lature; numerous laws upon these subjects | office until the 26th of July, 1836, when he re have since been pased; and it is not, therefore, an unjust interference that Congress has intended its legislation to be applicable to that construction.

signed it. In May, 1839, a suit was institute. upon his official bond, against him and his sur ties, to recover certain sums of public monyreceived by him, and not paid over. At the 2. If the series of acts of Congress is ex- trial of the cause, Dickson insisted upon cer amined, it will not be less apparent that, from tain credits to be allowed to him, and proved the beginning of the government, they have the receipt by him, while receiver, into his of contemplated annual salaries as the compensa- fice, as receiver of public money, amounting to tion of these officers, and quarterly settlements more than two hundred and fifty thousand dol of their accounts; and this, not for arbitrary lars, in each year, during the two years of his and uncertain periods, but for distinct and as continuance in office; and also of more than certained fiscal terms. This is the case as well two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the with officers of the customs as with those con- fraction of a year, commencing on the 22d of nected with the public lands. The regular days November, 1835, and ending on the 26th of of quarterly settlement, as adopted at the July, 1836, when he resigned his of [*159 treasury, are also recognized by these acts. 1 fice; and he also proved the depositing of suffi Story's Laws, 17, 26, 129, 150, 157, 228, 592, cient amounts in Natchez to entitle him to 665, 782, 786; 2 Story's Laws, 868, 932, 933, credit for the disputed items of his account. 950, 1309; 3 Story's Laws, 1632, 1710, 1790, Upon this evidence the court below charged the 1792, 1853, 1857, 1876, 1916. It seems impossi-jury that Dickson was entitled to credit for ble to construe these various provisions as fix-three thousand dollars, as compensation, ining a different rule or period for accounting and cluding his salary of five hundred dollars, for for making compensation. The compensation is "for the year;" for the duties performed "during the year;" for the duties embraced in the accounts as rendered and settled "for the year." Fixed annual compensation is that which is almost universally established for all offices. The exceptions are comparatively few, and those few Congress are constantly removing, as they grow up from some incidental circumstance. The fund from which this compensation is paid does not affect its character or amount. Whether it is paid by a commission 158*] out of the accruing revenue, before it goes into the treasury, or whether it is drawn from the treasury afterwards, is immaterial, if the sum fixed be so much "for the year." If the sum and the term are both fixed, the compensation is in reality a salary, and the payment of it is to be allowed and accounted for, exactly as if it were a salary, payable by annual appropriation out of the treasury. The mere fact that the compensation is for the collection of money, cannot warrant an increase in proportion to the amount collected. From the Treasurer of the United States down to the collector of the smallest port, there are numerous of ficers charged with the management of the public moneys, yet such a general rule has never been adopted.

It would seem, then, that whether we take the system established by public convenience, and by the construction early given to the regulations made for the settlement of accounts and the payment of compensation depending on those accounts; or whether we follow the general scope of the long series of legislative enactments, we are equally authorized to adhere to the existing practice, in preference to that which the decision of the district judge of Mississippi will introduce in lieu of it.

Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case of a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

The defendant in error, Samuel W. Dickson, was duly appointed a receiver of public moneys for the Choctaw district, in Mississippi, and entered upon the duties of his office on the 22d of November, 1833. He continued to hold the

the year commencing on the 22d of November, 1833, and ending on the 22d of November, 1834; and to the like compensation for the year commencing on the 22d of November, 1834, and ending on the 22d of November, 1835; and that for the fraction of a year between the 22d of November, 1835, and the 26th of July, 1836, he was entitled to two thousand five hundred dollars for commission. To this opinion and charge of the court a bill of exceptions was taken by the United States, and a verdict having been found accordingly by the jury, and judgment rendered thereon, the present writ of error has been brought to revise that judgment.

Upon the argument in this court, two points have been made on behalf of the United States: First. That the charge of the court below was erroneous, in allowing the receiver to calculate his yearly commission on the amount of public moneys received by him during a year commencing from the date of his appointment, instead of calculating it by the fiscal year, which commences with the calendar year, or on the first day of January of every year. Second. That the charge of the court below was erroneous, in allowing the receiver to charge the whole yearly maximum of commissions for the fractional portion of the year in which he resigned.

The validity of these objections to the charge of the Circuit Court must essentially depend upon the true interpretation of the Act of the 20th of April, 1818, ch. 118. Originally, the receivers of public moneys in the land offices were paid a commission of one per cent. on the moneys received by them, as a compensation for clerk hire, receiving, and keeping, and transmitting the public moneys to the Treasury of the United States. This was originally provided by the Act of the 10th of May, 1800, ch. 55, sec. 6. By the Act of the 26th of March, 1804, ch. 35, sec. 14, the compensation was increased by an addition of one half per cent. to the former commission, and also of an annual salary of five hundred dollars, with the exception of the land office of Marietta, [*160 where the annual salary was two hundred dollars only. Then came the Act of the 20th of April, 1818, ch. 118, which provided "that instead of the compensation now allowed by law

to the receivers of the public moneys for the lands of the United States, they shall receive an annual salary of five hundred dollars each, and a commission of one per cent. on the moneys received, as a compensation for clerk hire, receiving, safe keeping, and transmitting such moneys to the Treasury of the United States: provided always, that the whole amount which any receiver of public moneys shall receive, under the provisions of this act, shall not exceed, for any one year, the sum of three thousand dollars."

commencement of his term of service, by reason of such an intermediate appointment, as it may be where his office terminates in the midst of a quarter; in which case (as is admitted), from necessity, the fraction is brought into his closing official account.

The main controversy in the present case turns upon the meaning of the phrase "any one year" in the foregoing section. Does it mean "any one year" calculated from the date of the commission of the receiver? or does it mean "any one year" commencing with the calendar year, that is, with the 1st of January of each year; which is commonly called, in mat-rily ex-parte, without the benefit of an opposing ters connected with the Treasury Department, the fiscal year?

It has been also argued that the uniform construction given to the Act of 1818, ever since its passage by the Treasury Department, has been that the act has reference to the fiscal year. The construction so given by the Treasury Department to any law affecting its arrangements and concerns, is certainly entitled to great respect. Still, however, if it is not in conformity to the true intendment and provisions of the law, it cannot be permitted to conclude the judgment of a court of justice. The construction given to the laws by any department of the executive government, is necessaargument, in a suit where the very matter is in controversy; and when the construction is once The argument addressed to us on behalf of given, there is no opportunity to question or the government is that it means the latter. It revise it by those who are most interested in is said that all accounting officers (with some it as officers, deriving their salary and emoluunimportant exceptions) are required by law, ments therefrom, for they cannot bring the case and the regulations of the Treasury Depart to the test of a judicial decision. It is only ment, to render quarterly accounts of the when they are sued by the government for some moneys received by them, and of the disburse- supposed default or balance, that they can asments made by them, at the end of each quar-sert their rights. Their acquiescence, therefore, ter of the calendar year (see Act of 10th of is almost from a moral necessity, when there May, 1800, ch. 55); and that all the accounts is no choice but obedience, as a matter [*162 kept at the Treasury Department are governed by this mode of proceeding; and that if any other mode of keeping the accounts were adopted, it would introduce endless embarrassment and confusion into the department, and take away the only adequate means of ascertaining from time to time the exact financial state thereof, as to debts, and credits, and disbursements, which is so essential to the public security, and regular operations of the government. And hence, in order to give full effect to this system, it is contended that it is necessary, in all laws of this character, to construe the year to mean the fiscal year.

Admitting the argument in its full force (and we are not disposed to controvert the propriety of the present mode of keeping the public accounts, as being founded as well in law as 161*] in public convenience), still it does not appear to us to justify the conclusion attempted to be drawn from it. In short, we do not perceive what connection the mode of keeping the accounts in the Treasury Department has with the compensation allowed by law to any public officer. That compensation is to be ascertained from the terms of the law allowing it; and whenever the amount is once ascertained, according to those terms, it is to be allowed and credited to the officer, whatever may be the form in which the public accounts are kept, or the particular times at which they are required to be rendered and settled. Nor are we able to understand why the accounts of any public officer may not be made up regularly at the end of every fiscal quarter, allowing such compensation as he has then earned and is entitled to by law, where his precedent term of service has been less than a full quarter, in consequence of an intermediate appointment to office. The allowance for the fraction of a quarter may just as readily be made at the

of policy or duty. But it is not to be forgotten that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that the judicial department has imposed upon it by the Constitution the solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and however disagreeable that duty may be, in cases where its own judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.

The present question, then, must be decided upon the same principles by which we ascertain the interpretation of all other laws; by the intention of the Legislature, as it is to be deduced from the language and the apparent object of the enactment.

The object of the Act of 1818 manifestly is to provide a suitable compensation for the receivers and registers of public moneys for the public lands. The compensation is for services to be rendered by them, officially, during their continuance in office; and up to a certain point, at least, it is in exact proportion to the extent and duration of those services, and the responsibility incurred thereby. The compensation is measured by years. It is to be by an annual salary, and by a commission not exceeding an annual amount. The words are, that "they shall receive an annual salary of five hundred dollars each." The natural interpretation of these words certainly is that the salary is to commence at the time when the service is to commence, and that they are to be contemporaneous with each other. We believe this to be the uniform interpretation of all laws of this sort, and that when any person takes office in an intermediate time between one quarter and another, the practice is to pay him a proportion of the quarter's salary, accordingly; and if he leaves office before the end of his official year, to pay him for the like proportion of the last quarter. Indeed, it was admitted

at the argument that this is the rule adopted at the Treasury Department itself, in relation to the salaries of officers, viz., that it is begun and ended with the official year, and not with the fiscal year. Nor was it suggested that, in this particular, any difficulty arose as to the mode of keeping and settling the official accounts at the treasury, at the end of each quarter, or of the fiscal year.

that amount. Suppose it might be so, it would be a case of very rare occurrence; and to put an extreme case is not a good test of the fait and just interpretation of any statute. In such a case, each successive receiver would only receive his just proportion of the year's salary, and no more commission than Congress itself had established to be a reasonable compensation for his expenditures and responsibilities in receiving, safe keeping, and transmitting the public moneys. There is nothing in the reason of the case why each successive officer, who has incurred the full responsibility, by the receipt of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, should not receive the whole commission up to that extent. The argument ab inconvenienti, therefore, under such circumstances, does not address itself to this court with the force which it has been supposed to possess. It amounts merely to this, that the act is defective in some of its details, and does not reach all the cases which ought to be provided for.

If, then, the natural interpretation of the 163*] words of the act, as to the salary, has reference to the official year, and not to the fiscal year, what ground is there to presume that Congress, in the subsequent words regulating the commission, did not use the word "year" in the like sense? There is nothing in the language or in the nature of the compensation, which leads us to the conclusion that Congress had in view the fiscal year, or the mode of keeping the accounts in the Treasury Department, as guides to fix the interpretation of the word "year." For aught that appears, it was used in its ordinary sense. The words But there would be inconveniences, not to are, "and a commission of one per cent. on say apparent hardships, upon the receivers, in the moneys received, as a compensation for adopting the construction contended for on beclerk hire, receiving, safe keeping, and trans- half of the government. Thus, suppose a remitting such moneys of the United States; pro-ceiver should die, or be removed from office vided always, that the whole amount which without any default on his own part, during any receiver of public moneys shall receive the fiscal year, and after he had received and under the provisions of this act, shall not ex- become responsible for public moneys exceedceed, for any one year, the sum of three thou- ing two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; in sand dollars." The commission is on the such a case, the extent of the act would seem moneys received by any one officer, not by one fairly to entitle him to the full commission of or more officers, during any one year of his two thousand five hunderd dollars; and yet, services; not during any one calendar year, for according to the argument, he would be comthe services of one or more officers in that year. pelled to submit to an apportionment, which It is his compensation for clerk hire, paid by might reduce it to a quarter part thereof. him, and for his responsibilities in receiving, There is another consideration not unimporkeeping, and transmitting the public moneys; tant in the construction of the act; it is, that and not for his services and responsibility in the limitation of the compensation which any connection with other officers. The commis- receiver is to receive for any one year, is not, sion is a compensation attached to the particu- including his salary, to exceed the sum of three lar officer for his yearly service, and not to the thousand dollars. So that here we have both office itself for a fiscal year. If the intention of salary and commissions united together in the the Legislature had been what the argument ascertainment of the amount; and, of course, for the United States supposes, the language of the year, *with reference to each, must [*165 the proviso would have been different; it would have the same period of commencement and have been, provided that the United States termination. If, therefore, the salary is to be shall not, in any one calendar year, pay more ascertained by the official year, as has been althan one per centum upon all the moneys re-ready suggested, it would seem to be an irreceived during that year; and that the commission for any one year to whomsoever paid, shall not, in the whole, exceed the sum of twentyfive hundred dollars. It need not be said, how entirely different in its scope and legal intendment such language is from that of the present proviso; and yet the argument is that the court should give them precisely the same interpretation. We cannot but think that this is to call upon the court, not to expound the act as it is, but to frame its provisions anew, upon a conjecture of what might have been the original intention and object of Congress.

sistible conclusion that the same period must be assigned for the commissions.

Passing from these considerations to another, which necessarily brings under review the second point of objection to the charge of the court below, we are led to the general rule of law which has always prevailed, and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall It is further urged that unless we interpret fairly within its terms. In short, a proviso 164*] the words to refer to the fiscal year, carves special exceptions only out of the enact great inconveniences may arise; and the gov-ing clause; and those who set up any such ernment may, by there being several receivers exception, must establish it as being within in office during one and the same fiscal year, the words as well as within the reason thereeach of whom may have received more public moneys than would entitle him to the maximum of commissions, be compellable to pay more than twenty-five hundred dollars in one year; nay, may actually pay twice or thrice

of. Applying this rule to the circumstances of the present case, how does it stand? The enacting clause gives to each receiver a commission of one per cent. upon all the public moneys received by him. This was precisely in

167*] *BARNETT and ELIZA LEVY, Plain- sum of twelve thousand one hundred dollars,

EDMUND and DAVID FITZPATRICK, De- said Barnett Levy in the State of Louisiana."

The defendants in error addressed a petition to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, stating that the plaintiffs in error were indebted to them, in solido, in the sum of twelve thousand one hundred dollars, with And by the 22d section of the same act, final interest at the rate of ten per centum per an-judgments in civil actions, commenced in the num, by their certain writing obligatory, executed by them and one Moses A. Levy, who