be prejudiced by the negligence of public offi- | laws which regulate the rights, duties and cers, to whose care they are confided. Without conduct of officers, in the service of such procundertaking to lay down any general rule as ess, according to the exigency, upon the person applicable to cases of this kind, we feel satis- or property of the execution debtor; and also fied that when, as in this case, a statute which all the exemptions from arrest, or imprisonproposes only to regulate the mode of proceed- ment under each process, created by those ing in suits, does not devest the public of any laws." right, does not violate any principle of public policy; but on the contrary, makes provisions in accordance with the policy which the government has indicated by many acts of previous legislation, to conform to State laws, in giving to persons imprisoned under their execution the privilege of jail limits; we shall best carry 316] into effect the legislative intent by construing the executions at the suit of the United States to be embraced within the Act of 1828. This quotation covers the whole ground of controversy, on the effect of these words, "proceedings thereupon." We are of opinion, therefore, that the Act of 1828 gives to debtors imprisoned under executions from the courts of the United States, at the suit of the United *States, the privilege of the jail limits in [*317 the several States, as they were fixed by the laws of the several States at the date of that act. We give no opinion whether that act would extend so far as to enable the imprisoned debtthe benefit of the insolvent laws of the States, as the question does not arise in this case. Upon the whole view of the case, we think the judgment of the Circuit Court correct, and it is, therefore, affirmed. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed. Error, V. ror. Purchaser of a note of peculiar form, chargeable with knowledge of custom of bank where negotiable-fraud. Having come to this conclusion, it only remains to inquire whether the words in the Actors of the United States to avail themselves of of 1828, "the proceedings thereupon" (that is on executions), embrace as a part of those proceedings, the rights of an imprisoned debtor to have the privilege of the jail limits. Upon this question we are relieved from the necessity of argument by the decisions of this court. In the case of Wayman v. Southard, this court was expounding the meaning of the words, "modes of proceeding," in the Process Act of 1792; and the question was, whether these words included "proceedings on executions." They decided that they did; but the Act of 1828, passed after the decision of the case of Wayman v. Southard adopted the very terms, "proceedings on executions," because the expression is, "proceedings there: *SAMUEL L. FOWLER, Plaintiff in [*318 upon," referring to executions, which had just preceded it. And the reasoning of the court in Wayman v. Southard, proves clearly HARRIS BRANTLY et al., Defendants in Erthat these last words would include proceedings by debtors to obtain the privilege of the jail liberties. In the same case of Wayman. Southard, it was objected that the Process Act of 1792 ought not to be construed as embracing the proceedings on executions, because if it did, it would furnish the rule as well for writs of capias ad satisfaciendum as of fieri facias; and that the marshal would be as much bound to allow a prisoner the benefit of the rules under the Act of Congress of 1800, as to sell upon the notice, and on the credit prescribed by the State laws; and that as the Act of 1800 had, by separate and distinct legislation, provided for the jail limits, Congress could not be supposed to have provided for the same subjects in the Process Act. But the court considered this separate provision as to the jail limits merely as a cumulative act of legislation, with a view to remove doubts that might have arisen from the jails in which prisoners were confined not belonging to the United States. And this answers the argument urged at the bar, upon the ground of the several acts which especially provided for jail liberties, against the construction of the Act of 1828; which would extend to embrace the privilege of jail liberties, within the terms, "proceedings thereupon," that is on executions. Beers et al. v. Houghton, 9 Peters, 362, this court, in construing this very Act of 1828, say, "the words, the 'proceedings on writs of execution and other final process,' must, froin their very import, be construed to include all the In Action on a promissory note for two thousand dollars, drawn for the purpose of being discounted cashier of the bank or bearer, and upon which was at the Branch Bank at Mobile, payable to the written an order to credit the person to whom the note was sent, to be by him offered for discount to the bank for the use of the drawers, the order be Held, that the instruction was correct. The known custom of the bank, and its ordinary modes of transacting business, including the preNOTE. Notes and bills: Who will be deemed to have acted in good faith in taking same. What is notice to prevent holder recovering. What circumstances will amount to actual or constructive notice of any defect or infirmity in the title to the note, so as to let it in as a bar or scribed forms of notes offered for discount, entered into the contract of those giving notes for the purpose of having them discounted at the bank; and the parties to the note must be understood as having agreed to govern themselves by such customs and modes of doing business, and this, whether they had actual knowledge of them or not; and it was the especial duty of all those dealing with the note to ascertain them, if unknown. This is the established doctrine of the Supreme Court, as laid down in Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. in Mills v. The Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. and in The Bank of Washington v. Triplett and Neale, 1 Peters, 32. A note overdue, or a bill dishonored, is a circumstance of suspicion to put those dealing for it afterwards on their guard, and in whose hands it is open to the same defenses it was in the hands of the holder when it fell due. After maturity, such paper cannot be negotiated. "Credit: Diego M'Voy. The note had on it the two indorsements of Diego M'Voy and William D. Primrose; and that of Taulmin, Hazard & Company was stricken out. On the face of the note there was, in pencil, the figures 169. The defendants, the three makers, introduced evidence to prove that the note, in its present I States for the Southern District of Ala-factor in Mobile, to be offered for discount in N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United form (except the indorsements), was sent by one of the makers to M'Voy, who was his bama. In the Circuit Court of Alabama an action the Branch Bank of the State in that city as an was instituted on a promissory note, by the accommodation note; the proceeds of which were to be forwarded to said maker. That the plaintiff in error, against the defendants, and a verdict and judgment were entered for the de-note was offered for discount and rejected. fendants. The plaintiff took exception to the charge of the court, and prosecuted this writ of Mr. Justice Catron delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action of assumpsit by the assignee 319] of a note against the makers. The questions of laws arising in this cause depend on the construction of a note of hand, in the following words: "Selma, Dallas County, Alabama, March 1st, 1836. "Eleven months after date, we, Harris Brantly, Peyton S. Graves, and Hugh Ferguson, jointly and severally, promise to pay Andrew Armstrong, cashier, or bearer, two thousand dollars, value received, negotiable and payable defense against a holder for value, has been a matter of much discussion, and of much diversity of judicial opinion. It is agreed on all sides, that express notice is not indispensable; but it will be sufficient if the circumstances are of such a strong and pointed character, as necessarily to cast a shade upon the transaction, and put the holder upon inquiry. Cone v. Baldwin, 12 Pick. 545; Hall v. Hale, 8 Conn. 336; Story Prom. Note, sec. 197; Knapp v. Lee, 8 Pick. 452. For a considerable length of time the doctrine prevalled, that if the holder took the note under suspicious circumstances, or without due caution or inquiry, although he gave value for it, yet he was not to be deemed a bona fide holder without notice. Gill v. Cubit, 3 Barn. & C. 466; Snow v. Peacock, 3 Bing. 406; Strage v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 677; Slater v. West, 1 Dan. & Ll. 15; Easley v. Crockford, 10 Bing. 243; Nicholson v. Patton, 13 Lou. 213, 216; 3 Kent's Com. 81, 82, Marg. p.; Down v. Halling, 4 Barn. & C. 330; Beckwith v. Cowell, 8 Bing. 444; Chitty on Bills, 277-284. But this doctrine has since been overruled and abandoned, upon the ground of its inconvenience, and its obstruction to the free circulation and negotiation of exchange, and other transferable paper. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & Ell. 870; Uther v. Rich, 10 Ad. & Ell. 784; Stephens v. Fos The factor then proposed to raise money on the note for his own use, without the knowledge of the makers, and intended to conceal the appropriation of the note from them. The first per son to whom he offered to sell the note deemed the attempt a fraud, and refused to purchase. M'Voy then indorsed and transferred the note to Primrose for one thousand two hundred offered for discount at the bank and rejected. dollars, communicating to him it had been Taulmin, Hazard & Company held a note for three thousand two hundred and fifty dollars, on Black, indorsed by Vail and Dade, and by Primrose, and which was past due; to discharge which, in part, Primrose transferred the note in controversy to Taulmin, Hazard & Company; and Taulmin, Hazard & Company indorsed the same before its maturity to the plaintiff, Fowler, and received credit on their account, they being largely indebted to him at the time. The leading feature in the cause, involving the principle on which it turns, is this: the note was in the form prescribed by the bank to those who desired accommodations at it, which form was not in use before its adoption there. The memorandum on the left hand side of the note, and signed by the drawers, was designed ter, 1 Cromp. Mees. & R. 849; Arbonien v. Anderson, 1 Ad. & Ell. New R. 498, 509; Story on Bills, secs. 415, 416. The rule laid down in Gill v. Cubit, 3 Barn. & C. 466, and Down v. Halling, 4 Barn. & C. 330, that the negligence of a party taking a negotiable instrument fixes him with the defective title of the party passing it, is no longer law. Bank of Bengal v. Macleod, 5 Moore Ind. App. 1; 7 Moore, P. C. 35; 13 Jur. 945. A person who takes a bill under circumstances calculated to excite suspicion, and, having the means of knowledge, willfully abstains from making any inquiries, must be considered a holder with notice of the fraud, if any exists. Jones V. Gordon, 37 L. J. N. S. 477; 2 L. R. App. Cas. 616; 26 W. R. 172, H. L. What circumstances are sufficient to excite suspicion in the mind of a prudent man, relative to the title of a holder of negotiable paper offering it for sale. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 361. Suspicion of defect of title, or the knowledge of circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence on the part of the taker, at the time of the transfer, will not defeat his title. That result can only be produced by bad faith on his part. And the burden to show the officers of the bank to whose credit | not for circulation out of it. The pencil mark 320] the money was to be placed, should the note be discounted; and by the usages of the bank, no other person than the one thus named could receive the money. Primrose testified he knew from the pencil mark on the face of the note it had been offered for discount and refused, when he purchased it. | The cashier proved the pencil mark was made according to the usage of the bank on all notes offered for discount and refused. To a part of the first instruction, that held, if the plaintiff took the note in payment of a preexisting debt due to him from Taulmin, Hazard & Company, then the jury ought to find for the defendants, exception is taken; and the court refused to instruct the jury that, if the plaintiff took the note fairly in payment of a debt due to him, before its maturity, without notice of the purpose for which M'Voy had held it, then he was entitled to recover. And also refused to instruct, if the jury believed plaintiff took the note bona fide in payment of a previous debt, that he had no notice of any kind, and there were no circumstances to put him upon an inquiry into any fraud committed on the part of M'Voy, he was entitled to recover. on its face when sold, was common to all rejected paper, and was put there by the officers of the bank as evidence of the fact that it had been offered and rejected; and those dealing for it, with the mark on its face, must be presumed to have had knowledge what it imported, as the slightest inquiry would have ascertained its meaning. These were the legal presumptions attached to the contract when the plaintiff purchased it; and the explanatory evidence to prove the custom of the bank was introduced to enlighten the court and jury in regard to the rules governing the transaction, and furnishing the law of the case, and which the plaintiff, when he purchased the paper, is presumed to have known and understood, as the court knew and understood it after it was proved on the trial. This was the case made up of law and fact, on which the court was asked to [*321 charge the jury; and not the abstract proposition whether, on a proper construction of the statutes of Alabama, negotiable paper, payable in bank, purchased bona fide, and without notice of an existing infirmity, but taken in discharge of a pre-existing debt, carried the infirmity with it into the hands of the purchaser, for the reason that the mode of pay. ment was not in the usual course of trade. A note overdue, or bill dishonored, is a circumstance of suspicion, to put those dealing for it afterwards on their guard; and in whose hands it is open for the same defenses it was in the hands of the holder when it fell due. 13 Peters, 79. After maturity, such paper cannot be negotiable "in the due course of trade," although still assignable. There were other instructions asked and refused; but, as they are in effect the same as those recited, an answer to which will cover the whole case, they need not be further noticed. The known customs of the bank, and its ordinary modes of transacting business, including the prescribed forms of notes offered for discount, were matters of proof, and entered into the contract; and the parties to it must be understood as having governed themselves by such customs and modes of doing business; So the paper before us carried on its face cirand this, whether they had actual knowledge cumstances of suspicion so palpable as to put of them or not; and it was especially the duty those dealing for it, before maturity, on their of all those dealing for the paper in question to guard; and as to require at their hands strict ascertain them if unknown. Such is the estab-inquiry into the title of those through whose lished doctrine of this court, as laid down in Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheaton; Mills v. The Bank of the United States, 11 Wheaton; and The Bank of Washington v. Triplett and Neale, 1 Peters, 32, 33. The note sued on is peculiar in its form; it was made for the purposes of discount, and only intended for negotiation at the bank, and of proof lies on the party who assails the right claimed by the party in possession. Murray v. Leadner, 2 Wall. 110, 121. Where the supposed defect or infirmity in the title of the instrument appears on its face at the time of its transfer, the question whether the party who took it had notice or not, is, in general, a question of construction, for the court. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 365. But to impeach the title of a holder for value, by facts and circumstances outside of the instrument itself, it must be shown that he had knowledge of such facts and circumstances when the transfer was made. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; 13 Pet. 65; 14 Id. 318; 3 T. R. 80; 4 Mass. 270; 12 Johns. 305; 12 Pick. 345; 5 Wend. 566; Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer, 260. The question whether the party had such knowledge, is a question of fact for the jury. If the jury find that he did not, then unless there was bad faith, he is entitled to recover. Mere want of care and caution is not enough. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 348, 366; 4 Ad. & E. 870; 10 Id. 784; 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 276; 1 Cromp. M. & W. 849; 1 Ad. & E. N. S. 498; 16 Mees. & W. 355; 20 Pick. 545; 11 Conn. 368. A purchaser of a negotiable bond from a bona ade holder who obtained it for value before matu hands it had passed. Failing to be thus diligent, they must abide by the misfortune their negligence imposed, and stand in the condition of M'Voy. As between him and the defendants, there was no contract or liability on their part; nor as bearer of the note could he lawfully pass it off in the due course of trade, so as to commurity, takes it free from infirmities, as it was in the hands of such holder, notwithstanding the second purchaser bought with notice. Marion County v. Clark, 4 Otto, 278; Cromwell v. Soc. County, 6 Otto, 51; Shell v. Telford, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 307. One, who acquires negotiable paper from an unlawful holder in the usual course of business, for value and in good faith, has a perfect title thereto; notwithstanding circumstances of suspicion about the mode of its transfer to him, which might put a prudent man upon inquiry. Good faith, and not care or negligence in any degree, is the question for the jury. Steinhart v. Boker, 34 Barb. 436; 17 C. B. 161; 16 Barb. 550; 17 N. Y. 230; 1 C. M. & R. 849; 5 Tyrw. 870; Carton v. Ireland, 5 E. & B.; Crook v. Jadis, 5 B. & Ad. 909. The title of a holder of negotiable paper in good faith and for value is good, notwithstanding it was obtained from the maker by fraud, and the holder had notice of facts which should have put him upon inquiry. Magee v. Badger, 30 Barb. 246. The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as to diligence or negligence. He owes no duty of active Inquiry. Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247; Belmont Branch Bank v. Hoye, 35 N. Y. 65. nicate a better title to another; the face of the paper betraying its character and purposes, and M'Voy's want of authority. All the rulings of the court below must be referred to this paper, and to the special case made by the proofs. Any instruction asked, which cannot be given to the whole extent asked, may be simply refused; or it may be modified, at the discretion of the court. No instruction was asked that could have been lawfully given; to every one the court could well say, and did in substance say, that under no circumstances could a purchase of this note be made by the plaintiff, from Taulmin, Hazard & Company, so as to exempt it in the hands of the assignee from the infirmity it was subject to in the hands of M'Voy. And in regard to the last part of the first instruction, where the jury is in substance told that if they believed the note was taken in pay ment of a pre-existing debt, due to plaintiff from Taulmin, Hazard & Company, still they should find for the defendants: the court might have gone farther, and instructed the jury that neither could the plaintiff recover had the note been purchased bona fide, and without notice of the fraudulent conduct of M'Voy. The judgment is, therefore, ordered to be affirmed. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs. necessary to prove the decree. The deed was good without the decree. The possession of a deed, regularly executed, is prima facie evidence of its delivery. Under ordinary circumstances, no other evidence of the delivery of a deed than the possession of it, by the person claiming under it, is required. The grantor in the deed was David Carrick Buchanan, and he declares in it that he is the same person who was formerly David Buchanan. The Circuit Court were required to charge the jury that it was necessary to convince the jury, by proofs in court, that David Carrick Buchanan is the same person as the grantor named in the pattent, David Buchanan; and that the statement by the grantor was no proof to establish the fact. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that they must be satisfied from the deed and other documents, and the circumstances of the case, that the grantor in the deed is the same person to whom the patent was issued; and they declared their opinion that such was the fact. BY THE COURT: The principle is well established that a court may give their opinion on the evidence to the jury, being careful to distinguish be tween matters of law and matters of opinion, in regard to the fact. When a matter of law is given by the court to the jury, it should be considered by the court as conclusive; but a mere matter of opinion as to the facts, will only have such influence on the jury as they may think it entitled to. The law knows of but one Christian name, and the omission or insertion of the middle name, or of the initial letter of that name, is immaterial; and It is competent for the party to show that he is known as well without as with the middle name. A deed of lands sold for taxes cannot be read in evidence, without proof that the requisites of the law which subjected the land to taxes had been complied with. There can be no class of laws more strictly local in their character, and which more directly concern real property, than laws imposing taxes on lands, and subjecting the lands to sale for unpaid taxes. They not only constitute a rule of property, but their construction by the courts of the State should be followed by the courts of the United States, with equal if not with greater strictness than any other class of laws. The Supreme Court of Ohio has required a claimant under a tax title to show, before his title can be available, a substantial compliance with the requisites of the law. In an action of ejectment, the defendants having entered into the consent rule, the plaintiff in Ohio is not to be called upon to prove the calls of the patent under which he claims, on the ground of establishing the different corners. The defendants are bound to admit, after they have entered 822*] *JOHN F. GAMES and Nathan Gilbert, Into the consent rule, that they are in possession Plaintiffs in Error, Y. of the premises claimed by the lessor of the plaintiff. JOHN STILES, ex dem. Walter Dunn, De-IN States for the District of Ohio. N error to the Circuit Court of the United ceased, Defendant in Error. Deed in pursuance of decree of United States Court-not necessary to produce decree-possession of deed as evidence of delivery-Christian name-what is taxable. A deed was executed in Glasgow, Scotland, by which land in Ohio, which had been patented to David Buchanan by the United States, was conveyed to Walter Sterling. The deed recited that It was made in pursuance of a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia. No exemplification of the decree was of fered in evidence in support of the deed. court held that as Buchanan was the patentee of the land, although he made the deed in pursuance of the decree of the Circuit Court of Virginia, the decree could add nothing to the validity of the conveyance, and therefore it was wholly un The In 1836 the lessee of the defendants in error instituted an action of ejectment against the plaintiffs in error, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, for a tract of land lying between the Little Miami and Scioto rivers, in that part of the State of Ohio known as the Virginia Military District, being on a survey *under a part of a [*323 military land warrant for one thousand acres. The cause was tried at July Term, 1838, and a verdict and judgment were entered for the plaintiffs in the action, the defendant in error. On the trial of the cause, the defendant tendered a bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions states that the plaintiff ordered in evidence in support of his action First. A certified copy of the deed from David Carrick Buchanan to Walter Sterling, dated not material, or a misnomer, initials; "senior" or "junior" forms no part of name, see notes to 7 L ed. U. S. 581; 20 L. ed. U. S. 830. As to acquisition and use of name by individual, see note to 14 L.R.A. 690. Peters 14. Wills' Heirs, and H. Brush were complainants. and David Buchanan, in his lifetime, was de fendant; and his unknown heirs, after his decease, were, by bill of revivor, made defendants; wherein the title to the premises in question was decreed to the complainants in that suit. June 27th, 1825. The patent from the United | Ohio, in a case wherein White's Heirs and J. 8. States, dated 22d May, 1802, for the land in controversy, was granted to David Buchanan by the President of the United States, and the deed was executed by David Carrick Buchanan, stating that he had formerly been David Buchanan. The defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that the statement in the deed by the grantor, that he had formerly been David Buchanan, is no proof that he was David Carrick Buchanan. This instruction the court refused. The deed from David Carrick Buchanan recited that the deed was executed in conformity with a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Fifth Circuit, in the Virginia District, to convey the land described in it to Walter Sterling in fee-simple. The defendants excepted further to the introduction of the deed in evidence, because the proceedings of the Circuit Court of the United States in Virginia, recited in the deed, were not produced with it. But the court overruled the objection. Second. The defendants in their defense offered in evidence a certified copy of a paper, purporting to be a deed from William Middleton, auditor of Brown County, to John S. Wills, bearing date April 22d, 1824, for two hundred acres of land, and insisted it was duly acknowledged as such deed, and such copy was duly certified by the recorder of Brown County. The deed from William Middleton, the auditor of Brown County, recited that a sale had been made of two hundred acres of land, by William Middleton, county auditor, to John S. Wills, on the 29th December, 1823, for arrearages of taxes due to the State of Ohio, for 1821, 1822, 1823, for the lands conveyed; the land being part of the land patented to Buchanan. The deed particularly described by metes and bounds the tract conveyed, and granted the same to John S. Wills in fee-simple. It was duly acknowledged according to the laws of Ohio, and recorded in the proper office. The plaintiff objected to this deed as not competent to go to the jury without evidence of the proceedings and acts of the public officers, prior, and at the sale of said land for the tax, and insisted it ought to be admitted; and the court sustained the objection and overruled the evidence, and declared their opinion that the same evidence should not be admitted, and the same was rejected accordingly. The defendants then offered the same deed, or copy of deed, accompanied by a duly certified copy of the record of the proceedings, at and before the sale of said land for taxes, bearing date 9th May, 1838, certified by Hezekiah Lindsey, county auditor of said County of 324] Brown; which copies or papers, and certificates thereon, are referred to as a part of the bill of exceptions; whereupon, the plaintiffs, by counsel, objected to the admission of the same on the ground that the same did not contain all the legal requisites to justify and authorize said sale and conveyance of said land for taxes; and of this opinion was the court, and declared their opinion to be that the same ought not to be admitted in evidence in this case, and the same were rejected accordingly. The defendants below gave in evidence a transcript of the record of the proceedings and decree of the Supreme Court of the State of The defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that the record of the proceedings and decree given in evidence by defendants, may be considered by the jury as conveying the title to the land in controversy in that suit to the complainants therein, and will, and ought to affect parties and privies, who had knowledge of the same, to prevent their taking title from the defendant therein from the time such knowledge existed. In place of this instruction, the court instructed the jury that to prevent Buchanan from making a good deed to those lands, it was necessary he should have notice, actual or constructive, prior to the making such deed, and of the commencement of the suit; the service of the process or the order of publication, giving such notice to appear and answer; and such publication made, to be proved: if the jury should find the deed from Buchanan to Sterling was dated June 27th. 1825, and was at that time delivered, and the order of the court for the publication not made until August following, as appears in the record aforesaid, it was competent for Buchanan to make such deed to Sterling; and the court declared their opinions accordingly. The defendant prosecuted this writ of error. The case was argued by Mr. Mason for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Corwin, with whom was Mr. Bond, for the defendant. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error, Mr. Mason, assigned the following reasons for the reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court: First. That on the trial of the cause, the court admitted as evidence in the cause a paper purporting to be a deed from, or signed by David Carrick Buchanan to Walter Sterling, as appears by bill of exceptions; which, for the reasons stated in the bill of exceptions, should not have been admitted in evidence. Second. There is also error in this, that the court, on the trial aforesaid, admitted in evidence to the jury a copy of another paper, purporting *to be a deed from Walter Ster- [*325 ling to Walter Dunn; which, for the reasons stated in the bill of exceptions, ought not to have been admitted in evidence. Third. There is also error in this, that the court refused to admit a certified copy of a deed from William Middleton, auditor of Brown County, to John S. Wills, for two hundred acres of land, for the reasons stated in the bill of exceptions; whereas the same evidence ought to have been admitted. Fourth. There is also error in this, that said court refused to admit the same deed or copy accompanied by a duly certified copy of the record of the proceedings, at and before the sale of said lands for taxes, for the reasons stated in the bill of exceptions; whereas, said evidence ought to have been admitted. Mr. Corwin, for the defendants, contended that the proceedings of the court in Virginia were not necessary to the validity of the deed; that a good consideration is stated in the deed |