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extent and for the purpose we have supposed the terms, have we thereby appropriated the to have been had in view. It is all the provi- entire common law, and become subject to its sion there is upon the subject; and in so far as authority? Do we not borrow terms in science it falls short of the adoption of laws for the di- and arts without being pledged to the princirection of the courts, the defect is still unpro- ples to which they may have been applied ? vided for. The common law has never been The physician derives his nomenclature from otherwise adopted, nor have the courts power the Greek language; but is his practice conto create or adopt laws; they must administer trolled by the false notions which "those (*13 the law as existing.

terms often indicate, or the theories of those In support of this position it would be suffi- who invented them? The common law itself cient perhaps to refer to the cases of The Unit, has borrowed terms of pleadings and processes ed States v. Worrall, 2 Dallas, 384, The United and familiar proverbs from the civil law, but States v. Burr, opinion delivered by the Chief do we look to the original for any supposed Justice, Sept. 3d, 1807; The United States v. obligation? Our law idiom is essentially of Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32; The United common law origin, yet not foreign. It is the States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheaton, 415.

language familiar to us in the jurisprudence of In these cases, it is true, the question was, the respective States. It is there assimilated whether the courts of the United States had ju. and modified by our own circumstances and risdiction of crimes and offenses at common usages. In coming together with their respec. law, which had not been provided for by the tive States, the framers of the Constitution, and Constitution or laws of the United States; but our representatives in Congress after them, they involved the general question, whether the must be regarded as having had in view the common law had been adopted; for if it could language, laws, and institutions of the States be referred to at all, it was equally a source of which they represented. If, therefore, in the jurisdiction as it would be the rule of decision. organization of the federal judiciary, a system 12*) Accordingly, in the discussion *of the of laws is pre-supposed, it is the American law, question, it was thought necessary to assume, which is now as distinct in its character as the in the utmost latitude, that the common law English or French; yet, as it is not uniform in was the basis of our federal jurisprudence, as it the States, the adoption of it in the federal was of the several States; and the decision courts would be necessarily subject to some ought to be regarded as co-extensive with the legislative provision, as to the cases and cir. ground upon which the jurisdiction was as- cumstances to which the law should be appliserted, and to have finally disposed of it. cable. The general language of the law would,

Yet, as the court were not unanimous, and however, obviously occur, and be used in any the subject has been since debated with much legislation upon the subject, without the neceslearning and zeal by distinguished writers (see sity of definition as might be required, if some Duponceau on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of foreign code or any of its provisions were to be the United States; 1 Kent's Commentaries, 311, transferred and appropriated, like the Athenian 322; North American Review, July No. 1825; law, which was transmuted in a mass by the 1 Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, Romans, into the twelve tables. 141), it may not be supererogatory to examine But it is said that some of the provisions of it anew, as the question is now presented in a the Constitution can take effect only by reform that calls for a specific and final decision course to the common law, as the clause in ar. of the whole matter.

ticle 3, section 2, extending the judicial power It would seem to be a self-evident proposi- to all cases in law and equity, arising under the tion, that the adoption of the common law must Constitution, etc., and to admiralty and marihave been by the Constitution or legislative en time jurisdiction. The laws and practices of actment. Surely, the courts could not of their the States, it is argued, cannot be referred to own authority establish as the law of the land here, because in many of them no equity juris. a foreign code or system, no matter how con- prudence existed, and the maritime law of the sonant with our political character, or how States is supposed to have been too imperfect familiar its principles. By the same authority and unsettled to furnish any basis for that dethey could as well have adopted the civil law as partment of law. 1 Gall. 488. existing in France or Holland as the English To this it may be answered, that although in law.

some of the States there were no equity tribunals But, although it is conceded that there is no distinct from the common law courts, yet the express recognition or adoption of the common principles of equity, as distinguished from those law, either in the Constitution or laws of the of common law, were perfectly understood in United States, it is contended that the Consti- every State, and were in fact administered, altution pre-supposes, and is predicated upon though in some of them without the aid of a the existence of the common law. Justice court of chancery. The present organization Story, in the United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gall. of the federal courts in fact conforms with the 448; Bayard's Speech, Debates on the Judici- usage of those very *States where this [*14 ary, in 1802, p. 372, North American Review, defect of equity power is supposed to exist, before cited.

there is an equity jurisprudence fully carried Mr. Justice Story refers to the provisions in into effect, without separate courts of equity. the Constitution and laws, in respect to trial As to the maritime jurisdiction and course of by jury, the writ of habeas corpus, etc., as in- proceeding, it was sufficiently settled; for the stances when recourse must be had to the com- proceedings of our courts in the exercise of that mon law for the interpretation of terms. 1 jurisdiction, are regulated now, not by the En. Gall. 488.

glish admiralty law, but by the practice in our These observations are just—but what is the own country, engrafted on the English. 10 conclusion therefrom? Because we have used 'Wheaton, 473.

Mr. Dana cited the debates on the Constitu: point or question of law: whether, under the tion of the United States in the Convention of facts last mentioned, the defendant was entitled Virginia and in other States to show that with to the same defense to the action as if the suit out the aid of a statute the common law cannot was between the original parties to the bill, be called in aid of the jurisdiction of the courts, that is to say, Norton, or Norton and Keith, or for rules of decision as to the necessity of and the defendant; and whether the evidence legislation for the authority and manner of pro- so offered was admissible as against the plain ceeding in the courts of the United States; he tiff in the action. And this is the question cer cited the opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell, in Chis- tified to us for our decision. holm's Executors v. The State of Georgia, 2 Dal There is no doubt that a bona fide holder of las, 432. That the provisions of the twenty: a negotiable instrument for a valuable consider. fourth section are not confined to "statutes," ation, without any notice of facts, which im. he cited, as decided in this court, Jackson v. peach its validity as between the antecedent Chew, 12 Wheaton, 163; Henderson et ux. v. parties, if he takes it under an indorsement Griffin, 5 Peters, 161; Green v. Neal, 6 Peters, made before the same becomes due, holds the 291, The United States v. Wanson, 1 Gallison, 5; title unaffected by these facts, and may recover Van Reimsdyke v. Kine et al. 1 Gallison, 371. thereon, although as between the antecedent

parties the transaction may be without any Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of legal validity. This is a doctrine so long and the court:

so well established, and so essential to the seThis cause comes before us from the Circuit

rity of

egotiable paper, that it is laid up Court of the Southern District of New York, among the fundamentals of the law, and re. upon a certificate of division of the judges of quires no authority or reasoning to be now that court.

brought "in its support. As little doubt (*16 The action was brought by the plaintiff, is there, that the holder of any negotiable paper, Swift, as indorsee, against the defendant, before it is due, is not bound to prove that he Tyson, as acceptor, upon a bill of exchange, is a bona fide holder for a valuable considera. dated at Portland, Maine, on the 1st day of tion, without notice; for the law will presume May, 1836, for the sum of one thousand five that in the absence of all rebutting proofs, and hundred and forty dollars, thirty cents, pay- therefore it is incumbent upon the defendant to able six months after date and grace, drawn by establish by way of defense satisfactory proofs one Nathaniel Norton and one Jairus S. Keith of the contrary, and thus to overcome the upon and accepted by Tyson, at the city of prima facie title of the plaintiff. New York, in favor of the order of Nathaniel In the present case, the plaintiff is a bona fide Norton, and by Norton indorsed to the plain- holder without notice for what the law deems tiff. The bill was dishonored at maturity. a good and valid consideration, that is, for a

At the trial the acceptance and indorsement pre-existing debt; and the only real question in of the bill were admitted, and the plaintiff the cause is, whether, under the circumstances there rested his case. The defendant then in. of the present case, such a pre-existing debt troduced in evidence the answer of Swift to a constitutes a valuable consideration in the sense bill of discovery, by which it appeared that of the general rule applicable to negotiable in. 15*) Swift took the bill before it became struments. We say, "under the circumstances due, in payment of a promissory note due to of the present case," for the acceptance having him by Norton and Keith; that he understood been made in New York, the argument on be. that the bill was accepted in part payment of half of the defendant is, that the contract is to some lands sold by Norton to a company in be treated as a New York contract, and there. New York; that Swift was a bona fide holder fore to be governed by the laws of New York, of the bill, not having any notice of anything as expounded by its courts, as well upon general in the sale or title to the lands, or otherwise, principles, as by the express provisions of the impeaching the transaction, and with the full 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. belief that the bill was justly due. The partic. 20. And then it is further contended, that by ular circumstances are fully set forth in the the law of New York, as thus expounded by answer in the record; but it does not seem nec its courts, a pre-existing debt does not constiessary further to state them. The defendant tute, in the sense of the general rule, a valuable then offered to prove that the bill was accepted consideration applicable to negotiable instruby the defendant as part consideration for the ments. purchase of certain lands in the State of Maine, In the first place, then, let us examine into which Norton and Keith represented them the decisions of the courts of New York upon selves to be the owners of, and also represented this subject. In the earliest case, Warren v. to be of great value, and contracted to convey Lynch, 5 Johns. R. 289, the Supreme Court a good title thereto; and that the representa- of New York appear to have held that a pretions were in every respect fraudulent and existing debt was a sufficient consideration to false, and Norton and Keith had no title to the entitle a bona fide holder without notice to relands, and that the same were of little or no cover the amount of a note indotsed to him, value. The plaintiff objected to the admission which might not, as between the original par. of such testimony, or of any testimony, as ties, be valid. The same doctrine was affirmned against him, impeaching or showing a failure by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Bay v. Coddington, of the consideration on which the bill was 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 54. Upon that occasion accepted, under the facts admitted by the de- he said, that negotiable paper can be assigned fendant, and those proved by him, by reading or transferred by an agent or factor, or by any the answer of the plaintiff to the bill of discov- other person, fraudulently, so as to bind the ery. The judges of the Circuit Court there-true owner as against the holder, provided it be upon divided in opinion upon the following taken in the usual course of trade, and for •

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fair and valuable consideration, without notice | That section provides that the laws of tho of the fraud. But he added, that the holders several States, except where the Constitution, in that case were not entitled to the benefit of treaties, or statutes of the United States shall the rule, because it was not negotiated to otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded 17*] *them in the usual course of business or as rules of decision in trials at common law in trade, nor in payment of any antecedent and the courts of the United States, in cases where existing debt, nor for cash, or property advanced, they apply.” In order to maintain the argudebt created, or responsibility incurred, on the ment, it is essential, therefore, to hold, that the strength and credit of the notes; thus directly word “laws,” in this section, includes within affirming that a pre-existing debt was a fair and the scope of its meaning the decisions of the valuable consideration within the protection of local tribunals. In the ordinary use of language the general rule. And he has since affirmed the it will hardly be contended that the decisions same doctrine, upon a full review of it, in his of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, Commentaries (3 Kent. Com. sect. 44, p. 81). only evidence of what the laws are, and are not The decision in the case of Bay v. Coddington of themselves laws. They are often re-exam. was afterwards affirmed in the Court of Errors ined, reversed, and qualified by the courts them. (20 Johns. R. 637), and the general reasoning selves, whenever they are found to be either of the Chancellor was fully sustained. There defective or ill-founded, or otherwise incorwere indeed peculiar circumstances in that case, rect. The laws of a State are more usually which the court seemed to have consider as understood to mean the rules and enactments entitling it to be treated as an exception to the promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, general rule, upon the ground, either because or long established local customs having the force the receipt of the notes was under suspicious of laws. In all the various cases, which have circumstances, the transfer having been made hitherto come before us for decision, this court after the known insolvency of the indorser, or have uniformly supposed that the true interbecause the holder had received it as a mere pretation of the 34th section limited its applicasecurity for contingent responsibilities, with tion to State laws strictly local, that is to say, which the holders had not then become charged. to the positive statutes of the State, and the There was, however, a considerable diversity of construction thereof adopted by the local triopinion among the members of the court upon bunals, and to rights and titles to things having that occasion, several of them holding that the a permanent locality, such as the rights and decree ought to be reversed, others affirming titles to real estate, and other matters immov. that a pre-existing debt was a valuable consid- able and intraterritorial in their nature and eration, sufficient to protect the holders, and character. It never has been supposed by us, others again insisting that a pre-existent debt that the section did apply, or was designed to was not sufficient. From that period, however, apply, to questions of a more general nature, for a series of years, it seems to have been held not at all dependent upon local statutes or by the Supreme Court of the State, that a pre-*local usages of a fixed and permanent (*19 existing debt was not a sufficient consideration operation, as, for example, to the construction to shut out the equities of the original parties of ordinary contracts or other written instru. in favor of the holders. But no case to that ments, and especially to questions of general effect has ever been decided in the Court of commercial law, where the State tribunals are Errors. The cases cited at the bar, and espe- called upon to perform the like functions as cially Roosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. R. 85; ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general The Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true R. 593; and Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. R. exposition of the contract or instrument, or 605, are directly in point. But the more re. what is the just rule furnished by the princi. cent cases, The Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 ples of commercial law to govern the case. And Wend. R. 490; and The Bank of Sandusky v. we have not now the slightest difficulty in hold. Scoville, 24 Wend. R. 115, have greatly shaken, ing, that this section, upon its true intendment if they have not entirely overthrown those de- and construction, is strictly limited to local cisions, and seem to have brought back the statutes and local usages of the character bedoctrine to that promulgated in the earliest fore stated, and does not extend to contracts tases. So that, to say the least of it, it admits of and other instruments of a commercial nature, serious doubt, whether any doctrine upon this the true interpretation and effect whereof are question can at the present time be treated as to be sought, not in the decisions of the local 18'] finally established; and it is certain *that tribunals, but in the general principles and the Court of Errors have not pronounced any doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Un. positive opinion upon it.

doubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled upon such subjects are entitled to, and will rein New York, it remains to be considered, ceive, the most deliberate attention and respect whether it is obligatory upon this court, if it of this court; but they cannot furnish positive differs from the principles established in the rules, or conclusive authority, by which our general commercial law. It is observable that own judgments are to be bound up and gove the courts of New York do not found their deerned. The law respecting negotiable instru. cisions upon this point upon any local statute, ments may be truly declared in the language of or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage; but Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. they deduce the doctrine from the general prin- Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great ciples of commercial law. It is, however, con measure, not the law of a single country only, tended, that the 34th section of the Judiciary but of the commercial world. Non erit alia Act of 1789 (ch. 20) furnishes a rule obligatory lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, upon this court to follow the decisions of the sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una State tribunals, in all cases to which they apply. eademque lex obtinebit.

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It becomes necessary for us, therefore, upon*the one now before us; for the bill of ex. (*21 the present occasion, to express our own opin. change there drawn in discharge of a pre-ex. ion of the true result of the commercial law up-isting debt, was held to bind the party as ac. on the question now before us. And we have ceptor, upon a mere promise made by him to no hesitation in saying, that a pre-existing debt accept before the bill was actually drawn. does constitute a valuable consideration in the Upon that occasion Lord Mansfield, likening sense of the general rule already stated, as ap- the case to that of a letter of credit, said, that plicable to negotiable instruments. Assuming a letter of credit may be given for money al. it to be true (which, however, may well admit ready advanced, as well as for money to be ad of some doubt from the generality of the lan- vanced in future; and the whole court held the guage), that the holder of a negotiable instru- plaintiff entitled to recover. From that period ment is unaffected with the equities between downward there is not a single case to be found the antecedent parties, of which he has no no: in England in which it has ever been held by tice, only where he receives it in the usual the court that a pre-existing debt was not i course of trade and business for a valuable con- valuable consideration, sufficient to protect the sideration, before it becomes due, we are pre-holder, within the meaning of the general rule. pared to say that receiving it in payment of, or although incidental dicta have been sometimes 20*) as security for a pre-existing debt, "is ac relied on to establish the contrary, such as the cording to the known usual course of trade and dictum of Lord Chief Justice Abbott in Smith business. And why upon principle should not v. De Witt, 6 Dowl. Ryland, 120; and De la e pre-existing debt be deemed such a valuable Chaumette v. The Bank of England, 9 Barn. ! consideration. It is for the benefit and con. Crest. 209, where, however, the decision venience of the commercial world to give as turned upon very different considerations. wide an extent as practicable to the credit and Mr. Justice Bayley, in his valuable work on circulation of negotiable paper, that it may bills of exchange and promissory notes, layg pass not only as security for new purchases and down the rule in the most general terms. "The advances, made upon the transfer thereof, but want of consideration," says he, "in toto or in also in payment of and as security for pre-ex- part, cannot be insisted on, if the plaintiff or isting debts. The creditor is thereby enabled any intermediate party between him and the to realize or to secure his debt, and thus may defendant took the bill or note bona fide and safely give a prolonged credit, or forbear from upon a valid consideration.” Bayley on Bills taking any legal steps to enforce his rights. p. 499, 500, 5th London edition, 1830. It is The debtor also has the advantage of making observable that he here uses the words "valio his negotiable securities of equivalent value to consideration," obviously intending to make cash. But establish the opposite conclusion, the distinction, that it is not intended to apply that negotiable paper cannot be applied in pay solely to cases where a present consideration ment of, or as security for pre-existing debts, for advances of money on goods or otherwisu without letting in all the equities between the takes place at the time of the transfer and upon original and antecedent parties, and the value the credit thereof. And in this he is fully and circulation of such securities must be es borne out by the authorities. They go farther, sentially diminished, and the debtor driven to and establish that a transfer as security for the embarrassment of making a sale thereof, past, and even for future responsibilities, will, often at a ruinous discount, to some third per- for this purpose, be a sufficient, valid, and val. son, and then by circuity to apply the proceeds uable consideration. Thus, in the case of to the payment of his debts. What, indeed, Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Starkie, R. I, it was upon such a doctrine, would become of that held by Lord Ellenborough, that if a banker large class of cases where new notes are given be under acceptances to an amount beyond the by the same or by other parties, by way of re- cash balance in his hands, every bill he holds newal or security to banks, in lieu of old se of that customer's, bona fide, he is to be considcurities discounted by them, which have ar. ered as holding for value; and it makes no dif. rived at maturity? Probably more than one ference, though he hold other collateral securi. half of all bank transactions in our country, as ties more than sufficient to cover the execess of well as those of other countries, are of this na- his acceptances. *The same doctrine [*23 ture. The doctrine would strike a fatal blow was affirmed by Lord Eldon in Ex-parte Blox. at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre- ham, 8 Ves. 531, as equally applicable to past existing debts.

and to future acceptances. The subsequent This question has been several times before cases of Heywood v. Watson, 4 Bing: R. 496; this court, and it has been uniformly held that and Bramah v. Roberts, 1 Bing. New Ca. it makes no difference whatsoever as to the 469; and Percival v. Frampton, 2 Cromp rights of the holder, whether the debt for Mees. & Rose, 180, are to the same effect. which the negotiable instrument is transferred They directly establish that a bona fide holder, to him is a pre-existing debt, or is contracted taking a negotiable note in payment of or as at the time of the transfer. In each case he security for a pre-existing debt, is a holder for equally gives credit to the instrument. The a valuable consideration, entitled to protection cases of Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheaton R. against all the equities between the antecedent 66, 70, 73, and Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, parties. And these are the latest decisions R. 170, 182, are directly in point.

which our researches have enabled us to ascer. In England the same doctrine has been uni- tain to have been made in the English courts formly acted upon. As long ago as the case upon this subject. of Pillans and Rose v. Van Meirop and Hop- In the American courts, 80 far as we have kins, 3 Burr. 1664, the very point was made been able to trace the decisions, the same docand the objection was overruled. That, in- trine seems generally, but not universally, to deed, was a case of far more stringency than prevail. In Brush v. Scribner, I Conn. R

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V.

388, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, after the United States for the Southern District of
an elaborate review of the English and New New York, and on the point and question on
York adjudications, held, upon general princi: which the judges of the said Circuit Court
ples of commercial law, that a pre-existing debt were opposed in opinion, and which were certi.
was a valuable consideration, sufficient to con: fied to this court for its opinion, agreeably to
vey a valid title to a bona fide holder against all the act of Congress in such case made and pro-
the antecedent parties to a negotiable note. vided, and was argued by counsel; on consid-
There is no reason to doubt that the same rule eration whereof, it is the opinion of this court
has been adopted and constantly adhered to in that the defendant was not, under the facts
Massachusetts; and certainly there is no trace stated, entitled to the same defense to the ac-
to be found to the contrary. In truth, in the tion as if the suit was between the original
silence of any adjudications upon the subject, parties to the bill; that is to say, the said Nor-
in a case of such frequent and almost daily oc- ton, or the said Norton and Keith and the de.
currence in the commercial States, it may fair- fendant; and that the evidence offered (*24
ly be presumed that whatever constitutes a in defense and objected to, was not admissible
valid and valuable consideration, in other cases as against the plaintiff in this action. Where-
of contract, to support titles of the most solemn upon it is now here ordered and adjudged by
nature, is held, a fortiori, to be sufficient in cases this court, that an answer in the negative be
of negotiable instruments, as indispensable to certified to the said Circuit Courto
the security of holders, and the facility and
safety of their circulation. Be this as it may,
we entertain no doubt that a bona fide holder
for a pre-existing debt of a negotiable instru-
ment is not affected by any equities between
the antecedent parties, where he has received
the same before it became due, without notice *RICHARD J. WATKINS, Plaintiff in (*28
of any such equities. We are all, therefore, of

Error,
opinion that the question on this point, pro-
pounded by the Circuit Court for our consid-
eration, ought to be answered in the negative; THE LESSEE OF OLIVER HOLMAN et al.
and we shall accordingly direct it so to be certi-
fied to the Circuit Court.

Title to water-lot in Mobile-volume of State 23*] "Mr. Justice Catron said:

papers as evidence-deed executed under deUpon the point of difference between the

cree of court of another State-act of Legis. judges below, I concur that the extinguishment

lature subjecting lands of deceased to pay. of a debt, and the giving a post consideration,

ment of debts, to exclusion of personaltysuch as the record presents, will protect the

executive, legislative and judicial powers, and purchaser and assignee of a negotiable note

their limitations
from the infirmity affecting the instrument be-
fore it was negotiated. But I am unwilling to
Banction the introduction into the opinion of

Ejectment to recover possession of a lot in the this court a doctrine aside from the case made Circuit Court, claimed title to the land under Lucy

city of Mobile, Alabama. The defendants, in the by the record, or argued by the counsel, as. Landry, who was the devisee

of one Geronto; who suming to maintain that a negotiable note or having been in possession of the lot at the corner bill pledged as collateral security for a previous his death. On the arrival of Lucy Landry at age, debt, is taken by the creditor in the due course she occupied the lot as her own property; and in of trade, and that he stands on the foot of him 1818 she sold and conveyed it by deed to certain who purchases in the market for money, or to be the Mobile River.

persons, stating the eastern boundary in the deed

These persons on the same takes the instrument in extinguishment of a day conveyed the premises to Ollver Holman, who previous debt. State courts of high authority entered on it, and improved it, by, erecting houses on commercial questions have held otherwise; a merchant in co-partnership with one Charles and that they will yield to a mere expression of Brown, who lived in Boston, until December, 1822, opinion of this court, or change their course of when he died, leaving, as his heirs, the lessors of decision in conformity to the recent English lot commenced in 1800, and extended on Royal cases referred to in the principal opinion, is street, and on the east, followed the high water. improbable; whereas, if the question was per- mark on the river. The land was not subject to mitted to rest until it fairly arose, the decision Inundation, though in many places the water ran

Until the improvements made by Hol. of it either way by this court, probably, would, man, the lot was not susceptible of occupancy: and I think ought to settle it. As such a re. There was a ridge of high land formed of shells

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and sult is not to be expected from the opinion in the lot was situated ; and the ridge was protected

artificial deposits, to the east of which, to the river. this cause, I am unwilling to embarrass myself by the Spanish authorities, no person belog permit. with so much of it as treats of negotiable in- ted by them to improve on the ground, or to remove struments taken as a pledge. I never heard landing-place. Questions as to the title of the pro this question spoken of as belonging to the prietors of the adjacent lots above Water street to case, until the principal opinion was presented the lots extending to the river, prevalled untii last evening; and therefore I am not prepared to give any opinion, even was it called for by

NOTE. -As to estoppel by recital in deed, will, or the record.

other Instrument, see note to Carver v. Jackson, This cause came on to be heard on the tran

When vendeels estopped from disputing the

title of his vendor. script of the record from the Circuit Court of Where parties go into possession of premises, 10 L. ed.

Pet. 1.

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