moiety of the property of Holman, in Mobile, described in the title-bond to Brown, was conveyed to Brown, was inoperative. The deed was executed under a decree or order of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts, and by virtue of a statute of that State. It is not pretended that it was authorized by any law of Alabama; and no principle is better settled, than that the disposition of real estate, whether by deed, descent, or by any other mode, must be governed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.

1824; when on the 26th May, 1824, a law was passed which granted the lots known as water-lots under the Spanish government to the owners of the adjacent grounds. The improvements were made by Holman in 1819 or 1820. The defendants below gave in evidence, to maintain their title, the title to them from Lucy Landry, through her grantees to Oliver Holman: a title-bond from Holman to Brown for half of the lot in controversy, by which a deed was to be executed two years after the date of the bond; and an Act of the Legislature of Alabama, passed in December, 1823, after A court of chancery, acting in personam, may the decease of Holman, authorizing the administra- well decree the conveyance of land in any other trix of Holman, then residing in Boston, where State, and may enforce their decrees by process administration of the estate of the deceased had against the defendant. But neither the decree itbeen granted to her, to sell the real estate of which self, nor any conveyance under it, except by the he died seized, in the city of Mobile, for the pay-person in whom the title is vested, can operate be ment of his debts, the estate being Insolvent; a yond the jurisdiction of the court." deed made in pursuance of a sale of the premises under the act of Assembly and in conformity to the provisions thereof; and also the record of certain proceedings in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, wherein a license was given to the administratrix to make a deed in pursuance of the title-bond to Brown, and the deed made under this authority. The questions which arose in the case, and on which the court decided were: First, whether the act of the Legislature of Alabama, authorizing the sale of the estate of Holman, was constitutional and valid. Second, whether the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts were operative, and authorized the administratrix to convey the title. Third, whether a volume of State papers published under the authority of Congress was evidence. Fourth, whether the lessors of the plaintiff below had established a legal title. Fifth, 26] whether the defendants in the Circuit Court had not established a title in themselves, independent of and adverse to the title they had derived under Oliver Holman.

The relation of landlord and tenant in nowise exists between the vendor and vendee; and this is especially the case where a conveyance has been executed.

A mere intruder on land is limited to his actual possession; and the rights of a riparian proprietor do not attach to him.

The Act of Congress of 26th May, 1824, relinquished the rights of the United States, whatever they were, in the lot in question, to the proprietor of the front lot.

A volume of state papers published under the authority of an act of Congress, and containing the authentication required by the act, is legal evidence. In the United States, in all public matters, the journals of Congress, and of the State legisla tures are evidence, and also the reports which have been sanctioned and published by authority. This publication does not make that evidence, which Intrinsically is not so; but it gives in a most authentic form certain papers and documents. The very highest authority attaches to state papers published under the sanction of Congress.

The deed executed by the administratrix of Holman, in pursuance of the license given by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, by which nearly a

It is not perceived why a court of law should regard a resulting trust more than any other equitable rights; and any attempt to give effect to these rights at law, through the instrumentality of a jury, must lead to confusion and uncertainty. Equitable and legal jurisdictions have been wisely separated, and the soundest maxims of jurisprudence require each to be exercised in its appropriate sphere.

The act of the Legislature of Alabama, which au thorized Sarah Holman, resident in Boston, the administratrix of Oliver Holman, to sell the estate of which Holman died seized in the city of Mobile, was a valid act; and the deed made under that statute, according to its provisions, was legal and operative, and was authorized by the constitution of Alabama.

On the death of the ancestor the land owned by him descends to his heirs. They hold it subject to the payment of the debts of the ancestor, in those States where it is liable to such debts. The heirs cannot alien the land to the prejudice of creditors. In fact, and in law, they have no right to the real estate of their ancestors, except that of possession, until the creditors shall be paid.

No objection is perceived to the power of the Legislature to subjecting the lands of a deceased person to the payment of his debts, to the exclusion of the personal property. The Legislature regulates descents, and the conveyance of real estate. To define the rights of debtor and creditor, in their common duty, the whole range of remedies lie within their province.

N error to the Circuit Court of the [*27

Alabama.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by the defendants, who were plaintiffs in the court below, to recover possession of stores and a lot tion was in the common form. The plea, the of ground in the city of Mobile. The declarageneral issue. A verdict was rendered in the

claiming title thereto under a conveyance to a par-seized at the time of his first conveyance.
ticular grantee, they cannot set up an outstanding v. Patten, 24 Pick. 324.
title in a stranger, to defeat a person who claims
the premises under the same title as themselves,
but by a prior right, which overreaches their claim.
B'k of U. S. v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 528.

Where the party enters into possession of land, claiming under a particular title, he cannot set up an outstanding title in a stranger, as a defense to a sult, brought by the owner of the title under which he entered, to recover the possession of the premises. Id. 6 Johns. 34; 7 fa. 157; 6 Ohio, 89; 4 Dev. & Bat. Law R. 449.

A deeded land to B, which B subsequently reassigned by deed to A. Then A conveyed the same land to B by a second deed, with covenants of seizin, and right to convey; upon which covenants B brings an action of covenant broken. Held, that B was not ectopped by his deed to deny A's seizin and right to convey. Smith v. Strong, 14 Pick.

128.

A and B accepting a deed of quitclaim from C, nelther is estopped thereby, in a controversy between themselves, from showing that nothing passed by deed. Flagg v. Mann, 14 Pick. 467.

Where one who has no title conveys land with warranty, by deed duly recorded, and afterwards acquires title, and conveys to another, the second grantee is estopped to say that the grantor was not

White

A tenant in a real action is not estopped to set up a title by disseisin, by having relied, as one ground of title, upon a deed which did not convey the demanded premises. Melvin v. Locks and Canals, 5 Met. 15.

In ejectment for dower, against a grantee by quitclaim deed, of the husband, or a person holding under such grantee, the defendant is not estopped from showing that the husband was not seized of such an estate in the premises as to entitle his widow to dower. A deed which does not, on its face, define the estate or interest conveyed, or intended to be conveyed, or the premises, does not estop the grantor from showing, in opposition to it, that no title passed, or from claiming under after-acquired title; and hence, since estoppels must be mutual, it cannot estop the grantee, either in a controversy with the grantor, or with parties whose interest, like that of dower, depend upon his estate. Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. (1 Const.) 242; overruling Sherwood v. Vandenburgh, 2 Hill, 303; Browne v. Potter, 17 Wend. 164.

The grantee in a warranty deed is not estopped from controverting his grantor's title. Averill v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 180.

The grantee who takes possession under a qultclaim, Is not thereby estopped from denying that

The defendants in the Circuit Court, in order title-bond. to show title in them to one equal undivided The defendants in the Circuit Court also gave moiety of the premises in question, exhibited in evidence an act of the Legislature of Alaa bond executed by Oliver Holman, the ances-bama, in the following terms: tor of the plaintiffs in the ejectment, on the 29th September, 1821, to Charles Brown, by which Oliver Holman bound himself to give to Charles Brown a quitclaim deed of one half of the land he had purchased from McKinsie and Swett, the ground in question; the deed to be executed two years from date, if Charles Brown requests. Oliver Holman died soon afterwards, without executing the deed.

which shall be as binding as if the same had of the river not divided, and that this space been made by the said Oliver Holman in his was marked in two halves, with the word lifetime. “quai.” The defendant gave evidence con"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that Na-ducing to prove that the lands sued for were thaniel Littlefield and Gorham Davenport, be- embraced within the space, and that it continfore the sale of the estate aforesaid, shall en- ued to be public and open, till Holman's poster into bond with sufficient security, payable session and improvements in 1818; and so conto the judge of the County Court of Mobile tended before the jury. County, for the true and faithful payment of the money arising from the sale of the said estate into the hands of the administratrix thereof, to be appropriated to the payment of the debts due by the said decedent."

On the 24th day of April, 1824, by a deed executed in conformity with the law, in consideration of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars paid to the administratrix of Oliver Holman, the other moiety of the property was conveyed to Charles Brown.

The defendants further gave evidence that Holman and Brown were merchants, and that the carpenters who built the houses on the lands in dispute were sent out by the said Brown; that Brown and Holman were in partnership as merchants, and that in carrying on their business, these buildings were used as store-houses; that Brown resided in Boston, and had never been in Mobile, and that Holman resided in Mobile; that the store-houses were reputed to be Holman's, and not Holman & Brown's. After the death of Holman, agents of Brown went into possession; whether instantly or after the execution of the deeds aforesaid, his agents or vendees have enjoyed entire and exclusive possession of the premises. It was further in evidence that the house in It was further in evidence, that Oliver Hol-possession of defendants fronts on Water Street, man erected stores on the lot, and used them for four years, when he died.

The defendants in the Circuit Court claimed to hold all the premises in controversy by conveyances from the grantee of Charles Brown, made under the license of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and the act of the Assembly of Alabama.

one of the streets of the city: whereupon the court charged the jury, that if they believed, The lot which was proven to have been in from the evidence, that Geronio claimed title the actual possession of Geronio, was inclosed, to the premises in question, and was in actual there being a line of fence running from the possession of a part of the lot of land to which street on the north to the southern boundary of they were then attached, and remained [*31 the lot, and followed by the meanders of high in possession and claiming title from and prior tide water-mark. There was no person who to the year 1785, till the time of his death; and ever inclosed to the east of this lot, or who had that before his death he gave the whole of said ever set up any claim upon it, except so far as lot to Lucy Landry; and that her father therethe facts disclosed the claim of Lucy Landry, upon took and held possession of it for her under Geronio. The ground in dispute was until she arrived at full age, when she took more than one hundred feet distant from the possession, and claimed title to the full extent inclosure of Lucy Landry, and was at all times of the boundaries in the deed from her to subject to the influx of the tide, prior to the McKinsie and Swett; and that since the posimprovements of Holman. It was in evidence session of Mobile by the United States, the that all the land east of Lucy Landry's inclos- streets and quai have been so altered by the ure, before the improvements of Holman, had municipal authorities of said city, that the said been used, as all the land on the same line from quai has been discontinued or otherwise abolSt. Francis Street to Government Street, on the ished, and the said Water Street erected in lieu same line, had been used, as a public landing-of it; and that the premises in question are place by the people under the Spanish government, and that no improvements or obstructions had been erected upon that tract of land.

The Circuit Court decided that the bond from 80*] Holman to *Brown, and the proceedings of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and the deed under those proceedings were not sufficient to confer any legal title upon the defendants; these proceedings were without authority and of no effect, and that they were admissible as evidence, only to show the nature of the defendants' claim of possession. The court also harged the jury that the act of the Legislature, and all proceedings under it, were void, and the evidence was competent only to show the defendants' claim and possession; to which decision, as well as to the charge, the defendants' counsel excepted. The defendants then offered in evidence a map obtained from the general land office at Washington city, purporting to have been made in 1761, and which was certified to have been on file there, made by one surveyor. This map indicated that the city was then laid off into regular squares, and bounded by streets; that there was a space between the front and the margin

within the boundaries of the said lot conveyed, as aforesaid, by Lucy Landry to McKinsie and Swett, and by them to Oliver Holman; and that said Holman entered upon and remained in possession of the said premises from the date of his purchase, until the time of his death; the plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict, unless the jury believe, from the evidence, that actual possession was delivered by said Holman to Brown, under said bond for title; and that said Brown had remained in possession, and that the possession had been regularly transmitted through those claiming under him to the defendant. The defendant contended that the premises in question were not embraced within the claim of Lucy Landry, but formed a portion of the public quai. That the entry of Holman under the title derived from Lucy Landry, and the building of stores on the lot, gave him no title, and that his heirs could not maintain an ejectment for the lot, against those claiming under his partner, Brown. This the court overruled, and the counsel for the defendant excepted.

The defendant's counsel contended that, from the bond, the proof in the cause, and the

admission of Catharine Holman in the record | of the lot by possession and improvement by of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu- Holman, and now with the improvements held setts, thereto attached, it appeared that Hol- by the plaintiffs in error, that title cannot be man and Brown were jointly interested in the sustained. premises at the period of his entry. That although Brown never was upon the land, that the same was held by Holman for their joint benefit; and that though no actual possession was delivered under the bond for title, that if those facts were found, that Brown, or those claiming under him, could not be sued for the moiety in the bond, without a demand and notice to quit. This the court overruled. 32*] *The case was argued by Mr. Ogden and Mr. Legare for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Crittenden and Mr. Key for the defend

It is admitted that the right to the shores of tide water may be acquired by grants from the crown or government. Sir Henry Constable's case, 5 Holt, 107; Angel on Tide Waters, 140. The first question now arises-we claim the Although a grant from the crown may be preproperty under a title derived from Oliver Hol-sumed after long possession. But this only man, the ancestor of the defendants in error, his heirs-at-law. Can we be permitted to question and deny the title of the ancestor under whom we claim?

act, the plaintiffs in error held a moiety of the property. There is nothing in the record to impeach the fairness of this sale, or to show that the property was not sold for its full value.

The Circuit Court held this act of the Legislature of Alabama void. The reasons for this decision are not given, but it is presumed they

were.

1. It is supposed that the law interfered with and took away the vested rights of the heirs at law of Oliver Holman; or,

2. That this was a judicial act, which it was not competent for the Legislature of Alabama to perform.

and was enacted to enable her to pay the debts. It does not direct the sale, but authorizes it. The presumption is that it was passed to enable the administratrix to do her duty. He who seeks to avoid an act upon the ground that it was procured upon false suggestions, must prove, affirmatively, that the suggestions were false. There is not only no proof in this case that Holman's estate was not in debt at the time of his death, but the contrary is nowhere pretended. The law will therefore be presumed to have passed in good faith.

But it is said this law is against the [*36 constitution of Alabama, because it is a judicial act, and thus invades one of the branches of government, which can alone exercise judicial powers.

Does this law take away the vested rights of the heirs of Oliver Holman? If the law is void on this ground, it must be because the Legisla- Without the express prohibition of the conture had no power to pass this law; for, if constitution of Alabama, limiting to each departstitutional, the law can nowhere be questioned. ment its special duties, the separation of the It cannot be objected to the law that it in- government into legislative, executive, and judifringes the obligation of contracts, and is there- cial, was sufficient to prohibit each branch fore void under the Constitution of the United from invading the constitutional powers of the States. The law authorized the sale of the lot for other. the purpose of paying the debts of Holman, and But the act under examination is not a judithus enabling the administratrix to keep his cial measure. Judicial power is the right to contracts. How, then, can it be incompatible | decide between different parties; the power to with the obligation of contracts? But it has declare what the law is between conflicting been declared by this court, in the case of parties, and to carry judgments and decrees Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 414, that it into effect. How, then, can the act in question 35] has nowhere been said that a State be considered judicial? It does not decide bestatute which devests a vested right, is incom-tween the administratrix and the creditors; it patible with the Constitution of the United States.

Nor is the law inconsistent with the constitution of Alabama.

leaves all question as to the distribution of the proceeds open; and they must be decided by the judicial tribunals, if the parties cannot adjust them. Cited, Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 660.

By the laws of Alabama, upon the death of Holman, his real estate descended to his heirs; The courts of the United States sitting in the but in their hands it was subject to the pay-States, adopt the construction of the constitu ment of his debts. A law which authorizes the sale of such lands for the payment of the debts cannot be exceptionable. In the constitution of Alabama, there is nothing which, in terms, prohibits the passage of such a law; nor is the law a judicial act, thus trenching on the other constitutional departments. The law does nothing in its special provision but what had been done in effect by the general laws of Alabama, authorizing the sale of the estates of decedents for the payment of debts. But as, from the particular local situation of the administratrix of Oliver Holman, she could not be proceeded against under the general law, this special enactment is made. The same responsibilities for the payment of the debts are continued; and security is required for the performance of the duties to pay the debts out of the proceeds of the sales. No vested rights of the heirs of Holman were impaired, for all their rights were subject to the debts of their ancestor. In support of these principles, cited, Stoddard v. Smith, 5 Binney, 355; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 626; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Heirs, 2 Peters, 523; 16 Massachusetts Rep. 326; 13 Serg. & Rawle, 435, 2 Vernon, 711; 4 Cruise's Digest, 520.

Toulman's Digest of the Laws of Alabama contains a number of private acts similar to this, on pages 344, 345, 346. The constitution was formed in 1819, and this act passed in 1824. It was a contemporaneous exposition of the constitution.

The act was no doubt passed on the application of the administratrix of Oliver Holman,

tions of the States, which have been given by the decisions of the highest judicial tribunals of the States. This is essential to harmony be tween the courts of the Union and of the States. What would be the confusion if one construction were given to the constitution of the State, in the courts of the States, and in the courts of the United States a different construction? So, too, as to the laws of the States. It must be very plain that an act of the Legislature is a violation of the constitution, to justify a court to pronounce it void. 5 Mass. Rep. 534; 12 Mass. Rep. 417. In this case we have the uniform legislation of Alabama, since the State was organized, in corroboration of the constitutionality of this act; and titles to lands to an immense value are held under special acts of Assembly similar to this. A decision here against the validity of this law would shake the titles to a large amount of property within the State. The early passage of laws of a similar character with this now under examination is a contemporaneous exposition of the constitution; for they were passed within a few years after the constitution was adopted. In Alabama the question was at rest, until disturbed by the decision of the Circuit Court in the case now before the court.

*The title of the plaintiffs in error to [*37 one moiety of the property has never been shown. As to the other moiety, it is seen from the evidence in the case that after the death of Holman, Brown, his partner, went into possession of the whole property. The buildings and wharf were called Holman & Brown's