that this case is, in its facts, within the rule. To show that it Alex. P. Humphrey for appellants. Judge Richards delivered the following dissenting opinion: The opinion of the court herein only quotes from two authorities in support of the doctrine announced, viz., High on Injunctions and Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of British Museum, 2 Mylne & Keen, 552. As the former is based exclusively on the latter, we need only examine the one case to ascertain the extent to which the principle should be carried. In 1675 the Hon. Wm. Russell and wife, being the owners of a large tract of land adjoining the improved portion of London, conveyed seven acres to the Right Hon. Ralph Montagu. The grantors already occupied a lordly establishment on that part of the land retained, and the grantee convenanted to erect a similar one, it being the understanding that there should be but two mansions, such as the nobility occupied, with suitable appurtenances. These improvements were to be erected so as not to shut out from either mansion the view of the open fields or park to the northward. The action for the injunction was instituted nearly a century and a half after the conveyance, The Russell estate had passed by descent and grant through several owners. When the litigation commenced the Duke of Bedford was the owner by purchase. In 1800 the old Russell mansion had been pulled down to make way for streets and buildings erected on its site, and all that portion of the land around the Montagu mansion had been conveyed by the Duke of Bedford and his predecessors, and the respective grantees had erected business houses. The trustees of the British Museum having become the owners of the Montagu property attempted to extend their buildings over what had been the garden, and where the original grantee had covenanted nothing should be erected to obstruct the view. The injunction was prayed to prevent their erection. Now it seems to me the court very properly said to the complainant: "You can not under such circumstances come into a court of equity for a remedy which the court never grants except in cases where it would be strictly equitable to grant it." There the very mansion, for whose enjoyment the covenants had been exacted, was torn away and the view of the open fields to the northward had been obstructed by the erection of numerous buildings by permission of those to whom the covenants had passed. But what are the facts in the case at bar? Here the plaintiffs refused to sell to the defendant for fear the property might be used for car stables. Subsequently Allman applied for the purchase of the same property, and, suspecting he was the agent for the defendant, the plaintiff exacted the covenant in question, by the terms of which no building other than a resi dence was to be erected. As suspected by his grantors Allman transferred his purchase to the defendant, and the corporation, after the lapse of a few years, commenced the erection of its stables. Now it seems to me the plaintiffs have done all they could have done to protect themselves against the obnoxious building, unless they had refused to sell that lot to anyone-a sacrifice I apprehend the law does not require. But my brother judges are of the opinion that the subsequent sales of other lots to other parties without exacting similar covenants is a waiver within the principle announced in Duke of Bedford v. Trustees, &c., yet it seems to me the condition of the parties is widely different. It is evident that the real object of the cove nant was to prevent the erection of a car stable, but even if the other object stated in the petition (to secure the erection. of residences alone) be considered paramount, it does not ap pear that any other buildings than residences have been erected on the other lots. If the grantors were willing to rely upon others not erecting any but residences, why should that release the defendant, especially since none of the other grantees have betrayed that confidence? On the contrary, anyone of those grantees could insist upon the faithful performance of the covenants in the deed under which appellee holds. Covenants similar to these have become common in modern times, and are necessary for the protection of rights in property. The owner of real estate has the privilege of selling, or selling upon conditions, or not selling at all, as he may deem best; and where a grantee has obtained his conveyance upon conditions that are reasonable, he should be enjoined from violating his covenants except where it would be inequitable to do so. It seems to me that the injunction should have been granted in this case. Alex. P. Humphrey for appellants. Brown & Davie for appellee. WHAT LITERARY MEN THINK OF LAWYERS. I. MACAULEY. Their legal arguments are intellectual prodigies, abounding with the happiest analogies and the most refined distinctions. The principles of their arbitrary science being once admitted, the statute book and the reports being once assumed as the foundations of reasoning, these men must be allowed to be perfect masters of logic. But if a question arises as to the postulates on which their whole system rests-if they are called upon to vindicate the fundamental maxims of that system which they have passed their lives in studying-these very men often talk the language of savages or of children. Those who have listened to a man of this class in his own court, and who have witnessed the skill with which he analyzes and digests a vast mass of evidence, or reconciles a crowd of precedents which, at first sight seem contradictory, scarcely know him again when a few hours later they hear him speaking on the other side of Westminster Hall in his capacity of legislator. They can scarcely believe that the paltry quirks which are faintly heard through a storm of coughing, and which do not impose on the plainest country gentleman, can proceed from the same sharp and rigorous intellect which had excited their admiration under the same roof and on the same day. NEW BOOKS. Legal and Equitable Rights of married women in respect to their property and persons and their children. By Wm. H. Cord, Esq. 2 Vols. 2d Edition. Kay & Bro., Phila., 1885. This work is very much like the ordinary law book. All the cases hearing on the question are gotten together and put into a sort of patchwork without much system. The lawyer in this State will, however, find it of peculiar value, as the Kentucky law, statutes and decisions, seem all to have been collected and is given a particular prominence. The mere opinions of text-writers are of little value, but in the making of law books there is still need and call for considerable original work and ability to be displayed in analyzing and logically dividing the subject-matter of the decisions. Fisher's Digest should be a model for all ambitious law writers. Future law books must be digests and not treatises. Paragraphs like this (page 17) have no proper place in a law book: “No man's happiness is full orbed until he looks upon the woman who is the elect of his heart and calis her his wife. There she stands before him, with the vows of her love fresh upon her, his ideal woman and all his own, he has chosen her out of all the world. She is his elect, and now she stands in the queenly radiance of her beauty, the tremulous trill of her love-charged voice in his ear, pure as the pearly dew, culti vated, elegant and beaming with intelligence and faith-his wife. If he seeks wealth it is that he may make his home such as satisfies his love for her, his mansion is projected for such architectural effects as may meet her taste, the grounds are laid off upon a plan that will gratify her, statuary, painting and elegant furniture are but the frame of which she is the living and half divine picture," etc. The etc. is his own. had better have put it after the first sentence and left out what follows. He Transfer of Stock in Private Corporations. By Abbott Lawrence Lowell and Francis C. Lowell. Seton on Decrees. Forms of Decrees, Judgments and Orders with Notes. By Sir Henry Seton. Thatcher's Practice. A Digest of Statutes, Admiralty Rules and Decisions upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings and Practice of the District Courts of the United States. Little, Brown & Co., Boston. There was recently a trial for murder in which the evidence was so palpably insufficient that the judge stopped the case and directed the jury to return a verdict of "not guilty." A wellknown lawyer, however, who wished to do something for the fee he had received for the defense, claimed the privilege of addressing the court. "We'll hear you with pleasure, Mr. B.," said the judge; "but to prevent accident, first acquit the prisoner." "I am going to get married," said a lawyer, who has a big case for the Widow K., "when I can find a woman with attractions or money enough to tempt me." "Why don't "Why don't you win "What for?" "Why, Widow K.'s case and then marry her?" for her money. "Her money! Why, she'll have no money when I get through. It would be she who would be marrying me for the money that comes out of the case." January, 1885-5 |