an application to discharge the forfeiture unless personally present, and in support of his objection, presented a certificate of the United States marshal showing that the defendant was still at large, a fugitive from justice. The court received the certificate and refused to entertain said motion, to which counsel for defendant excepted. Afterwards the court ordered the clerk to pay over said deposit of money to the territorial treasurer, as directed by section 411 of the criminal practice act. Arthur Brown, for the appellant. Zera Snow, for the respondent. EMERSON, J. This appeal, prosecuted on the part of defendant by his counsel, is from the order of the court forfeiting the money deposited in lieu of bail, upon the default of the defendant in not appearing when the case was called for trial, and from the ruling of the court in refusing to entertain the motion to discharge the order of forfeiture made by his counsel while the defendant was still at large, a fugitive from justice, and without his having in any manner surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court subsequent to the order of forfeiture, and no excuse whatever being offered for his failure to appear at the trial, and also from the order of the court directing the clerk to pay over the money deposited to the territorial treasurer. When the cause was called for argument the assistant district attorney (Zera Snow, Esq.) moved the court to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the defendant was still at large, a fugitive from justice-this fact is made to appear by the certificate of the United States marshal, nor is it denied by the counsel who prosecutes this appeal for the defendant-and upon the further ground that the orders themselves are not appealable. The appeal should be dismissed on both grounds. The offense charged is a felony, and so long as defendant remains a fugitive from justice he has no right to be heard upon any appeal in his behalf in this court: People v. Redings, 55 Cal. 290, where many cases are reviewed, all holding the same way. Certainly, this defendant has no right to be heard while he refuses to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon any matters connected with the proceedings appealed from. The orders are not appealable. They were but steps in the criminal proceedings commenced by the filing of the indictment, and if reviewable at all could only be so on an appeal from a final judgment: People v. Clark, 42 Cal. 622. The appeal is dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON TERRITORY. PARKER ET AL. v. DENNY. Filed July 11, 1883. AN APPEAL WILL NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FORMAL DEFECTS IN THE NOTICE OF APPEAL in regard to the title of the court and cause and the particular description of the judgment appealed from, when the provisions of the statute are substantially complied with in such respects. A NOTICE OF APPEAL SHOULD CONTAIN A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION of every ruling, order, decree, or decision whereby the appellant has been aggrieved. All that it is essential for the appellant to say in such regard is, that he has been aggrieved by the following orders, rulings, and decisions, and then enumerate them severally by descriptions sufficient to identify each. APPEAL from the dictrict court. The opinion states the facts. Allen & Thompson, for the appellee. GREENE, C. J. We are agreed that the formal defects of this notice of appeal in regard to the title of the court, and title of the cause, and the particular description of the judgment appealed from, are not such as would warrant a dismissal of the appeal. It is not every non-compliance with the provisions of section 458 that will fall outside the saving provisions of section 464. What the court is from which the appeal is taken, and what the cause and judgment are which are brought here, sufficiently appear from the notice. In these particulars there is a substantial compliance with the statute. But this notice has faults not so easily overlooked. Two sorts of notices are prescribed by section 458. One is for cases in error, the other for cases upon appeal. These two, though they are intended to be similar in structure, do not necessarily assume the same form. The one must contain a particular description of the errors assigned, the other a particular description of each ruling or order whereby the appellant claims to have been aggrieved; or, in other words, one must have in it a specific assignment of errors, the other a specific list of injurious rulings, orders, or decisions. A like purpose is intended to be accomplished both by the list and by the assignment. It is to narrow the range of controversy to its minimum, to define it, and to apprise the adverse party and the appellate court of its extent. But the nature of the device for effecting this purpose is different in the one from what it is in the other. Under the old common-law practice, an assignment of errors was a pleading, the allegations whereof were to be proved by the production of the record from the lower court, and its nature is still the same when incorporated in the notice required by our statutory practice. But the list of obnoxious rulings required to be in the notice, under our statute, in an appeal case, is not in the nature of a pleading, but of an election. Notwithstanding this distinction, however, there is no reason why the same rules for brevity and simplicity of statement should not apply as well to the list as to the assignment. They have been assimilated by the legislature on purpose to simplify and unify the procedure for getting common-law and chancery cases into this court for review. It is possible to choose a form of words which will serve equally well for the one as for the other. All the statute requires on appeal is a particular description of every ruling, order, decree, or decision whereby appel lant has been aggrieved. What more is it necessary for him to say, then, than that he has been aggrieved by the orders, rulings, and decisions following, and then enumerate them severally by descriptions sufficient to identify each? But in the notice before us, the particular description of orders objected to is a bewildering mass of involved statement, repetition, and surplusage. Sixteen or eighteen pages are filled with a stretching and stuffing of what might be amply stated in a couple of pages. All that was done by the referee was covered by the order of the judge in passing upon the referee's report. A designation of that single order, as one by which appellant has been aggrieved, would have been enough to bring before this court the entire doings of the referee. We feel compelled to strike from this notice, therefore, all in it relating to interlocutory matter. This will not necessitate a dismissal of the appeal, although it may render an amendment of the notice desirable. We wish to say further, in regard to this notice, that it is altogether too prolix from beginning to end. Among other peculiarities, we remark that it embodies matter showing that a bill of exceptions was made in the lower court, and includes much that constitutes that bill. A bill of exceptions has no place nor function in a chancery cause; besides incumbering the records, it greatly and uselessly enhances cost. Motion denied; and it is ordered that all matter in the transcript from the third line of page 286 to the sixteenth line of page 307, inclusive, be stricken out. WINGARD and HOYT, JJ., concurred. CRAWFORD ET AL. v. HALLER. Filed July 24, 1883. FAILURE TO FILE TRANSCRIPT-DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.-Where the transcript on appeal was filed less than fifecen days before the commencement of the term, the appeal will be dismissed unless the appellant shows himself guiltless of inexcusable laches in not having filed the transcript sooner. ERROR to the district court. The opinion states the facts. Struve, Haines & McMickin and J. R. Lewis, for the plaintiff in error. McNaught, Ferry, McNaught, and Mitchell, for the defendant in error. GREENE, C. J. The transcript in this cause was filed less than fifteen days before the term, and was unaccompanied by any authenticated copy of the notice of appeal. On account of a want of compliance, in these respects, with sections 459 and 460 of the code, appellee moved to dismiss the appeal. Hearing of this motion was continued, and meantime leave was given to appellants by a day certain to bring in a duly certified copy of the appeal notice, and to show themselves guiltless of inexcusable laches in not having the transcript filed sooner. Afterwards, on the set day, appellants filed the certified copy of notice, but failed, and still fail, to make the proposed showing; very earnestly they contend that no showing is necessary; each party, after full argument, submits the motion. Resort must be had to a number of sections of our code in order to determine intelligently the questions involved. Especially applicable and entirely decisive, to our mind, are the various provisions of the code touching the taking of appeals and the curing of defects and informalities. Section 453 begins with a clause which fixes six months next after judgment as the period within which an appeal must be taken. Putting the case at bar to a computation, we find that the six months had elapsed on the fourth day of last May, sixty-six days before this term commenced. Embraced in section 458 is a clause that prescribes that an appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order appealed from is entered a notice stating the appeal from the same, or some specific part thereof, and serving a copy of said notice on the adverse party or his attorney." Continuing the subject of taking an appeal, section 459 says that "an appeal shall not be perfected until the notice has been served on the adverse party or his attorney of record," and then proceeds to provide that upon payment of his fees, the clerk shall forthwith transmit a transcript of the record in the cause. The word "forthwith" in this section, 459, does not cast on the clerk any unreasonable instantaneousness of action, nor does it, together with the connected words, take from appellant the right, nor relieve him from the duty, of looking after and supervising, or abridge his privilege of interrupting, the preparation of his transcript. Obviously, the intent of the language is, that the clerk shall, as quickly as may reasonably be, consistently with the nature of the record and the appellant's actions and directions, send up the transcript. Failure of the transcript to reach this court speedily, even after payment of fees, is not to be imputed to negligence of the clerk until the presumption that he has acted as he ought is fairly rebutted. Passing to sections 460 and 461, we find the former enacting that the notice "must be served at least thirty days, and the cause docketed at least fifteen days, before the first day of the next term of the supreme court, or the same shall not then be tried unless by the consent of parties;" and the latter, that "if the appellant fails to file a transcript and have the same docketed, as provided in the preceding section, the appellee may file a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed from, and of the notice served, and on motion have the appeal dismissed, provided, that when the failure to file the transcript is owing to the fault or omission of the clerk of either the appellate or inferior court, or other circumstances over which the appellant has no control, the court shall not dismiss the cause, but shall fix such time for hearing the same as shall insure fair trial." Effect must be given to both these last two sections, and such that they shall not conflict. Referring to section 453, we see that a party to a judgment in the district court has a full six months within which to decide whether he will appeal. Six months may expire, and consequently his decision to appeal may occur, where the time remaining before the next term of the supreme court is too short to admit of a service of notice and filing of transcript, outside the periods limited in section 460. Over the date of expiration of his statutory time for appeal appellant has no control. No fault, therefore, could be attributed to him if the failure to file in time depended upon that date. Such a case, and all other cases where through any circumstance beyond his control the statutory periods of section 460 may not have been observed, are met and provided for in that clause of the section which says, that either of those periods failing, there shall be no trial at the return term unless by consent. In section 460 provision is thus made for the rights of parties whenever tardiness or omission of service or filing has happened from some circumstance not under appellant's control, or otherwise excusable; while in section 461 provision is made for the rights of appellee in cases where such tardiness or omission is owing to any circumstance which was under appellant's control. Section 461 manifestly contemplates that there shall be a dismissal under certain circumstances, and plainly intends that those circumstances shall be adjudged to exist where there is inexcusable negligence on the part of the appellant. Nothing of value in the way of interpretation or construction can, as we think, be got from gazing at the narrow literal purview of the first half of section 461. Our opinion is that the question thence arising, whether or not there is a total omission or only a mere delay, is entirely a barren one. The legislature is here dealing with very grave interests, that surely ought not, and can not be intended to, turn on a consideration which is not of the slightest practical importance. Great weight, no doubt, in construing this and the preceding sections, should be given to the liberal provisions of our code, and particularly those of section 466, regarding defaults, defects, and informalities. On careful review of those provisions, however, it will be easily gathered that they are not meant, in any case, to shield a man from the consequences of his own inexcusable neglect. Our duty is to apply those provisions generously to aid all proper cases, but not to extend them to situations they were never meant to cover. Defendants below, appellants here, while showing no excuse whatever for their failure to file this transcript in time, would, were this motion denied, succeed in putting the appellee to an injurious election, either to argue this cause at this term without the full statutory time for preparation, or to have determination of his suit, and perhaps collection of his demand, postponed at least a year. Motion granted, and appeal dismissed. STILES V. JAMES. Filed August 6, 1883. VENUE, WHEN MUST BE ALLEGED.-In an action to recover the possession of specific personal property, the jurisdiction of the court must be shown by an allegation in the complaint of the place of detention. A failure to make such allegation can not be taken advantage of after verdict when the sheriff's return shows that the property was taken in the county over which the court had jurisdiction. ERROR to the district court of Columbia county. The opinion states the facts. Sturtevant, Scott, and J. B. Allen, for the plaintiff in error. WINGARD, J. This was an action begun in the above-mentioned court for the recovery of the possession of specific personal property, to wit, two horses. Upon issues joined, the cause was tried by a jury at the regular June term, 1882, and a verdict was returned in favor of the |