matter of right, any authority to collect assets | debt due from the government to his intestate;

but the moneys so received constituted assets under that administration, for which he was accountable to the proper tribunals in Kentucky; and that distribution thereof might have been, and should have been sought there, in the same manner as of any other debts due to the intestate in Kentucky.

It has also been supposed that the Act of Congress of the 24th of June, 1812, may well entitle the appellants to maintain the present suit; since it places a foreign administrator upon the footing of a domestic administrator, in the District of Columbia. That act provides that it shall be lawful for any person to whom letters testamentary or of adminis

of the deceased in any other State; and whatever operation is allowed to it beyond the original territory of the grant is a mere matter of comity, which every nation is at liberty to yield or to withhold, according to its own policy and pleasure, with reference to its own institutions and interests of its own citizens. On the other hand, the administrator is ex6] clusively bound to account for all the assets which he receives under and in virtue of his administration to the proper tribunals of the government from which he derives his authority; and the tribunals of other States have no right to interfere with or to control the application of those assets, according to the lex loci. Hence, it has become an estab-tration hath been or may hereafter be granted lished doctrine that an administrator, appointed in one State, cannot, in his official capacity, sue for any debts due to his intestate in the courts of another State; and that he is not liable to be sued in that capacity in the courts of the latter, by any creditor, for any debts due there by his intestate. The authorities to this effect are exceedingly numerous, both in England and America; but it seems to us unnecessary, in the present state of the law, to do more than to refer to the leading principle as recognized by this court in Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259; Dixon's Executors v. Ramsay's Executors, 3 Cranch, 319; and Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565.

by the proper authority, in any of the United States or the territories thereof, to maintain any suit or action, or to prosecute and recover any claim in the District of Columbia, in the same manner as if the letters testamentary or of administration had been granted to such person by the proper authority, in the said district. It is observable that this provision is limited by its terms to the maintenance of suits, and the prosecution and recovery of claims in the district, by any executor or administrator appointed under the authority of any State. It does not authorize any suits or actions in the district against any such executor or administrator. Its obvious design But it has been suggested that the present was, therefore, to enable foreign executors and case is distinguishable, because the assets administrators to maintain suits, and to sought to be distributed were not collected in prosecute and recover claims in the district, Kentucky, but were received as a debt due not against the government alone, but against from the Government at the Treasury De- any persons whatever, resident within the dispartment at Washington, and so constituted trict, who were indebted to the deceased, and local assets within this district. We cannot to discharge the debtor therefrom, without the yield our assent to the correctness of this grant of any local letters of administration. argument. The debts due from the govern- In effect, it made all debts due from persons ment of the United States have no locality at within the district, not local assets, for the seat of government. The United States, which a personal representative would be in their sovereign capacity, have no particular liable to account in the courts of the district; place of domicile, but possess, in contempla- but general assets, which he had full authority tion of law, an ubiquity throughout the Union; to receive, and for which he was bound to acand the debts due by them are not to be count in the courts of the State from [*8 treated like the debts of a private debtor, which he derived his original letters of adwhich constitute local assets in his own domi- ministration. Indeed, the very silence of the cile. On the contrary, the administrator of a act as to any liability of the personal reprecreditor of the government, duly appointed in sentative to be sued in the courts of the disthe State where he was domiciled at his trict for such assets, so received, would seem death, has full authority to receive payment, equivalent to a declaration that he was not to and give a full discharge of the debt due to be subjected to any such liability. It fortifies, his intestate, in any place where the govern- therefore, rather than weakens the conclusion ment may choose to pay it; whether it be at which is derivable from the general principles the seat of government, or at any other place of law upon this subject. The same view of where the public funds are deposited. If any the purport and objects of the act was taken other doctrine were to be recognized, the by this court, at the last term, in the case of consequence would be that before the personal Kane v. Paul, 14 Peters, 33. representative of any deceased creditor, belonging to any State in the Union, would be entitled to receive payment of any debt due by the government, he would be compellable to take any letters of administration in this 7*] district *for the due administration of such assets. Such a doctrine has never yet been sanctioned by any practice of the government; and would be full of public as well as private inconvenience. It has not, in our judgment, any just foundation in the principles of law. We think that Northup, under the letters of administration taken out in Kentucky, was fully authorized to receive the

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the Circuit Court was right in dismissing the bill for the want of jurisdiction, and therefore the decree is affirmed with costs.

This case came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the County of Washington, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is ordered and decreed by this court that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby af firmed with costs.

**] *EDMUND P. GAINES, and Mira Clarke, | portions of the estate, through the executors or late Whitney, Complainants, under them. The bill contains an inventory of the estate RICHARD RELF, Beverly Chew et al., De- of Daniel Clarke, as far as can be made out. For these frauds and breaches of trust the bill claims restitution, etc.

V.

fendants.

Equity powers of Circuit Court in Louisiana procedure jurisdiction of, only appellate as to Circuit Court proceedings.

In the case of Livingston v. Story, which came before this court in 1835, 9 Peters, 655, the court took occasion to examine the various laws of the United States establishing and organizing the District Court of Louisiana, and to decide whether that court had equity powers; and if so, what should be the mode of proceeding in the exercise of such powers. The various cases which had been before the court, involving, substantially, the same question in relation to the States where there were no equity State courts, or laws regulating the practice in equity causes, were referred to; and the uniform decisions of the court have been that there being no equity State courts, did not prevent the exercise of equity jurisdiction in the courts of the United States; and it was accordingly decided that the District Court of Louisiana was bound to proceed in equity causes according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to the courts of equity, as contradistinguished from courts of common law. The cases of Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 655; 13 Peters, 368; Ex parte Poultney v. The City of La Fayette, 12 Peters, 474; Ex parte Mira Clarke Whitney, 13 Peters, 404, cited; and the principles

On the 20th February, 1837, about two months after subpoenas were returned, served, the two executors, with twenty-five of their co-defendants, appeared by their respective solicitors, and filed a petition; wherein, styling themselves respondents, eleven of them say, French is their "mother tongue," not that they do not understand English as well, and pray, as a precedent condition to their being held to plead, answer, or demur to the bill, that a copy, in their "maternal language," be served on each and every one of them, severally, over and above the English copies already served. Then, "all the aforesaid respondents including, of course, the two executors, here appearing separately by their respective solicitors, crave oyer" of all the instruments and papers of every sort mentioned in the bill; but, "if it be not possible for said complainants to afford these respondents oyer of the original of said supposed instruments, they then pray that copies of the same, duly certified according to the laws of the State of Louisiana, may, by The Supreme Court has not the power to compel order of this honorable court to said comthe Circuit Court to proceed according to estab- plainants, be filed herein, and served on these lished rules in chancery cases. All that the court respondents, that they may be enabled to can do is to prevent proceedings otherwise, by reversing them, when brought here on appeal. take proper cognizance thereof." The respondIt is a matter of extreme regret that it appears to ents more especially crave oyer of twentybe the settled determination of the district judge three of these instruments, enumerated and of Louisiana not to suffer chancery practice to prevail in the Circuit Court of Louisiana in equity specified in a list, referring to the several causes, in total disregard of the repeated decisions clauses of the bill where they are respectively of this court, and the rules of practice established mentioned. by the Supreme Court to be observed in chancery

of these cases affirmed.

cases.

No answer having been put in by the twenty-five respondents, *a motion was [*11 a certificate of division from the Circuit made for an attachment, which was refused by

On district judge,

ern District of Louisiana.

A bill of complaint was originally filed in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was afterwards transferred to the Circuit Court for the same district.

Subpoenas were issued on the 1st of August, 1836, with a copy of the bill, to each and all the defendants, about fifty in number. Service of this process was made by the marshal, on twenty-seven of the defendants, and amongst them, on Richard Relf. W. W. Whitney, one of the plaintiffs, having deceased, the proceeding was continued in the name of Mira Clarke 10*] Whitney, "his widow. The bill claimed the estate left by Daniel Clarke, at the time of his death; alleging that Mira Clarke Whit ney was his only child and heir-at-law, and his devisee.

The bill charged Beverly Chew and Richard Relf with having fraudulently concealed and suppressed Daniel Clarke's true and last will, in which the complainant, his daughter and heir-at-law, was his only devisee, and was his general legatee; with having set up another will, in which they were named executors, and with having taken and appropriated all the estate, real and personal, of Daniel Clarke. The other defendants are charged with confederating with the executors; and with having obtained, and still holding, large

a judge of the Circuit Court, to which the proceedings were transferred after the establishment of a circuit court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

At the same time Judge Lawrence, sitting alone in the Circuit Court, prescribed rules of practice for that court; among which was a general one, that "the mode of proceeding in all civil cases, those of admiralty alone excepted, shall be conformable to the Code of Practice of Louisiana, and to the acts of the Legislature of that State, heretofore passed, amendatory thereto."

The complainant applied to the Supreme Court, at January Term, 1839, for a mandamus to Judge Lawrence, in order to compel him to proceed in the case. 13 Peters, 408.

The mandamus so applied for was denied, for reasons appearing in the court's opinion; but the court, at the same time, expressly declared, though the remedy by mandamus be inadmissible, that it is the duty of the Circuit Court to proceed in this suit according to the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court at the February Term, 1822, can admit of no doubt; and that the proceedings of the district judge, and the orders made by him in the cause, which are complained of, are not in conformity with those rules of chancery practice, can admit of as little doubt. 13 Peters, 408.

Since then, the present complainants (hav

ing intermarried) filed a petition for rehearing the before-stated order, by a bill filed in the Circuit Court on the 1st of June, 1839.

The petition stated that the complainants were much aggrieved by the interlocutory decree made in the case by the former district judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana; whereby it is ordered that the application of the defendants for oyer of documents, and for copies of the bill of complaint be allowed; and further, that all further proceedings in the case shall be in conformity with the existing practice of the court.

On June 1, 1839, in the Circuit Court, before the honorable Judges M'Kinley and Lawrence, the counsel for the complainants moved the court,

1st. To set aside and vacate said decretal order.

2d. To remand the said cause to the rule 12*] docket, and order *that the complainants should be permitted to proceed therein according to chancery practice. The defendants appeared by their counsel, and resisted said application and motion, upon the ground that chancery practice should not be had in this court, and they relied upon the treaty of cession of Louisiana to the United States, from France, in 1803; the acts of Congress of 29th September, 1789; 26th May, 1824; the 19th May, 1828; and 20th May, 1830; and the first rule adopted by this court, of 20th November, 1837.

The judges of the Circuit Court having differed in opinion on the hearing of the motion, it was ordered to be certified to the Supreme Court for its decision upon the following ques

tions:

1st. Does chancery practice prevail, and should it be extended to litigants in this court, and in this cause?

2d. Should or not the said order of the date of 9th March, 1837, be annulled and vacated? 3d. Should or not the cause be placed upon a rule docket, and the complainants be permitted to proceed according to chancery practice, and the defendants be required to answer without oyer of the documents prayed for, or a service of the bill in French, as prayed for? And the cause coming on to be heard, by consent of parties, upon the demurrer, and upon the adjudication thereof, the judges were opposed in their opinions, and the foregoing questions were ordered to be certified to the Supreme Court of the United States for its decision and adjudication.

The case was argued by Mr. Key and Mr. Jones for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Coxe for the defendant.

The courts of equity are of a peculiar form. The Code of Louisiana gives a judge in certain cases a right to proceed according to the principles of natural justice; but this gives no chancery powers.

They contended that the case exhibited in the complainants' bill was one peculiarly of chancery jurisdiction. It is a beneficial bill, and should have the protection of the court. Cited, Brown's Parliamentary Cases, 550; Dickens' Reports, 26; 2 Vesey & Beames, 259. But the chancery jurisdiction of the Circuit Court nas been fully recognized in the case of Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 655; 12 Peters, 474; 13 Peters, 368, 404. The rules of court regulating the practice of the Circuit Court show that the call for papers, as made by the defendant is not allowed. 10 Rule of Court; 3 Dallas, 335, 339. The rules of practice in the Civil Code of Louisiana do not sanction such a call for papers.

Mr. Coxe argued that the case exhibited in the bill was not one of chancery jurisdiction; nor is a proceeding to vacate a will, in the power of a chancery court. Cases cited, 13 Peters, 369; 9 Peters, 657; 12 Wheaton, 169, 175; 1 Williams on Executors, 157; Cowper's Equity Pleading, 268; 2 Story's Equity, 670. Mr. Coxe referred to the Louisiana Code, to show that the Probate Court was the proper tribunal to set aside the will. So, too, the code authorizes proceedings in the established courts of Louisiana to recover legacies.

It was not his intention to controvert the decisions of the court, but such a case as this had not yet been decided.

Mr. Justice Thompson delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, upon a certificate of division of opinion upon the following points:

1. Does chancery practice prevail, and should it be extended to litigants in this court, and in this cause?

2. Should or not the said order of the 9th of March, 1837, be annulled and vacated?

3. Should or not the cause be placed upon a rule docket, and the complainants be permitted to proceed according to the chancery *practice; and the defendants be required [*14 to answer without oyer of the documents prayed for, or a service of the bill in French, as prayed for?

This was a bill filed in the District Court of the United States for that district, on the 28th of July, 1836, according to the course of practice in the courts of the United States, upon The counsel for the plaintiffs contended the equity side of the court; and in the that the single question in the case was course of proceeding, the district judge, on whether the Circuit Court of Louisiana has the 9th of March, 1837, entered the following chancery jurisdiction. The argument that the order: "W. W. Whitney et ux. v. Richard case is not one for chancery jurisdiction, does Relf et al. In this case having maturely connot apply. The question whether the case of sidered the prayer for oyer, and for copies of the complainants is, or is not one of chancery bill in French, the court this day delivered its cognizance, is not before the court on the written opinion thereon, whereby it is ordered, certificate of division. No provision of the adjudged and decreed, that the application for Code of Louisiana gives chancery jurisdiction over of documents, and for copies of the bill to the courts of that State. Chancery law as of complaint, in the manner prayed for (in administered in the courts of the United French) be granted: and further, that all 13*] States, is a fixed code of laws; and de- future proceedings in this case shall be in conpends on established rules and decided cases.formity with the existing practice of this court."

been so repeatedly decided by this court, and WRIT of error to the Supreme Court of the the grounds upon which they rest so fully State of Ohio, to reverse the judgment of stated and published in the reports, that it is that court. unnecessary, if not unfit, now to treat this as an open question. It is matter of extreme regret that it appears to be the settled determination of the district judge not to suffer chancery practice to prevail in the Circuit Court in Louisiana, in equity causes; in total disregard of the repeated decisions of this court and the rules of practice established by the Supreme Court to be observed in chancery

cases.

This court, as has been heretofore decided, has not the power to compel that court to proceed according to those established rules; all that we can do is to prevent proceedings otherwise, by reversing them when brought here on appeal.

All the questions presented by the record are accordingly answered in the affirmative.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and on the points and questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, 1st. That chancery practice does prevail, and should be extended to litigants in the said Circuit Court, and in this cause. 2d. That the order of the said court of the date of 9th March, 1837, should be annulled and vacated. And, lastly, that this cause should be placed upon a rule docket, and the complainants be permitted to proceed according to chancery practice; and the defendants be required to answer without oyer of the documents prayed for, or a service of the bill in French, as prayed for. Whereupon it is now here ordered and decreed by this court that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court with directions to proceed accordingly.

The original action of ejectment was brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton Coun. ty, and taken thence by appeal to the Supreme Court; where it was tried, and a verdict and judgment given for the plaintiffs, at May Term, 1833. Afterwards a new trial was ordered; and on a case stated, a judgment was rendered by the court in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff prosecuted this writ of

error.

The case was argued, on the merits, by Mr. Leonard for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Buck for the defendant.

The decision of the court having been given on the question of jurisdiction, those arguments are omitted.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court:

This case arises upon an action of ejectment which was decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio for the County of Clinton, and being brought here from a State court, we have no authority to revise the judgment, unless jurisdiction is given by the 25th section of the Act of 1789.

The land is situated in what is usually called the Virginia military district, and, at the trial, both parties derived title under the Act of Congress of March 2, 1807, which was passed for the purpose of extending the time for locating Virginia military land warrants, between the Little Miami and Sciota rivers.

The plaintiffs made title as heirs-at-law of Thomas J. M'Arthur, *who obtained a [*19 patent for the lands in question in 1823, upon | an entry and survey made for him in that year, as assignee of part of a military land warrant granted to John Trezuant.

The defendant, who was in possession of the land, claiming it as his own, in order to show title out of the plaintiffs, offered in evidence an entry in the name of John Tench, assignee of part of the aforesaid warrant to Trezuant, made on the 8th of August, 1787; and a survey pursuant to the said entry, on the 7th of March, 1794, which was recorded June 24, 1796. The plaintiffs having produced a complete

18*1 *LESSEE OF EFFIE COONS et al., legal title, as above stated, the prior survey of

Plaintiffs in Error,

V.

CHARLES P. GALLAHER, Defendant in Error.

Jurisdiction under 25th section Judiciary Act.

It is not sufficient to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in the case of a writ of error to the Supreme Court of a State, that the question as to the construction of an Act of Congress, might have been raised and might have been decided, and was involved in the case. It must appear either in direct terms, or by necessary intendment, that it was In fact brought to the notice of the court, and decided by it.

The case of Crowell v. Randall, 10 Peters, 898,

cited.

Tench was no bar to their recovery, unless it was made so by the Act of 1807, before referred to. The first section of that act contains the following proviso: "That no locations as aforesaid within the above-mentioned tract, shall, after the passing of this act, be made on tracts of land for which patents had been previously issued, or which had been previously surveyed; and any patent which may nevertheless be obtained for land located contrary to the provisions of this section, shall be considered as null and void."

It seems to have been admitted in the State court that this act of Congress intended to protect those surveys only that were made by lawful authority, and that the survey of Tench was no defense, unless it appeared that he was, in truth, the assignee of a portion of Trezuant's warrant. No assignment was produced at the trial, but evidence was offered by the defendant, from which the court may have presumed