, and there was an the court for a reasonable time, within the easy and regular communication by mail be. knowledge of the appellants. The facts of the case, as stated in the protest, where the vessel was ashore; and they might
tween Boston and the island of Nantucket, and as detailed in the decree of Mr. Justice and ought to have been consulted by the masStory, in the Circuit Court (2 Sumner, 213); ter before making such sale. were: “The brig having on board a cargo of rice and cotton, sailed on a voyage from Savan- for example, hypothecation by the master in
In cases resting upon the same principles, nah for Boston, and on the 23d of March, 1828, was stranded on the southwest side of the is: cases of necessity, the rule laid down by the land of Nantucket. On the next day assistance English courts is that the master can hypothewas obtained from the shore, and the anchors cate only when the vessel is in some other were got out and hove tight, in order to start
an English port. No English the vessel, but without success. In the course * case, it is believed, can be found, in 1*390 of the forenoon the wreck master came
which the master has been authorized to do it board, with twenty men, and pursuant to his while in England; the English writers condirections, the deck load was thrown over sider that every port in England is a home 389") board. They then hove the cables port, and the residence of the English owner. again, but with no beneficial effect. They then
The learned author (Abbott on Shipping, proceeded to open the hatches and discharge 123) adds that Ireland has been held to be a the cargo from the hold; and then hove out the foreign country, but that since the union it is cables again, but to no purpose, as the tide had doubtful whether the rule is not altered. See, fallen, and there was a considerable surf rolling also, the case of The Lavinia, Barclay, before in shore.
Mr. Justice Washington, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 49. The captain and crew remained on board So in cases of the lien of material men, the that night, and the day following nothing courts of the United States have held 'that could be done, as the wind blew strong at the when a vessel was repaired in a port of a southeast, and there was a heavy surf. After State to which she did not belong, there was a the weather moderated, the cargo was, with lien by the general marine law; but if the regreat difficulty, got on shore. The protest pairs were made in her own State, there was stated that the wind and the surf of the sea no lien, unless established by the local laws of had driven the brig so far on shore as to render such State. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; it impossible to get her off.
4 Peters's Cond. Rep. 439. It further appeared from the evidence that As to the necessity of the sale, generally, it the place where the brig was stranded was on is a prominent fact that the vessel was got off a sandy beach, about twelve miles distant by very soon after she was sold on the sandy sea, and six miles by land, from the town of shore, which was a smooth beach without any Nantucket; and that the brig was at no time rocks, and she was immediately repaired and high and dry there. The depth of the water fitted for sea again. about her varied; sometimes it was six feet,
The brig Pearl, 2 Sumner's Rep. 217, to and sometimes it was ten feet, and she was at no time of tide out of water. The cargo was
which the Circuit Court alludes in giving the discharged in about five days, and the spars, opinion of the case at the bar, was stranded Bails, and rigging were then stripped off and nearly in the same place with the Sarah Ann, carried on shore, and sold in small lots to the and lay there through the winter, and was got highest bidder. After the cargo was sold, the off following spring. Several other vesbrig became loose in the sand, and slewed sels which went ashore on the same island have round, and lay with her broad-side to the shore. been got off, as appears by the depositions in She was sold on the 28th of March, by the the case.