As I said at a press conference *** the possibility of usefully spending vast sums of economic money in this area has not been demonstrated.

In this part of the world the problem is to create something that is totally new, and I am inclined to think that while the problem certainly needs our very best thought, the finding of ways and means to help is the most important first thing. The problem needs to be tackled first from that standpoint rather than the standpoint of first appropriating vast sums of money and then trying to think later on how it can be spent with advantage.

17. OUR MILITARY COMMITMENT

The committee, conscious of our other treaty obligations in the Pacific which, if the present treaty and protocol are ratified, will encompass 12 other nations, was concerned lest the United States might be overextending itself. It raised this question with the Secretary of State by asking for information concerning possible plans to create local defensive forces in the area. For the information of the Senate, his full statement on that question is reprinted here.

It is not the policy of the United States to attempt to deter attack in this area by building up a local force capable itself of defense against an all-out attack by the Chinese Communists if it should occur. We do not expect to duplicate in this area the pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its significant standing forces. That would require a diversion and commitment of strength which we do not think is either practical or desirable or necessary from the standpoint of the United States.

We believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking power, and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe that is more effective than if we tried to pin down American forces at the many points around the circumference of the Communist world in that area. It may very well be that other countries of the area will want to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the area under this treaty. But we made clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force including, for example, United States ground troops for that area, but that we rely upon the deterrent power of our mobile striking force.

18. THE PACIFIC CHARTER

At the same time the treaty and protocol were negotiated at Manila, the governments there represented drew up and signed a declaration known as the Pacific Charter. This was a proclamation of general principles and ideals by the delegates to the conference expressing their deep interest in the further development of freedom and independence in the area.

In spirit, the Pacific Charter is not unlike the Atlantic Charter of 1942 in which the postwar aims of the allied powers were set forth. Appealing to the "highest principles of justice and liberty", the delegates to the Manila Conference proclaimed that they "uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and would earnestly "strive to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities." The charter proclaims further that the delegates of the governments represented were each prepared "to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement" of these purposes. They stated that they would continue "to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region"; and were determined "to prevent or counter *** any attempt in the treaty ares

to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity."

The Pacific Charter grew out of a suggestion by President Magsaysay of the Philippines who felt that it would be helpful to have the delegates proclaim the fundamental principles summarized above and the intentions and purposes which motivated them. It does not contain anything to which the United States has not frequently subscribed in past international instruments.

By this proclamation the Asiatic peoples are assured of the acceptance by the delegates to the conference of the common ultimate aim of self-determination and self-government for all areas in Asia.

19. NEED FOR EARLY RATIFICATION

The President transmitted the treaty and protocol to the Senate on November 10, 1954, with a request for "early and favorable consideration." At a hearing held on November 11, Secretary of State Dulles stressed the uncertainties in the treaty area and suggested that early approval by the Senate might be expected to promote stability in the region concerned.

The need for prompt ratification remains urgent. On January 3, 1955, the Department of State announced that the Foreign Ministers of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty powers had agreed to meet on February 23 in Bangkok at the invitation of the Government of Thailand. The announcement stated that

The purpose of the meeting will be to consider arrangements for the implementation of the Manila Treaty and to exchange views on matters affecting the peace and security of the treaty area.

Although the proposed meeting need not await the entry into force of the treaty it would be helpful if all signatories had ratified by that time. The chances for this are good. Thailand has deposited its ratification and the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have completed parliamentary action but not yet consummated the formalities of ratification. In France and Pakistan, parliamentary action is not expected to be necessary. The Republic of the Philippines expects to consider the treaty shortly after its Congress reconvenes on January 24.

More important than the technical desirability of bringing the treaty into force by the February 23 meeting would be the psychological impact of prompt action. It would demonstrate to the nations. of South Asia the seriousness of our purposes and intentions. Such a show of unity would also buttress the conviction of the treaty powers that they can work harmoniously together on problems affecting the southeast Asia area.

The general exposure of the area to the threat of communism, both internal and external, makes it doubly important and urgent that we and our partners to this treaty discuss measures for giving early effect to its provisions.

20. CONCLUSIONS

It is the committee's view that the Manila pact constitutes a considerable accomplishment in bringing together a group of eight countries of divergent religious, racial and political backgrounds, in a common resolve to defend their freedom against the menace of

international communism. By strengthening that resolve the United States will make a substantial contribution to the preservation of free governments and to the defense of its own security.

The principle underlying this treaty is that advance notice of our intentions and the intentions of the nations associated with us may serve to deter potential aggressors from reckless action that could plunge the Pacific into war. To that end, the treaty makes it clear that the United States will not remain indifferent to conduct threatening the peace of Southeast Asia.

Until now, our protective system in the Pacific area has been predicated upon a group of treaties of a bilateral and trilateral character. The Southeast Asia treaty is a long step toward a more comprehensive, collective security arrangement which has been regarded as desirable by the administration and the committee.

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

For these reasons, the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty. [Appendix omitted.]

237. JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES AND RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA, JANUARY 29, 19551 Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous

1 Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st session.

to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

238. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FEBRUARY 8, 19551

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Ex. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess.), signed at Washington on December 2, 1954, reports the treaty to the Senate, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The present treaty constitutes the sixth link in the chain of security pacts which the United States has concluded with other governments in the Western Pacific. Like the ones which have preceded, its primary purpose is to prevent aggression on the part of a potential enemy, by giving advance notice that the United States will regard an armed attack upon the area covered by the treaty as dangerous to our peace and safety. Should such an attack occur, we will act to meet the danger in accordance with our constitutional processes (art. V). Purely defensive in character, the text of the treaty reaffirms the parties' faith in the principles of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples (preamble, arts. I, V, and VIII). Likewise, the parties undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations (art. I). They pledge themselves to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack as well as Communist subversive activities (art. II). They also agree to cooperate in the development of economic progress and social well-being (art. III), and to consult together from time to time concerning the implementation of the treaty (art. IV). Other articles define the territory to which the provisions of articles II and V are applicable (art. VI) and authorize the United States to dispose its land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as required for their defense, subject to mutual agreement.

1 U. S. Congress. Senate. Executive Report No. 2, 84th Congress, 1st session.

2. BACKGROUND

Conclusion of this treaty reflects the continuing and increasing concern of the United States with the security of the Pacific area. In 1951, the United States negotiated Mutual Defense Treaties with the Philippines and with Australia and New Zealand and a Security Treaty with Japan. A Mutual Defense Pact With Korea followed in 1953. Last year the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Mutual Defense Treaty With the Republic of China were added to the security system of protection against Communist aggression in Asia.

Preliminary consideration to the desirability of a treaty with China was given following a proposal for such an agreement by the Republic of China in December 1953. After the Southeast Asia Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles visited Formosa and discussed the scope of such a treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek. Further negotiations were carried on by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Robertson, at Taipei in October 1954, and later at Washington with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Yeh Kung-ch'ao. The treaty was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954. It was transmitted to the Senate on January 6, 1955.

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

Although the administration had requested that the treaty receive prompt consideration, action by the Senate was delayed somewhat owing to the necessity of giving more immediate attention to the President's message of January 24, 1955. In that message the Chief Executive requested congressional authority to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands against armed attack.

In a meeting held jointly with the Armed Services Committee, the committee examined the authority requested in the President's message with Secretary of State Dulles on January 24, and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur W. Radford. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, United States Army, and Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, also appeared and acquainted the committees with their views. In the course of these discussions, the significance and effect of various provisions of the present treaty were explored at some length, particularly as they related to the authority requested under the proposed resolution.

On February 7, Secretary of State Dulles appeared before the committee in executive session, at which time he was heard in greater detail on the specific provisions of the treaty. On February 8 the committee agreed, by a vote of 11 to 2, to report the treaty to the Senate for final action.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

In the previous defense pacts we have negotiated in the Pacific, a more or less standard pattern has been used, with variations to fit the situation confronting the signatory parties. The present treaty follows