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the inquisition under the elegit the property is therefore no lien-viz., on the 12th day of Auplaced in the hands of the creditor, who takes gust in the year 1827. Reuben Burton conall the profits of it, paying therefor a fair an veyed the property to trustees for the benefit nual rent, to be applied as a credit against his of his creditors. In the month of December, in claim; and of the portion thus placed in his the year 1829, more than two years after the hands no one has a right to share the profits rendition of the judgments, during the whole of with him. If this may be done in favor of the which time no attempt was made to enforce the creditor of one child, it may be done for the judgment as against the coal lands by the apcreditors of each; and if two elegits issue at pellees—who are among the creditors enumeratthe same time against the same defendant, ed as the persons for whose benefit the deed of they take not a moiety but the whole: and trust is made-a sale of the subject is made thus the widow who has renounced her claim under the deed of trust by public auction, and to dower in the other lands of her husband, and the appellant became the purchaser. No step thereby suffered them to pass away from her, uad been taken, or any act done by the appel is to be again ousted and deprived of the an- lees indicating their dissent from the deed of nuity, in consideration of which, in great part, trust, nor was any such step taken until the she has made her relinquishment under an month of September, in the year 1834, more agreement with the heirs, which is obligatory than seven years after the judgment was renupon them, and as effectual to charge the prop dered. In the answer, all knowledge of the erty with the rights of the doweress as any judgment of the plaintiff, as affecting the coal which could have been resorted to. It is not property at least, is denied; the impression, it necessary to the validity of an assignment of seems, being that an elegit had been levied updower that it should be registered: i. e., re on other lands, and it is thought the evidence corded as a conveyance. If it is, however, and sustains the answer. this agreement is to be affected by the failure Certainly the answer is not overthrown by to register (although as to one of the parties the requisite degree of proof-there being only it was fully proved, being acknowledged, and one witness to oppose it; and that witness is should have been recorded), then it cannot opposed in his present recollections by his own diminish the rights of the widow, and the written statement made at the time of the sale. argument upon the hypothesis that no assign The appellant stands, then, in the position of ment has been made, applies.
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, of If land is subject to a trust for the use of a property upon which the appellees had acquired grantor and another, e. g., to raise an annuity, no lien, and to which, with equal equity, the and a judgment is rendered against the grantor, appellant holds the legal title. In such a case, the land cannot be taken by elegit. Doe ex the purchaser is entitled to the protection of a dem. Hull, v. Green Hill, 4 Barnwell & Alder- court of equity: but if he is not, he is certainson, 684. In the present case the land was subo ly not the proper object for the vindictive exerject to a trust, and one of the uses charged cise of its power, and the court of equity will upon it was to raise an annuity. The agree leave the adversary creditor to his legal rights. ment here being a case of dower, was as valid Sugden on Vendors, sec. 5, 338-344, and the to charge it as any form of conveyance, and so opinion of Judge Green in Coutts v. Walker, 2 to protect it; the reason is the same in each— Leigh's Reports, 268. The space allowed in the right of the annuitant.
this form of argument will not permit a comWhat, then, it may be asked, were the rights ment on the reason of this rule, if it were of the appellees in reference to this property, necessary. Its justice is apparent: the fair when they obtained their judgment? They purchaser for a valuable consideration has, upwere twofold-either to take Reuben Burton on every principle, at least as much equity as under a ca. sa., and thus acquire his rights, the sleeping judgment creditor-one who sleeps whatever they were, in the subject, and by ex for seven years. And why should a court of press provision of the execution law, the right equity seek to turn the scale against him, to sell them; or upon the return of the fi. fa., equity, which always follows and only aids the to file a bill for an account of the rents and law? In such a case the proper language of profits of the coal mines, and for a receiver, equity is, “I cannot aid you against one who and a decree for the satisfaction of the judg. is equally entitled to my sympathy; if you ment out of it. In the lifetime of Reuben Bur- have any legal advantage over him, assert it; I ton they could have done no more. An ac- cannot, and would not if I could, prevent you; count of rents and profits cannot be had in the but I can do no more.” Here the case is peculifetime of the debtor, even after removing a liarly, strong for the application of the rule. fraudulent conveyance, if an elegit can be lev. The judgment creditor has, to say the least, ied; and the power of a court of equity to sell been guilty of the most culpable laches. He the lands in such a case is clearly repudiated has laid by for seven years—during which time by Lord Hardwicke in the case of Higgins et al. he took no step against the deed, or the propv. The York Buildings Company, 2 Atkyns, 107. erty in question—the property of his debtor, The proceedings to judgment at law, and the conveyed to secure the payment of his among lis pendens to enforce it in equity, would have other debts by a conveyance which gave a prigiven it, if not a lien exactly, a preferable ority over him, is sold; and the money arisclaim; and a purchaser, even for valuable con- ing *from the sale applied according [*469 sideration, would have been bound as a pur to the provisions of the deed---more than two chaser with notice.
8a. had been years having elapsed between the rendition of executed after the conveyance, the lien of the the judgment and the sale under the deed. judgment would have been lost.
Here was time most ample for any purpose, 468*] *In the absence of a lis pendens, and and if any step had been taken by the creditor, when, if this view be correct, the appellees had the priorities of the parties would have been not the power to extend by an elegit and had settled and the purchase money paid over ac
cordingly. Passing by all this-after the trus., when the rents and profits will in a reasonable tee has misapplied the purchase money, as the time discharge the debt. judgment creditor contends, he comes into a Looking to the reason of the thing, it may court of equity to ask as against the purchaser, well be asked upon what ground it is that a that which he cannot obtain at law. No prin- court of equity should deny itself the power ciple is conceived upon which the claim pre. to sell the land when the debtor lives; and yet ferred can be sustained.
as soon as he dies and his children have become II. If the judgment did confer a lien, then more helpless, and therefore entitled to the care the appellees, in the case as it now appears to of the court, it shall assume the power to sell the court, i. e., unless it appeared that the the lands to satisfy the very same debt. There profits would not in a reasonable time pay the is no reason for it, unless in a case in which the debt, had no claim whatever to the aid of a obligation binds the heir; and then, as the heir court of equity: that equity follows the law is chargeable to the whole extent of assets deand only aids it, is a principle too familiar and scended, the court of equity may, without much well known to need authority; and has been stretching its power, order the sale. It is beexpressly affirmed in respect to this very ques. lieved that the power has resulted from con• tion of a lien of a judgment by Lord Hard- founding the power to redeem prior incum. wicke, in a case already referred to (2 Atkyns, brances, and the practice in marshaling assets 107), and in other cases to which there may be and securities, whereby an entirely new power occasion to refer. The power of a court of has been made; not justified by the first head, equity over the lands of a debtor by judgment as the authorities cited show, and not justified is the consequence of the right acquired by the by the latter, as will be seen by consulting any creditor to redeem prior incumbrances. This is work upon the subject, as the latest and most the source and fountain of the power; and if luminous of which, Story's Equity, titles Marthe prior mortgages or incumbrances will not shaling, Assets, and Marshaling Securities, is permit him to redeem, or if he is not able to referred to. The practice of selling when the redeem without a sale of the lands; he may obligation binds the heirs, if it be established, apply to a court of equity to compel a redemp- cannot furnish authority for selling in a case tion, and therefore à sale of the property. like that before the court, because the judgSugden, 340.
ment does not bind the heir. Stileman v. AshBy degrees, in the absence of any law or le down, 2 Atkyns, 477. Nor can any authority gal principle to sustain them, the courts have be derived from the other heads; because in extended their power; and commencing with those cases there must be two securities and the principle of aiding and following the law, two funds. Here there was but one fund and they have arrived at the conclusion that they one security, and nothing therefore to mar. may do that which the law could not do, and shal, i. e., to array and arrange, so as to prosell the land. But this has been, not in a case mote justice and equity. like that before the court, but in cases as it It is thought, however, that the court will will be presently shown, founded upon obliga- find in most, if not all the cases in which detions which bound the heir. But to recur: did crees for sales have been made, that the case the judgment, in the case before the court, give came into court under the power to redeem, as a lien upon the lands? If it did, then it is re- in Stileman v. Ashdown, or to marshal, or upon spectfully submitted that the appellees, in the claims binding the heirs in some form. In this case they have made, had no claim to the aid case not one of these qualities exists. There is of a court of equity; because there was nothing nothing to redeem; if there is, the plaintiff does to impede their progress, and remedy at law. not ask that privilege; there is no fraud alIn the case before cited (2 Atkyns, 107), where leged; there is nothing to marshal; and the the debtor was living, Lord Hardwicke decided claim was originally on a simple contract, and that the Court of Chancery had the power to therefore did not bind the heirs, and the judg. remove a fraudulent conveyance; it being a ment does not bind the heirs. The case, then, principle of equity jurisdiction that where presents these peculiarities. One man has a simfraud in fact is charged, a court of equity ple contract claim against another: he sues him therefore has jurisdiction, because from its and obtains judgment. If he pleases he may more comprehensive power it can more fully extend his lands, but he cannot sell them: he try the fraud, although a court of law is com extends them, and the debtor dies, and by that petent to try it. But having done that, its event a power is conferred to sell the land, alpower ceases, and the parties must be left to though the reason against selling may be and their remedy at law upon the elegit; and in generally is stronger after the death of the an. the case of Wilders v. Chambliss, Administra- cestor than before. To the heir it may be a trix, and Heirs, 6 Munford, 432, the Court of matter of great importance to be enabled to Appeals of Virginia affirmed a decree of Chan- pay the debt off by the gradual process, or at cellor Taylor, dismissing the bill of the judg. least to keep it out of the market, where it ment creditor upon the ground that the elegit may be sacrificed at a sheriff's sale, until he was the remedy; it appearing in that case
can acquire *the means to prevent the (*471
sacrifice. How is it that the death of the 470*] *that the profits of the land would in a father shall confer the power to do that which reasonable time discharge the debt. Here is a could not be done while the father lived? Why decision upon the point when the debtor was should it be so? If it be said that here the alive, and another when the debtor was dead, elegit was not actually levied in the lifetime of concurring in both cases; the claim resting up the debtor; that only weakens, if it affects at on an obligation which bound the heirs. It all the case. Then the case stands thus: the will be shown presently that the latest Vir- land descends to the heir, and comes into his ginia decisions concur with that last cited; at possession; the creditor pursues with a claim least in this, that the land should not be sold which does not bind the heir, and which, if
carried to its utmost extreme, could only take plaintiff was not entitled to a sale, but must be possession for a limited time of a moiety of paid out of the profits. the land; the heir is ready to yield the land to In the case before the court, the agreement the whole extent to which it was liable in the with Mrs. Burton places the property, as to lifetime of the ancestor, and yet he is to be told the debtor, just where the settlement in Coutts' this shall not be; he must pay immediately the case did; subject to the annuity, he was entidebt for which he is not bound, and for the tled to his share of the profits and the reversatisfaction of which not even the other moiety sion in fee. The case seems to be in point diof the land could be touched, for which in the rectly. In a later case (Tennant's Heirs v. Pat. lifetime of his ancestor no foot of the land ton, 6 Leigh, 196), the same court reversed a could have been sold, or the entire moiety must decree for sale, and decided that where the be sold. Whence the right thus to abridge the rents and profits would in a reasonable time right of the heir? Let it be supposed that the pay the debt, it must be paid from them. And profits of the land would in three years pay off in the case of Mann v. Flynn, recently decided the debt, and the property is of that description(the opinion pronounced by Judge Stannard), which at a forced sale is almost invariably the same court affirm the case in 6 Leigh. Tho sacrificed, and such is emphatically coal prop- manuscript opinion is now offered to the court erty; whence is derived the power to doom him by the favor of Mr. Leigh. to this sacrifice, and put his property into the The case of The United States v. Morrison et possession of his creditor, perhaps at half its al., in this court, has been relied upon. That value? Where is the justice and equity of the case was ruled chiefly upon authority of Coleproceeding? Many other illustrations might be man v. Cocke et al. 6 Randolph. Now, it so given, but the limits of a written argument happens that in Coleman v. Cocke, the question forbid it.
was not raised as appears by the case; and Thus far the question as affecting the heir Judge Green, moreover, expressly so declares has been discussed; but the case is really in Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh, 29. against a fair purchaser, who is liable only,
IV. It is insisted that the appellees, having and can be proceeded against as terre-tenant. made no objection to the deed of trust although Is there a case in which the power of the cred - two years elapsed after it was made, and beitor has been enlarged as against him? Upon fore it was acted upon; and taken no step to what ground is it that he shall be doomed to a prevent the sale, are to be presumed to have sacrifice of that property for which he has acquiesced in it; and by their laches, have lost fairly paid, and which, in the hands of the the right to impeach the sale, especially as man from whom he purchased it, would not nearly five years more elapsed after the sale have been liable to such sacrifice ? Is it not before any move was made. The trustee is the enough in such a case that the creditor may agent of the grantor and cestui que trust; and pay himself by the use of the property! With if any wrong has been done, it has been by him there is no privity, no liability, not strict their agent, and to him the appellees should ly legal; the purchase of the land may have de- look. prived him of the means to redeem, and it may
V. An account of the administration of be that the land will soon pay the debt. Could Reuben Burton's estate should have been orhis land have been sold in the lifetime of the dered, whereby the appellant might have shown vendor! Clearly not, as it could not be sold a personal fund adequate to the payment of in the hands of the vendee. How can the subse the debt. quent death of the vendor so operate upon the
VI. An account of the rents and profits of vendee as to make that property liable to sale the coal property should have been ordered; and after the death, which was not liable before the surplus, after paying the annuity, applied There can be no pretext of redeeming, nor of to the payment of this debt, if it was to be marshaling either assets or securities; for the paid from the land in any form. land, at the death of the vendor, was no part of
VII. The widow and heirs of Daniel Burton his estate. No reason is seen, and no author. should have been parties to this suit; the ity is known for it, in a case like the present.
widow at least. III. If the appellees had a right to come into VIII. The judgment was dead and inoperaa court of equity, it was because of a valid tive when the decree was rendered, and no delien (which is denied) that could not be en cree should have been rendered upon it until it forced at law; and, in that case, they were en was revived, if it could be. If it could not be, titled to an account only of the rents and prof. then no decree could be founded on it. its accruing, and the application of them to *For the foregoing reasons, it is asked [*473 the payment of the debt.
that the decree of the Circuit Court may be re472"] *In Coutts v. Walker, 2 Leigh's Reversed, and the bill dismissed; or, if that may ports, 288, land was settled to the use of the not be, that it be reversed and modified accordgrantor and his wife while they lived—to pay
ing to the views herein submitted. the wife an annuity if she survived; and, at the counsel for the appellants said, the cases
În reply to the argument for the appellees, her death, to be divided among the children of relied upon are cases binding the heirs, and the grantor. The wife survived, and during the question was what constituted assets under her life judgments were rendered against one of the plea of "Reins per descent.” In such cases, the sons. The judgment creditor filed his bill the heir who inherits a valuable reversion can: to subject the son's interest, and the Court of not make the plea; the reversion is assets in Chancery decreed a sale of it, subject to the his hands. This is emphatically the case in rights of the widow, as in this case. The | Tindales v. Warre, 4 Eng. Condensed Chancery Court of Appeals reversed the decree, and di- Report. But, it is repeated, that when the rected an account of profits; deciding that the right of the creditor depends upon the power of
the elegit. a dry reversion is not liable, because of cutting and taking on any part of the tract, it cannot be extended. It is believed, with due all necessary timber and wood for the use and submission, that no such case can be found. management of the coal pits, opened, or to be How can you extend, at a yearly rent, that opened, paying to the widow, during her life, which, by the terms of the proposition has no a yearly sum of $200 for her dower interest. It yearly value? What would be the condition has been objected that Reuben Burton's interest of the creditor, whose debt was annually wast in this part of the subject could not be charged, ing away by the use of a thing which was not because the subject was not exclusively his. susceptible use ? Who was accounting an: This objection can present no difficulty. The nually for the profit of that which could not judgment is clearly a lien upon a moiety of all yield profit?
the lands or tenements of which the debtor is Mr. Robinson, for the appellees:
seized. The estate in lands or tenements of a In the court below the statute of Virginia joint tenant, or tenant in common, is charged was relied on, which declares that no action of by judgment against such joint tenant, or tendebt shall be brought against an executor or ant in common, as much as any other interest administrator, upon a judgment obtained in real estate. It has long been so settled. In against his testator, or intestate, nor shall any Viner's Abr. tit. Execution, let. N, pl. 25, Vol. scire facias be issued against any executor, or X. p. 549, it is laid down that “if there are administrator, to revive such judgment after two joint tenants, and one makes a statute, the expiration of five years from the qualifica and afterwards joins with his companion in a tion of his executor, or administrator. 1 R. feoffment of the land, the moiety of the land C. p. 492, sec. 17. A single answer to this ob- may be extended upon this statute.” As it jection will suffice. The qualification of Reu. may be extended upon a statute, it may likeben Burton's administrator was on the 9th of wise be extended upon a judgment. See GilDecember, 1829. This suit was brought the 15th bert on Executions, 41, 42. of September, 1834. It was, therefore, brought The question applicable to the tract generalbefore the expiration of five years from the ly, with the exception of the interest just men. qualification, and the statute does not apply. tioned, is, whether a judgment against a debtThis being the case, it is unnecessary to urge or who has a reversion in fee expectant upon upon the court the considerations which forbid an estate for life, creates a lien upon such resuch a defense in equity by a purchaser under a version. It was upon this part of the case that deed of trust, which mentions the judgment, the other side relied principally in the court and acknowledges the debt to be due.
below. The judgment remaining in full force, the We were told that a rentseck was not extend. question then is, how far it operates as a lien ible, and from this it was attempted to deduce upon the real estate of the judgment debtor. the conclusion that a reversion after an estate
The writ of elegit given by the statute of for life (a dry reversion as it was called) could Westm. 2, has always been in use in Virginia. not be extended. Every person recovering any debt, damages, The case in which it was decided that a rentor costs, may sue out this writ to charge a moi- seck could not be extended, was that of Walsal ety of all lands and tenements whereof the v. Heath, Cro. Eliz. 656. The action was redebtor was seized at the day of obtaining the plevin. The avowry was, that J. S. seized of judgment, or at any time afterwards. 1 R. lands for the life of Sibyl, his wife, in right of C. 525.
his wife, the reversion in fee to the baron; he Some years before the judgment, Daniel Bur- and his feme made a lease for years, reserving ton, the father of Reuben Burton, di intes £4 rent per annum. The baron being indebted tate, leaving Sarah Burton, his widow, and by obligation made the *said Sibyl, his (*475 the following children as his heirs, to wit: wife, executrix. The debtor brings debt against Thomas, a child by the said Sarah; and Susan, her, by the name of Isabel, and recovered; and Mary, Reuben, Rebecca, and William, by upon a writ of fieri facias a devastavit was re474"] *a former marriage. Rebecca after- turned, and thereupon an elegit awarded, and wards died intestate, and unmarried, leaving the sheriff returned that Isabel had £4 rent is. her brothers and sisters as her heirs. As heirs suing out of that land, upon a demise made by of Daniel Burton his two sons, Reuben and her and her husband, and delivers the moiety William, were each entitled to a sixth part of of that rent, and thereupon he avows for the his real estate; and as heirs of Rebecca, they same, and it was thereupon demurred and adwere each entitled to two ninths of her real es- judged ill for three causes. First, because a tate. Reuben Burton acquired, by purchase, the lease for years by baron and feme, without whole interest of William, as heir of Daniel deed, is void against the feme. Second, the reBurton, and also as heir of Rebecca; and incovery against Isabel is void against Sibyl, and this way his share of the real estate of Daniel , the sheriff cannot extend her land. Third, the Burton (taking into account the part of Wilsheriff delivering the rent without' land, 80 as liam and the part of Rebecca) was two sixths there is not any reversion, it is but a rentseck; and four ninths of another sixth, being rather and a bare rent cannot be delivered, ut liberum more than two fifths.
tenementum. By the terms of the agreement relied on in This case does not at all go to show that a the defense, the heirs of Daniel Burton were to reversion in fee is not charged by a judgment. have during the widow's life the right of oc It would be very remarkable if the judgment cupying, using, and working the coal pits, and should create no lien upon a reversion when also the right and power of sinking shafts and such reversion is liable to a mere bond creditor searching for coals on any part of the tract of of the ancester. For it has been long adjudged land attached thereto, except the yard, houses, that upon an obligation of the ancestor, binding and gardens; and also the right and privilege i himself and his heirs, the heir may be charged
in respect to any estate of freehold which has ments were actually vested in the defendant: descended upon him. A reversion in fee expect because the statute is a moiety of the lands, ant on a term of years, is regarded as assets in which extends to reversions, which are com the hands of the heir, although the term be to prised under the name of lands, since they are continue five hundred years, as was the case in lands returning to the defendant when the Smith v. Angell, 2 Ld. Raym. 733. A reversion particular estate ceases; and, therefore, though in fee expectant on an estate for life is also this was formerly disputed, the latter resolu. assets, notwithstanding the life estate be still tions have settled the law to be as we have al. continuing. Rooke v. Člealand, 1 Lutw. 303; ? ready mentioned.”. L. Raym. 53; Vin. Abr. tit. Execution, M. pl. The law is laid down in the same way by Sir 7, 15. If the party seized of the reversion de Henry Gwillim in a volume which he prepared vise it for any other purpose than the payment before his death, of the last edition of Bacon's of debts, the devise is void as to specialty abridgment. See tit. Execution, let. C. Vol. creditors; and the creditor may maintain an ac III. p. 381, of Lond. ed. of 1832. And in the tion on the specialty against the devisees as late case of Harris v. Pugh, 4 Bing. 335; 13 well as the heirs, and charge them in respect to Eng. Com. Law Rep. 459, it is expressly stated the reversion. Stat. of W. & M. enacted in Vir- by the court, that if the estate of the debtor ginia in 1789; 1 R. C. 391, 392. And if any heir in the reversion had been a legal instead of an or devisee, so liable, shall before action brought equitable estate, the judgnient would have alien the estate descended to him, he will be bound it, and overreached the subsequent conliable for the value of the land so aliened.
Ibid. veyance. The inquiry then presents itself, whether a The judgment being a lien upon the propcreditor who has obtained a judgment against erty, that lien clearly operates against the a debtor in his lifetime, is worse off, in respect alienees of the debtor. The United States v. to this matter, than a creditor by specialty Morrison, etc., 4 Peters, 124; Watts v. Kinney, merely.
etc. 3 Leigh, 272. In the case of Coke v. Barnsley, Brownl. 234, If there were any difficulty in taking the rewhere the question was whether land held in version of the debtor in execution at law, it ancient demesne was extendible, the judges held would, upon the general principles of a court that it was, saying, "for otherwise, if it should of equity, still be bound in equity, and the lien not be extendible, there would be a failure of enforced against the debtor's alienees. Coutts justice, which the law doth not allow of.” v. Walker, 2 Leigh, 268. There would be an equal failure of justice, if In this case, the reason for enforcing the lien a reversion in fee were not liable to a judgment against the alienee is stronger than usual; for creditor. It is well settled that if a man lease here the property subject to the lien was purfor a year, rendering rent, the reversion may be chased with full knowledge of the judgment, extended upon an elegit during the lease, and and knowledge also that the debt was still due. the tenant by elegit shall have a moiety of the *The trustees in the deed of trust (*477 rent. Sir Thomas Campbell's case, 1 Rolle's could, certainly, not object to the court's deAbr. 894, pl. 5. It is also settled that if there creeing a sale of the property subject to the 476*]be tenant *for life, the reversion in fee, lien. For they, by the terms of the deed of and he in reversion acknowledges a statute, and trust were to sell at all events. See Mutual then grants the reversion, and then tenant for Ass. Society v. Stanard, etc., 4 Munf. 538. life dies, this land shall be extended upon the Neither can anyone claiming under the trust statute. 2 Rolle's Abr. part. 2, p. 473, let. Q. make that objection. It might indeed have This proves that a statute creates a lien upon been seriously contended, upon the authority a reversion expectant upon an estate for life, of the case just cited, that the decree should though the life estate be still continuing. have been for the sale of the whole property,
The lien upon a reversion created by a judg- instead of a moiety merely. But such a decree ment, is equal to that of a statute. It was so would no doubt have been objected to on the decided by Lord Hardwicke, in Gifford v. Bar- other side, and the objection has been carefully ber, 4 Vin. Abr. tit. Charge, let. A. pl. 17, p. avoided. The decree in this case merely di451. There the judgment debtor had a rever- rects a sale of the land, 80 far as the creditor sion after an estate tail. The estate tail hav. has a lien upon it. ing terminated, and the reversion coming into That equity will at the suit of the creditor, possession of the heir of the judgment debtor, after the death of the judgment debtor, acthe question was whether the judgment created celerate the payment by directing a sale of the e lien upon it. The Chancellor held that a moiety, and not compel the judgment creditor person having an estate of inheritance subject to wait till he has been paid out of the rents to intermediate estates, might grant, charge, or and profits, was settled in Stileman v. Ashdown, encumber the reversion as he should see fit, and 2 Atk. 608; Amb. 13, and has been acted on might encumber it by judgment as well as in in a great number of cases. Galton v. Hancock, any other manner.
2 Atk. 433; O'Gorman 6. Comyn, 2 Sch. & Lef. The whole law upon the subject is laid down 137; O'Fallon v. Dillon, Ibid. 13; Countess of with great clearness in Gilbert on Executions, Warwick v. Edwards, 1 Dick. 51. In Virginia 88, 39. He says, “The judgment binds not the principle has been recognized in Blow v. only the lands and tenements of which the de. Maynard, 2 Leigh, 57, 66. fendant is actually seized, but also the rever No portion of a debtor's real estate is exonsions on leases for lives as well as for years. erated from his creditors, or exempted from beFor though the words of the elegit are 'a ing sold, because it yields nothing annually. moiety of all the lands and tenements of which În Robinson, etc. v. Tong, 2 Str. 879; 3 P. the said A. Was seized, etc., yet the intent of Wms. 401, where the question related to an the writ extends to whatever lands and tene- advowson which had descended upon the heir,