full knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case. And the inquiry is, whether a mistake committed under such circumstances affords a sufficient ground on which to set aside the agreements. I will first consider the principles of this case, as they would apply to a controversy between individuals respecting a common boundary. averments, counteracted by any allegations in | chusetts commissioners, and with an equal and the bill, not denied by the plea, constitute a bar to the right asserted by the plaintiff. The plea states that in the year 1642, Woodward and Saffrey erected a station or monument at a point then taken and believed to be on the true and real boundary of Massachusetts, on the south. And that in 1710, this station was agreed to be the true boundary, and the place from which the line should be run, by Dudley and Jenckes, commissioners appointed by Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and who were authorized to settle and establish the line. And that afterwards, in the year 1718, other commissioners were appointed by Massachusetts and Rhode Island, to whom ample powers were given to compromise and settle forever the boundary, and who established the same place of beginning. And that the report made to Rhode Island by its commissioners, setting forth the agreement, was accepted by its Legislature, and duly recorded and ratified. The mistake of a fact, unless it operates as a surprise or fraud on the ignorant party, affords no ground for relief in Chancery. 1 Story's Eq. 160; 2 Ball & Beatty, 179, 180; 4 Bro. Ch. Rep. 158; 6 Ves. 24. The ground of relief in such cases is, not the mistake or ignorance of material facts alone, but the unconscientious advantage taken of the party by the concealment of them. For if the parties act fairly, and it is not a case where one is bound to communicate the facts to the other, upon the ground of confidence or otherwise, the court will not interfere. 1 Story's Eq., 160; 9 Ves. 275. And the plea avers that the Massachusetts It is essential, in order to set aside such a commissioners were guilty of no fraud or mis-transaction, not only that an advantage should representation, and that both agreements were be taken, but it must arise from some obligaentered into with perfect fairness and in good tion in the party to make the discovery; not faith, and with full and equal knowledge by an obligation in *point of morals only, [*274 the parties. That the claims of the plaintiff, as but of legal duty. 2 Bro. Ch. 420; 1 Har. Eq. set forth in the bill, were fully heard, dis- bk. 1, ch. 3, 4, note n. cussed, and settled, and that Massachusetts has retained possession and exercised 273*] Jurisdiction over the country north of the line thus established until the present time. These are the facts, substantially, on which the defendant relies, as a bar to the plaintiff's bill. The principal ground of relief alleged in the bill is the mistake in fixing the place from which the line was to run more than seven miles south of Charles River; whereas, by the charter of Massachusetts, it was to be but three miles south of that river. By the charter, the boundary was declared to be "three English miles south of any or every part of Charles River." Some doubt may arise from this phraseology, whether the three English miles are to be measured from the source of the southern branches of Charles River, or from the main channel of the river. And it would seem, from the establishment of the Woodward and Saffrey Station, and other acts done in reference to this boundary shortly after the date of the charter, and when its language was at least as well understood as at present, that the measurement was understood not to be required from the body of the river. At that early day the country was a wilderness, and the land was of but little value; so that Massachusetts could have felt no very strong interest in establishing the line farther south than was authorized by the charter. The bill alleges a mistake in this distance from the river of the Woodward and Saffrey Station by the commissioners of Rhode Island, in both of the agreements respecting the boundary; and this mistake is not denied by the plea. But, in the language of the plea, these agreements are now to be considered as having been fairly made, in good faith, without fraud or misrepresentation by the Massa Equity will not relieve where the means of information are open to both parties; and where each is presumed to exercise his own judgment. 2 Wheat. 178, 195. Where an agreement for the composition of a cause is fairly made between parties with their eyes open, and rightly informed, a court of equity will not overhaul it, though there has been a great mistake in the exercise of judgment. 1 Ves. 408; 1 Story's Eq. 163. In like manner, where the fact is equally unknown to both parties, or where each has equal and adequate means of information, or where the fact is doubtful from its own nature; in every such case, if the parties have acted with entire good faith, a court of equity will not interpose. For in such cases, the equity is deemed equal between the parties; and when it is so, a court of equity will not interfere. 1 Pow. on Con. 200; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 62-64; 1 Story's Eq. 163. The principles recognized by these authorities apply in all their force and conclusiveness to the case under consideration. A greater number of authorities might be cited, but it cannot be necessary. The principles stated are founded on reason and the fitness of things, and they have been sanctioned by a uniform course of adjudication. If these rules are to be respected, and the mistake alleged in the bill had occurred under precisely the same circumstances between individuals, it would seem to be clear that there would be no ground for relief. A controversy exists between individuals reclaims that the line should begin at a certain specting a common boundary. One party point, and the other at a different one. Arbitrators are appointed, with full powers to settle and compromise the dispute, who established the point as claimed by one of the parties. Some dissatisfaction is subsequently manifested by the unsuccessful party; and happen, it is rather a question of policy than of right, whether they shall be corrected. seven years after the first reference, a second one is made to other persons, who are vested with ample powers to settle and compromise the I am inclined to think with the counsel on controversy, and they do settle it in exact both sides, that the great question in this case conformity to the first award; and this second should not be decided by the rules for the aetaward is reported to the principals, who sanc-tlement of private rights. tion it. In addition to this, the line or place of beginning established by the arbitrators is the place claimed by the successful party as his line more than seventy-five years before the second award, and more than twenty years before the other party had any interest in the boundary. And the conduct of the arbitrators is free from any imputation of fraud or unfairness; all having equal and full knowledge of the matter in dispute, which was fully and fairly discussed and understood, and finally determined. A case under these circumstances between individuals, to say nothing of the lapse of time and acquiescence, since the award, would 275*] *not seem to be very strongly recommended to the equitable interposition of the court, on the ground that the arbitrators mistook a fact: a mistake not induced by the opposite party, or by misrepresentation, but into which the arbitrators of the unsuccessful party had innocently fallen, having as full a knowledge of the whole merits of the case as the arbitrators chosen by the other party. Relief which should set aside the award, and open up the controversy, under such circumstances, would create a new head of equity. The high litigant parties, and the nature of the controversy, give an elevation and dignity to the cause which can never belong to differences between individuals. It may be a simple matter to determine where a line shall be run; but when such determination may draw after it a change of sovereign power over a district of country and many thousand citi- [*276 zens, the principles involved must be considered as of the highest magnitude. The question is national in its character, and it is fit and proper that it should be decided by those broad and liberal principles which constitute the code of national law. Vattel, in his treatise (277), says: "When sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions, and are nevertheless desirous of preserv ing or restoring peace, they sometimes submit the decision of their disputes to arbitrators, chosen by common agreement. When once the contending parties have entered into articles of arbitration, they are bound to abide by the sentence of the arbitrators: they have engaged to do this, and the faith of treaties should be religiously observed." And again: "In order to obviate all difficulty, and cut off every pretext of which fraud might make a handle, it is necessary that the arbitration articles should precisely specify the subject in dispute, the respective and opposite pretensions of the parties, the demands of the one and the objections of the other. These constitute the whole of what is submitted to the decision of the arbitrators, and it is upon these points alone that the parties promise to abide by their judgment. If, then, their sentence be confined within these precise bounds, the dis The mistake is admitted, because it is not denied by the plea; and this may be said to be a technical advantage of the plaintiff. For if the fact of mistake were to be tested by the circumstances of the case, it would be difficult to come to the conclusion that a mistake had really occurred. If it were admitted to have taken place, in the first award, it would require no small degree of credulity to believe that it again occurred in the second award, made seven years after the first one, and after much dissat-putants must acquiesce in it. They cannot say isfaction had been manifested against the first award. This dissatisfaction could only have arisen from the supposed fact that the boundary had been established too far south. But as the case is now considered, the mistake alleged is admitted, but admitted under all the averments of the plea. If the Woodward and Saffrey Station be as many miles south of Charles Řiver as alleged in the bill, it would seem to be a more reasonable supposition that it was agreed to under a construction of the charter, or on the principles of compromise, than through mistake. But the mistake being admitted, still, as between individuals, there would be no sufficient ground for the interposition of a court of equity. And if relief could not be given between in dividuals, can it be decreed under the same circumstances as between sovereign States. There are equitable considerations which would seem to apply with greater force to controversies between individuals, than to those which arise between States. Among States there is a higher agency, greater deliberation, and a more imposing form of procedure, in the adjustment of differences, than takes place between private individuals. Between the former, from the nature of the proceedings, mistakes of fact seldom occur; and when they do that it is manifestly unjust, since it is pronounced on a question which they have themselves rendered doubtful by the discordance of their claims, and which has been referred, as such, to the decision of the arbitrators. Before they can pretend to evade such a sentence, they should prove, by incontestable facts, that it was the offspring of corruption or flagrant partiality.", And again, in page 178, he says: "Arbitration is a very reasonable mode, and one that is perfectly conformable to the law of nations, for the decision of every dispute which does not directly interest the safety of the nation. Though the claim of justice may be mistaken by the arbitrators, it is still more to be feared that it will be overpowered in an appeal to the sword." The author well observes that the Helvetic republic, by a wise adherence to this mode of adjusting controversies among themselves, and with foreign countries, has secured its liberty, and made itself respectable throughout Europe. These principles have been established by the common consent of the civilized world. And where they are invoked in the settlement of disputes between States, and the proceeding is characterized by fairness and good faith, it ought not to be set aside, and, indeed, cannot be; without, in the language of Vattel, proving by the clearest evidence that the award was the offspring of corruption or flagrant partiality. And if the determination of the arbitrators has the sanction of time as well as of principle, it is believed that history affords no instance where it has not been considered as absolutely binding on the parties. The peace of nations and the prosperity of mankind require that compacts thus formed should be held sacred. mined on and designated any boundary as that which was intended by the Treaty of 1783.” This view, by the Secretary, of the binding effect of the decision if it had been made on the point submitted to the arbiter, is in accordance *with the principles of national law, [*278 and has a direct and most forcible application to the case under consideration. No objection is made by Rhode Island that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. No such objection can be made. Their powers were ample; and their proceedings, both in 1710, and in 1718, seem to have been characterized by great dignity and deliberation. 377] The pretensions of Massachusetts in favor of the line as established by both arbitrations, commenced in 1642; and no other jurisdiction had been, at any time, exercised over the country north of this line. It was claimed The complainant, it is true, was dissatisfied before Rhode Island had a political existence. with the first decision, establishing Woodward The elements of which it was afterwards com- and Saffrey's Station; and by remonstrances posed were, at the time this right was first as-induced the appointment of the second commis. serted, mingled with the parent colony of Massachusetts, and with other communities and nations. And after they became embodied and organized under the charter of 1663, it was nearly half a century before there seems to have been any dispute respecting this boundary. Nearly two centuries have elapsed since the claim of Massachusetts to this line was set up, and more than a hundred and twenty years since the controversy was settled by the commissioners or arbitrators chosen by the parties: and, as averred in the plea, specially Banctioned and confirmed by Rhode Island. Is time to have no influence in this case, on the agreements of the parties? It covers with its peaceful mantle stale disputes between individuals. And so strong is its influence that fraud, which vitiates all human transactions, cannot be reached when covered by great lapse of time. sion in 1717, which in the following year confirmed, in all respects, the first decision. Notwithstanding these remonstrances against the first decision, it would seem from the bill that until 1749, the complainant believed that Woodward and Saffrey's Station was only three English miles south of Charles River, and was consequently the true point from which the line should be run. This being the case, as the bill does not state the precise ground of dissatisfaction at the first report, it cannot well be imagined. Rhode Island, it seems, from time to time, by remonstrances, in the form of resolutions and otherwise, and by the appointment of commissioners, signified its dissatisfaction at the boundary, as established in 1710 and 1718. Massachusetts, as it was bound in comity to do, listened to these expressions by Rhode Island, and more than once appointed commisHas a treaty ever been set aside on the sioners on the subject. But whether we look ground of mistake? Has it ever been contend- to the averments in the plea, or to the stateed that after its ratification by the high con-ments in the bill, the defendant never seems to tracting parties, either could look behind the have done anything which could impair the treaty and object to it because the negotiators | force of the agreements. had mistaken a fact? It is believed that such a pretension would be new in the history of diplomacy. The treaty must speak for itself, and under its provisions must the rights of the parties be ascertained. In the first treaty of limits between this country and Great Britain, it is a fact not now questioned that a mistake of many miles was made in establishing our northern boundary. But this has afforded to Great Britain no occasion of remonstrance or complaint. The bill states various facts, such as the little value of the land bounding on the disputed line for many years, the sparseness of the population, the want of means, and the intervention of war; as reasons why Rhode Island did not bring this controversy before the king in council, under the colonial government. It appears from the exhibits accompanying the bill that, in 1740, there being a dispute between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, whether the former could exercise its jurisdiction to the shores of the Narraganset Bay, the King of Great Britain appointed commissioners to settle the controversy, who decided against Massachusetts. This decision was confirmed on an appeal from the commissioners, by the king and council. So long as the colonial government continued, this mode of redress, so successively invoked by the complainant in the above in Our own government, on a recent occasion, declined an acquiescence in the decision of the King of the Netherlands, in relation to this same boundary. But, in his letter of July 21st, 1832, to the representative of Great Britain in this country, the Secretary of State says, in relation to the resolution of the Senate against the decision, that it was adopted under the conviction that the arbiter had not decided the question submitted to him, or had decided it instance, remained open. The articles of cona manner not authorized by the submission. "It is not," he adds, "the intention of the undersigned to enter into an investigation of the argument which has led to this conclusion. The decision of the Senate precludes it, and the object of this communication renders it unnecessary; but it may be proper to add that no question could have arisen as to the validity of the decision, had the sovereign arbiter deter federation formed by the new government made special provision for the settlement of disputed boundaries between States. And when these were revoked by the adoption of the Constitution, the tribunal at last appealed to was open, and has ever remained ready to hear and decide the controversy. Giving full weight to all the allegations in the bill which go to *excuse the delays [*279 of Rhode Island in asserting its claim, it is still difficult to say that the claim remains unaffected by the unmolested possession of Massachusetts, according to the agreements. Rhode Island, it is true, is small in territory, and weak in numerical force, but it has always stood high in moral power and intellectual endowment; and the tribunals which, since the commencement of the controversy, have been open to hear its complaint, have been tribunals of reason, of justice, and of established law. The arguments of the counsel for the complainant, zealous and able as they were, rested mainly on the hardship and injustice of deciding this controversy on the pleadings as they now stand. The mistake is admitted; and what is there else in the bill, taken in connection with all the facts and circumstances, which can give the case of the complainant a more imposing form. No fraud is imputed; the sealed agreements, now and ever, must speak the same language; the effect of time will remain, and the excuses alleged in the bill for delay, can scarcely have, under any form of pleading, greater effect than may be given to them as the case now stands. I speak not of the volume of evidence which may be thrown into the case by a change of the pleadings, but of the leading and indisputable facts which must, under any form of procedure, have a controlling influence in the decision. Believing, as I do, that in admitting the truth of the plea, Rhode Island has done nothing prejudicial to her interests, and that in the present attitude of the case, its substantial merits are before us, I feel bound to pronounce a different opinion from that which has been given by a majority of my brother judges. Taking the facts of the plea, and giving due weight to all the allegations of the bill, not denied by the plea, I am led to the conclusion that the bar is complete. In coming to this conclusion, I feel no want of respect for the State of Rhode Island, which has become so illustrious in our history by its enterprise, its intelligence, and its patriotism. Mr. Justice Catron. The facts and pleadings have been so fully stated by my brethren, as to require from me only a brief notice of the conclusions my mind has come to on the points in controversy. The defense, in the form of an incongruous plea, must set up matter in bar, which, if true, renders immaterial every other fact alleged in the bill; be these as they may, the defense must be conclusive of the controversy, and every necessary averment to sustain the matter pleaded in the bar must also be made in an answer covering the plea, which cannot be permitted to stand unsupported by an answer. This is the familiar and settled practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, and adopted by rule in the courts of the United States. In form, it is believed, the plea and answer in this cause are accurate in a high degree, in regard to the matter pleaded, and the aver 280*]ments necessary to give it effect, in the sense it is relied on as a bar, unless the de fense set up is double. It is insisted the plea is multifarious, because it relies on two defenses: first, the compacts, and second, the possession and occupation of the territory claimed by the plaintiff, for more than a century. The facts pleaded must be conducive to a single point of defense; and the question is, are the compacts, the making of the line in part execution of them, and the taking and holding possession in other part, and complete execution of them, combined facts and circumstances, conducing to establish the single point relied on in defense? Tuat is, that the line run from Woodward and Saffrey's Station was the true boundary, established by, and marked in execution of, the compacts; and that by the compacts Rhode Island is estopped to deny its validity. And I think the circumstances pleaded are so connected as not to vitiate the plea. If it is bad, it must therefore be so on its merits involving the obligatory force of the compacts. That they are prima facie conclusive of the boundary, is admitted; but the bill alleges they were made in mistake, and the line run and marked, and possession surrendered to Massachusetts, in mistake of prominent fact: that Rhode Island then believed the station, and the line run from it, three miles south of Charles River; whereas subsequent observation and examination had ascertained it to be much further south, that is, about seven miles. The Massachusetts charter calls for a line to be drawn east and west, "three miles south of the waters of said Charles River, or of any, or of every part thereof;" and the plea, in substance, avers the charter was construed, and the line settled by the compacts, without misrepresentation on the part of Massachusetts, and with full and equal knowledge of all circumstances by both parties. The plea having been set down for argument, without an issue, must for the present be taken as true; and the averments taken as admitted that the parties entered into the compacts, and established the boundary, with full and equal knowledge of all the circumstances of law and fact involved in the controversy, as it then existed and now exists. And in the face of the compacts thus made, can Rhode Island be heard to allege the existence of a mistake in the boundary established by them, and marked by the mutual commissioners, and as the joint act of both parties? Under the circumstances, to open the controversy and let in proof of a mistake, at this day, to overthrow a solemn treaty made between two independent governments, is deemed by me inad missible, not to say dangerous. And I think the matters pleaded (if true) a good defense. If this compromise and solemn establishment of a boundary, made a century ago, can be impeached on the ground of a mistake so palpable and easy of detection, cannot every other made by the States brought before this court, on a similar assumption, usually much better founded; especially where degrees of latitude *are called for as boundaries? If the [*281 parties, "with full and equal knowledge of all circumstances," compromised and settled a doubtful construction of the Massachusetts. charter, and in which they were engaged nearly ten years; why should this court go further into the matter, at the hazard of encouraging litigation in so many other quarters? I will for the present refrain from entering into the inquiry, how far such a mistake of law, in construing a private instrument, could be enquired into by a court of chancery in a suit between man and man; nor what help the mistake of law (if any exists) could derive from the facts apparent by the bill, unless the statement of the proposition should suggest the answer. of distinction between such private agreenient, Nor will I attempt to draw the marked line and a public treaty, by State with State, in regard to the difficulty of going into matters of mistake, usually not predicable of a treaty. On consideration of the plea filed in this case by the defendant, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had, as well in support of as against the said plea, it is now here ordered by this court, that the said plea be, and the same is hereby overruled; and it is further now here ordered by this court, that the defendant answer the bill of complaint, as amended, on or before the first day of the next term. 282*] *ALBERT P. DE VALENGIN'S ADMINISTRATORS, Plaintiff's in Error, V. JOHN H. DUFFY, Defendant in Error. Belligerent property covered as neutral-property received by administrator in his representative character; how recovered by party entitled. It has been frequently held that the device of covering property as neutral, when in truth it was belligerent, is not contrary to the laws of war or of nations. Contracts made with underwriters in relation to property thus covered, have always been enforced in the courts of a neutral country, where the true character of the property, and the means taken to protect it from capture, have been fairly represented to the insurers. The same doctrine has always been held where false papers have been used to cover the property, provided the underwriter knew, or was bound to know, that such stratagems were always resorted to by the persons engaged in that trade. If such means may be used to prevent capture, there can be no good reason for condemning with more severity, the continuation of the same disguise after capture, in order to prevent the condemnation of the property, or to procure compensation for it, when it has been lost by reason of the capture. Courts of the capturing nation would never enforce contracts of that description, but they have always been regarded as lawful in the courts of a neutral country. Whatever property or money is lawfully recov ered by the executor or administrator, after the death of his testator or intestate, in virtue of his representative character, he holds as assets of the estate; and he is liable therefor in such representative character, to the party who has a good title thereto. The want of knowledge, or the possession of knowledge on the part of the administrator, as to the right and claims of other persons upon the money thus received, cannot alter the rights of the party to whom it ultimately belongs. The owner of property or of money received by an administrator, may resort to the administrator In his personal character, and charge him, de bonis propriis, with the amount thus received. He may do this, or proceed against him as executor or administrator at his election. But whenever an executor or administrator, in his representative character, lawfully receives money or property, he may be compelled to respond to the party entitled, in that character; and shall not be permitted to throw it off after he has received the money, in order to defeat the plaintiff's action. In the case of a factor who sells the goods of his principal in his own name, upon a credit, and dies before the money is received, if it is afterwards paid to the administrator in his representative character, the creditor would be entitled to consid er it as assets in his hands, and to charge him in the same character in which he received it. The debtor, that is to say, the party who purchased from the factor without any knowledge of the true owner, and who paid the money to the administrator under the belief that the goods belonged to the factor, is unquestionably discharged by this payment; yet he cannot be discharged unless he pays it to one lawfully authorized to receive it, IStates for the District of Maryland. except only in his representative character. N error to the Circuit Court of the United In the Circuit Court of Maryland, John H. Duffy, the defendant in error, instituted a suit against the administrators of Albert P. De Valengin, for the recovery of a sum of money which he claimed to belong to him, being a portion of the indemnity paid by the government of Brazil, for the capture and loss of the brig President Adams, by a Brazilian cruiser, in 1828. John H. Duffy, a citizen of the United States, domiciled at Buenos Ayres, in 1828, shipped a quantity of hides, and other articles of merchandise, in 1828, on board the brig President Adams, commanded and part owned by Albert P. De Valengin, a citizen of Baltimore, for Gib*raltar. The government of Brazil and [*283 that of Buenos Ayres were then at war. For the better security of the property from Brazilian capture, the property was shipped in the name of De Valengin, and soon after she sailed she was captured by an armed vessel of Brazil, and carried into Monte Video. There, both vessel and cargo were totally lost. Under an agreement between John H. Duffy and Captain De Valengin, a claim for the cargo as well as the vessel was made by him on the government of Brazil, for indemnity. The ownership of John H. Duffy was concealed in this application, as his property was liable to capture by the cruisers of Brazil; he being domiciled at Buenos Ayres. Captain De Valengin died before anything was recovered from the government of Brazil for the President Adams and cargo; and a certain James Neale, who had become his administrator, under letters of administration granted in Maryland, prosecuted the claim as the representative of De Valengin, and was, at length, paid the indemnity in Baltimore, by the aid of Mr. James Birkhead, of Rio de Janeiro, who remitted it to him from that place. The proceeds of the property remitted by Mr. Birkhead were returned in an inventory filed by Mr. Neale, as administrator, in the Orphan's Court, at Baltimore, as the estate of DeValengin. A suit for the recovery of the amount claimed by John H. Duffy, was instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States against James Neale, as the administrator of De Valengin; and he having died before the trial of the cause, and the plaintiff in error having taken out letters of administration, de bonis non, to the estate of De Valengin, they were summoned, and they appeared and took defense in the action. In the declaration in the action, the only count applicable to the controversy, between the parties to the suit was that for money had and received by James Neale, the administrator of De Valengin, for the use of the plaintiff. On the issues of non assumpsit and plene administravit, the jury found for the plaintiff on the first, and for the defendants on the sec |