and did not render a judgment for the sale of the infant's real estate void, but voidable. Schuk, Gd'n, &c. v. Stoll, &c. November 29, 1884. Campbell Ch. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. J. Creutz for appellants; John S. Ducker for appellees.

Judgments

Consent judgment-A consent judgment can only be called in question, if at all, by some of the means recognized by law. It can not be supplemented by agreements not a part of it, unless attacked for fraud or mistakes, and in the mode prescribed by law. Cord v. Hendrick. Tabler v. Cord. November 26, 1884. Fleming Cir. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J., Sup. Ct., aff. W. H. Cord for Cord; W. J. Hendrick for Hendrick and Tabler.

Judicial Sales

Purchase by commissioner-A commissioner in chancery can not become a purchaser at his own sales or reap any benefit from a purchase by another under an agreement that he is to be regarded as a joint purchaser. Such contracts are against public policy, and it is immaterial whether the suit is by the debtor to set aside the sale or by the commissioner to enforce the contract as against his co-purchaser. Bagby, &c., v. Eversole, &c. November 15, 1884. Perry Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. W. Lindsay and G. W. & B. F. French for appellants; John L. Scott for appellees.

License

Liquor dealer-A wholesale liquor dealer who sells whisky by the pint without license incurs the penalty denounced by the act of May 8, 1884. Commonwealth v. Rosenbaum. November 21, 1884. Jeff. Ct. of Com. Pleas. Separate opinion by each member of Sup. Ct. rev. A. G. Caruth and Helm & Bruce for appellant; James Harlan for appellee.

Limitation-See Pleading. 2

Adverse possession-The actual possession of land for fifteen years under an unconditional parol gift will bar a recovery by the donor, and though donee entered expecting that at some time the donor would convey or devise the land to her. If, however, she entered by the mere permission of the donor, expecting him to give it to her, then she can not convert her possession into a hostile holding so as to defeat the recovery, nor will the law presume a gift from the entry and possession under such circumstances. Chamberlain, &c. v. McKinney. November 1, 1884. Russell Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. Montgomery & Jones for appellants; Hays & Stone for appellee.

Married Women

Title bond-The bond of a married woman for title was not only voidable but void, and the obligor having died before she executed a conveyance the land she agreed to convey descended to her next of kin. The chancellor, therefore, properly rescinded her contract, and the judgment in this case vacating the judgment of rescission is reversed. Cummings, &c. v. Hamilton, &c. November 15, 1884. Mercer Cir. Ct. Opin. by

Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. P. B. Thompson, Sr., for appellants; Bell & Wilson for appellees.

Master and Servant

Where one does not hold himself out as skilled in a particular business and his employer knows that he is without experience, all the duty he owes his employer is to act with fidelity to the extent of his ability, whatever it is. Southern Wheel and Handle Co. v. Moormau. November 21, 1884. Daviess Cir. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J.. Sup. Ct., aff. Weir, Weir & Walker for appellant; Williams & Powers for appellee.

Mortgage

1. Conveyance with agreement to reconvey-When land is conveyed absolutely and the grantee agreees to reconvey upon the grantor's paying a certain sum of money the transaction amounts to a mortgage only.

K. having purchased C.'s land at decretal sale, C. procured R. to redeem the land for him, and thereupon K. transferred to R. the benefit of his purchase, and a deed was made to R. by the commissioner, R. executing to C. a writing whereby he agreed to convey the land to C. in the event C. should pay to him in twelve months the sum he had paid to redeem the land. C. having failed to pay the money and never having surrendered possession of the land, R. instituted this action for the recovery of the land.

Held-That the transaction was simply a loan from R. to C., R. holding the land as security for the debt. Coffey v. Ranney. November 25, 1884. Wayne Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. J. S. Vanwinkle for appellant; M. C. Saufley for appellee.

2. Stock of goods-Where the mortgagor of a stock of goods is permitted to buy and sell as if there were no mortgage, in a controversy with other creditors it devolves upon the mortgagee to show what particular part of the mingled mass is embraced in his mortgage. Rosenberg & Nathan, &c. v. Thompson, &c. November 17, 1884. Appeal from Montgomery Cir. Ct. Opin. of the court by Bowden, J., Sup. Ct., rev. Reid & Stone, Arthur Carey, Laf Joseph and H. Marshall for appellants; W. H. Holt for appellees.

Municipal Corporations-See County Courts, 9.

Negligence

1. Willful neglect-In this action by appellee against appellant for wilful neglect in causing the death of appellee's intestate, who was killed while acting as brakeman on one of defendant's freight trains, facts that he was not of age and that his mother had notified the conductor not to employ him, and that he was subsequently employed at his own request after stating that his mother had withdrawn her objection, were not sufficient to authorize the jury to infer willful neglect.

2. Infants-One who employs an infant old enough and large and strong enough to do the work he is employed to do, knowing at the time that the parent of the child objects to the employment, does not, by reason of that knowledge, become liable in punitive damages for any injury the infant may receive while employed, regardless of whether or not he is charged with want of care.

3. Pleading-In an action by a personal representative against a railroad company for willful neglect, under section 3 of chapter 57, General Statutes, no recovery can be had for ordinary negligence unless it is alleged that the plaintiff's intestate was not in the employment of the company. Ky. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Dunn's Adm'r. November 26, 1884. Nicholas Cir. Ct. Opin. by Bowden, J., Sup. Ct., rev. O'Hara & Bryan for appellant; Norvell & Tureman, W. P. Ross and Wm. Lindsay for appellee. 4. Leaving train in motion-While a passenger on a railroad train who voluntarily undertakes to leave the train before it stops is guilty of negligence, yet when told by the conductor to leave, and the passenger, unaware of the danger, relies upon the direction of the conductor, and an injury results to the passenger, who is guilty of nothing more than following the conductor's advice, the railroad company is responsible, and this rule is held to apply where a passenger, by the conductor's direction, attempted to leave a train while in motion at a crossing between stations, the conductor having agreed with the passenger when he entered the train to stop at the crossing. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Sharp. November 22, 1884. Taylor Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap.. aff. Lyttleton Cooke, W. Lindsay, John McChord and W. S. Knott for appellant; Russell & Avritt for appellee.

New Trials

1. When a motion for a new trial has been made and overruled the court can not, after the expiration of the time within which it has power over its judgments, set aside the order overruling the motion and grant a new trial.

2. A motion for a new trial in the Louisville Chancery Court, except upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence, must be made within fifteen days after the judgment. Bland, &c. v. John, &c. November 12, 1884. Lou. Ch. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J., Sup. Ct., dis. Harrison & McGrain for appellants; Elliott & Hemingray for appellees.

Partnership

1. Debts-Where one of two partners borrowed money before the actual terms of the partnership had been agreed upon, but borrowed it in contemplation of the partnership and used it in purchasing partnership property and the firm treated the debt as a partnership debt, it should be so treated in the distribution of the partnership assets.

2. Dissolution-A member of a firm can not relieve himself from liability for money paid to his partner for the firm by showing that he had notified the persons paying the money not to trust his partner. He should have protected himself by dissolving the partnership. Brooks, Water

field & Co. v. Lovelace & Co. November 25, 1884. Kenton Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. Hallam & Myers for appellants; Collins & Fenley for appellees.

Pleading

1. Bill to discover defendant-The Civil Code, section 655, prohibits a bill to discover a sole defendant.

2. Amendment-Limitation-Where a petition was filed against several defendants, declaring that the plaintiff did not know who owed him, and, therefore, could not state a cause of action against anyone, but asking for information to enable him to do so, and an amended petition was filed stating a cause of action against one of the defendants, limitation continued to run until the filing of the amendment, the original proceeding being expressly prohibited by law. Mowery v. Webb. November 19, 1884. Henry Cir. Ct. Opin. by Bowden, J., Sup. Ct., aff. Ward, P. J.. dissenting. Geo. C. Drane for appellant; Carroll & Barbour and R. W. Masterson for appellee.

Pleading and Practice in Criminal Cases

1. Impeachment of witness-The statements of a witness on a former trial having been admitted in evidence, the witness being dead, his testimony can not be impeached by proof of contradictory statements made subsequent to the former trial.

2. Conitnuance-The refusal of the lower court to grant a continuance upon the ground of the absence of a witness was not prejudicial, as the testimony of the absent witness could have produced no appreciable effect upon the final result.

3. Corroboration of accomplice-The court having properly determined that there was evidence to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice, it was for the jury to determine its weight and credibility. Neal v. Commonwealth. November 13, 1884. Carter Cir. Ct. Opin. by Hines, Ch. J., Ct. Ap., aff. Brown & Lackey, Z. F. Smith, Jr., and Wood & Day for appellant; P. W. Hardin and K. F. Pritchard for appellee. 4. Jurisdiction-An indictment having been found in one court for an offense of which another court has exclusive jurisdiction, a formal order setting aside that indictment was not necessary before proceeding under an indictment found in the court having jurisdiction, to which a copy of the first indictment and the original papers had been transmitted. 5. Impeaching witness-It was incompetent for the Commonwealth to impeach the testimony of defendant's witnesses by proving statements made by them at the inquest, without first having laid the foundation for the attack by giving them an opportunity to explain. Roe v. Commonwealth. November 22, 1884. Madison Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. Chenault & Parrish for appellant; P. W. Hardin for appellee.

Practice in Civil Cases

1. Prejudicial error-The overruling of exceptions to appellee's testimony when his cause was made out by other evidence in the case did not prejudice the appellant's rights. Burks, &c. v. Strader. November 25, 1884. Barren Cir. Ct. Opin. by Holt, J., Ct. Ap., aff. Leslie & Botts and E. W. Hines for appellants; Porter & Ritter, W. P. D. Bush and Finlay F. Bush for appellee.

2. A reversal may be had for error in an instruction, although all the evidence is not before the court, if the instruction be such that it could not have been correct, whatever the evidence. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Cam bron. November 12, 1884 Marion Cir. Ct. Opin. by Bowden, J., Sup. Ct., rev. W. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle for appellant; J. P. Thomp son for appellee.

3. The finding by the court or jury of a fact, the existence of which is denied by the petition, can not profit the plaintiff. Mowery v. Webb. November 19, 1884. Henry Cir. Ct. Opin. by Bowden, J., Sup. Ct., aff., Ward, P. J., dissenting. Geo. C. Drane for appellant; Carroll & Barbour and R. W Masterson for appellee.

4. New trial-An alleged error occurring during the progress of a jury trial must be definitely mentioned as a ground for a new trial in the lower court, or it can not be relied on for a reversal in an appellate court.

5. Reversing judgment-Upon all appeals granted prior to the amendatory act of 1884 the Superior Court has no power to reverse a judgment except for the particular errors assigned.

6. The appellant, being in no position to question the correctness of the verdict, can not complain of a judgment that strictly pursues that verdict. Commercial Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, &c. November 24, 1884. Jeff. Ct. of Com. Pleas. Opin. by Richards, J., Sup. Ct., aff. A. E. Wilson for appellant; J. T. O'Neal and Thomas Joyes for appellees. 7. Where an ordinary action is tried by the court and the conclusions of fact are found separately from the conclusions of law and separately from each other, they should have the same effect as the separate verdict of a jury, and upon appeal judgment should be ordered in conformity thereto, applying the law as understood by the appellate court and not as found by the trial court. Southern Wheel and Handle Co. v. Moorman. November 21, 1884. Daviess Cir. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J., Sup. Ct., aff. Weir, Weir & Walker for appellant; Williams & Powers for appellee.

8. Affidavit to petition-Where the averments in a petition are positive the plaintiff, in swearing to the petition, may qualify his affidavit by stating that he believes" the statements of the petition are true, although such a qualification is objectionable where the averment in the petition is that the plaintiff has information or belief simply. Gillham v. Baldwin & Co. November 19, 1884. Campbell Cir. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J., Sup. Ct., rev. J. F. & C. H. Fisk for appellant; J. S. Ducker for appellees.

9. Partial transcript-A judgment can not be reversed upon a partial or imperfect transcript unless there is enough of the record before the