deadlock. It is now apparent that this deadlock cannot be broken at the Commission level.

Both political and technical considerations demand that no important areas of the world be outside the control system. It is therefore evident that the full co-operation of the USSR is indispensable for the establishment of a system of control which would prevent an atomic armaments race.

Whether the functions and powers of the International Control Agency as elaborated by the majority are politically acceptable or not, they provide the technically necessary basis for an effective control of atomic energy. The question is not whether those measures are now acceptable but whether governments now want effective international control.

The problems which have not been elaborated in detail, i. e., organization and administration, financing, strategic balance, prohibitions and enforcement, and the stages of transition from the present situation to one of full international control, are of a different nature. These questions do not affect the basic nature of the problem of control. Some questions, such as stages, which only concern the period of transition to full international control, will be conditional on future technological developments and to the conditions of world security. The same considerations apply to the question of the strategic balance to be established in the location of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors between one part of the globe and another. Others, such as organization and administration of the agency-on which inconclusive discussions have recently taken place and the question of the agency's finances, depend almost entirely on the existence of prior agreement on the nature and extent of the control system. Indeed, until agreement on the basic principles of control has been reached, the elaboration of proposals to cover these remaining topics would be unrealistic and would serve no useful purpose. On the other hand, given such agreement, solutions to these problems could be worked out.

The discovery of atomic energy has confronted the world with a new situation. The Atomic Energy Commission has studied and made recommendations on the international control of atomic energy to meet this situation. It has rejected proposals which do not meet the known facts of the problem.

By concentrating on the technical facts which, irrespective of any political situation, must be met by any satisfactory plan of control, the Commission has prepared findings and recommendations which, in the view of the majority, will stand as the basis of any further study of this subject. This is a substantial achievement. These findings and recommendations are summarized in Annex 2 as the best evidence both of the scope of the problem and of the realism with which it has been faced.

In addition to thus summarizing what it has done, the Commission has a duty to set forth the reasons why it has not achieved more, for it is important that Governments and peoples may understand the findings it has made, the lessons it has drawn from the difficulties it has met, and the conclusions it has reached.

General conclusions and recommendations.-The mandate given by the General Assembly is clear evidence that all Members of the United Nations share the conviction that, unless effective international control

is established, there can be no lasting security against atomic weapons for any nation, whatever its size, location, or power.

The First and Second Reports of the Commission show how and to what extent the world must adapt itself if it wants to be protected. against the misuse of its new discovery. Ways and means to eliminate the dangers of diversion, clandestine activities, and the seizure of atomic materials and facilities have been studied at length. Specific proposals have been put forward, together with principles for the governance of national policies and of the policies to be pursued by the International Control Agency itself.

The principles submitted in the two Reports of the Commission provide an alternative to the armaments race that results from the absence of international control and which would not be prevented by the establishment of an inadequate system of control. These principles require that atomic energy must not be developed on the basis of national interests and needs, means and resources; but that its planning and operation should be made a common enterprise in all its phases.

Only if traditional economic and political practices are adapted to the overriding requirements of international security can these proposals be implemented. Traditional conceptions of the economic exploitation of the resources of nature for private or national advantage would then be replaced in this field by a new pattern of co-operation in international relations.

Furthermore, secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compatible with lasting international security. Co-operative development and complete dissemination of information alone promise to remove fears. and suspicion that nations are conducting secret activities.

The unprecedented character of its conclusions has not deterred the majority of the Commission from adopting them, since the scientific and technical evidence makes such conclusions inescapable. Past experience has shown that unless there is a novel approach to the problem of controlling a force so readily adaptable to warfare, atomic weapons-notwithstanding their vastly superior destructive powerwill continue just as uncontrolled as other weapons have been and still are, and the threat of atomic war will remain.

The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the impact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals. It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfil the Commission's terms of reference.

The new pattern of international co-operation and the new standards of openness in the dealings of one country with another that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass destruction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy.

However, in the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations

in this field by the first and second reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on co-operation in broader fields of policy.

The failure to achieve agreement on the international control of atomic energy arises from a situation that is beyond the competence of this Commission. In this situation, the Commission concludes that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the Commission level.

The Atomic Energy Commission, therefore, recommends that, until such time as the General Assembly finds that this situation no longer exists, or until such time as the sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946, who are the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, find, through prior consultation, that there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy, negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission be suspended.

In accordance with its terms of reference, the Atomic Energy Commission submits this report and recommendation to the Security Council for consideration, and recommends that they be transmitted, along with the two previous reports of the Commission, to the next regular session of the General Assembly as a matter of special concern.

34. REPORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AS SEMBLY, NOVEMBER 4, 19481

The GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING EXAMINED the first, second and third reports of the Atomic Energy Commission which have been transmitted to it by the Security Council in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946,

1. Approves the General Findings (part II C) and Recommenda tions (part III) of the first report and the Specific Proposals of part II of the second report of the Commission as constituting the neces sary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons in accordance with the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission;

2. Expresses its deep concern at the impasse which has been reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission as shown in its third report and regrets that unanimous agreement has not yet been reached; 3. Requests the six sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946, which are the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, to meet together and consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on the international contro of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons, and to report to the General Assembly the results of their consultation not later than its next regular session:

1 Department of State Publication 3437, pp. 134-135.

4. Meanwhile,

The GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Calls upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its sessions, to survey its programme of work, and to proceed to the further study of such of the subjects remaining in the programme of work as it considers to be practicable and useful.

35. TEXTS OF THE GENERAL FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AS APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON NOVEMBER 4, 19481

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. GENERAL FINDINGS

The findings of the "First report on scientific and technical aspects of the problem of control" and of the "First report on safeguards required to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes", while limited to the more technical aspects of the control of atomic energy, provide a basis for further progress by the Commission toward the fulfilment of the terms of reference set out in the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946, establishing a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters. The resolution of 14 December 1946 of the General Assembly, entitled "Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments," provides certain broad and essential political agreements. Based upon the proposals and information presented to the Commission upon the hearings, proceedings and deliberations of the Commission to date, and upon the proceedings, discussions, and reports of its several committees and sub-committees, all as set forth in this report, the Commission has made the following additional findings of a general nature:

1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible: (a) To extend among "all nations the exchange of basic scientific information" on atomic energy "for peaceful ends";

(b) To control "atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes";

(c) To accomplish "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons", and

(d) To provide "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions".

2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure-including one or more of the following types of safeguard: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing-must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel and are

1 Department of State Publication 3646, October 1949.

used. Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

3. That whether the ultimate nuclear fuel be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all of these related purposes.

4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent risks to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of widespread exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection. An international treaty or convention to this effect, if standing alone, would fail: (a) "to ensure" the use of atomic energy "only for peaceful purposes", and (b) to provide "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions", and thus would fail to meet the requirements of the terms of reference of the Commission. To be effective, such agreement must be embodied in a treaty or convention providing for a comprehensive international system of control and inspection and including guarantees and safeguards adequate to ensure the carrying out of the terms of the treaty or convention and "to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions".

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the findings of the Commission set forth in Part II of this report, the Commission makes the following recommendations to the Security Council with respect to certain of the matters covered by the terms of reference of the Commission, which recommendations are inter-dependent and not severable, embodying the fundamental principles and indicating the basic organizational mechanisms necessary to attain the objectives set forth in Part II C, General findings, paragraph 1 (a)-(d).