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Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opin. | in question is described by abuttals with sufiion of the court:

cient precision. To the admission of all or any This was an action of ejectment brought by of this evidence, the defendant objected; but Linthicum against Remington, in the Circuit the objection was overruled by the court, and Court for Washington County, in the District the evidence admitted; and this forms the first of Columbia, to recover part of lot No. 153, exception. in Beatty & Hawkins's addition to Georgetown. The evidence stated in this exception was of.

It seems that a certain Zachariah M. Offutt, fered by Linthicum, in order to show a legal of the said county, was the owner of the prop- title in himself at the commencement of the erty in question; and being indebted to Linthi- suit; and undoubtedly such a title must be cum in the three several sums of money, actions shown by the plaintiff in ejectment, and he were brought by the latter upon those claims, cannot recover upon a title acquired pending in the year 1836. Judgments were obtained, the action. In deciding upon the admissibility in due course of law; and executions against of this evidence, for the purpose for which it the property of the defendant were issued upon was offered, we must of course be governed by each of them, returnable to November Term, the laws of Maryland, as far as we can gather 1837, of the said court. Upon each of these them from the decisions of her courts; because writs of fieri facias the marshal seized the prop- the property in question is situated in Washing. erty which is now in question, and sold it at ton County, in this district, where the laws of public sale, on the 13th of January, 1838; and Maryland, as they existed at the time jurisat this sale Linthicum was the highest bidder, diction was assumed by Congress, have been and became the purchaser.

adopted. In 1835, before the institution of any of the *In the case of Boring's Lessee v. Lem- ('92 91"] above-mentioned *suits, Offutt, by deed mon, 5 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 225, the Court of duly executed, conveyed this property to James Appeals of Maryland held that the sale of land Remington, who in the same year conveyed it, by the sheriff, seized under a fieri facias, transin like manner, to William Remington, the ferred the legal estate to the vendee, by operaplaintiff in error.

tion of law; and that a deed from the sheriff Linthicum, having purchased of the marshal, was not necessary. as before mentioned, brought an ejectment, in The authority of this case is recognized in February, 1838, against William Remington, Barney's Lessee v. Patterson, 6 Harr. & Johns. who was the tenant in possession. The case Rep. 204, in which the court say, “it is not came on for trial at March Term, 1839, and the return of the officer that gives title to pur. the judgment of the Circuit Court being in chaser, but the previous sale.” But they then favor of the plaintiff, the defendant brought proceed to qualify in some measure the general the writ of error which is now before us. expressions used in Boring's Lessee v. Lemmon,

Three bills of exception were taken at the and declare that sheriff's sales of land are with trial, but the principal and most important in the statute of frauds, and that some memoquestion arises on the first. It appeared that randum in writing is necessary to be made; and the writs of fieri facias, hereinbefore mentioned, they recommend, for the safety of purchasers, had not been returned to the court, but had that in addition to a deed from the officer, remained in the possession of the marshal, and there should be a special return of the execu. were produced by him at the trial, after the tion, particularly describing the premises, and jury were sworn. The plaintiff offered these setting out the name of the purchaser; either writs in evidence, together with the indorse of which (the deed or the special return), the ments upon them, and also a schedule, in the court say, “though not operating to pass the usual form, of the property seized; and a par- title, would be safe and competent evidence of ticular account of its sale, as entered in a book the sale." kept by the clerk of the marshal for such pur- The chief objection to the special return poses. It is, however, unnecessary to state the made by the marshal in this case, is, that it was contents of those indorsements, and of the not made before the suit was brought; and is said account, because the opinion of this court not therefore , admissible to show title at the does not turn upon them.

commencement of the suit. This objection In addition to these papers, the plaintiff of rests upon the hypothesis that a deed from the fered in evidence a special return, of the said marshal, or a special return upon the execution, writs by the marshal, which return it was ad- was necessary to perfect the title of the vendee. mitted, was not written until after the jury But the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the were impaneled; and the plaintiff accompa- two cases above referred to, have decided that nied this offer with a prayer to the court to neither the return nor the deed pass the title: authorize the marshal to make such written that they are nothing more than evidence of return.

the sale, and that it is the sale which transfers The return thus offered bears date April 19th, the title by operation of law. It would seem to 1839, which is the term at which the ejectment follow from these decisions that it cannot be was tried in the Circuit Court. It states that material at what time this evidence is obtained. the fieri facias was levied on this property; He cannot recover without it, because the sale that it was duly advertised and sold according being within the statute of frauds, it must be to law; states the day of the sale; that Linthi- proved by written evidence. But whenever cum, being the highest bidder, became the this evidence is obtained, it proves the previous purchaser; states the price at which he bought; sale by the officer; and as it is the sale that that he had paid the purchase money, and ful. passes the title, the vendee must take it from filled the conditions of the sale. This return the day of the sale. The evidence may be prorefers to the schedule of the property seized, cured, therefore, before or after suit brought, and returned with the writ; in which the lot Jr Jefore ur arter we jusy are sworn in the

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trial of the ejectment. Aad the special return, tablish by the production of these deeds. The of the marshal, in the case before us, made at third and last exception has not been much the time of the trial, was admissible in evi-pressed here, and certainly in the manner in dence; for when thus made, it related back to which the point is here stated, there is nothing the sale, and proved the title to be good from for this court to act upon. The exception that day. The return is also sufficiently special, states generally that the plaintiff offered eviand complies with the statute of frauds. dence tending to prove that the conveyance

Neither is there any objection to the time at from Offutt to James Remington was fraud. which this execution was actually returned to ulent as against the plaintiff; and that the de the court. It is true that it was made return- fendant offered evidence tending to prove the able, on the face of it, to November Term, contrary: and then moved the court to instruct 1837. But, if property, real or personal, is the jury that upon the evidence offered by the seized under a fieri facias, before the return day plaintiff, if believed by them, he was not enof the writ, the marshal may proceed to sell, at titled to recover; which instruction the court any time afterwards, without new process from refused. No part of the evidence given by the the court. And as a special return on the fieri plaintiff to establish the fraud, nor any given facias is one of the modes of proving the sale by the defendant to rebut it, is stated in the exand securing the title of the purchaser, the mar. ception. It is impossible to say that *the (*94 shal must be authorized to make the indorse Circuit Court were in error, when we have ment, after the regular return term, in cases none of the facts before us upon which their 93*) *when the sale was made afterwards. In opinion was given. Indeed, from the manner this case the executions had never been re in which the testimony is referred to in the exturned; they were still in the possession of the ception, it would seem that the question was marshal; and the return at first indorsed on rather one of fact than of law; and that it was, them, was still in his power; and if he believed therefore, properly left to the jury. it not correct, or not sufficiently particular, he An objection has also been taken to the dechad a right to change it. His return, when laration, upon the ground that the property thus made, was under his oath of office; and sued for is not described in it with sufficient he was equally responsible for it as if it had precision. It is described as "all that lot, been made on the return day named in the writ piece, or parcel of land, lying, and being in itself. And as the executions in question had | Georgetown, aforesaid, being that part of lot not before been returned to the court, we do number one hundred and fifty three, in Beatty not think that any leave was necessary in order & Hawkins's addition to Georgetown, aforesaid, to authorize the special indorsement made upon which is bounded as follows, to wit”—and the them.

declaration then proceeds to set out its abuttals. We bave said nothing of the short returns Undoubtedly, it has often been decided in indorsed, in the first instance, on these execu. Maryland, that a declaration for a part of a tions, nor of the accounts of sales contained in tract of land by its name only, or for part of a the marshal's private book of accounts; because lot in a town, by its number only, without setthe returns, as first written, did not name the ting out the lines or boundaries, is too uncertain; purchaser, nor state the price paid for the prop- and that an action cannot be supported upon erty; and were, consequently, not of themselves such a declaration. But this case does not such written evidence as would satisfy the come within these decisions, because the vague statute of frauds. Nor can they be made better and imperfect description objected to, is imby reference to the memorandum of the sales mediately followed in the declaration by a parin the private book accounts of the marshal, ticular description by lines and boundaries. It which certainly was not that kind of written ev. is said, however, that this description is also too idence of the contract of which Linthicum vague and uncertain, and that the property is could avail himself, in order to avoid the oper- not sufficiently identified by abuttals, set out in ation of the statute of frauds. We place the the declaration. We think otherwise. The decision upon the special return before men description of the premises appears to us to be tioned.

sufficient, and we perceive no objection on that The second exception may be disposed of in score, which ought to have prevented the a few words. In order to supersede the neces- plaintiff in the court below from sustaining his sity of tracing a title regularly from the State, action. the plaintiff read in evidence the deed from The judgment of the Circuit Court is, there. Offutt to James Remington and from James fore, affirmed. Remington to William Remington, hereinbefore mentioned; for the purpose of showing that the defendant in ejectment, William Remington, claimed title under the said Offutt. And then offered further to prove that the said

*PETER E. FREVALL, Appellant, [*95 deeds were fraudulent and void, as against him the plaintiff. This last-mentioned evidence was FRANKLIN BACHE, Administrator of John objected to by the defendant, but admitted by

Dabadie, Deceased, Appellee. the court; and we think rightly admitted. The deeds were read by the plaintiffs to show that Powers of Commissioners under treaty of in. Remington claimed under Offutt, but not to

demnity with France of July 4, 1831. show that he was a bona fide purchaser. And when he afterwards offered evidence to prove A claim for the sum awarded by the commissionthat these deeds were fraudulent, there was ers under the treaty of Indemnity with France of nothing in this offer inconsistent or incompat- July 4th, 1831.

The power and duties of the commissioners under ible with what he had before endeavored to es the treaty of indemnity with France, were the same

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u. those which were exercised under the treaty the Treasury, and the Treasurer of the United with Spain, by which Florida was ceded to the United States ; as decided in the cases of Comegys

States may be enjoined from paying it. V. Vasse, 1 Peters, 212, and Sheppard v. Taylor et

To this bill the appellee put in his plea and al. 5 Peters, 710. There is a diference in the words answer, pleading the award of the commissionased in the treaty and act of Congress, when delining the powers of the Board of Commissioners; but

ers in bar of the complainant's bill, and also inthey mean the same thing. The rules by which the sisting, by way of answer, Dabadie owned the Board acting under the French Treaty is directed five sixteenths of the cargo in question, and had to govern itself in deciding the cases that come before it, and the manner in which it is constituted

a valid claim, on that account, against the and organized, show the purposes for which it was French government; that he had never trang. created. It was established for the purpose of de- ferred or relinquished it to Curcier; and that ciding what claims were entitled to share in the his (Dabadie's) administrator was entitled to indemnity provided by the treaty; and they of course awarded the amount to such person as ap

receive it out of the indemnity provided by peared from the papers before them to be the right treaty: and he exhibits as the evidence of his ful claimant. But there is nothing in the frame of inierest in this cargo, an account, signed by the law establishing the Board, or in the manner of constituting and organizing it,' which would lead to Andrew Curcier, in behalf of himself and the inference that larger powers were intended to Stephen Curcier, and dated June 16, 1810. be given than those conferred on the commissioners under the Florida Treaty.

A general replication was put in by the com. plainant: and the testimony of a witness resid

ing at Marseilles, in France, was taken by N appeal from the Circuit Court of the agreement of parties. This witness, it appears, trict of Columbia.

phia; and was engaged in commerce there from This case was argued by Mr. Coxe for the the year 1796 until 1827, when he returned to appellant, and by Mr. Key for the appellee. his own country, where he has ever since resid.

ed. He was intimate with Curcier and DabaMr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opin- die; and he states in his testimony, that in the ion of the court:

year 1818, at Philadelphia, he, as umpire and This case comes before this court upon an mutual friend, settled an account between them, appeal from the Circuit Court for the District, in which all differences were finally adjusted; of Columbia.

that the voyage of the Spencer to St. Sebastians, The controversy has arisen out of the ship and the ownership of her cargo, were settled in ment of a cargo of cotton, indigo, and coffee, that account; and that by the terms of the setmade in the fall of 1809, in the brig Spencer, tlement, the claim on the French government from Philadelphia to St. Sebastians, or Port for indemnity was afterwards to belong to Cur: Passage. The vessel duly arrived, and dis- cier. The witness mentions circumstances charged her cargo. She was afterwards seized, which took place at the settlement, to show and the cargo sequestrated by the French gov- that his memory is firm and accurate in relation ernment. In the following year, the vessel was to it. He states that it was reduced to writing liberated, and returned to the United States: in the shape of an account current, as was cusbut the cargo was never restored.

tomary; and that two accounts were made, exThe cargo of the Spencer thus sequestrated, actly the same in every particular, both origi. was entitled to share in the indemnity provided nal, and one of them delivered to each of the by the treaty with France, of July 4, 1831. But parties. No account current, however, was exa dispute a rose before the commissioners ap-hibited to the witness at the time of his examipointed under that treaty, as to the right to five nation, and none therefore has been identified sixteenths of the indemnity allowed for this by him as the account current settled between cargo. The opposing claimants were the pres- the parties in 1818: and he states that he had ent appellant, who claimed for the whole of the not recently seen it, nor had any communicacargo, and the appellee, who claimed for the tion from any one in relation to its contents. said five sixteenths. The commissioners award. Upon the hearing, the Circuit Court dissolved ed in favor of the latter.

the injunction, and dismissed the bill, and the The appellant therefore filed his bill against case is brought before this court by the appeal the appellee, in the Circuit Court for Washing of the complainant. ton County, in the District of Columbia; alleg. *Two questions have been presented [*97 ing, among other things, that a certain Andrew for consideration here: 1. Is the decision of Curcier, then a resident merchant in Philadel. the commissioners appointed under the treaty 96*] phia, was the owner of the Spencer *and with France conclusive upon the rights of the her cargo on the voyage in question; that the parties? 2. If the case is not concluded by the said seizure and sequestration gave him a valid decision of the commissioners, is the appellant, claim against the French government; which upon the testimony in the record, entitled to he afterwards, for a valuable consideration, relief? transferred to the claimant, who took it without

Upon the first question the court have enternotice of any other claim. And he charges tained no doubt. This case cannot, we think, also that if Dabadie, the appellee's intestate, be distinguished from the cases of Comegy v. ever had an interest in the cargo, it had been Vasse, 1 °Peters, 212, and Sheppard et al. v. relinquished to Curcier by a settlement which took place between them in 1818, long before Taylor et al. 5 Peters, 710. it bas been ar. the assignment to the complainant. And he gued on the part of the appellee, that these produces, as an exhibit, the account which, as

cases were decided under the treaty with Spain; he alleges, contains this renunciation: and he and that the language of that treaty, and of prays that the appellee may be enjoined from the act of Congress creating the board of comreceiving the five sixteenths awarded to him by missioners under it, differs materially from the the commissioners, and that the Secretary of' treaty and act of Congress under consideration,

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when defining the powers of the board. It is , ceeds of her outward cargo; for such an infer. true, that there is a difference in the words ence would be contrary to the allegations of used; but in our judgment, they mean the same both the bill and the answer. And if it refers thing. The rules by which the board is direct to a homeward cargo, there is no evidence to ed to govern itself in deciding the cases that show that such a cargo was brought by the come before it, and the manner in which it was Spencer; nor, if brought, by what means or constituted and organized, show the purposes out of what funds it was procured. There is for which it was created. It was established certainly nothing in the record to connect this for the purpose of deciding what claims were item in any manner with the outward cargo, entitled to share in the indemnity promised by which was seized; nor to alter the rights of the treaty; and they of course awarded the property in it. It does not answer the descripamount to such person, as appeared from the tion which the witness gives of the account pa pers before them, to be the rightful claimant. which he settled in 1818, as the umpire and But there is nothing in the frame of the law es. mutual friend of the parties; and it is highly tablishing this board, or in the manner of con- probable that the transaction of which ho stituting and organizing it, that would lead us speaks, may, from the lapse of time, have been to infer that larger powers were intended to be confounded with some subsequent voyage of given than those conferred upon the commis- the same vessel, out of which disputes may sioners under the Spanish treaty. The plea have arisen between the parties. He states that therefore put in by the defendant in bar of the he has not seen the account, nor communicated complainant's bill, cannot be sustained, and the with any person about it; and after twenty case is fully open before this court upon its years have passed, it ought not to be a matter merits.

of surprise or reproach if some of the items of Upon the second point there has been much an account, and some of the circumstances con. more difficulty. It is very clear that Dabadie nected with the settlement of it, were not accu. was the owner of five sixteenths of the cargo of rately remembered. At all events, there is the Spencer, upon the voyage in the fall of nothing in the account of 1818, or any account 1809, from Philadelphia to St. Sebastians, or in the case, that would justify us in saying that Port Passage. This is abundantly proven by the claim of Dabadie to the indemnity in questhe account stated and signed by Andrew Cur. tion was transferred to Curcier, as charged in cier, for himself and Stephen Curcier, in June, the bill. 1810. For Dabadie, in this account, is charged The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore with thirteen thousand seven hundred dollars affirmed. and thirteen cents, for his five sixteenths of the cargo, and with three thousand nine hundred This cause came on to be heard on the tran. and ninety-three dollars and ninety-five cents script of the record from the Circuit Court of for insurance upon it. He was therefore enti. the Cnited States for the District of Columbia, tled to indemnity to the extent of his interest holden in and for the County of Washington, in the cargo, and had a valid and just claim for and was argued by counsel; on consideration it against the French government.

whereof, it is now here ordered and decreed Has this interest been transferred to Curcier ? by this court that the decree of the said Cir. The witness above mentioned deposed that it cuit Court in this cause be, and the same is was relinquished to him, and the agreement re- hereby affirmed with costs. duced to writing in an account current, settled in June, 1818. If such an account had been produced by the plaintiff, it would decide the controversy in his favor. He does indeed pro- *JOHN PETERS, and John Peters, Jun., (+99 duce an account settled between the parties,

with mutual acquittances, in June, 1818. But
it is not such an account as the witness de- THE WARREN INSURANCE COMPANY,
scribes. Neither of the sums with which Daba-

die was debited in the account of 1810, for his
share of the cargo, and for insurance, appear

Marine Insurance-collision-proximate and re98*] *in any way in this account of 1818. The

mote cause foreign laws. acquittances therefore then executed do not ap- Insurance. Insurance was made to the amount ply to them. The apply only to claims which of eight thousand dollars on the ship Paragon, for the parties may have had against one another;

The policy contained the usual risks, and and not to claims which either of them had assured claimed for a loss by collision with another

among others, that of the perils of the sea. against the French government, or any other vessel, without any fault of the master or crew of third party.

the Paragon, and also insisted on a general aver.

age and contribution. There is an item in the account of 1818, insured; and in November, 1836, in the year during

The Paragon was in part which has been much relied on by the com- which the policy was in operation, she sailed from plainant, in which Dabadie is credited with five Hamburgh, in ballast, for Gottenburgh, for a cargo sixteenths of the proceeds of the Spencer's cargo down the Elbe, with a pilot on board, she came in

While proceeding on this voyage, sold at six months' credit. But contact with a galliot, and sunk her. She lost her there is nothing to show that any part of the bowsprit, jib-boom, and anchor, and was otherwise

damaged, and put into Cuxhaven, a port at the outward cargo was sold in France. On the mouth of the Elbe, and in the jurisdiction of Hamcontrary, the bill states that the whole cargo burgh. The captain of the galliot libeled the Para. was sequestrated, and claims indemnity for the gon, alleging that the loss of his vessel was caused

by the carelessness or fault of those on board the whole: and the answer admits the seizure of Paragon. Upon the hearing of the cause, the court the whole, and claims indemnity for five six decided that the collision was not the result of the teenths of the entire cargo. We cannot there. fault or carelessness of either side ; and that there.

fore, according to the marine law of Hamburg, fore suppose that this item refers to the pro- the loss was a general average loss, and to be borne

one year.

The surance.

equally by both parties : that is, that the Paragon burgh, to procure a cargo of iron, for the Unite was to bear one half of the expense of her own reed States. pairs, and to pay one half of the value of the gal. llot; and that the galliot was to bear the loss of the Whilst proceeding down the Elbe, with a half of her own value, and to pay one half of the pilot on board, she came in contact with a galwas that the Paragon was to pay two thousand she liot called Frau Anna, and sunk her. The Par. hundred dollars, being one half of the value of the agon lost her bowsprit, jib-boom, and anchor, galliot (three thousand dollars) after deducting, one and sustained other damages, which obliged halt of her own repairs, being four bundred dollars. her to go into Cuxhaven, a port at the mouth burgh, the captain was obliged to raise the money of, the Elbe, and subject to the jurisdiction of on bottomry. There being no cargo on board the Hamburgh for repairs. Paragon, and no freight earned, the Paragon was obliged to bear the whole loss. Held, that the as

Whilst lying there, the captain of the galliot sured were entitled to recover.

libeled the Paragon in the Marine Court, alA loss by collision, without any fault_on either leging that the loss of the vessel was caused by side, is a loss by the perils of the sea, within the the carelessness or fault of those on board of protection of the policy of insurance. Injury and repairs done to the Paragon itself ex- Paragon. The ship was arrested; but subsetend, the underwriters are liable for all damages. quently released on security being given by the losses arising from the proximate cause of the agent of the owners, to respond to such damloss, and not for losses arising from a remote ages as should be awarded by the court. cause, not immediately connected with the peril, The captain of the Paragon, in his answer is correct; when it is understood and applied in its denied the charges of carelessness or fault on true sense : and as such, It bas been repeatedly the part of those on board of his ship; and the recognized in this court.

The law of Insurance, as a practical science, does court, after hearing the parties and their proof, not indulge in niceties. It seeks to administer Jug-decided that the collision was not the result of tice according to the fair interpretation of the intention of the parties ; and deems that to be a 1088 fault or carelessness on either side: and that within the policy, which is a natural and necessary therefore, according to article first, title eighth, consequence of the peril insured against.

of the Marine Law of Hamburgh, the loss was If there be any commercial contract which more than any other requires the application of sound a general average loss, and to be borne equally common sense and practical reasoning in the ex: by each party: that is, the Paragon was to position of it, and in the uniformity of the appll- bear one half of the expense of her own reCation of rules to it, it is certainly a policy of in- pairs, and to pay one half of the value of the

It has been held by learned forelen writers on galliot; and the galliot was to bear the loss of the law of insurance, that whenever the thing in

onc half of her own value, and to pay one half sured becomes by law directly chargeable with any expense, contribution or loss, in consequence of a of the expense of the repairs of the Paragon. particular peril: the law treats the peril, for all In conformity with this decision, a general practical purposes, as the proximate cause of such expense, contribution or loss. This they hold, up- average statement was drawn up by Mr. Older. on the general principles of law, applicable to the mann, the Despacheur of Hamburgh; an of. contract of insurance. In the opinion of the Su- ficer appointed by law, and by whom alone preme Court, this is the Just senge and true Inter- such statements can be prepared. pretation of the contract.

In all foreign voyages, the underwriters, neces- In this statement are charged, first, the exsarlly, have it in contemplation that the vessel in- penses of repairing the Paragon, after making sured must, or at least may be, subjected to the the deduction of one third new for old, saving operation of the laws of the foreign ports which are visited. Those very laws may in some cases impose one of her anchors and chains, which was lost burdens, and in some cases give benefits, different at the time of the collision; wages and provi. from our laws; and yet there are cases under pollusions of the captain and the crew during the law will govern the rights of the parties, and not detention, and the expenses of surveys, prothe domestic law. Such is the knowo case of gen. test, defending the suit, etc. amounting in all eral average, settled in a foreign port according to

to about eight hundred dollars, and one half the local law, although It may differ from our own

of which is charged to the Paragon, and one

half to the galliot. Na certificate of division from the Circuit

*Second, are charged the of Massachusetts.

court, of her freight and cargo, the expenses 100*] *This was a case on a policy of insur- of surveys, protest, prosecuting the suit, etc., ance, dated the 1st of April, 1836, whereby amounting in all to about six thousand dolthe defendants insured the plaintiffs, for whom lars, one half of which is to be charged to the it may concern, payable to them, eight thou- Paragon. sand dollars on the ship Paragon, for the term The statement concludes thus: “Which, acof one year, commencing the risk on the 15th cording to the before-mentioned ordinance reday of March, 1836, at noon, at a premium of lating to insurance and average, is to be borne five per cent. The declaration alleged a loss by ship, cargo and freight, as general averby collision with another vessel, without any age. The ship Paragon has to claim from the fault of the master or crew of the Paragon, and Frau Anna, for half the damages, say $400 also insisted on a general average and contri. And the Frau Anna from the Paragon bution.

one half the damages, Bay $3,000 The parties agreed that the verdict should so that the Paragon must pay . $2,600 be rendered by the jury for the plaintiff or for Which amount the Tribunal of Commerce the defendants, according to the opinion of the decreed should be paid instanter. court, upon the matters of law arising upon the The owners of the Paragon, having no funds following statement of the facts of the case. in Hamburgh, the captain

was obliged to raise The plaintiffs are the owners of the ship Para- the money on bottomry. gon, insured by the defendants in part.

There being no cargo on board of the ParaOn the 10th of November, 1836, the vessel gon, and no freight earned, the ship has to sailed from Hamburgh, in ballast, for Gotten. I bear the whole of the general average loss.

Peters 14.

O`Courer of the United States for the District galice, mas 95, appraisale under an order of

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