Powers. Such decisions may not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the Four Powers.

V. SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PEACE TREATY

The signatories to the treaty should include all states, or the successors thereof, which were at war with Germany. The treaty should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

144. EUROPE: SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION: STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (EDEN), JULY 18, 19551

This Conference is unique in history because the conditions in which we meet are unmatched in human experience. We all know what unparalleled resources the scientific and technical discoveries of our age have placed within our reach. We have only to stretch out our hand and the human race can enter an age of prosperity such as has never been known. It is equally clear how utterly destructive must be the conditions of any conflict in which the Great Powers are engaged.

There was a time when the aggressor in war might hope to win an advantage and to realise political gain for his country by military action. The more overwhelming the military power the more tempting was the prize and the less might the aggressor expect to have to pay. We can each one of us think of examples of this in history. Nothing of the kind is possible now. No war can bring the victor spoils; it can only bring him and his victim utter annihilation. Neutrals would suffer equally with the combatants.

These are stern facts out of which we can perhaps win enduring peace at last. The deterrent against warlike action holds up a warning hand. But the deterrent cannot of itself solve international problems or remove the differences that exist between us. It is in an attempt to make progress with these problems and differences that we are met here today. And at this Conference we have to deal with them mainly in the context of Europe.

What is the chief among them? There can surely be no doubt of the answer. The unity of Germany. As long as Germany is divided, Europe will be divided. Until the unity of Germany is restored there can be neither confidence nor security in this continent. Within the limits of our Western Zone we have done all we can to unify Germany. We have broken down the barriers between our zones. We have treated the three Western areas as an economic unit and given them a federal Government. We have brought the occupation to an end.

Quite apart from the larger issues of German reunification it would mark a real advance if, pending our negotiations for German unity, the Soviet Government felt able to relax the physical restrictions which now aggravate the division of Germany, and prevent contact between Germans in the East and West.

Now I must turn to the wider issues of German unification. What is the reason why the Berlin Conference failed a year ago? We must examine this as dispassionately as we can in order to see what

Department of State Publication 6046, October 1955.

progress we can now make from the apparently fixed positions which the great Powers on both sides then felt obliged to take. At the Berlin Conference the West proposed the unification of Germany with free. elections and the free right of Germany of [to] choose her own foreign policy. Under the so-called Eden Plan Germany could have chosen either association with the West or association with the East or neutrality. But the Soviet Government was unable to accept that plan. Yet we all know in our hearts that Germany must be united and that a great country cannot be permanently prevented from freely deciding its own foreign policy.

The reason why the Berlin Conference failed was because one of the Powers there believed that a united Germany, rearmed and exercising its choice to join the NATO alliance, would constitute an increased threat to its safety and security. I am not now going to argue whether those fears are justified. In these last ten years there have been plenty of occasions for suspicions and alarms. These have found expression in heavy armament programmes. To try to deal with these issues in their wider aspect we have all agreed to work through the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. We welcome the substantial progress which has recently been made there and the important measure of common thinking which has now emerged between the various proposals of the Western Powers and those recently set before us by the Soviet Government. All these discussions will go on, but, as we know, the immediate need is to make a practical start.

The urgent problem is how to begin the process of reducing tensions and removing suspicion and fear. There is also the practical question of how we can devise and operate together an effective control of armaments and of armed forces.

To reunify Germany will not of itself increase or reduce any threat which may be thought to exist to European security. Everything will depend on the conditions under which reunification takes place. I wish therefore now to suggest that we should consider a number of inter-related proposals which are intended to do two things. First, they are calculated to meet the apprehension of increased danger which some at Berlin felt might follow the acceptance of our plan. Secondly, they are intended to make a practical experiment in the operative control of armaments. This, if locally successful in Europe, might, as it were, extend outwards from the centre to the periphery. If we can once establish a sense of security over the continent of Europe-if we can create an effective system to reduce tensions here— can we not hope that this first success will be the preliminary for wider and more far-reaching understanding? We have therefore had in mind certain ideas which we think could be helpful to this end. As I have said, our purpose is to ensure that the unification of Germany and her freedom to associate with countries of her choice shall not involve any threat to anybody. There are no doubt many ways of doing this. To illustrate what I have in mind let me give some examples. These will consist partly of actions and partly of assurances. Let us take the latter first. We would be prepared to be parties to a security pact of which those round this [table] and a united Germany might be members. By its terms each country could declare itself ready to go to the assistance of the victim of aggression, whoever it might be. There are many forms which such a pact might take.

We

would be ready to examine them and to set out our views about them. We would propose to inscribe any such agreement under the authority of the United Nations. It would also be our intention that if any member country should break the peace that country would forfeit thereby any rights which it enjoys at present under existing agreements.

Secondly, we would be ready to discuss and try to reach agreement, as to the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany. To do this it would be necessary to join in a system of reciprocal control to supervise the arrangement effectively. All those represented here would we hope be partners in this, together with a united Germany. It would be understood that any proposals in this field would not exclude or delay the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to which we attach great importance.

Is there some further reassurance we can give each other? There is one which I certainly think should be considered. We should be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarised area between East and West.

It is true that these ideas are limited in the first instance to the area of Europe, but I am sure that they could help us here in practice and perhaps as an example. I will sum them up. There is the suggestion of a mutual security pact. There is the prospect of an agreement about the total of forces and armaments of the two groups both in Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany. This would be subject to reciprocal supervision. There is the concept of a demilitarised area.

If we could start work on these lines we should have a chance of providing a constructive and encouraging plan to ensure peace for Europe. These ideas would give real security: and it is for the lack of that security that Germany is kept divided today. I suggest that they should be further examined. I have given only the summary of

them here.

There are other aspects of our work together which I could have mentioned. For instance we would warmly welcome any proposals which would result in a greater freedom of movement and exchange of contracts between our peoples.

But it seems to me that it will be by our success in achieving some practical results about the future of Germany and European security that this Conference will be judged. We want to agree to two things: the urgent need for the unification of Germany and the broad outline of the means by which it can be achieved. I do not pretend that our ideas are anything in the nature of a complete plan but they are the outline sketch which once agreed upon could surely be filled in. If we can draw up something like this before we leave Geneva at the end of this Conference, the peoples of the world will not be disappointed.

145. DISARMAMENT: MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION, JULY 21, 19551

The United Kingdom Delegation propose that, as a means of increasing mutual confidence in Europe, consideration should be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe. In specified areas of agreed extent on either side of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe joint inspecting teams would operate by mutual consent.

This project would provide opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces in being and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

The willingness of the Four Governments to accept such inspection would moreover demonstrate their determination to reduce international tension in Europe.

The system of inspection here proposed is without prejudice to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is also distinct from the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation for the limitation, control and inspection of forces and armaments in connection with European security.

146. PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, OCTOBER 27, 19552

At the Geneva conference, the Heads of Government recognized, in their directive to the Foreign Ministers, the common responsibility of the Four Powers for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have striven unceasingly for the reunification of Germany in freedom. in order to promote real stability in Europe. Last year they put forward, in the Eden Plan, proposals which offer the German Nation the means to recover its unity in accordance with the rights of peoples and liberty of the individual. They renew these proposals in the paper attached hereto.

Free elections leading to the formation of a single government for the whole of Germany are the right way of ensuring full participation of the German people in the solution of the German problem, which the Soviet Government says it also desires. If agreement in principle is reached during the present Conference, it should be possible to settle without delay questions concerning the Electoral Law and the supervision of the elections, which could take place as early as 1956. Without German unity, any system of European security would be an illusion. The division of Germany can only perpetuate friction and insecurity as well as grave injustice. France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are not prepared to enter into a system of European security which, as in the Soviet proposals put forward at Geneva, does not end the division of Germany.

Department of State Publication 6046.

* Department of State Publication 6156.

73052-56-37

At the Geneva conference, the Soviet Government expressed concern about the policy and associations of a reunified German Government. The Soviet Union appears to fear that a unified Germany, established by free elections and free to choose its associates in collective defense, would constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The fact is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization and the Western European Union are strictly defensive organizations. Far from constituting a threat to peace, they contribute to the security not only of their members but of all states. This is evident from the various limitations and restrictions which the members of the Western European Union have assumed and from the restraint on individual action which the NATO system imposes on its members. If a reunified Germany elects to associate itself with these organizations, the inherent obligations of restraint and control would enhance rather than detract from Soviet security.

Nevertheless, to remove any possible grounds for Soviet refusal to reunity Germany promptly, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are prepared to take further steps to me! the concern expressed by the Soviet Government. They accordingly propose the conclusion of a treaty in the terms set forth below, co currently with the conclusion of an agreement to reunify Germany under the Eden Plan. This treaty would comprise undertakings to refrain from the use of force and to withhold aid from an aggressor provisions for the limitation and control of forces and armaments and the obligation to react against aggression. The treaty would enter into force only in conjunction with the reunification of Germany It would be carried out by stages. Its signature would be concurrent with the signature of the agreement on the Eden Plan. The final stage would become effective when a reunified Germany decides to enter NATO and the Western European Union.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are convinced that these proposals could lead to an agreement satisfactory to both sides. If the Soviet Union's concern over immedia German reunification is primarily security, these proposals should constitute an acceptable basis for negotiation since they provide s system of control in which the Soviet Union would directly participate. and reciprocal assurances from which the Soviet Union would direct benefit. Such a settlement, by creating confidence in an area vi for world security, would facilitate the solution of even wider problems

OUTLINE OF terms of trEATY OF ASSURANCE ON THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

The treaty, which would be concluded concurrently with an agre ment on the reunification of Germany under the Eden Plan, would cover the following subjects:

1. Renunciation of the use of force

Each party would undertake to settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which it might be involved and to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes

United Nations.

of the