General Proposals

62. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WORKING PAPER SETTING FORTH PROPOSALS FOR PROGRESSIVE AND CONTINUING DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, APRIL 5, 1952 1

INTRODUCTION

General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) calling for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments directs that the Disarmament Commission be guided by a number of principles, including the following (paragraph 3):

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces-including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic;

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established."

Paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:

"5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution."

It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and arma

ments.

A. EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continuing programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be on a permanent or at least a long-term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind, includ ing para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments, including atomic.

3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind, including para-military, security and police forces and all armements, including atomic.

4. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguard under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and powers.

1 UN Document, DC/C.2/1.

B. STAGES OF DISCLOSURES AND VERIFICATION

5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when, and only when, previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by stages are two:

(a) In the existing state of international tensions all States must be protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of stages gives all States the opportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of all other States. The mere agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of checking the good faith of other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would proceed from the less secret areas, which would be disclosed and verified in early stages, to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature, in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States, would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information which many States would like reserved until substantial co-operation and good faith have been demonstrated.

6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as its objective the full implementation of the programme of disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the programme of disclosure and verification but also the entire programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is proposing that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should be five-a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of the programme.

7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely in the interest of clarity of presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the

problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the items set forth both in annex I and in annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages.

8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three general characteristics:

(a) They should prove to be the least secret items.

(b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by periodic visits of inspection and through reference of statistical records with the result that verification can take place with the minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries. Some resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and aerial reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.

(c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification, as provided in this stage, in and of itself would act as an indication of good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate goals of the entire programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.

9. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second, third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify except through "on-the-spot" investigations in conjunction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.

10. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the five stages as outlined in annexes I and II can in general be summarized as follows:

Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types, including atomic.

Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials required for production of all armaments, including

atomic.

Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments), fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized in their production.

Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized in the production of novel armaments, including atomic (armaments not in general use by the end of the Second World War but in volume production today).

Stage V. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments, including

atomic.

11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages-and particularly in the early stages-is so vast that there appear to be

advantages in disclosing material only at the rate at which it can be processed. Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed plan from the less sensitive information to that which is more sensitive.

C. INSPECTION

12. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the over-all programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition, provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of "on-the-spot" inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports. and through aerial surveys.

13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages of the dislosure and verification procedure.

14. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will take place in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of the greater ease of verification, through other methods, of the items disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set forth in annexes I and II.

15. Each State at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed, should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan.

16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities, be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.

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17. Each State should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.

18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilities or installations, access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.

19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any seven members of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the State guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other States should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.

20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the programme of disclosure and verification and referred to in paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment, pursuant to such treaties, of international machinery responsible for carrying out the programme of disclosure and verification, including the portion of such machinery located within the territory of States adhering to the programme.

21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first stage could commence upon a Commission determination that the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.

D. MISCELLANEOUS

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the time of the adoption of the general principles governing this programme the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the programme. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utilization to supervise the programme for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilized in connexion with the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate study.

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering States should begin simultaneously and should go forward at approximately the same tempo.

24. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect the disclosure and verification system should specifically provide for adherence of States in accordance with the principles set forth in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and sub-paragraph 3(e) of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, the relevant portions of which are as follows.