establish a Council, which consists of their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, to consider problems relating to the implementation of the treaty. While the Council will be organized so as to be able to meet at any time, it is not expected that the Council will find it necessary to convene often unless an emergency should arise.

The committee paid particular attention to the language of article VIII. The words "Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area" leave the implication that the treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and the other security treaties, are but the first step in the creation of a more effective security system for the Pacific. Representatives of the executive branch expressed the conviction that there should be a further evolution in that area although there are at present no plans for the negotiation of a regional arrangement in the Pacific comparable to the Atlantic Pact or the Rio Treaty. At the moment it seems impractical to go beyond what is now being proposed, particularly in view of the reluctance of certain states to enter into a regional security pact.

According to the terms of article X the treaty is to remain in force over an indefinite period. Any party may cease to be a member of the Council, however, 1 year after notice of withdrawal has been given. Since the threat to peace in the Pacific is of indefinite duration, the provision seems to be a logical one.

The committee agrees that the treaty will serve the national interests of the United States by making clear our mutual interests and our sense of common destiny with our allies in the Pacific. It seems highly desirable that our friends as well as our enemies understand that our concern over such matters as the North Atlantic Pact and the Japanese Peace Treaty in no way implies any lack of interest on our part in working together for peace with such valuable allies as New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines.

E. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE

PHILIPPINES

The deep interest of the United States in the welfare and security of the Philippines dates back to the Spanish-American War. Following World War II, relations between the two Governments were formally established in a series of important agreements. These included the Treaty of General Relations, signed on July 4, 1946, which recognized the independence of the Philippines, and the two agreements of 1947 relating to military assistance and the use of certain bases in the islands.

On April 18, 1951, President Truman, in a public statement, underlined the importance which the United States attaches to the security of the Philippines:

The whole world knows

stated the President

that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

This is the principle which is incorporated in the security treaty between the two Governments and which is now before the Senate.

In

a sense it can be said that the treaty merely formalizes a relationship that has been in existence for some time.

that_area.

The committee agrees that, in view of the importance of the Republic of the Philippines in the Far East and its new status as a sovereign state, it would seem highly desirable to include that country on a basis of complete equality in any collective arrangements for peace and security in that area. That is why, during the negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, members of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed with the executive branch that a mutual security pact be concluded with the Philippine Government. On the Senate side, consultations relating to this matter took place between Ambassador Dulles and the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

It will be noted that, in general, the provisions of the treaty with the Philippines follow very closely the terms of the security pact with Australia and New Zealand. Since that agreement has been outlined in section 25 above, it will not be necessary to repeat those comments here. Suffice it to say the two parties agree to settle their disputes by peaceful means (art. I), to develop their capacity to resist armed attack (art. II), to consult if their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened in the Pacific (art. III), and to take appropriate action in the event an armed attack is launched against them (art. IV). The treaty does not formally establish a council as does the pact with Australia and New Zealand, although adequate provision is made for consultation between the Foreign Ministers or their deputies.

Article VIII provides that the treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party, however, may terminate it following a 1 year's notice of its intention to do so.

CONCLUSIONS

In various sections of this report the surrender terms of the Potsdam Conference were alluded to. The Potsdam proclamation of July 26, 1945, which ratified earlier wartime conferences, called for

(1) The elimination of irresponsible militarism from Japan; (2) The destruction of Japan's warmaking power to be implemented by the occupation;

(3) The limitation of Japanese sovereignty to the four home islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku;

(4) The complete disarming of Japanese military forces; (5) The meting out of stern justice to the war criminals; and (6) The establishment of freedom of expression, and other democratic institutions in Japan.

The committee believes that in general these objectives have been fulfilled. Further occupation of Japan would serve no useful purpose and might easily be misconstrued as United States imperialism. Since the end of hostilities it has been the view of the United States Government that the occupation of Japan should be ended and our task as victorious occupiers completed at the earliest practicable time. The committee is fully aware that any action in this area involves risks. The Soviet Union and Communist China have made clear their objection and vigorous opposition to the pacts. It is, of course, problematical if the support of these two countries for the treaties. would have diminished any way the danger of aggression to Japan.

The facts, however, are that Japan has no effective defense force with which to oppose aggression and must depend, for the present at least, upon the United States and the United Nations for protection. Since Japan's neighbors on the continent of Asia are branded aggressors, who pose a real menace for Japan, they also pose the possibility of involvement of United States troops in Japanese defense. It is also important to add to these risks the danger to Japan from indirect aggression growing out of the newness of her democratic institutions, which makes them more vulnerable than if they were mature. Finally there are many problems which Japan must iron out before she can attain security and stability, not the least of which are her difficult trade adjustments in the Far East.

But the risks would not be avoided by postponing peace. Indeed, such inaction would probably bring new and much greater risks. Positive action for peace is called for by the following considerations: The community of free nations needs Japan, which can be a strong force for peace and stability in the Far East. Conversely, Japan needs the free nations, especially as a bulwark against its ancient enemy, Russia. If Japan is to develop its resources and its productive capacity, and take care of its people, it will need the independence, peace, and freedom contemplated in these treaties. If the free world is to maintain faith with itself, it needs to recognize Japan's freedom. Finally, these treaties constitute an important contribution toward clarifying the position of the United States in the Pacific. They are logical and desirable steps in liquidating the old war and in strengthening the fabric of peace in the Far East against the danger of a new war.

For these reasons the Committee on Foreign Relations strongly urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the four treaties

[Appendix omitted.]

235. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA, JANUARY 21, 1954 The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Mutual Defense Treaty With Korea (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, without objection reports the treaty to the Senate with an understanding, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The primary purpose of this treaty is to deter further aggression in the Pacific area by a clear warning to potential aggressors that the United States and the Republic of Korea will regard an armed attack on the territory of either party as dangerous to their peace and security and that they will act to meet this danger in accordance with their constitutional processes (art. III). Other articles of the treaty spell out the obligation of the parties to refrain from force or the threat of force in their relations with other nations (art. I), to consult should an external attack threaten, and to maintain and develop through self-help and mutual aid their individual and collective strength to repel an armed attack (art. II). Finally, in article IV, the Republic

JU. 8. Congress, Senate. Executive Report No. 1, 83d Congress, 1st session.

of Korea grants and the United States accepts the right to station armed forces in South Korea subject to mutual agreement.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY

Since the outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea, the United States has sought by various means to strengthen the security of the Pacific. One of these has been to enter into mutual defense or security pacts with certain nations important to the security of that area and to our own defense interests. Three such treaties are now in effect-the first with the Philippines, the second with Australia and New Zealand, and the third with Japan. The Senate gave its advice and consent to these treaties on March 20, 1952. The Korean treaty makes the fourth strand in this network of mutual defense treaties in the Pacific.

The treaty grew out of the Korean armistice negotiations and the legitimate concern on the part of the Republic of Korea for its security in the period following the armistice. In an exchange of letters last May and June with President Rhee, President Eisenhower stated that he was "prepared promptly, after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice, to negotiate" with the South Korean Government a mutual defense treaty similar to those with the other Pacific nations, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Preliminary discussions on the treaty were held between Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and President Rhee in June while armistic talks were still in progress. They reached a considerable area of agreement, and following the conclusion of the armistice on July 27, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles and President Rhee finished the negotiations on the Mutual Defense Treaty, which was made public on August 8, 1953. The treaty was subsequently signed on October 1, 1953, and transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on January 11, 1954.

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

Assistant Secretary Robertson, on his return from the preliminary negotiations with President Rhee, appeared before the committee on July 16, 1953, and gave a full report on the course of the negotiations, on the problems encountered, and on proposed future negotiations. This was supplemented by several consultations between the Secretary of State and the members of the Far Eastern Subcommittee during the negotiations. In the light of these consultations, and the fact that the treaty was made public almost 2 months before it was signed and 5 months before it was transmitted to the Senate, the committee felt that adequate opportunity for a full consideration of all the issues involved had been offered. Consequently, the committee proceeded to consider the treaty soon after its reference to the Senate.

On January 13, 1954, public hearings began with testimony by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who discussed in detail the foreign-policy aspects of the treaty. The hearings concluded the following day with testimony by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Matthew V. Ridgway, who addressed themselves to the military aspects of the treaty. The committee considered the treaty in executive session on January

19, 1954, and voted without objection to report the treaty to the Senate with an understanding, which is discussed below.

The committee wishes to commend the executive branch for its attempts to keep the committee informed during the course of the negotiations. Such consultations, properly timed as they were, can do much to build a spirit of cooperation between the two branches of the Government.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

In the preamble to the treaty the parties express their determination and desire to live in peace, to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific, to defend themselves against external armed attack, and to strengthen their efforts for collective defense pending the development of a more effective system of regional security in that area. The preamble thus recognizes the relation between the security interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Article I of the treaty sets the keynote of the instrument as a purely defensive arrangement which is dedicated to peace and constitutes a threat to no nation, but which is intended to further the system of collective security thus far developed for the defense and protection of free nations in the Pacific. By its terms the parties undertake to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any party toward the United Nations.

Article II, which incorporates the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.), requires the parties to consult together whenever either one is of the opinion that the political independence or security of either is threatened by external armed attack. Both countries also undertake, separately and jointly, through self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and to implement the treaty. The joint consultation contemplated by the first clause of this article may take any form deemed appropriate by the parties.

Article III contains the heart of the treaty. It is worded as follows:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on each of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

This language corresponds to the provisions of article V of the Philippine and Australian-New Zealand Mutual Defense Pacts with the United States, but with this difference: Article V of the latter treaties applies to an armed attack on the

metropolitan territory of any of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article III of the Korean Treaty, on the other hand, which is dealt with in more detail below, was drafted to take cognizance of the fact that the Republic of Korea at present has effective control over only a part of Korea, and to anticipate the day when a settlement unifying

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