was given by Judge Jackson: "Such differences of opinion between the courts was certainly not the 'prejudice or local influence' which the law contemplates as furnishing a ground or reason for removing a suit from one jurisdiction to another. Webster defines 'prejudice' as follows: An opinion or decision of mind formed without due examination; prejudgment; a bias, or leaning towards one side or the other of a question from other considerations than those belonging to it; an unreasonable predilection or prepossession for or against anything; especially an opinion or leaning adverse to anything, formed without proper grounds or before suitable knowledge.' It is in this general sense that the removal acts use the word 'prejudice,' and it cannot be properly applied to the solemn judgment of the highest court of a State, on the mere ground that said judgment differs from that of the Supreme Court of the United States on the same question. The term 'local influence,' if not synonymous with 'prejudice,' manifestly refers to an improper influence exerted by or existing in favor of one side or against the other, which will prevent the latter from obtaining justice in the State courts. The 'prejudice or local influence' which the law meant to make the grounds of removal may relate to the person of the litigant or the subject-matter of the litiga

5 In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 457. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has, however, reversed a decree because in their opinion the affidavit of local prejudice and local influence was

tion; but in either case there must exist improper bias, partiality, unreasonable predilection, or hostility in the local community or courts, which will work injustice, or prevent the party seeking a removal from obtaining justice. If in any case a State court's decision can be made the ground of removal, it must be alleged and shown that such decision proceeded, not from error or mistake of law, but from that improper bias or unreasonable predilection which constitutes the 'prejudice' or 'local influence' contemplated by the law." Adelbert Col. lege v. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. R. 836, 843.

"Questions of prejudice or local influence are matters resting largely in opinion, and are not generally susceptible of proof by evidence of facts like issues in ordinary actions at law or suits in equity." Reeves v. Corning, 57 Fed. R. 774, 776. Judge Deady said: "This case is a good illustration of the indelicacy and inexpediency of the proceeding authorized by the Act of 1887, whereby this court may be required to pass upon the fitness of a State judge to try a particular case. The affidavits of the defendants amount to nothing. Of course there is no prejudice in the county against the plaintiff personally, for he is unknown to the community. But there may be a prejudice in favor of his adversary that would be as much in his way not sufficiently specific. P. Schwenk S. Co. v. Strang, 59 Fed. R. 209.

In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 453; Collins v. Campbell, 62 Fed. R. 850.

of obtaining justice as a prejudice against himself. The prejudice and local influence mentioned in the statute is not merely a prejudice or influence primarily existing against the party seeking a removal. It includes as well that prejudice in favor of his adversary which may arise from the fact that he is long resident and favorably known in the community. Then there is the element of local influence, which implies that in a controversy between a stranger and resident parties having the power through wealth, business, or social relations, or personal popularity, or all combined, to direct or materially aid in the direction of political parties, and control the selection of public officers and the distribution of party emoluments, the former may be at a great disadvantage, if not powerless to assert his right. And this implication is no unusual reflection on any particular community or persons. On the contrary, it is such a well understood and recognized frailty of human nature that jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different States was expressly given by the Constitution to the national government, and this, not only as a means of doing justice, but of facilitating the trade and intercourse between the people of the several States, which the Constitution was formed, for more than any other purpose, to protect and promote. Neither is it unreasonable that in a case like this, where a stranger from another State is seeking to set aside conveyances made in favor of local creditors of long standing and high character in the community by a failing debtor

of like standing and character, that there should be prejudice and local influence, not against the plaintiff personally, but against his cause, and in favor of his adversaries. How far this influence and local prejudice might extend, and whether it would consciously or unconsciously influence the mind and action of the court, would depend largely on the temper and character of the judges. Counsel for the defendants maintain that, admitting there is a prejudice and local influence in Linn county in favor of the defendants in this case, the case being an equity one, to be decided by the court without a jury, there is no reason to think or believe that the circuit judge would be affected or influenced by it in the least degree. On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiff contends that on the proofs and in the nature of things there is a strong prejudice and influence in Linn county in favor of the defendants in this controversy; and that the circuit judge, who holds his office by the good will of this community, and is a particular friend of the principal defendant, may be, and probably will be, more or less unconsciously affected in his mental vision and conclusions by these circumstances." Neale v. Foster, 31 Fed. R. 53, 55, 56. The removal was sustained upon grounds independent of prejudice and local influence.

In a suit for a declaration that a street railroad franchise had expired, and for a mandatory injunction compelling the grantee to vacate the streets, the defendant presented an affidavit by the secretary of a trust company, swearing positively to

prejudice and local interest against the defendant, and setting forth upon information and belief certain facts as evidence of the same, including a riot; the conduct of the mayor and council in reference thereto, as evidenced by official records and otherwise; the calling and proceedings of a public meeting; the appointment of a committee by that meeting and their public acts; the speeches at the meeting, as evidenced by a stenographic report thereof; extracts from the local press; the issues of a local election, and its results; the messages of the mayor; the resolutions of the council and other matters of local history. A removal was ordered. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Fed. R. 1. Removals were or dered in Turnbull Wagon Co. v. Linthicum Carriage Co., 80 Fed. R. 4; Smith v. Crosby Lumber Co., 46 Fed. R. 819; s. c. (C. C. A.), 51 Fed. R. 63; Hall v. Chattanooga Agr. Works, 48 Fed. R. 599; Herndon v. Southern R. Co., 76 Fed. R. 398; Tacoma v. Wright, 84 Fed. R. 836.

In an action by a foreign corporation for the price of lumber sold, the defendant counterclaimed for serv. ices rendered, and for damages for a breach of contract. In support of a petition for a removal to a Federal court, the plaintiff filed an affidavit signed by several citizens of the county in which the defendant resided, stating in general terms that from prejudice and local influence the plaintiff could not obtain a fair

trial in that county or in the judicial district. The facts stated in the affidavits were that the defendant had a large and influential business connection in the county and district, and that the counties had more or less litigation in their corporate capacity, which had excited a prejudice against non-resident corporations.

This affidavit was controverted by an affidavit signed by numerous citizens of the vicinity. The court refused to remove the case. Carson & Rand L. Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. R. 885.

An affidavit that defendant has no acquaintance in the county in which the trial in the State court will be had; that plaintiff is well known there as a lawyer and a politician, having lived and practiced law at the county-seat many years, and having been a candidate for the office of attorney-general of the State,- was held insufficient to justify a removal. Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. R. 535. 7 Ibid.

8 Niblock v. Alexander, 44 Fed. R. 306. See to a similar effect, Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Fed. R. 114; Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. R. 536; s. c., 38 Fed. R. 868; P. Schwenk Co. v. Strang, 59 Fed. R. 209. Contra, Adelbert College v. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co., 47 Fed. R. 836, 841; Cooper v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 42 Fed. R. 697.

9 Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Fed. R. 1, 11.