arithmetical ratios describe inadequately the profound changes in all relations between nations foreshadowed by the existence of the atomic bomb. The bomb and the improvements on it, which will certainly be made, mean that another war in which atomic bombs are used will threaten the existence not only of cities and nations, but of civilization itself. 2. Other countries of the world will be able to make atomic bombs. The monopoly which we hold at present is precarious and certain to be short-lived. Estimates differ as to when this or that country will be able to produce atomic bombs, but it is clear that any nation which is relatively industrialized has a good chance of producing bombs within the next 5 to 15 years. The degree of industrialization will determine how soon bombs can be made in quantity rather than the possibility of mastering the art of making an atomic bomb. 3. No real military defense against the atomic bomb has been devised, and none is in sight. The destructiveness of atomic bombs is so engulfing that any defense which is not almost literally airtight will not protect our country against devastation. 4. Some protection may accrue from the faithful adherence to international agreements for the prevention of atomic bomb manufacture. Such agreements raise technical problems of inspection and control which are inordinately difficult but not beyond solution. The political problems depend for their solution on widespread good faith and the will to peace among nations. Thus, it turns out that the real protection against the atomic bomb lies in the prevention of war. 5. The secrets which we hold are matters of science and engineering that other nations can and will discover. In large part they are secrets of nature, and the book of nature is open to careful, painstaking readers the world over. We can give ourselves a certain temporary protection by retaining the secrets we now have. But that protection grows weaker day by day, and our research must be vigorously encouraged, supported, and pursued if we are to maintain our place among other nations, to say nothing of retaining our advantage. 6. The peacetime benefits of atomic energy promise to be great indeed, particularly in medicine, biology, and many branches of research. These benefits are immediate in their promise but will require extended and unfettered development for full realization The vast possibilities of utilizing atomic energy as a source of power depend on (1) further research and development, and (2) study of the economic and international implications of the establishment of plants producing and using fissionable material. In this connection, the point has been repeatedly emphasized that plants which produce power also produce material which constitutes the explosive element of bombs. This fact raises domestic and international issues of profound significance. 7. Military control of atomic energy development, though necessary and useful during the war, is a form of direction to which scientists in peacetime will not willingly submit. The continuation of such control will probably discourage further development and research. And on that development depends not only peaceful progress, but the maintenance of a position in the military arts essential to the national defense. On the other hand, the armed services are entitled to extensive participation in this development, insofar as it relates to the military applications of atomic energy. It is their right also to have a voice in protecting the military secrets of atomic weapons. On the basis of these data the outlines of legislation to deal with atomic energy began to emerge. At the conclusion of the first group of hearings it seemed evident that certain facts relating to atomic energy, including all technical data on the design and construction of the atomic bomb itself, ought to be kept secret, at least until effective and reciprocal international safeguards could be devised. This was the principle enunciated in the joint declaration of President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King on November 15, 1945. At the same time, it was realized that the keeping of these secrets was only a temporary thing. Legislation should facilitate as far as possible (1) international agreements on atomic energy which would themselves be a step toward international understanding and good will, and (2) the rapid scientific development of atomic energy, which would promote both the industrial prosperity of the world and the improvement of our own instruments of national defense. Specifically, the testimony heard before the Christmas recess suggested answers to the main problems which had been raised by the three bills introduced before the hearings were begun. It suggested that the development of atomic energy, which was of paramount importance, could best be done by a full-time civilian commission. This Commission would require broad powers to stimulate private research and development and should be able actively to promote military as well as industrial and scientific research. The Commission should be required to own all materials from which an atomic bomb might be made and to operate all plants where these materials were manufactured. Legislation should make adequate provision for the protection of information of direct military value to a foreign power and for the role of the armed services in relation to military applications of atomic energy. However, since the only real solution to the whole problem lies in continued world peace, legislation should be directed in specific terms toward that end and should contain a practical expression of our desire for international cooperation. 203. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ON AMENDING THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, SENATE REPORT, JUNE 30, 1954 1 The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to whom was referred the bill (S. 3690) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, and for other purposes, having considered the same, unanimously report favorably thereon and recommend that the bill do pass. Some individual members of the Joint Committee hold divergent views on certain sections of the bill which are attached hereto or will be presented appropriately in their respective Houses. This report describes the background of S. 3690, which is the committee-approved revision of S. 3323 on which public and executive hearings have been held, sets forth the basic considerations which impelled the Joint Committee to report it favorably, and furnishes a section-by-section analysis of the bill. 1 U. S. Congress. Senate. Report No. 1699, 83d Congress. CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN ATOMIC ENERGY The primary purpose of S. 3690 is to bring the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 into accord with atomic progress and to make our Nation's legislative controls better conform with the scientific, technical, economic, and political facts of atomic energy as they exist todayalmost a decade after S. 1717 became the law of the land (Public Law 555, 79th Cong.). The organic law was written at the very outset of the atomic era. Those who participated in drafting that law were keenly aware that many unknown factors were involved in measuring the future impact of this new source of energy upon our national life. Indeed, the law warned in its findings and declaration that "any legislation will necessarily be subject to revision from time to time." We deem it a tribute to the special committee which drafted S. 1717, 79th Congress, and to the late Senator Brien McMahon, sponsor of the legislation and subsequently chairman of the Joint Committee, that the organic law has served our Nation so well for nearly a full decade. We would also record our satisfaction with the fact that, at a time when atomic energy was popularly associated only with the atom bomb, the organic law specifically called attention to constructive uses of the atom, by declaring that subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, our Nation has developed, in the form of our atomic-weapon stockpile, a degree of deterring power which may well constitute the free world's greatest material asset in its effort to avert another worldwide war. The elementary requirements of national security have compelled us to give military uses of the atom top priority. Yet we have simultaneously developed, to a considerable degree, beneficent applications of this new force. The past 8 years have witnessed extraordinary scientific and technical achievements in atomic energy, both on the peacetime and military sides. Technological developments some promising longer and richer lives for all privileged to share in the peacetime benefits of the atom, and others posing grave threats to the very existence of civilization-have proceeded much more rapidly than was expected in 1946. As a result, atomic-energy legislation which was once fully responsive to assuring the common defense and promoting the national welfare must now be revised to take account of existing realities in atomic energy, in our Nation and throughout the world. When the original act was written, the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic weapons. In a world where just and lasting peace was fervently sought though not yet assured, simple prudence dictated stringent security regulations aimed at prolonging our monopoly. It was widely believed that the Soviet Union might not explode its first atomic bomb for many years to come, and that still more years might pass before it could produce atomic weapons in quantity. In point of fact, however, the Soviet Union broke our atomic monopoly less than 3 years after the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was put on the statute books. In the fall of 1953, less than a year after our first full-scale fusion-weapon test, the Soviets also achieved a thermonuclear explosion. This clearly does not mean that the security regulations contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 served no useful purpose, or that an indiscriminate relaxation of these safeguards is now in order. It does mean that our provisions for the control of information must now be revised to protect our national interest in a world where the forces of evil have added to their conventional arms a growing ability to launch a devastating atomic blow against the free world. When the organic law was enacted, atomic bombs were regarded by most as strategic weapons. Tactical applications of the military atom were but dimly perceived. Still less was it recognized that the time would soon come when tactical atomic weapons could profoundly, perhaps even decisively, affect the operations of the ground forces defending Western Europe. With our Nation the sole possessor of atomic weapons, and with these weapons husbanded for a strategic counterblow against an aggressor, there was no need for acquainting friendly nations with information concerning the effects and military employment of tactical atomic weapons. Today, however, we are engaged with our allies in a common endeavor, involving common planning and combined forces, to dam the tide of Red military power and prevent it from engulfing free Europe. America's preponderance in atomic weapons can offset the numerical superiority of the Communist forces, and serve emphatic notice on the Soviet dictators that any attempt to occupy free Europe, or to push further anywhere into the free world, would be foredoomed to failure. Yet, so long as our law prohibits us from giving our partners in these joint efforts for common defense such atomic information as is required for realistic military planning, our own national security suffers. To contrast still further differences between the perspective of 1956 and that of 1954: It was commonly believed 8 years ago that the generation of useful power from atomic energy was a distant goal, a very distant goal. Atomic energy then was 95 percent for military purposes, with possibly 5 percent for peacetime uses. The resources of the Atomic Energy Commission and of its contractors appeared fully adequate to develop atomic-power reactors at a rate consistent with foreseeable technical progress. Moreover, there was little experience concerning the health hazards involved in operating atomic plants, and this fact was in itself a compelling argument for making the manufacture and use of atomic materials a Government monopoly. Today, however, we can draw on the experience acquired in designing, building, and operating more than a score of atomic reactors. It is now evident that greater private participation in power development need not bring with it attendant hazards to the health and safety of the American people. Moreover, the atomic-reactor art has already reached the point where atomic power at prices competitive with electricity derived from conventional fuels is on the horizon, though not within our immediate reach. For more than 2%1⁄2 years, the experimental breeder reactor has actually been producing relatively small amounts of electricity at the national reactor testing station in Idaho. The land-based prototype of the atomic engine propelling the U. S. S. Nautilus has already produced more than enough power to send an atomic submarine around the word, fully submerged and at full speed. The Westinghouse Electric Corp. and the Duquesne Power & Light Co. are now constructing the Nation's first large-scale atomic-power reactor, which will generate 60,000 kilowatts of electricity-an amount sufficient to furnish light and power for a sizable city. Many technological problems remain to be solved before widespread atomic power, at competitive prices, is a reality. It is clear to us that continued Government research and development, using Government funds, will be indispensable to a speedy and resolute attack on these problems. It is equally clear to us, however, that the goal of atomic power at competitive prices will be reached more quickly if private enterprise, using private funds, is now encouraged to play a far larger role in the development of atomic power than is permitted under existing legislation. In particular, we do not believe that any developmental program carried out solely under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, can substitute for the costcutting and other incentives of free and competitive enterprise. Today we are not alone in the drive to achieve peacetime atomic power. Eight years ago, besides the United States, only the United Kingdom, Canada, and as we have recently come to find-the Soviet Union, had major atomic energy projects in being The possibility of cooperating with other nations to gain mutual advantage in the area of peacetime power appeared far in the future. As against this, however, more than 20 countries now have vigorous atomic energy programs, and several of them are pressing toward the construction of atomic power plants to turn out useful amounts of electricity. In 1946, finally, our Nation earnestly hoped that worldwide agreement on international control of atomic energy might soon be secured. It was reasonable, therefore, that the original act should prohibit an exchange of information on commercial uses of atomic energy with other nations until such time as the Congress declared that effective and enforcible international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been established. But our hopes of 1946 have been thwarted by unremitting Soviet opposition to the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy. Although we would be morally derelict if we abandoned our hopes for the eventual effective international regulation of all armaments, legislative policy cannot now be founded on the expectation that the prospect of such control is either likely or imminent. In summary: Statutory provisions which were in harmony with the state of atomic development in 1946 are no longer consistent with the realities of atomic energy in 1954. Legislation not responsive to the needs and problems of today can serve only to deny our Nation, and like-minded nations as well, the true promise of atomic energyboth in augmenting the total military strength of the free world, and in increasing opportunities for beneficent uses of the atom. HISTORY OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION As the committee of Congress required by statute to "make continuing studies of the development, use and control of atomic energy," the Joint Committee has, since it first met in 1947, concerned itself with the relationship between a changing and growing atomic program and the overall legislative requirements of this new field. As a result, the Joint Committee has, from time to time, recommended to the |