mencement of such action. The writ of attachment should contain a citation to the defendant to appear and answer the affidavit. The issues thus raised should be tried and the attachment lien dissolved or continued, according to the verdict of the jury. If sustained, the attachment would remain a subsisting lien on the property of the debtor, and upon the maturity of the demand a declaration might be filed and the defendant cited to plead thereto. If the plaintiff recovered judgment, then a writ of venditione exponas might be issued for the sale of the property attached, and the proceeds thereof applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. Id.

9. A DEFENDANT WHO APPEARS IN AN ATTACHMENT SUIT AND MAKES NO OBJECTION to the writ, can not, after judgment has been given against him, question the sufficiency or character of the writ. Wagner v. Romero. N. M. 269.

10. Failure to HAVE THE SUKETIES ON AN ATTACHMENT BOND justify is a mere irregularity which can be cured, and, therefore, such failure does not render the attachment void. Baxter v. Smith. Wash. 794.

11. A SUBSEQUENT ATTACHING CREDITOR, WITHOUT NOTICE, takes priority over a prior mortgagee under an unrecorded chattel mortgage. Id.

12. JUDGMENT ON A FORTHCOMING BOND.-In an action on a forthcoming bond given under section 13 of that portion of the Kearney code relating to attachments, an order which directs that the property attached shall be "forthwith delivered to the Sheriff of San Miguel County, and that the same be sold and the proceeds of said sale be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment," is sufficiently definite both as to the time and place of delivery. If it were not so, the Court has authority to amend such order at the same term by designating more definitely the time and place of delivery. Wagner v. Romero. N. M. 269.

ATTACHMENT.

See CORPORATIONS, 11; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1.

ATTORNEYS.

1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW - MALCONDUCT IN HIS OFFICE-REMOVAL FROM THE BAR.- It appearing that an attorney-at-law stopped a judge of a court as he was driving through the public street in company with his daughter, a young lady, and thereupon addressed abusive, insulting and threatening language to such judge concerning his judicial action in a certain cause, previously and then pending and undetermined in the court of which he was a judge, wherein the said attorney was counsel for one of the parties; and that he accused said judge of tyrrany and oppression in said cause, and having secured its submission to a prejudiced judge for trial; and that he assailed said judge with vile epithets, and threatened to expose him by publishing the said accusations in the newspapers; and it further appearing that the said attorney refuses to retract, apologize for, withdraw or modify these accusations, but on the contrary still justifies his conduct and insists that he has not violated any professional duty; and it further appearing that upon an opportunity given him to substantiate his said charge by evidence, he has entirely failed to prove their truth. Held, that such acts constitute "malconduct in his office" for which the attorney should be removed from the bar, under the statute which provides "that the justices of the supreme court shall have power, at their discretion, to strike the name of any attorney or counsellor-at-law from the roll for malconduct in his office." People ex rel. Elliott v. Green. Col. 311, 521. 2. THE SAME-JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO PUNISH Attorneys-at-Law FOR THEIR MALCONDUCT IN OFFICE.-It is not necessary, in such a case, that the indignity or insult to the judge should occur in open court, nor that it should constitute a statutory contempt of court, in order to confer on the supreme court jurisdiction to disbar therefor. Id.

3. DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY.-Evidence held insufficient to justify the defendant's removal or suspension from the bar. In re Lowenthal. Cal. 733.

4. LIABILITY OF ATTORNEY ON EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY. · A applied to a money lender for a loan of three thousand dollars and offered his note therefor, secured by a mortgage on certain real property; B, the attorney of the money lender, examined the title to the real property, and furnished the latter a certificate to the effect that A's title was good and the property unincumbered, and thereupon the loan was made on the terms proposed; subsequently and before the maturity of the note it was assigned to the plaintiff, who foreclosed the mort

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

1. AN ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS ACQUIRES ONLY SUCH RIGHTS in the
property assigned as his assignor had at the date of the assignment. Gammons v.
Holman. Or. 822.

2. A PAROL TRANSFER OF GOODS TO ARRIVE, AS SECURITY FOR A PRE-EXISTING IN-
DEBTEDNESS and for advances subsequently to be made, is valid as against the
assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the transferor, although actual possession
of such goods is not obtained by the pledgee until after the assignment for the benefit
of creditors. Gammons, Assignee, etc., v. Holman et al. Or. 822.

3. THE SURVIVING PARTNER OF AN INSOLVENT FIRM CAN NOT ASSIGN THE PARTNER-
SHIP assets for the benefit of preferred partnership creditors. If he does so, the
validity of such assignment may be questioned in a legal action by a firm creditor
without first resorting to an equitable action to cancel and set aside the same.
isbury v. Ellison. Col. 102, 612.

ATTACHMENT.

Sal-

1. ATTACHMENT LAW-AMENDMENT OF 1881.-The fourteenth subdivision of section one
of the Attachment Act, as amended in 1881, providing that "in all actions brought
upon overdue promissory notes, bills of exchange, other written instruments for the
direct payment of money, and upon book accounts, the creditor may have a writ of
attachment issue upon complying with the provisions of this section," creates a new
and distinct ground of attachment, additional to the twelve others enumerated in
such act. Simmons v. California Powder Company. Col. 517; Kellerman v. Cres-
cent Milling, etc., Co. Col. 520.

2. SHERIFF'S FEES FOR KEEPING ATTACHED PROPERTY, ALLOWANCE OF.-Where prop-
erty has been attached by a Sheriff, at the instance of the plaintiff, in an action
which is afterward dismissed, the Sheriff is entitled to a reasonable compensation as
fees for his expenses in maintaining a keeper in charge of the property attached.
Such fees may be taxed as costs against the plaintiff. To determine the amount of
his fees, there being no statute regulating the same, the Sheriff should present his
bill to the court or judge, and procure an order allowing the same, or so much there-
of as may be proper. The party against whom such allowance is made may, upon
motion to retax, procure a rehearing and re-examination. The clerk has no power
to make such allowance. If, however, he does so, and his action is affirmed by
the court on a motion to retax, such irregularity furnishes no ground for a reversal.
City Bank of Leadville v. Tucker, Sheriff, etc. Col. 402.

3. ATTACHMENT-EXEMPTION, CLAIM OF HOW MADE.-No form is prescribed for mak-
ing a claim of exemption by a defendant whose property has been attached in an
action in the Justice's Court. He may make the same orally, and without notice to
the plaintiff. The notice referred to in Section 12 of the Attachment Act of 1879
applies to the cases of claimants to the property attached, other than the defendant.
Bassett v. Inman. Col. 534.

4. THE SAME-WAIVER OF EXEMPTION.-A defendant does not waive the right of
claiming property as exempt from attachment, by first traversing the attachment
upon other grounds. Id.

5. THE SAME COUNTY COURT-JURISDICTION TO DISSOLVE AN ATTACHMENT. - Upon
an appeal from the Justice's Court, the County Court has jurisdiction to dissolve an
attachment on the ground that the property attached is exempt. Id.

6. THE SAME REVIEW OF ORDER DISSOLVING ATTACHMENT.-The appellate court wil
not review an order dissolving an attachment for a ground not raised in the court
below. Id.

7. ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS, TRIAL OF ISSUES ON.-Under the Statutes of this Ter-
ritory attachment proceedings are auxiliary to actions at law, but each is character-
ized by separate pleadings and a distinct practice. If on the trial of the issues
alleged in the affidavit for an attachment a verdict is rendered for the defendant,
the attachment is dissolved, but the action at law proceeds to final judgment, when
the same is founded upon a matured demand. Where, however, the statute author-
izes an attachment on demands not due, but fails to describe the mode of procedure
to be followed in such cases, this Court has authority to provide by rule what the
practice shall be, so as to give effect to such attachment. Staab et al. v. Hersch.
N. M. 425.

8. IN ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS ON DEMANDS NOT DUE, the only consistent mode of
procedure is to treat such proceedings as separate and distinct from the action at
law, and to go no further than to create an attachment lien in advance of the com-

mencement of such action. The writ of attachment should contain a citation to the defendant to appear and answer the affidavit. The issues thus raised should be tried and the attachment lien dissolved or continued, according to the verdict of the jury. If sustained, the attachment would remain a subsisting lien on the property of the debtor, and upon the maturity of the demand a declaration might be filed and the defendant cited to plead thereto. If the plaintiff recovered judgment, then a writ of venditione exponas might be issued for the sale of the property attached, and the proceeds thereof applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. Id.

9. A DEFENDANT WHO APPEARS IN AN ATTACHMENT SUIT AND MAKES NO OBJECTION to the writ, can not, after judgment has been given against him, question the sufficiency or character of the writ. Wagner v. Romero. N. M. 269.

10. FAILURE TO HAVE THE SUKETIES ON AN ATTACHMENT BOND justify is a mere irregularity which can be cured, and, therefore, such failure does not render the attachment void. Baxter v. Smith. Wash. 794.

11. A SUBSEQUENT ATTACHING CREDITOR, WITHOUT NOTICE, takes priority over a prior mortgagee under an unrecorded chattel mortgage. Id.

12. JUDGMENT ON A FORTHCOMING BOND.-In an action on a forthcoming bond given under section 13 of that portion of the Kearney code relating to attachments, an order which directs that the property attached shall be "forthwith delivered to the Sheriff of San Miguel County, and that the same be sold and the proceeds of said sale be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment," is sufficiently definite both as to the time and place of delivery. If it were not so, the Court has authority to amend such order at the same term by designating more definitely the time and place of delivery. Wagner v. Romero. N. M. 269.

ATTACHMENT.

See CORPORATIONS, 11; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1.

ATTORNEYS.

1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW-MALCONDUCT IN HIS OFFICE-REMOVAL FROM THE BAR.- It appearing that an attorney-at-law stopped a judge of a court as he was driving through the public street in company with his daughter, a young lady, and thereupon addressed abusive, insulting and threatening language to such judge concerning his judicial action in a certain cause, previously and then pending and undetermined in the court of which he was a judge, wherein the said attorney was counsel for one of the parties; and that he accused said judge of tyrrany and oppression in said cause, and having secured its submission to a prejudiced judge for trial; and that he assailed said judge with vile epithets, and threatened to expose him by publishing the said accusations in the newspapers; and it further appearing that the said attorney refuses to retract, apologize for, withdraw or modify these accusations, but on the contrary still justifies his conduct and insists that he has not violated any professional duty; and it further appearing that upon an opportunity given him to substantiate his said charge by evidence, he has entirely failed to prove their truth. Held, that such acts constitute "malconduct in his office" for which the attorney should be removed from the bar, under the statute which provides "that the justices of the supreme court shall have power, at their discretion, to strike the name of any attorney or counsellor-at-law from the roll for malconduct in his office." People ex rel. Elliott v. Green. Col. 311, 521. 2. THE SAME-JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO PUNISH ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW FOR THEIR MALCONDUCT IN OFFICE.-It is not necessary, in such a case, that the indignity or insult to the judge should occur in open court, nor that it should constitute a statutory contempt of court, in order to confer on the supreme court jurisdiction to disbar therefor. Id.

3. DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY.-Evidence held insufficient to justify the defendant's removal or suspension from the bar. In re Lowenthal. Cal. 733.

4. LIABILITY OF ATTORNEY ON EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY. — A applied to a money lender for a loan of three thousand dollars and offered his note therefor, secured by a mortgage on certain real property; B, the attorney of the money lender, examined the title to the real property, and furnished the latter a certificate to the effect that A's title was good and the property unincumbered, and thereupon the loan was made on the terms proposed; subsequently and before the maturity of the note it was assigned to the plaintiff, who foreclosed the mort

suance of the charter of 1858, and he brings a suit against the city to recover the amount of the unpaid and overdue interest coupons of such bonds. Held, That the parties who surrendered their prior evidences of indebtedness and took these bonds took them under the provisions of the charter of 1858, which was a contract made between the city and them, to the effect that the bonds should be collected and paid only in the particular manner therein specified, and in no other, and that the city should not be liable to be sued; and that such contract was made upon a valuable consideration of advantage moving to both parties, and was valid and binding; and therefore no action can be maintained by the holders of said bonds, against the city, to recover the amounts unpaid and overdue thereon. If the provision of the State constitution, making all corporations liable to be sued like natural persons, has any application to municipal corporations, it had been waived by the bondholders. Kennedy v. City of Sacramento (U. S. Cir. Ct.), Cal. 223.

4. MANDAMUS THE REMEDY.-It seems the proper and only remedy of the bondholders is by mandamus against the City Treasurer, to compel him to pay the interest out of the fund in his hands; or, if there is no such fund, then by mandamus against the city government to compel them to raise and appropriate the fund by taxation, as directed by the original charter of 1858. The provision of that charter being a part of the contract between the city and the bondholder, for his benefit, its repeal by the Legislature would be nugatory. Id.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Boone on Real Property, 677.

Desty's Federal Procedure, 677.

Hawes on Parties to Actions, 677.

Hayne on New Trial and Appeal, 293.

High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 802.

Jones on Pledges, 292.

Stewart on Marriage and Divorce, 679.

BRIBERY.

See ELECTION, 3.

BRIDGES.

See WATER RIGHTS, 3-4, 6-8.

BURGLARY.

1. BURGLARY-WHAT IS.-In section 59, crimes and punishments, revised laws, page 332, wherein it is provided that "every person who shall, in the night-time,

break and enter any dwelling-house or tent with intent to commit murder, robbery, mayhem, larceny, or other felony," the term "larceny" applies alike to grand and petit larcenies. In an indictment for burglary drawn upon that statute, it is not necessary to allege the value of the property intended to have been stolen. People etc., v. Stapleton. Idaho, 176.

2 BURGLARY INTENT INSTRUCTIONS.-The information charged the defendant with burglary in feloniously entering the ticket office of a railroad with intent to commit larceny. Held, that an instruction that the defendant could not be convicted unless he entered the building with the intent to commit "some felony," was properly refused, since the information charged an intent to commit larceny. People v. Young. Cal. 830.

3. THE SAME.-One who enters, with burglarious intent, a room of a house, enters the house with such intent. Where such room was known as a ticket office, it may be properly described as "a building, to wit: the ticket office." Id.

4. BURGLARY MAY BE DEFINED IN THE LANGUAGE of the penal code. Id.

5. A ROOM MAY BE CONSTRUCTED WITHOUT A PARTITION reaching to the ceiling, and the court may so instruct the jury. Id.

6. CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS REVIEWED AND HELD CORRECT. Id.

See CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE

CANCELLATION.

1. FRAUDULENT MARRIAGE CONTRACT-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO CANCEL.-Equity
has jurisdiction to declare null and void and to cancel an instrument which is claimed
to be a marriage contract, executed in conformity with section 75 of the civil code
of California, when the same is a forgery or was obtained by fraud. Sharon v. Hill.
(U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal. 164.

2. CANCELLATION OF DEED PROCURED BY FRAUD.-Every person who signs, executes
and acknowledges a deed is presumed to know the contents and legal effect thereof.
But where a deed is executed by reason of false and fraudulent representations as to
its contents, and where it is falsely read to the grantor, and by reason of such false
and fraudulent representations, and in ignorance of its contents, the grantor executes
the same, such deed may be annulled and canceled, and parol evidence is admissible
to show such facts. Tufts, Administrator, etc., v. Tufts. Utah, 459.

3. FINDING THAT A CERTAIN DEED WAS OBTAINED BY REASON OF FALSE and fraudu-
lent representations on the part of the grantee, he'd, supported by the evidence. Id.
4. ACTION FOR CANCELLATION NECESSARY PARTIES.-In an action for the cancellation
of a deed, alleged to have been fraudulently obtained by the grantee during his life-
time, the heirs and devisees of the deceased grantee are necessary parties. Snyder
v. Voorhies, Executrix, etc. Col. 616.

5. EJECTMENT-EVIDENCE-CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE.-In an action
of ejectment, where the plaintiff relies on a certificate of the receiver of public
moneys, evidence tending to show a cancellation of such certificate, and the reasons
therefor, are admissible on the part of the defendant. Hays v. Parker. Wash. 801.

CERTIORARI.

1. REVIEW UPON CERTIORARI IS CONFINED to questions-of jurisdiction. State ex rel.
Barnett v. Fifth District Court. Nev., 630.

2. CERTIORARI TO REVIEW ACTION OF SUPERVISORS-RECLAMATION OF SWAMP LAND.—
An order of a board of supervisors creating a district for the reclamation of swamp
land is an act of legislation in the exercise of the taxing or police power of the State,
and is not reviewable upon certiorari. Williams v. Board of Snpervisors. Cal. 732.

See CONTEMPT, 1; INJUNCTIONS, 1, 4.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

See MORTGAGE, 7.

CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT.

1. RESTRICTION ACT, WHEN TOOK EFFECT.-The Act of Congress of May 6, 1882, com-
monly called the Chinese Restriction Act, does not state when it was to go into op-
eration, and, consequently, it took effect immediately upon its approval by the
President. In re Leong Yick Dew. (U. S. Cir. Ct.), Cal. 83.

-

2. CHINESE LABORERS EVIDENCE OF FORMER RESIDENCE.-A Chinese laborer who
was a resident of the United States on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, the
date of the treaty with China, but who left the same after the taking effect of the
Restriction Act, and after having an opportunity to obtain the certificate required
by Section 4 thereof, cannot re-enter the United States, either by land or sea, or
having re-entered remain therein, unless he proves the fact of his former residence
by such certificate. No other evidence of such fact is admissible. Id.

3. THE SAME.-Chinese laborers who were in the United States on November 17, 1880,
the date of the treaty with China, and who left before the passage of the Restric-
tion Act on May 6, 1882, and those who came into the United States and departed
therefrom between such dates, or afterwards before June 6, 1882, the date on which
the Collector of the Port of San Francisco was prepared to issue the certificates pro-
vided for in Section 4 of such Act, in the form prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, are entitled to re-enter the United States upon satisfactory evidence of
their former residence other than that furnished by such certificate. Id,

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

See REPLEVIN.