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be revised relate to errors alleged on matters | cuit Court can deliberate by judicial power, on of law, apparent in the record and judgment. granting a rule to show cause why a man.

That this is a case within the jurisdiction of damus should not issue, all intermediate questhe Circuit Court, I therefore cannot doubt, tions between the rule and an attachment aro even admitting that had it been exercised, in and can be nothing else but the exercise of any way interfering with the defendant, under jurisdiction, is fully supported, I have noththe circumstances of this case, it would have ing to add on this point. been contrary to law, on the true construction It is also my opinion that the acts to be perof the act and resolution of Congress; but that formed by the Secretary of the Navy, in relathe action of that court can be declared to be tion to the payment of a pension, either under extrajudicial, on a matter within their ac. the general laws or the special resolution in knowledged jurisdiction, merely because it re. favor of the relator, if, by their fair construclated to an act which this court deem not to be tion, she was entitled *to the extent of (* 606 ministerial, seems to me to be the subversion of her claim, are of a purely ministerial nature, principles which have been long established, according to the decisions of this court. and till now have been held as acknowledged If the right of the relator was in all other ones in every past adjudication.

respects clear, except so far as they depended In my opinion, there can be no subject on on the construction of the acts of Congress, the which this court should act with more caution, case was of judicial cognizance only: the duty or adhere more steadily to the marked corner of a secretary is not judicial; it is not his trees of the law, than those which point to and province to construe laws which enjoin on him denote the line between the jurisdiction of in the performance of definite acts, differently ferior courts and its exercise; indeed, there is from what the courts have done, or may do. no subject on which a departure from an es- Where the law directs him to act, he must act tablished principle would more radically "sub- according to law, on all matters where his vert our whole system of jurisprudence.” 9 duty is prescribed, so as to restrain his disPet. 602. When it is considered, that on the cretion; as the commissioner of the navy pen. adherence to this line, or a departure from it, sion fund, he decides whether the applicant every order, decree, or judgment of the courts comes within the law on the evidence adduced of the United States, on the various subjects of before him; but when he has decided that a their jurisdiction, is absolutely conclusive on pension is due, or when the law declares that the subject matter decided, if no appeal or a person named is entitled to one, and prewrit of error lies or is taken; or an absolute scribes the amount, he has no longer a disnullity binding neither on other courts, parties, cretion to withhold it. The ascertainment of or the officers of those courts which render a the date at which the pension commenced, its judgment, who may refuse to execute or be amount, and duration, are ministerial acts on come punishable in executing it; the inquiry which discretion is excluded, for its exercise into jurisdiction becomes a question of the cannot alter either; if the payment is a right of highest import. If the past adjudications of the applicant, the law makes it a duty to pay, this court had settled the law to be, that on or give a warrant for payment by the officer the question whether a circuit court had juris- who holds the fund. Thus, under the general, diction of an action of ejectment or debt, this act, it is enacted, "That if any officer," etc., court could look through the judgment, to the “have died,” etc., "leaving a widow," "such declaration and evidence, when the parties and i widow shall be entitled to receive," etc. 4 subject matter were confessedly within their Story, 2542; or Resolved, “That the widow jurisdiction, and make the mode in which it had of the late S. D. be paid from the navy pension been exercised by a judgment for plaintiff or fund a pension,” etc. (Ib. 2555); the command defendant, the test of the power to render any of the law is unqualified in both cases; if the judgment at all; or if it had the right on an applicant comes within the description, the indictment and sentence to make the same in officer whose duty it is to pay, or direct the quiry, when the power of the court to try and payment, has no discretion to do it or not, punish was admitted, I should feel bound to after being satisfied of the right of the apapply the same principles to a case of manda- plicant, as one of the beneficiaries of the law. mus in the Circuit Court of this district, with. The name must be inscribed on the pension roll, out feeling myself at liberty to look to the con- and thenceforth, the payment is but the ex. sequences. But finding the law to be settled ecution of a specific, defined duty, prescribed otherwise in all other cases, and being wholly by law, of the same nature as entering an unable to discover in the decisions of this ascertained credit, on the account of a court any one rule or principle which will extractor in the Postoffice Department (12 Pet. cept the case of a mandamus from the applica- 614); the issuing a patent, after all the tion of the cases cited, I feel bound to examine requisites of the law have been complied with the effect of testing the jurisdiction of a court (6 Wheat. 600), or the payment of a liquidated on mandamus by a rule which is repudiated in claim, under a special act of Congress direct. every other case, civil or criminal. The differing it to be done. In all these cases, the act to ence between an adherence to, or an innova- be done is purely ministerial; all the discretion tion upon established principles of general ap- to be exercised has been exhausted; the duty plication, on any supposed inconvenience, seems is positive, by the command of the law, which to me to be as visible, as practical, and as im- no authority can supersede or grant a dispen. portant, as the difference between a change of sation from its performance; while system of jurisprudence by legislative power, Kendall's case is recognized as authority, can and the assumption of a power by a court, to the nature of an executive office exempt the make it what it ought to have been made by a incumbent from the supervisory power of a law. Being fully convinced that on the author- | competent court, in a case otherwise proper for ity of this court the proposition that if the Cir. its exercise. 12 Pet. 610-616.

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The judges of the courts of the United out or any authority noted in favor of the writ States are not clothed with any immunity or of error, and the court confined themselves to exemption from this power; it is applied to a mere declaration that it would lie, and in the them; and courts of record, of general juris- case in 12 Peters, this question was argued diction to the extent of the judicial power of only on one side, and entirely unnoticed by the the United States by this court, and on the court in their opinion, it cannot be considered same principles as to an executive officer, by as conclusively settled. the court of this district, not where the law That the great questions of jurisdiction confides a discretion to do or withhold a par- which arise in this court, in cases on error ticular act, but where it requires it to be done under the 22d or 25th sections of the Ju. as a ministerial duty. As where the law re- diciary Act, should be considered with the quired that after the court had rendered a greatest deliberation, and remain open till all judgment, it should be signed by the judge, doubts are removed, especially in cases where and the judge died after the rendition of the the common law is decisive against the jurisjudgment, but without affixing his signature diction, on one will deny. When the court ex. to the record; his successor refused to sign it press an opinion, or act in a case involving their because the judgment had been given by his jurisdiction, in which there is either no argu. predecessor, and this court held: That the ment, a partial one, or ex-parte only; it ought judge in office had a discretion to set aside the not and cannot have the same weight as ju. judgment by granting a new trial; but if he dicial authority, as when the whole subject is did not exercise his discretion by doing it as a presented to the court; considered as it may judicial act, he was bound to sign the judg. be elsewhere than in open court, it is necesment as a mere ministerial act required by law, sarily in the absence of counsel, and of any in order to give one party a right to execution, but a very limited reference to adjudged cases. and the other a right of appeal or writ of er. In other times this court often declared that a ror. In the opinion of this court, there is the point decided without argument remained open following sentence, which is too appropriate to for consideration (3 Cranch, 172; 6 Cranch, one ground of objection to the jurisdiction, and 317) till it was directly made; even on a ques. action of the Circuit Court in this case, to be tion of jurisdiction, which was for the first omitted; it is this:

time made, thirty-four years after the court “But the district judge is mistaken in sup had been in the constant exercise of that posing that no one but the judge who renders which was objected to. the judgment can grant a new trial. He, as the In Buel v. Van Ness, it was objected that the 607*] successor of his predecessor, *can exer- amount of the judgment in a State court was cise the same powers, and has a right to act in not sufficient to ground an appeal or writ of every case that remains undecided on a docket, error; this court say: “This is a new ques. as fully as his predecessor could have done. tion. Thirty-four years has this court been The court remains the same, and the change of adjudicating under the 25th section, etc.; and the incumbent cannot, and ought not, in any familiarly known to have passed in judgment respect, to injure the rights of litigant parties." upon cases of very small amount, without ever A peremptory mandamus awarded. 8 having its attention drawn to the construcPet. 303, 304.

tion, etc., now contended for. Nevertheless, if In this case the change of officers who had the received construction has been erroneously the disbursement of the pension fund, can have i adopted, without examination, it is not too no effect on the rights of the relator; a relate to correct it now. But we think that it fusal by the predecessor of the present in is not necessary to sustain our practice, upon cumbent, is no legal cause for his refusal to do contemporaneous, and long protracted exposi. the act required, had it been enjoined by law; tions, that as well the words of the two sece it can be considered only as a repeated refusal tions under which we exercise appellate juris. of successive applications, having the same ef- diction, as the reasons and policy on which fect as if made to himself to perform the same those clauses were enacted, will sustain the ministerial act which it would have been the received distinction between the cases to which duty of either to perform, if the right claimed those sections extend.” 8 Wheat. 321, 322. had existed, but as it did not exist, the refusal As no past opinion of this court has taken was justifiable.

this course, in considering this question, I hold The remaining point in this case is, whether it to be as open now as it was in the [*608 a writ of error lies from this to the Circuit case just quoted, and shall pursue that which Court of this district, to remove and revise the the court then took. proceeding on mandamus; which I shall not ex- A mandamus is directed to a judge, to an inamine in detail, as my opinion in Holmes v: ferior court, or an officer, commanding the per Jennison, on the same question in the kindred formance of a specific act; but it lies in neither case of habeas corpus, is given at length. case on any matter of discretion, or to coerce

If this question remained as unembarrassed the judgment as to the manner of acting, by the authority of this court, as it was in the where the law permits the doing or refusing case of Holmes, I should have as little doubt in to do the act; though it does lie to enforce the this as I had in that case; but as this court as- performance of a mere ministerial act, by an serted their power to issue the writ of error in executive officer (12 Pet. 610), a judge or the case in 7 Wheat. 534, and acted on it in 12 court (8 Pet. 302), which they have no "au. Pet. 608–626, the question can no longer be thority to deny or control.” Ib. The man. considered exclusively on the principles of the damus acts upon no right of the respondent of common law, the terms of the Judiciary Act, person or property, where he has no interest in or analogous decisions of this court. Ye the subject matter, as in the case now before the case in 7 Wheaton did not call for any “The real parties to the dispute are the action of this court, as the argument is not set relator and the United States," who cannot




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be med or the claim be in any way enforced on motion in chancery; there is a concurrent against them, without their consent through an jurisdiction in the two courts, and, of conseact of Congress; but when they consent to quence, it would seem not to be a prerogative submit the whole subject of pensions to an writ, even by the common law, when directed officer of their own, and impose on him a to an inferior court, but a writ in the nature positive duty to pay, he is the mere instru- of a mandamus described in 12 Pet. 122. In ment to execute the law. Vide 12 Pet. 611, *5 Pet. 193, a mandamus to a public of (* 609 612.

ficer is declared to be the exercise of original The command of the writ of mandamus is jurisdiction, but appellate when directed to a no "inal judgment” in the cause before a court; the power of this court to issue this court, "on which a writ of error may issue for writ is asserted, under the 13th section of the its reversal” 8 Pet. 303: it is one of “those in Judiciary Act, to be the same which is exer. termediate proceedings which take place be- cised by the Chancellor in England, and by the tween the institution and trial of a suit; obedi. supreme courts of the States, in virtue of their ence may be refused, if it be shown that there “general superintendence of inferior tribunals," are matters in a cause which are within the and the court use this language:

"The ju. discretion of the court below, which justify dicial act confers this power expressly on this the refusal (8 Pet. 689, 590); and what is con- court. No other tribunal exists by which it clusive on this point is, that a writ of error can be exercised." Ib. 194. In 12 Pet. 621, may be dismissed by this court for the want the power to issue this writ, and the purposes of jurisdiction, as was done in 12 Pet. 140; in for which it may be issued in the courts in the the same case in which a peremptory man- States, other than in this district, is asserted damus had been awarded four years before under the 14th section, as a power common to (8 Pet. 304) to sign a judgment previously this and the circuit courts in the States. But rendered, and in which this court refused a sec- this power is not exercised as in England by ond mandamus to render a final judgment. 9 the King's Bench, as having general superPet. 602, 605. All that this court can do is to vising power over inferior courts, but only for order the court below to proceed to judgment; the purpose of bringing the case to a final judg. but it will not direct in what manner its ment or decree, so that it may be reviewed.” discretion shall be exercised (8 Pet. 304; 9 Ib. 822. So far, then, as respects a mandamus Pet. 602, 603); it compels them to “proceed to from this to a circuit court, or from a circuit a final judgment, in order that we may exer- to a district court, it is clear that no decision cise the jurisdiction of review given by the upon such writ is a final judgment revisable in law" (12 Pet. 622), but only for that purpose. error or on appeal, as well on these principles Ib.

as the following language of this court in 9 A mandamus never issues to an executive of. Pet. 602, in an unanimous opinion delivered by ficer to control his discretion or judgment, the late Chief Justice on a motion for a manwhere the law gives him any right to deliber- damus: ate, it is to perform ministerial acts which the “This court is asked to decide that tho law has enjoined on him; the mandamus is a merits of the case are with the plaintiffs, and summary order to enforce the duty, by sup- to command the District Court to render judg. plying a remedy for a denial of an existing ment in their favor. It is an attempt to introright, where, for the want of a specific one, duce the supervising power of this court into there would otherwise be a failure of justice. a cause while depending in an inferior court, 12 Pet. 620. The writ of mandamus, like the and prematurely to decide it. In addition to writ of habeas corpus, is a writ of right; but this obvious unfitness of such a proceeding, its the proceeding upon it is matter of discretion, direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of in nowise partaking of the character of a our whole judicial system cannot escape notice. final judgment, its effect, or an award in the The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its ordinature of final judgment, which can be revised nary appellate jurisdiction, can take cognizance on error; 80 the law has been finally settled of no case until a final judgment or decree in England by the House of Lords, as declared shall have been rendered in the inferior court. and recognized by this court in 6 Pet. 657; | Though the merits of the cause may have been and so it must be considered here, unless a substantially decided, while anything, though final judgment means one thing in the Judicia- merely formal, remains to be done, this court ry Act, and another and different thing at cannot pass upon the subject. If from any common law, which distinction is negatived in intermediate stage in the proceeding an apthe same case. The writ of mandamus, as peal might be taken to the Supreme Court, the known to the common law, is well defined in appeal might be repeated to the great oppres. 1 Cranch, 171, 5 Pet. 192, and 12 Pet. 620; it sion of the parties. So, if this court might is a prerogative writ, which is issued from the interpose in the progress of a cause by way of Court of King's Bench, in virtue of its general mandamus, and order a judgment or decree, a supervising power over all inferior tribunals writ of error may be brought to the judgment, and officers, to compel them to do what that or an appeal from the decree, and a judgment court has determined, or supposed to be con- or decree entered in pursuance of a mandamus Bonant to right and justice, where there is no might be afterwards reversed. Such a proother specific remedy prescribed. Yet this cedure would subvert our whole system of court have held that the mandatory writ in the jurisprudence. register, which issues from the officina brevium Taking it, then, as settled, that on a prounder the seal of the Court of Chancery, perceeding by a mandamus to an inferior court forms the same office, without the interference no writ of error lies, I now proceed to inquire of the Court of King's Bench. 5 Pet. 192–194. whether it will lie when the mandamus is di. If this is so, then there is a specific remedy by rected to an officer to perform a merely niinisan appropriate writ in the register, grantable terial act, by a court having original jurisdio

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tion to award the writ, as the court of this of this court, or any provision of any act of district is admitted to possess by the acts of Congress, which discriminates a mandamus to February, 1801, referred to in 12 Pet. 619, 622, a court, from one to an officer, either in its 624. As the purposes of this case do not re nature, the action of the court upon it, or the quire it, I shall not examine into the apparent effect thereof. It is but an order to do an discrepancy between the opinion in 5 Pet. and act, ministerial in its nature, enjoined by law 12 Pet. on the nature or office of the writ of in a case which involves no discretion or leaves mandamus whether they depend on the 13th or any alternative; such an order is never made 14th section of the Judiciary Act, but confine where a judicial act remains to be done by a myself to the view which the court take of court, or an executive act to be performed by the subject, under the act which gives juris- an officer which the law submits to the exerdiction to the court of this district to award cise of his own judgment on the matter. Thus, it; which is this, "That proceedings and an ap. in 8 Pet. 304, the order was made to sign à plication to a court of justice for a mandamus judgment previously rendered, because the law are judicial proceedings, cannot admit of a commanded it; but in the same case, the court doubt; and that this is a case in law is equal. refused to order a judgment to be rendered for ly clear. It is the prosecution of a suit to en- the plaintiff. 9 Pet. 602. So in Kendall's case, force a right secured by a special act of Con- the mandamus was properly issued for the gress, requiring of the Postmaster-General the reasons assigned, the act commanded was performance of a precise, definite, and specific purely ministerial; it was refused in this case act, plainly enjoined by the law. It cannot because some discretion was involved, which be denied but that Congress had the power to will be found to be the turning point in all the command that act to be done; and the cases at common law, or in this court, without power to enforce the performance of the act a dictum in either which asserts the doctrine must rest somewhere, or it will present a case that the order of the court partakes any more which has often been said to involve a of the character or effect of a final judgment in monstrous absurdity in a well organized gove the one class of cases than the other. Each is ernment, that there should be no remedy, al- the prosecution of a suit to enforce a right, though a clear and undeniable right should be secured by a special, or the general law which shown to exist, and if the remedy cannot be governs the case; the proceeding is the same 810*] applied by the Circuit Court of this in both, from the presentation of the petition district it exists nowhere. But by the express till the order of the court is made; and when terms of this act, the jurisdiction of this made, the order relates to a ministerial act, circuit extends to all cases in law, etc. No in which neither the court or the officer has more general language could have been used; any interest, unless in cases where the manan attempt at specification would have weak- damus restores the relator to an office of which ened the force and extent of the general words he has been ousted by an illegal act. But in -all cases. Here, then, is the delegation to such cases the mandamus effects only the posthis Circuit Court of the whole judicial power session. Vide 12 Pet. 620. The right to the in this district, and in the very words of the office remains open on a quo warranto. Constitution, which declares that the judicial In the present case, the writ is prayed for in power shall extend to all cases in law and order to obtain the payment of a sum of equity arising under the laws of the United money to which the respondent has no claim; States,” etc. 12 Pet. 623, 624.

the act required of him is to sign such warrant No one has ever denied that Congress has or other order on the officer who has the cus. power by the Constitution to give authority to tody of the pension fund, as will enable the the courts of the United States to issue a man. relator to receive what Congress have apdamus to an inferior court, or a public officer; propriated to her use. Whether such approthe only objection to its exercise by this court priation has been made, depends on the con. on the writ directed to the Secretary of State struction of the acts of Congress; which must was, that it was by original jurisdiction, which be decided by the court, and not the Secretary; could not be granted in such case. 1 Cranch, if the right to the sum claimed exists by the 175. But this objection cannot avail when ap- law, its payment is as much a ministerial act plied to a court of general, original, and ex. in signing the warrant, as signing a judgment clusive jurisdiction, in the whole range of the already *rendered; both being on ex. I*611 judicial power of the Constitution; which ecution of the command of the law, there is necessarily embraces prerogative, among all no principle which excludes a writ of error in other writs known to the common law, or the one case that can justify it in the other. The laws of the States which ceded this district to only question in this case is, whether Con. the United States, with powers of exclusive gress has directed the money to be paid, as it legislation in and over it. Such is the juris-was in Kendall's case—whether the credit diction of the Circuit Court of this district, as should be given; when that is settled, the man. declared in the above extract from the opinion damus only enforces the right of the relator to in Kendall's case, which contains in substance receive that which Congress had declared be. the common law definition of the prerogative longed to her; the awarding the writ is by a writ of mandamus; whether it is directed to a summary order, made on affidavit and motion, court or an officer, it equally comes within the without a jury or the forms of the common definition, being adapted to the exigency of the law being pursued, as in suits commenced by case, so as to give an adequate remedy when original writs. Whether the subject matter of ever there is an existing right which can be the order relates to the payment of money, or enforced by no other process, which is the very any other act of a ministerial nature; the naoffice of the common law prerogative writ. ture or character of the order does not become There is no principle of law, there is no decision that of a final judgment, revisable by a writ

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of error; the common law does not authorize at the common law or in this court is referred any appellate proceedings on a prerogative | to; its jurisdiction seems to be assumed more writ; the Judiciary Act makes no provision for from the supposed necessity of its exercise it, and nothing but future legislation can, in than from any principle of law, or provision my.opinion, convert a summary order on a in the Judiciary Act; and no argument was motion or rule, into a final judgment, so as to had on this point till it was directed by the make it cognizable in error. The reasoning of court, after *an argument on the merits (*612 the court in 9 Pet. 602, is conclusive that error at a preceding term: for which reasons, I have does not lie to an order awarding a man. been disposed rather to look to this case as a damus to a court. It is admitted that it does beacon, than to adopt it as a precedent. It not lie at common law in any case of man- has been, in my opinion, unfortunate for this damus, 6 Pet. 657; for which one reason alone court that the course of argument, in cases inis sufficient to show the true policy of the volving the momentous question of what are law. That as this remedy was designed to be the proper subjects for the exercise of its apa speedy one, the party who had obtained it pellate jurisdiction, have been so limited as it should not lose its benefit by being hung up appears in the reports of its decisions on this by a writ of error (1 Strange, 543; 8 Co. 127 subject. In tracing them back to the organiza. b); or, in the language of this court, by the tion of the court, it will be found that forty appeal being “repeated to the great oppression years had elapsed before there was a writ of of the parties” 9 Pet. 602, by subjecting them error sustained on a prohibition; more than to all the delay incident to an appeal or writ thirty before it was asserted that it would of error, which "would subvert whole lie on a mandamus; fifty before it was acted system of jurisprudence," Ib., if a summary on, and that this is the first case in which it order shall be deemed a final judgment or de has been held to lie on a habeas corpus. This

affords, it is true, no conclusive argument that The essence of a prerogative writ is in the the power exists only by assumption, because promptitude of the remedy; it is devised to it has been so long dormant; yet it affords the create one where none adequate existed, and it most powerful reasons for the most thorough is administered

to meet the ends of consideration of a case where its exercise is in. justice in a summary manner. 12 Pet. 620. It voked for the first time, by a full research into is not for me to say whether power to so act the principles, the analogies, and the usages of ought to be subject to revision; my inquiry is law, which define appellate power and its subonly whether the law has made it so, by prajects, according to the common law applied to scribing one rule for the case of its exercise on the Judiciary Act, which, by reference, adopts a court or judicial officer, and a different one it as its basis. for an executive or ministerial officer. The There is great danger of error in bringing most solemn decisions of this court justify me any case within the 22d or 25th sections, which in denying the existence of any revising power is either without precedent in the common law, in the first classes of cases; every reason and or opposed to its settled principles, still more principle on which they are founded apply so, when both objections apply as they do in equally to the last classes: and where I find the case of a prohibition; for it will be found that the only cases in which the existence of very difficult to exercise under the Judiciary such power is asserted or assumed contain no Act any appellate power which is repudiated reference to precedent authority, or reasons to by the principles, usages, and adjudged cases support them, I cannot feel bound to consider of the common law. And if it should so hapthe law to be so settled as to govern this pen that even on the fullest consideration, a case. Nor, in the course of the opinion now single case of this description is acted upon, delivered by the court, does there seem to me too much caution cannot be used in most to be such a train of reasoning, or reference to thoroughly examining another case, supposed settled principles, as to overcome the weight to be analogous; a fortiori, where the first in. of authority in the previous adjudications of novation was without argument, a partial or this court.

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ex-parte one, or one directed on second thought, In referring to the case of Weston v. Charles. after the merits of the case had been diston, in 2 Pet. 463, wherein it was held that a cussed. No safer course can be adopted than writ of error would lie under the 25th section, was taken in the case in 8 Wheat. 321, 322, to the refusal of a State court to award a wherein the court would not sustain an un. prohibition; I think the court has added to the questioned practice of thirty-four years, “by strength of their own opinion but little, if any contemporaneous and long protracted exposithing, in rinciple or authority; for no order tion,” in the actual exercise of jurisdiction of a court partakes less of the character of a under the 25th section; but justified it by final judgment in a suit than an order award- reference to "the reasons and policy” developed ing or refusing a prohibition. In one case an in that and the 22d sections, in conferring inferior court is ordered not to proceed to a their appellate power. Had this course been judgment, but to surcease action in the cause; taken in this, and the case of Holmes in the other, it is left free to act; but in either | Jennison, by investigating the grounds on case the only question is, whether the inferior which a writ of error had been sustained on a court has jurisdiction; if they have, it cannot prohibition; instead of assuming that position be controlled in its exercise; if they have not, as impregnable, then holding that the appelthey can render no judgment; the action of the late power to revise the proceedings on Superior Court must necessarily be confined mandamus was a consequence resulting from to jurisdiction, and its revision by this court its exercise in a case of prohibition; and that can extend no farther.

the same power over a habeas followed as the In the opinion in 2 Pet. no adjudged case conclusion from those premises, the final result


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