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first degree north latitude, of which Spain was powers, as governments de facto, were held not in possession at the time of the grant; the to be valid under those treaties or the law of court decided this case on the same principles nations, to have been exclusively these. The as were adopted in Poole v. Fleeger, and ap- British grant was made flagrante bello, the plied to the compact between Kentucky and Treaty of Peace neither ceded or relinquished Tennessee. These were the principles laid any territory to the United States, or to pardown in their opinion: “It is the usage of all ticular States; it was a solemn recognition and the civilized nations of the world, when terri. acknowledgment of their pre-existing rights. tory is ceded, to stipulate for the property of The Spanish grant, though made during its inhabitants, etc. “Had Spain considered peace, became void by the admission of Spain, herself as ceding territory, she would not have in the Treaty of 1795, of the original right of neglected a stipulation which every sentiment the United States to the territory in which the of justice and national honor would have de land was situated, by the express stipulation manded, and which the United States would that the settlers within the boundary estabnot have refused. But instead of requiring an lished should remove, with their effects, within article to that effect, she has expressly stipu. a stipulated time; and that there was no stipu. lated for the withdrawal of the settlements | lation in the treaty for the protection of the made within what the treaty admits to be the inhabitants, in the enjoyment of property held territory of the United States, and for permis- under Spanish grants previously made. sion to the settlers to bring their property with * There was another feature, com- [*401 them. We think this an unequivocal acknowl. mon to both cases, which was noticed by the edgment that the occupation of that territory court, growing out of the compact with Geor. 400*) by Spain was wrongful; and *we think gia, and the subsequent acts of Congress. This the opinion thus clearly indicated was sup- compact was made by "article of agreement ported by the state of facts. It follows that and cession," entered into the 24th April, 1802, Spanish grants, made after the Treaty of "between the United States and the State of Peace, can have no intrinsic validity; and the Georgia," in virtue of an act of Congress, "for holders must depend for their titles on the an amicable settlement of limits with that laws of the United States." Henderson v. Poin- State," and a law thereof. dexter, 12 Wheat. 535, 536; vide 11 Peters, 200, By art. 1 "Georgia cedes to the United 210.
States all the right, title, and claim to the ju. The statement of this case by the court, in a risdiction and soil of the lands within her boundpreceding part of their opinion, gives a most ary, west of the River Chatahoochee, upon the lucid illustration of the principles above re: following express conditions, and subject thereferred to. After alluding to the treaties of to, that is to say,” etc. Second. “That all perpeace between Great Britain and the United sons who, on the 27th October, 1795 (the date States, France and Spain, in 1783, the court of the treaty with Spain), were actual settlers say: “In the treaty with Spain, the Floridas within the territory thus ceded, “shall be conwere ceded to that power without any descrip-firmed' in all the grants legally and fully exetion of boundary.” “The United States con-cuted prior to that day, by the former British tinued to assert a claim to the thirty-first degovernment of West Florida, or by the govern. gree of north latitude, while Spain maintained ment of Spain, and in the claims which may be perseveringly her pretensions farther north. derived from any actual survey or settlement This was the subject of long and fruitless dis- made under the Act of the State of Georgia,” cussion between the two governments, which etc., passed 7th February, 1785. was terminated by the treaty, etc., of 27th 0:- By art. 2 “The United States accepted" this tober, 1795, etc. This treaty declares and cession, on the conditions therein expressed, agrees that the line which was described in the and ceded all their right, title, and claim to Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the soil and jurisdiction, of any land east of the United States as their south boundary, shall be line of cession, by Georgia to the United the line which divides their territory from East States. and West Florida.”
By art. 3. "The present act of cession and “This article does not import to be a cession agreement shall be in full force as soon as the of territory, but the adjustment of a controver: Legislature of Georgia shall have given its assy between the two nations. It is understood sent to the boundaries of this cession,” etc. No as an admission that the right was originally law or other act of assent was therefore neces. in the United States," etc. (534.)
sary by the United States to give it full effect. This opinion is confirmed by a subsequent In April, 1802, Georgia passed an Act to ratipart of the same article. That “the settle-fy and confirm the agreement, which enacted, ments of either party in the territory of the "That the said deed or articles of agreement other, according to the above-mentioned bound- and cession be, and the same hereby is, and are aries, shall be withdrawn within six months fully, absolutely, and amply, ratified and conafter the ratification of this treaty, or soonerfirmed in all its parts; and hereby is and are if it be possible: and that they shall be per- declared to be binding and conclusive on the mitted to take with them all the goods and ef. said State, her government, and citizens for. fects which they possess." 12 Wheat. 534, 535, ever.” 1 Laws U. S. 488. 644.
The act of Congress under which this comThis state of facts in Harcourt v. Gaillard pact was made, authorized the commissioners and Henderson Poindexter, shows the appointed by the United States, to adjust and grounds on which the British grant, made be determine," "all interfering claims of the Unitfore the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, ed States and Georgia, to territory west of and the Spanish grant, made before the Treaty the Chatahoochee, north of thirty-one degrees of 1795 with Spain, for lands within the dis- north latitude, and south of the cession made puted territory while in the possession of those ' by South Carolina,” etc. 1 Story, 494. A sub
sequent act gave them power, "finally to settle, Wheaton, as a treaty of cession, settlement, by compromise,” etc., "any claims mentioned and peace, or as a relinquishment by Spain and in the former act, and on behalf of the United purchased by the United States, or as a com. States, to receive a cession of any lands there. pact, deed, or articles of agreement; let it rein mentioned, or of the jurisdiction thereof, on ceive the same construction and effect as was such terms as to them shall seem reasonable." given to the agreement, or as the court called Ibid. 779.
it, the treaty with Georgia, and then it can be Subsequent laws provided for carrying this ascertained what would have been the result compact into effect. 2 Story, 893, 952, 955. had the grants in those cases been protected by
By now comparing the Treaty of 1819, with any treaty stipulation. Let, also, the acts of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, Congress which related to claims under the it is palpable that it contains no recognition or treaty with Georgia, be compared with those acknowledgment of the pre-existing right of which related to the country west of the Perdithe United States to the disputed territory; it do *especially, passed before 1821; to- [*403 402*] therefore does not come within the gether with those passed since the treaty was principles which the court applied to the Brit. ratified for the adjustment of titles to land, ish grant, arising from the nature of that trea- and the same construction be applied to all, ty; nor does the principle of the law of na as the court gave to the former; a satisfactory tions, in relation to grants made during a war, answer can be given to those questions. apply to grants made by Spain, between 1804 1. Under such a treaty, would private prop and 1810, while in peaceful possession of the erty be protected by the law of nations, if the territory. A comparison of the two treaties fifth, sixth, and eighth articles had been omitwi Spain places them in more striking con. ted ? trast in their titles and the stipulations or 2. Under the fifth, could the inhabitants who their respective articles. That of 1795 was de- remained in the province, in the enjoyment of clared to be a “Treaty of Friendship, Limits, their religion, be deprived of their property? and Navigation;" that of 1819 was declared to 3. Could those who chose to remove, give
a “Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and a good title to the property which they might Limits."
choose to sell, whether it was lands or chattels! The declared object of the first was “to es 4. Under the sixth, till their incorporation tablish several points, the settlement whereof into the Union, can the inhabitants enjoy the will be productive of general advantage and re- rights, privileges, and immunities of Ainerican ciprocal utility to both nations." Vide 1 Laws citizens, if the United States can confiscate U. S. 262. Its stipulations have been noticed. their lands, by declaring their titles void, and The declared object of the second was to "set- granting them to others; and could this be done tle, terminate, and put an end to all their dif- after their incorporation ? ferences and pretensions," so as "to consolidate 5. Under these, and the eighth article, is it on a permanent basis,” etc.
optional with the United States to confirm or Art. 5. “The inhabitants of the ceded terri- confiscate ? tories shall be secured in the free exercise of 6. Had there been no treaty, would not the their religion without any restriction; and all grants have been valid under previous pledges those who may desire to remove to the Spanish by the United States, and the laws annexing dominions, shall be permitted to sell or export the disputed territory to the adjacent States ? their effects at any time, without being subject 7. Without a treaty or specific pledge, would in either case to duties."
not the Constitution of the United States proArt. 6. “They shall be incorporated into the tect the inhabitants in their rights of persons Union," etc.; "and admitted to the enjoyment and property, by the very act of such annexa. of all the rights, privileges, and immunities of tion, accepted by a State? citizens of the United States."
8. Are they not so protected, as the inhabitArt. 7. “The officers and troops of His ants of a territory of the United States, under Catholic Majesty,” etc., “shall be withdrawn, the ordinance of 1787, which was in force in and possession of the places occupied by them this territory? shall be given within six months after the ex 9. Does not the law of nations give to these change," etc.
grants the same protection as in the case of Art. 8. “All grants of lands,” etc., "shall be conquest, or military occupation, until Congress ratified and confirmed to the persons in pos- shall, in virtue of the law of a conqueror, de. session of the lands, to the same extent that clare them void, and resume the lands! the same grants would be valid, if,” etc.
And, 10. Can questions arising in cases This treaty, it must be remembered, had been brought to recover property embraced by such preceded by the same mutual claims and pre- grants, be decided by the courts of the United tensions of both parties, perseveringly main- States, in virtue of the judicial power of the tained, during long and fruitless discussions be. Constitution, and 25th section of the Judiciary tween the two governments, as had been the Act of 1789, or by special tribunals appointed case before the Treaty of 1795; and that the under the acts of Congress, with power to depossession of the territory was held by the cide on the validity of titles acquired under United States, under the most solemn pledges such grants ? by the President and Congress, that it was in So far as the solution of these questions de their hands subject to future negotiation, and pends on the stipulations of the Treaty of 1819, that the inhabitants should be protected in the and the laws of nations applicable thereto, the enjoyment of their liberty, property, and re principles laid down by the court in Harcourt ligion.
v. Gaillard, and Henderson v. Poindexter, al. Now, let this treaty have the benefit of the ready quoted, are so full, and 80 completely principles of the law of nations, which were answer them, as to save the necessity of relaid down by the court in the two cases ia 12 peating them. That treaty presents the reverse
of those then under consideration, and the grant ant to make the concession. No question of in the present case is one which must have been that sort appears to have been made in the then held valid on every ground assumed by court beelow. *Assuming, then, the (* 405 the court in favor of the grants then before authority of the Spanish intendant to make the 404*) them, had they come within the *rules concession and warrant of survey, the quesand principles on which the court made the dis- tion made and decided in the District Court tinctive line between the different kinds of fairly arises: was it a sufficient title to recover treaties.
upon in an action of ejectment? If the concesBut when we apply them to the grant in the sion had been made in a country where at the present case, it is a matter of much surprise time the principles and practices known to the that there could exist a doubt of its validity: common law prevailed, it would not bear a con. Independently of the treaty, it was protected test. It would be regarded, at most, as an inby the law of conquest, military occupation, cipient, inchoate right, but not a perfect, legal cession, or relinquishment; independently, too, estate. It would not be such title as would of any of these considerations, the property of maintain an action of ejectment. Was it a perthe plaintiff in the land granted was protected fect, legal estate; was it a title according to by the acts of the United States, under which the Spanish law which prevailed at Mobile at their military occupation or acquisition begun the time it was made! We apprehend not.' and was continued. And, independently of all "It shows upon its face that other acts of other considerations, it was protected by the sovereignty remained to be done to perfect the stipulations of a treaty of cession, amity, seto title, and which the sovereign power might tlement, and limits, every clause whereof was withhold. A survey was to be made; and ac. accepted, ratified, and confirmed by the treaty. cording to the laws and usages of Spain, a formaking power of the United States, and pro- mal grant was to be made in such cases, to claimed as binding on them, by its constitu- complete the title. tional effect.
"It may be admitted that the United States At the same term in which Harcourt v. Gail. I were bound in good faith by the terms of the lard, and Henderson v. Poindexter were decided, | treaty of cession by which they acquired the the case of Delacroix v. Chamberlain came up; Floridas, to confirm such concessions as bad the controversy arose on a concession of land been made by warrants of survey; yet it would in the disputed territory; and as the opinion of not follow that the legal title would be per. the court, taken in connection with the two fected until confirmation. The government of preceding cases, and the case of Canter, 1 the United States has throughout acted upon a Peters, 542, decided at the next term, is of de different principle, in relation to these inchoate cisive bearing on this case, it is given at large. rights, in all their acquisitions of territory,
"The concession referred to in the bill of whether from Spain or France. Whilst the exceptions, is, upon its face, not a grant, government has admitted its obligation to connor a survey, but it is, as is expressed in firm such inchoate rights or concessions as had the bill of exceptions, only a warrant or order been fairly made, it has maintained that the of survey, authorizing the deputy-surveyor to legal title' has remained in the United States, make a survey, and to report to the intendant until by some act of confirmation it was passed the survey when made, in order to found a or relinquished to the claimants. It has maingrant upon it. The order of survey bears date tained its right to prescribe the forms and the the day of , 1806. At that date the manner of proceeding in order to obtain a con. Spanish authorities were in the actual posses- firmation, and its right to establish tribunals to sion of Mobile, where the land lies; and they investigate and pronounce upon their validity.” claimed it as part of the Floridas, then belong. Ibid. “This is demonstrated by the laws which ing to the Spanish crown. The United States Congress have repeatedly passed, establishing claimed it as part of Louisiana. But it is not boards of commissioners to investigate these necessary to investigate these conflicting claims. claims, and to reject or confirm them, or reThe United States have since obtained the Flor- port them to Congress in cases of doubt; and idas by purchase and cession from Spain, with by the acts of Congress requiring all such out having previously settled the controverted claims to be recorded within prescribed periods. boundary between the Floridas as claimed by It does not appear that this order of survey has Spain, and Louisiana as claimed by the United ever been recorded, or passed upon by the board States. A question of disputed boundary be of commissioners, or register of the land office, tween two sovereign, independent nations, is, established by Congress in the district in which indeed, much more properly a subject of diplo- the land lies. It can therefore derive no aid matic discussion and of treaty than of judicial from the laws of the United States." 12 investigation. If the United States and Spain Wheat. 600, 602. had settled their dispute by treaty, before the In conclusion, the court affirmed the judg. United States extinguished the claim of Spain ment, because an ejectment could not be susto the Floridas, the boundary thus fixed would lained on the order of survey. Ibid. 603. have concluded all parties. But as that was But had this been a legal title, complete in not done, the United States have never, as far form, granting the legal estate, and duly reas we can discover, distinguished between the corded, there could have remained no doubt concessions of land made by the Spanish au- that the plaintiff would have recovered, as his thorities within the disputed territory, while case came within every principle of the precedSpain was in the actual possession of it, from ing cases of Harcourt v. Gaillard, Henderson concessions of a similar character made by v. Poindexter, of which the leading one is this: Spain within the acknowledged limits. We that "all the acts of Congress on the subject of will not, therefore, raise any question upon the grants within the disputed territory, under the ground of any want of authority in the intend.compact with Georgia, presupposed the validity
406*) of those which were legally and fully , conquest, the rights of private property aro executed before the 25th October, 1795." 12 protected by the law of nations, according to Wheat. 528, 529, 536. The articles with Geor- the law of the territory, though no stipulation gia were in themselves a confirmation of titles is contained in the act of cession or relinquish. within its provisions (539); protected by thein ment; and even in case of conquest, no other (540), and confirmed by them. And by the acts change is effected except as to government; of 1819 and 1822, perfect grants were express and that when a stipulation for property is ly recognized as complete titles.
required it is never refused, and when made, is If these opinions of this court require ad sacredly observed. But when, by a treaty or ditional support to entitle them to respect, it compact, one nation or State admits the orig. will be found in Keene v. M'Donough; in which, inal right of the other to the disputed territory, by a decree of a Spanish court, rendered in without any stipulation in favor of the inhabit1804, at Baton Rouge, which is within the dis. ants, as to lands held by grant under the parputed territory, lands were sold and conveyed ty which admits the right of the other, the to the defendant's grantor, who held them un treaty binds their rights, and the grants are der such decree and sale, and this is the lan. not valid against the party whose original guage of this court in affirming its validity: right is acknowledged. S. P. 11 Peters, 209,
"The adjudication having been made by a 210. Spanish tribunal, after the cession of the coun- Delacroix v. Chamberlain established the ap. try to the United States, does not make it plication of the Treaty of 1819 to the disputed void; for we know historically that the actual territory, as a cession thereof by Spain, a pur. possession of the territory was not surrendered chase by the United States, and a settlement until some time after these proceedings took of former controversies concerning it (S. P. 12 place. It was the judgment, therefore, of a Peters, 515); that the grants and concessions competent Spanish tribunal, having jurisdiction made by Spain while in possession, are on the of the case, and rendered whilst the country, same footing as in other parts of Florida; that although ceded, was de facto in the possession the United States are bound in good faith to of Spain, and subject to Spanish laws. Such confirm her imperfect titles, and has admitted judgments, so far as they affect the private its obligation to do so, when the inchoate title rights of the parties thereto, must be deemed has been fairly made. And when, in the case of valid.
Canter, this court declared that this treaty is "This view of the case supersedes the neces- the “law of the land” (1 Peters, 542), the omis. sity of considering the question of prescripsion of any reference to either of these cases a tion.” 8 Peters, 310.
the opinion in Foster and Elam, shows most The Spanish tribunal, it must be remem- clearly that they were not considered by the bered, was the governor of the province, acting court; and when the principles they established in his judicial capacity, in which he had pow. are properly considered, it cannot be doubted er by the Spanish law to order a sale of land; that had they been noticed by the majority, the which passed the title of the proprietor to the judgment would have been different, for they purchaser, on the execution of a deed, which covered every point in the case. was deemed the strongest and safest convey. The Percheman's case, the court unanimously ance known to the jurisprudence of Spain. In assert that if the Spanish part of the treaty his political capacity, the same governor had had been within their view in Foster and Elam, power to dispose of the royal domain, and to they would have given it the same construction make valid grants thereof, which conferred a as they afterwards did; and it is not disreperfect right of property in the land so granted. spectful in me to say that a similar result must It would, therefore, be a novel principle in have followed if the four last decisions of the American jurisprudence, if while this govern court had been under their consideration. or, by judicial power, could transfer the prop- The silence in the opinion in Foster and Elam erty of A to B, he yet could not by political can by no just rule be taken to overrule either power, so far dispose of the public domain as of those cases; it lays down no antagonistic to bind the king, in whose name and by whose principle, except that the treaty remained a authority he acted as his direct representative; mere contract till Congress executed it by a or even affect his conscience as a trustee, in law; it was as silent on the law of nations as virtue of the grant, to the grantee. And if the on former adjudications; yet it will not be preking was so bound by a perfect grant, or be tended that it was meant to controvert or abcame a trustee by a mere concession or order rogate those principles which are consecrated of survey, the United States succeeded to the by “the usage of the civilized world." obligation of the king to perfect the title, ac Wheat, 535. cording to the laws, usages, and customs of That opinion admits of no such interpretaSpain; and the grant or concession stood "rati- tion; when carefully examined (from 2 Peters, fied and confirmed” under the treaty, to the 299-317) it will be found to turn entirely on same extent, at least, as a judgment did before the since overruled construction of the treaty, it. 12 Peters, 484.
and the nonfiling of the plaintiff's claim; nor, The two first of these cases established these with that exception, is there a single principle principles—that grants of land in a disputed laid down which militates with former deci. territory, made by a government in possession sions in any * respect. And if the since (* 408 thereof, during peace with a nation which is exploded construction of the treaty is strieken entitled to its dominion and propriety, are valid from the opinion, and the principles of Arreby the law of nations, without any treaty stip: dondo, Percheman, Clarke, and all subsequent ulation; if made during war, they are not valid cases are inserted in its place, it will be found 407*) unless protected *by the treaty: that that there is not a stronger case in favor of when territory is acquired by a cession, or re- the validity of grants in the disputed territory. linquishment of one nation to another, or by 'The case arose on one of that description; the
court tested its validity by the treaty, which overruled, I rely as supporting the plaintiff's they construed in reference to its language title; and by now infusing into it the uni. alone, as applicable to the whole ceded terri. versally received and admitted construction of tory, without adverting to any distinction in the treaty, considered it as decisive of this its construction, between grants within or case, without the aid of the acts of 1824 or without the disputed territory; on the con- 1836. trary, it was expressly held that the treaty It is somewhat remarkable that there is no would apply to a grant west of the Perdido, if one opinion of this court, or any of its memit was construed as it has been ever since; and bers, which even questions any one principle that the eigth art would have confirmed of the law of nations, as laid down in the cases even the rejected grants, had they not been ex of Harcourt v. Gaillard, Henderson v. Poindexcepted by the rat:fication. 2 Peters, 312, 313. ter, Insurance Company v. Canter, The United
When the true construction of the treaty is States Soulard, Arredondo, Percheman, infused into that opinion, it supports every po- Delassus, Mitchell, Strother V. Lucas, and sition on which the plaintiff's title rests; and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts: in the latter of the doubts which have arisen upon it can be which these principles are reiterated. “There attributed to no other cause than by misappre are two principles of the law of nations which hending its principle, or by viewing the over- would protect them (the inhabitants of a disruled construction as restored, without a refer. puted territory) in their property: 1. That ence to the ground on which the decision was grants by a government de facto, of parts of a placed, or appreciating the principles which disputed territory in its possession, are valid would have followed, by considering the treaty against the State which had the right; 2. That as self-executed by its own intrinsic force. In when a territory is acquired by treaty, cession, which case the court declared that the grant or even conquest, the rights of the inhabitants would have been valid, within the disputed ter to property are respected and sacred.” 12 ritory.
Peters, 748, 749. It has been supposed that the opinion in that If the reference to Poole v. Fleeger, in 12 case went on the ground that questions of title Peters, 521, is to be considered as questioning to lands, arising on Spanish grants in the dis- any principle of the law of nations, to which puted territory, between 1803 and 1810, were the above-named cases refer, it must have of a political, and not judicial character; de arisen from relying on two passages of the pending on the construction of the Louisiana opinion in Poole v. Fleeger, detached from the Treaty, as to its eastern boundary. But no context immediately preceding and succeeding such principle is to be found in the opinion; them. the question of boundary is taken to be settled, When the whole opinion in 11 Peters, 209, and not open to judicial inquiry; yet all other 211, is taken in connection with the terms of questions affecting the validity of the grant, the compact between Kentucky and Tennesare throughout considered as open and of ju see, it will be found that the case turned on dicial cognizance: had boundary and title been the precise principles of Harcourt v. Gaillard, considered to be identical, the court would have and Henderson v. Poindexter, as is abundantly been saved from the labor which they took to manifest from the turning and decisive point show that the title was invalid other in the case. grounds; for when the Perdido was taken as The Circuit Court instructed the jury "that the true boundary, all grants west of it were the State of Tennessee, by sanctioning the consequently void, if title depended on bound-compact, admitted in the most solemn form, ary.
that the lands in dispute were not within her This is another source of misapprehension of jurisdiction, nor within the jurisdiction of this opinion, which has of late given to it an North Carolina at the time they were granted; importance, after it had remained unnoticed in and that, consequently, the titles were subject any opinion of the court after Percheman's to the conditions of the compact,” which was case, till 1838.
the ground of the exception and writ of error After the opinion in that case was promul. to this court. After referring to the law of nagated, the turning principle of Foster and Elain tions and the Constitution, the learned judge was universally understood to be overruled, and who delivered the opinion of the court proits authority ceased to be relied on; and it was ceeded to assign their reasons. not even quoted by the counsel of the United "The compact, then, has full validity, and all States in the argument of Percheman's case, the terms and conditions of it must be equal. though the aid of Arredondo was invoked. I ly obligatory upon the citizens of both States." Vide, 7 Peters, 59, 62.
*“Independently of this broad and [*410 It is not a little strange that it should now general ground, there are other ingredients in be taken to be a leading case on Spanish titles, the present case equally decisive of the merits. when its vital principle is extinguished by an “Although in the compact, Walker's line is 409") *unquestioned series of decisions to the agreed to be in future the boundary between contrary, and all the principles, which remain the two States, it is not so established as hav. unshaken are decidedly in favor of a conclu. ing been for the past the true and rightful sion directly the reverse of that to which the boundary; on the contrary, the compact ad. court arrived, on their then erroneous construc. nits the fact to be the other way. While the tion of the eighth article, and the ratification compact cedes to Tennessee the jurisdiction up of the king. If, then, the case of Foster and to Walker's line, it cedes to Kentucky all the Elam is yet to be considered as a leading or inappropriated lands north of latitude thirty. authoritative one, it can be only as to the six degrees, thirty minutes north. It thus boundary of Louisiana, which is a concessum; admits what is in truth undeniable, that the on every other principle of that case, which is true and legitimate boundary of North Caronot now admitted to be overruled, and to stand / lina is in that parallel of latitude, eta. It goes