of Pennsylvania of 21st March, 1813, entitled, | ley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421, Mr. Justice An Act to recharter certain Banks; and it was Story says: "This court will not suffer its juadmitted that the bank commenced the business risdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder, or of banking at Warren, in Pennsylvania, having nonjoinder of formal parties." The converse of been organized under the Act of 1824. The the proposition is equally true. counsel for the bank also produced the note on which the suit had been brought. The counsel for the bank stated, and the defendant's counsel admitted, that this suit was founded on the note. "Whereupon, it appearing to the court that this suit is founded on the note aforesaid, dated 6th Sept., 1837; that Guy C. Irvine was, at the date of the institution of this suit, a citizen of 295*] Pennsylvania, and that N. A. Lowry was, at the same date, a citizen of the State of New York; that said bank was erected, and duly organized at Warren, in Pennsylvania, under the Act of February 28th, 1834, aforesaid; and that six persons mentioned in the record, and sundry other stockholders thereof were, at the date of said suit, citizens of the State of New York, and due consideration being had of the premises, the court are divided in opinion; one of the judges thereof being of opinion that this court has no jurisdiction of the case; that the rule, granted as aforesaid, be made absolute and the record of this suit remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of the County of Warren. The other judge being of opinion that the court has jurisdiction of the case, and that the rule granted as aforesaid be denied." The judges of the Circuit Court certified this division of opinion to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was argued by Mr. M'Candless for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Marvin for the defendant. Mr. M'Candless contended that Guy C. Irvine is a mere nominal party in the suit, except as guarantor of the sufficiency of Lowry, the defendant. He is one of the garnishees in the attachment; and he is a competent witness in the cause, under the decisions of the court of Pennsylvania. The nominal plaintiff, who as signs an obligation, is a competent witness in an action against the obligor. 9 Serg. & Raw. Rep. 20; 2 Brown's Rep. 171. The courts of Pennsylvania, even after suit brought, allow a party on the record to assign the action, depositing with the clerk enough to cover the costs of the suit. 3 Binney's Rep. 306. The reason of this rule is, that in Pennsylvania there are no courts of chancery; and the assignee of a chose in action is therefore compelled to bring his suit in the name of the assignor. So, also, a bankrupt, who has obtained his certificate, and released his claim to the surplus of his estate, may be a witness. 4 Dall. 137; 2 Dall. 172; cited, also, 7 Serg. & Raw. Rep. 116; 3 Rawle's Rep. 407; 1 Peters's C. C. R. 308. This court have decided the question now depending before it. In Brown v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 903, it was held that the courts of the United States have jurisdiction in a case between citizens of the same, when the plaintiffs are only nominal, for the use of an alien. Who is the real party in this cause? It is not Guy C. Irvine, but the Lumberman's Bank at Warren. This court have said they would look at the real parties in the cause. In Worm It has been incontestably shown, 1. That Guy C. Irvine is not a party, or if a party, is only nominal. 2. That the Lumberman's Bank is *the real party. 3. That this court will [*296 look at the real parties, for the purpose of entertaining or excluding jurisdiction. This is the case of a corporation aggregate, part of whose stockholders live in the same State as the defendant. This court has decided that a corporation aggregate cannot be a citizen, and cannot litigate in the courts of the United States, unless in consequence of the characters of the individuals who compose a body politic. The Hope Insurance Company v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57; Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61; Breithaupt v. The Bank of Georgia 1 Peters, 238; Paine's C. C. R. 410; Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; 1 Wash. C. C. R. 146; The Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519; 1 Kent's Com. 324-326; 3 Cranch, 267; The Commercial and Rail Road Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocumb et al., decided at this term. Another question arises in this case. This was a foreign attachment; a proceeding in rem. Do the provisions of the Judiciary Act extend to any actions but those in personam? 1 Story's Laws, n. 1, 57. The act of Congress gives jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in cases where "the defendant is an inhabitant, or when he shall be found in the district at the time of serving the process." Lowry was not an inhabitant of the Western District of Pennsylvania, nor found there at the time of serving the writ. He was at the time the writ issued, and afterwards, residing in the State of New York. What is the object of the foreign attachment? It is a proceeding against the lands or goods of a defendant, to compel his appearance. Can a party plaintiff compel the appearance of a defendant in the Circuit Court, by issuing a foreign attachment? It has been decided that this cannot be done. 2 Dall. 369; Sergeant on Attachments, 42. If a Circuit Court of the United States cannot have jurisdiction, originally, can it have by the removal of a cause from a State court? It was not intended by the 12th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over causes brought before them on removal, beyond the limits prescribed to them originally. Conklin's Treatise, 78. No suit can be removed to the national court which might not, by the Constitution, have been originally commenced in those courts. As to the construction of the note on which the action was brought, the counsel cited, 1 Peters, 489; 3 Chitty on Commercial and Maritime Law, 107. Mr. Marvin, for the defendant. The question raised in this case has never yet been decided. Four questions have been presented in the argument for the plaintiff, but one only is depending. Has the Circuit of Is the Lumberman's Bank, at Warren, the 297] plaintiff in the cause, or is Guy C. Irvine the plaintiff? On the decision of this point the case must be decided. Guy C. Irvine is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Nathaniel A. Lowry is a citizen and resident of the State of New York; and those are the parties on the record. This brings the case within the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. the Western District of Pennsylvania jurisdic-| Court of Pennsylvania has been solemnly overtion of the cause? ruled. Scott v. Lloyd, 12 Peters, 151. The case cited from 8 Wheat. (Wormley v. Wormley) was a case in equity. And it rested on its special circumstances. The case cited from 5 Cranch, 303, was one in which the bond sued upon was taken officially, for the use of creditors. The bond had been given to a public officer for the use of creditors. This was, no doubt, averred in the declaration. The real character of the parties was thus apparent on the record. The real party was the creditor. As to the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court, it being a foreign attachment, the counsel for the defendant contended that there is no limitation imposed in the Constitution. The act of Congress protects suits by parties not citizens of the same State, or found in the State in which the action, of whatever kind it may be, shall be brought. Act of Congress of 1789, section twelve; Conklin's Treatise, 78, 79. Suits cannot be removed which are not within the constitutional provision. But, it is said, the court will go beyond the parties named in the suit, and inquire who is beneficially interested. That it is not the party to the record, which will give or exclude jurisdiction; but the party really interested, and he only is in the contemplation of the act of Congress. In this case, it is said, the action is brought for the bank, because this is so stated on the record. But the act of Congress looks only to the parties on the record. Pennsylvania is the only State in the Union in which actions in this form are brought. In The affidavits made in the Court of Common New York no such form of proceeding is Pleas of Warren County were improperly adknown. Would the court in a case brought mitted by that court, and should not be rehere from New York, and standing on the rec-garded here; nothing in the case can be tried ord between parties subject to the jurisdiction by affidavits of this character. of the court, inquire who are the persons really interested in the controversy ? Was it necessary in this case to state for whose use the action was brought; and if it was, could issue be taken upon it? If, this could be, a collateral issue would be raised; the regular inquiry in the cause would not be pursued. In all other States the courts will take care that the party really interested has the money which may be recovered. This will be done by the equitable powers of the courts. Mr. Justice Baldwin delivered the opinion of the court: This suit was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County, Pennsylvania, whence it was removed to the Circuit Court for the western district of that State, pursuant to the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, section twelve; and comes before this court on a certificate of division of opinion between the judges of that court, on a motion to remand the cause for want of jurisdiction. The legal party in the suit is Guy C. Irvine, Irvine, in whose name the suit is brought, is and the Circuit Court, on its law side, will look a citizen of Pennsylvania; the Lumberman's only to the legal party. The note is not as- | Bank of Warren is a corporation chartered by signable by indorsement, for it is not a negotia law of that State, and located at Warren; able instrument. It is not given for the payment of money, but for the office notes of the Lumberman's Bank. It is not, therefore, within the statutes which make promissory notes negotiable. It is said that Guy C. Irvine is not a party in this cause, because he may be a witness. But if he can be a witness, which is denied, it does not follow that he is not a party. Does the jurisdiction of the court of the United States depend on the Legislature, or on the decisions of the courts of the States? In many of the States a party is a witness to an account; and according to the rule now set up, this would deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction in a case between citizens of different States, when an account was the subject of contestation. The cases cited by the counsel for the plaintiff go on the principle that the party has no interest in the cause, the costs having been paid, and his interest assigned. But in all these cases he still continues the plaintiff in the cause. The law is not, however, as stated by the plaintiff's counsel. It has been decided by this court that a party who is a plaintiff in a cause, cannot by an assignment of the action and the payment of the costs, become a 298*] witness; and the decision of the Circuit part of the stockholders are citizens of New York, of which State the defendant is also a citizen. The suit is brought upon a paper, of which the following is a copy: "$53,000. "Warren, Pa., 6 September, '37. "Three months after date, I promise to pay to the order of Guy C. Irvine, Esq., fifty-three thousand dollars, in the office notes of the Lumberman's Bank of Warren, and payable at their banking house in Warren, Pa.' "N. A. Lowry." Indorsed on side, "Guy C. Irvine." This suit was commenced by the process of foreign attachment, agreeably to the law of Pennsylvania; that property of the defendant was attached according to its provisions; whereupon he appeared, and, by his counsel, moved for the removal of the cause; and having complied with the requisitions of the Judiciary Act, the cause was ordered to be removed to the Circuit Court. *By thus approving and submitting to [*299 the process of attachment, the defendant waived any privilege to which he was entitled by the section of the Judiciary Act, as held by this court in Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters, 330, 331; so that on his appearance and entry of bail, the attachment was dissolved, and the cause will thenceforth proceed as if it had commenced by | tion between this and the case of Brown v. the ordinary process of the court, served on the defendant within the district. The commencement of the action in the Common Pleas, by attachment, being expressly provided for in the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act, it must be considered, when removed into the Circuit Court, as an original one. This brings us to the question raised in the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, whether that court can exercise any jurisdiction over the case, on the ground that the defendant, and some of the stockholders of the bank, are citizens of New York; which would be a fatal objection to the jurisdiction, if the corporation is to be considered as the plaintiff and sole party in interest. On this subject, the decisions of the court have been uniform, and, as declared in the present term, in The Vicksburg Bank v. Slocomb, have settled this point decisively; nothing then remains but to ascertain from the record, as certified, whether the bank is the real plaintiff; for if they are not, then as Irvine is admitted to be a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Lowry of New York, the jurisdiction is undoubted. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303, which was a suit against an executor on his administration bond, given to the justices of the peace of the county where the testator died, and who were citizens of the State of Virginia, as well as the defendant. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was sustained, on the ground that though the plaintiffs and defendants were citizens of the same State, the former were mere nominal parties, without any interest or responsibility, and made by the law of Virginia the mere instruments or conduits through whom the legal right of the real plaintiff could be asserted; as such their names must be used, for the bond must be given to them in their official capacity; but as the person to whom the debt was due was a British subject, he was properly considered as the only party plaintiff in the action. Whatever right of action existed in virtue of the bond, passed by the operation of the law of Virginia directly to the person for whose bene. fit it was given, through the conduit appointed for that purpose. For such, and kindred cases, the person or officer thus selected by the law as its agent, is not a party to the suit; and no transfer of the bond or other security to the person intrusted is necessary to invest him with a complete legal interest or right of action; but cases of this description cannot be applied to actions like the present, in which the interest and responsibility of the parties to the paper depends on their contract; and the law neither dissolves or transfers any legal right of action on or to the party who accepts it as security for payment of a pre-existing We are therefore of opinion that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the case, and direct that it be so certified. The paper on which the suit is brought is not negotiable by the usage or custom of merchants; it is payable to order; the promise is to pay so many dollars, but not to pay any certain sum of money; it is a promise to pay the amount "in the office notes of the Lumberman's Bank at Warren," which are not money, and at most a chattel. Not being a promissory note, either by the law merchant, the statute of Anne, or the kindred act of Assembly of Pennsylvania, it is not negotiable by indorsement; | debt. and not being under seal, it is not assignable by the act of Assembly on that subject relating to bonds. The bank, therefore, cannot sue in their own name, in virtue of the indorsement of Irvine in blank; nor could they so sue if it was specially indorsed to them; because the legal right of action would still remain in Irvine, though the equitable interest in the thing promised may have passed to the bank. This case, however, is not of that description; the only evidence of any transfer of the contents of the note is the blank indorsement of Irvine, and the affidavit of the president of the bank; in the latter of which it is stated that the note was received by the bank from the defendant at the time it bears date, as a security for his previous indebtedness thereto; and that Irvine had not then or since any interest in said note, except as a guarantor for its payment, and the solvency and sufficiency of the drawer. In referring to the affidavit, we are not to be "THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff [*301 understood that whatever may be its contents, they would influence our decision; yet, assuming the case to be as there stated, the This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and on the point and question on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such cases made and provided, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court that the said Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the case. Whereupon it is ordered and adjudged that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court accordingly. in Error, V. legal right of action is in Irvine; the paper is JACOB KNIGHT, Benjamin Knight, Isaac 300*] not the evidence of an original debt, contracted by a discount thereof; or its reception as payment of a pre-existing debt due the bank; it is only a collateral security, by adding the name of Irvine as indorser. Standing as such to the bank, their rights are derivative through him; and as the indorsement passes only an equity, the legal interest is in him; he is the real plaintiff in a court of law, in which legal rights alone can be recognized. This consideration points to the true line of discrimina Knight, and Edward Knight, Defendants in Action on bond-privilege of jail limits-rule applies when United States a party. Action on a bond given to the United States for the liberty of the jail yard in Portland, in the State of Maine. The condition of the bond was that J. K. and B. K. "should continue true prisoners in the custody of the jailer, within the limits of the jail yard.' It was agreed by the counsel for the plaintiff and defendants that J. K. and B. K. had remained within "the limits of the jail | bounds of said jail yard, until lawfully disyard," as established under the laws of 1787, of charged from said imprisonment, according to Massachusetts, then prevailing in Maine; the limIts of the jail' yard having in October, 1798, been the laws of the United States in such cases extended over the whole county; but had not re- made and provided, and commit no manner of mained within the limits established on the 29th May, 1787, and existing when the act of Congress escape, then the said obligation to be void; was passed, 4th January, 1800, authorizing per- otherwise to remain in full force." sons under process from the United States to have the jail limits," as established by the laws of the State. Held, that the Act of Congress of 19th May, 1828, gives the debtors imprisoned under executions from the courts of the United States, at the suit of the United States, the privilege of Jall limits in the several States, as they were fixed by the laws of the several States at the date of that act. Whatever might be the liability of the officer who took the bond from the defendants, if the jail limits continued to be such as were established under the law of Massachusetts of 1787; the bond not having been taken under that law, and the condition being different from the requirements of those regulations, the parties to the bond, the sult being upon the bond, are bound for nothing whatsoever but what is contained in the condition, whether it be or be not conformable with the law. The statute of May 19th, 1828, entitled, "An Act further to regulate Processes in the courts of the United States," which proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding civil suits, does not devest the public of any right, does not violate any principle of public policy, but on the contrary makes provision, in accordance with the policy which the government has indicated, by many acts of previous legislation, to conform to State laws, In giving to persons imprisoned under their execution the privilege of Jail limits, embracing executions at the suit of the United States. The cases Wayman v. Southard, 1 Wheat. 10. and Beers v. Houghton, 9 Peters, 332, cited and affirmed. IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine. The United States, in 1838, instituted an action of debt against the defendants in error, on a bond executed by them on the 30th day of January, 1838, for the sum of seventeen thousand four hundred and ninety-four dollars and four cents; the condition of which was as fol. lows: "The condition of the above written obliga tion is such, that whereas the said Jacob and Benjamin Knight have been and now are imprisoned in the prison at Portland, in the said Maine District, by virtue of an execution issued against them on a judgment obtained against them by the said United States, at the District Court of the United States for Maine District which was begun and holden at Portland, within and for the District of Maine, on the first Tuesday of December, A. D. 1837, for the sum of eight thousand four hundred and sixty-two dollars and thirty-six cents, principal; and one hundred and sixty-one dollars and seventy302] nine cents for interest thereon, to the 19th day of December, aforesaid, and costs of suit taxed at twenty-four dollars and forty. seven cents, and also for all legal interest that may accrue on said sum of eight thousand four hundred and sixty-two dollars and thirty-six cents, from the said 19th December, until said judgment shall be fully discharged and satisfied, with one hundred cents more, for one writ of execution, and the officer's fees and charges for commitment, taxed at ninety-seven dollars and forty cents. "Now, if the said Jacob Knight and Benjamin Knight, from the time of executing this bond, shall continue true prisoners, in the custody of the jailer, within the limits of the jail yard, until they shall be lawfully discharged, and shall not depart without the exterior In this case the parties in the Circuit Court agreed to the following statement of facts: "On the 30th day of January, last past, Jacob and Benjamin Knight were committed to the jail in the city of Portland, on an execution issued on a judgment in favor of the said United States, against said Jacob and Benjamin; whereupon the said Jacob and Benjamin, as principals, and Isaac and Edward Knight as sureties, gave the bond declared on in this suit; that said Jacob and Benjamin continued to remain within the limits of the town of Portland, exclusive of the islands, and did not depart therefrom up to the time of the commencement of this suit, nor have they since departed therefrom; but neither the said Jacob nor Benjamin, from the time of the execution of said bond, nor afterwards, at any time, lodged in the night time within the walls of said jail, but remained at large within the limits of said town of Portland, exclusive of the islands belonging to the same, both day and night. "If, upon the foregoing facts, the court are of opinion that the condition of said bond has been broken by the said Jacob and Benjamin, and that they have made an escape, then the court are to render judgment, to be entered as of said October Term, and as on verdict rendered for the said United States; and if the court shall be of opinion that the obligation of the bond has not been broken, then judgment to be rendered, in manner aforesaid, for the said defendants." And each party reserves to themselves the right to a writ of error, to reverse any such judgment, as may, as aforesaid, be rendered by said court in the case. The justices of the peace of the County of Cumberland, on the 29th May, 1787, established the "proper boundaries of the jail yard in the county, to be: Beginning at the bottom of Love Lane, at low water-mark; thence up said lane, including the houses on each side thereof to the northerly side of Back Street; thence down said Back Street, including the houses on both sides thereof, to King Street; from thence down said King Street, including the houses on both sides thereof, to low [303 water-mark; thence by low water-mark to the first bounds, including all the ground and buildings within the aforesaid limits." Afterwards, on the 16th of October, 1798, the limits of the jail yard were extended to "the town of Portland, exclusive of the islands;" and on the 10th of September, the judges of the Court of Sessions ordered "that the bounds of the jail yard be extended over the whole county, and to the exterior limits thereof: which are hereby fixed and established as the bounds of the jail yard for the said County of Cumberland." At the October sessions of the Circuit Court, judgment, on the facts agreed, was given, that "the obligation of the bond was not broken," and the United States prosecuted this writ of error. The case was argued by Mr. Gilpin, Attor ney-General of the United States, for the plain- | privileges they renewed, also for limited peritiff in error, and by Mr. Evans for the defendants. Mr. Gilpin, for the United States, submitted to the court that the obligation of the bond given by the defendants to the United States was broken 1. Because they were only entitled, pursuant to the Act of Congress of 6th January, 1800, to the like privileges of the yards or limits of the said jail, as persons confined on process from the courts of Maine were entitled to at the time that act was passed. 1 Story's Laws U. S. 715. 2. Because the privileges of persons confined on process from the courts of Maine at the time that act was passed, did not extend to the privilege of being outside of the walls of the jail during the night time. Mr. Gilpin continued: The conditions of the bond which the defendants gave to the United States were: 1. That Jacob and Benjamin Knight should continue true prisoners in the custody of the jailer, within the limits of the jail yard, until they should be lawfully discharged. 2. That they should not depart without the exterior limits of the jail yard, until lawfully discharged from imprisonment according to the laws of the United States; and, 3. That they should commit no manner of escape. A violation of either of these conditions, by Jacob or Benjamin Knight, entitled the United States to a judgment for the penalty of the bond. The facts are, that although neither of them did depart beyond the limits of the town of Portland exclusive of the islands, which constituted the boundaries of the jail yard, yet neither of them did at any time lodge at night within the walls of the jail, but both went at large within the boundaries during the night as well as the day. The Circuit Court adjudged that this was no breach of either of the conditions of the bond. The correctness of this judgment depends 804*] upon the meaning of "true imprisonment," and an "escape" therefrom. A true imprisonment, under an execution from the courts of the United States, is that which the laws of the United States prescribe, and an act of the prisoner before his discharge, at variance therewith, is an escape. The United States, not having jails in the States for the custody of their prisoners, recommended to the State legislatures, on the 23d September, 1789, (1 Story's Laws, 70), to make it "the duty of the keepers of their jails, to receive and safe keep therein, all prisoners committed under the authority of the United States," until lawfully discharged; and to subject them to the same penalties as in the case of prisoners committed under the State Laws. To this recommendation Massachusetts, of which Maine then constituted a part, acceded on the 26th February 1790 (1 Laws of Massachusetts, 487); thus requiring all prisoners committed under the laws of the United States to be "received and safely kept" in the jails of Massachusetts. On the 5th May, 1792 (1 Story's Laws, 246), Congress extended, for a limited period, to persons so imprisoned, "like privileges of the yards or limits of the jails," as persons confined for debt under judgments of the State courts, but subject also to "the like regulations and restrictions." These ods, in 1794 and 1796 (1 Story's Laws, 340, 341); and finally made them permanent by the Act of 6th January, 1800. 1 Story's Laws, 715. Since then, and previous to the present suit, they have passed no additional act upon the subject. The law, therefore, in regard to the imprisonment of debtors of the United States is, that they are to have the same privi leges, and be subject to the same restrictions, while in jail, as debtors under process from the State courts had or were subject to, on the 6th January, 1800; that then, and only then, are they "truly imprisoned;" and that the jailer is subject to the penalties attendant on their "escape," if he allows them any other privileges, or relaxes any of those restrictions. What, then, were the privileges and restriotions of an imprisoned debtor in Massachusetts in 1800? They were, as declared in the act of 21st February, 1785, 1 Laws of Massachusetts, 221, that he might have “a chamber and lodg. ing in any of the houses or apartments belong. ing to the prison, and liberty of the yard within the day time." These were the privileges of the debtors, and the restrictions upon them; to lodge in any apartment belonging to the jail, and to be at large within the limits of the yard in the day time. To lodge elsewhere, or to be set at large even within the limits of the yard during the night, was not a "true imprisonment," but clearly amounted to "an escape." The words of the law seem too plain to permit a doubt as to this construction; but if there be any, it is removed by the judicial decisions of the courts of Massachusetts. The rule laid down in the case of M'Keen v. Delancey, 5 Cranch, 32, that the construction given by the State courts to State statutes is to be adopted, has been always upheld by this court. Applied to the present case, it is conclusive. A series of decisions upon this statute [*305 has established, as an absolute restriction on the privileges of an imprisoned debtor, that he must lodge in an apartment belonging to the jail; and that he must not be absent from such lodging, or outside of the jail, at night; it has established that a violation of this restriction is "an escape." Bartlett v. Willis, 3 Mass. Rep. 105; Clapp v. Cofran, 17 Mass. Rep. 101; Freeman v. Davis, 7 Mass. Rep. 201; Burroughs v. Lowder, 8 Mass. Rep. 379; Trull v. Wilson, 9 Mass. Rep. 154. It is thus apparent that under the laws of Massachusetts an imprisoned debtor who should lodge outside of the jail, or be absent therefrom at night, would not "remain a true prisoner," but would "commit an escape:" and as the acts of Congress of 1789 and 1800, while they extend the same privileges, also impose the same restrictions on debtors imprisoned on process from the courts of the United States, it follows that Jacob and Benjamin Knight did not "remain true prisoners" but that their acts amount tothe commisison of "an escape." Consequently, the condition of the bond of the defendants has been broken, and the judgment of the court below is erroneous. Mr. Evans, for the defendants in error, contended that the condition of the bond in suit had not been broken: "1. Because the Act of Congress of 6th January, 1800, gives to persons imprisoned on |