erents to distinguish between them, and responsibility for any conflict arising from neglect to do so must rest upon the negligent power.

This caustic exchange of views on harboring submarines took place before the appearance of the U-53. Had the Allies deferred approaching the United States until after that event, the situation favored the belief that the submarine's behavior would have dictated a different reply from Washington. Indeed, there was a strong presumption that if another German armed submarine had the temerity to visit an American port it might have been promptly interned, not under international law, but at the behest of public opinion.

HE conduct of the country's foreign policy became hampered by the presidential campaign. President Wilson was frankly uncertain of reelection and embarrassed by the feeling that any determination he made of a policy toward Germany might be overturned by his successful opponent. So American domestic politics perceptibly intruded at this stage in the country's foreign policy.

In fact, that policy was practically in suspension. Germany eagerly availed herself of the hiatus, and, satisfying herself that President Wilson would be defeated, and that his successor would adopt a different attitude to her (she had no real ground for this supposition), embarked upon a submarine activity that was in strange contrast to the moderation which the German Chancellor had stubbornly fought for in its conduct.

The point to be remembered was that Germany's pledge to President Wilson was the only curb on frightfulness. Germany rashly assumed that the defeat of President Wilson would nullify it. At any rate, his uncertain outlook in the preelection period opened the way for a submarine outbreak which would be ex

tended with impunity owing to the Administration's hesitation in taking action that might not be sustained by the President's presumed successor, on the theory that Mr. Wilson's defeat would be tantamount to a popular repudiation of his policies.

Light was thrown on the German submarine policy by a Berlin dispatch, dated October 26, 1916, which indicated that the submarines were at least placating the extremists:

"While the silence of the German press and public on the subject of sharpened submarine warfare may be attributed in some measure to the stand of Hindenburg and Ludendorff against it, much more significant is the growing popular realization that sharpened submarine warfare is actually in force. And the public is beginning to regard it as efficient and highly satisfactory. The fact is that it is successful as never before, for it is sharpened not qualitatively, but quantitatively."

The British admiralty later reported that between May 4 (the date of the German pledge) and November 8, 1916, thirty-three vessels had been sunk by German submarines without warning, resulting in the loss of 140 lives. In the same period 107 ships, all of British registry, had been sunk and "the lives of the crews and passengers imperiled through their being forced to take to the sea in open boats while their ships were a target for the enemy's guns."

President Wilson's success at the polls, which hung in the balance several days after the election, was the signal for a change of attitude on Germany's part. The Berlin Government realized that his foreign policy had received the indorsement of a majority of American citizens, and the assurance was communicated that the German admiralty was again on its good behavior.

But many depredations had been committed which Germany would be hard put to to explain satisfactorily. No less than ten pressing American inquiries regarding sunk ships were sent to the Berlin Foreign Office as soon as the President, assured that his tenure of office was no longer in doubt, returned to the consideration of foreign affairs. The submarine outbreak showed an undoubted disposition on Germany's part to violate her

pledge, and if the Administration was satisfied that she had done so, its expressed attitude was that no more protests would be sent. The American answer to Germany's defiance could only be the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff from Washington and the recall of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin.

The outstanding cases on which the United States called for an adequate defense from Germany were:

The Rowanmore, British freighter, bound from Baltimore to Liverpool, sunk off Cape Clear on October 25, 1916. Two Americans and five Filipinos were on board. No lives were lost.

The Marina, a British horse carrier, bound from Glasgow to Newport News, sunk without warning off the southwest coast of Ireland on October 29, 1916. She carried a mixed crew of British and Americans. Six Americans lost their lives.

The Arabia, a Peninsular and Oriental passenger liner, sunk in the Mediterranean without warning on November 6, 1916. One American was on board. No lives were lost.

The Columbian, an American steamer, sunk off the Spanish coast on November 8, 1916, after being held up for two days under surveillance by the submarine during a storm.

Germany charged that the Rowanmore attempted to escape on being ordered to stop. Her steering gear was shot away after an hour's chase, when the captain hove to and lifeboats were lowered. The crew complained that the submarine shelled the boats after they had cleared the ship. This the commander denied. The flight of the Rowanmore appeared to deprive her of the consideration due to an unresisting vessel under cruiser warfare.

The Marina carried a defensive gun, as did the Arabia. This fact alone, Germany contended, entitled her submarines to sink both vessels without warning, in addition to the commander's belief in each case that the vessel was a transport in the service of the British admiralty. The American Government was satisfied that neither vessel was engaged in transport service on the voyage in question. In the Arabia's case, 450 passengers were on board, including women and children, who were only saved because the Administration had already held that the gun's

presence on a vessel did not deprive her of the right to proper warning before being sunk. Germany admitted liability for sinking the Columbian and agreed to pay for the value of the vessel and the contraband cargo she carried.

The Marina case stood out, in the view of the State Department, as a "clear-cut" violation of Germany's pledges to the United States. Her gun was not used, and no opportunity was afforded for using it. The "presumption" on the part of a Ger man submarine commander that a vessel was a transport was a favorite defense of Germany's and disregarded the American ruling on armed merchantmen, which held that "the determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption, but upon conclusive evidence."

Berlin was looking for trouble. A period of complications in American-German relations was frankly predicted. The Administration was plainly concerned by the situation; but no decision to take action was forthcoming. Its hesitation appeared to be due to the apparent need for a further note to dispose of new interpretations Germany had ingeniously woven in her various excuses by way of evading the letter and spirit of the Sussex agreement. One view of her submarine "rights" which Germany insisted on upholding was that armed merchantmen were not legally immune from attack on sight.

Herr Zimmermann, the German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, defined anew his Government's attitude:

"As the armament of several British ships has been used for attack, and has therefore endangered the lives of crew and passengers, of course armed ships cannot be considered as peaceful trade boats."

The cases of the Marina and Arabia put the German pledges to a test. Neither vessel attempted to escape nor offered resistance, though armed with a solitary gun. The issue therefore resolved itself into these considerations:

First. Since the German submarine commanders have pleaded extenuating circumstances on which they based their presumption that the Marina and Arabia were transports, and not passenger vessels, were these circumstances sufficient to have

justified the commanders in mistaking the two steamers for transports?

Second. If there were such extenuating circumstances, were they such as to warrant the commanders in departing from the general rule laid down by the American Government in the Sussex note, calling forth the pledges given by Germany in May, 1916, in which it was guaranteed that "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance?"

Whatever intimation was made to Germany by the United States did not become public. By December, 1916, the whole question appeared to have been suddenly shelved by the peace proposals Germany hurled at the Allies in loud tones of victory, coupled with an invitation to the United States to interpose as a mediator. Peace, of course, would dispose of further friction with the United States. While the proposals were pending, moreover, American action on German violations of her sub marine agreement was suspended. What was the use of a diplomatic rupture with Germany on the eve of peace? But Germany knew that her official "peace kite" was making an abortive flight. Peace she really did not expect, knowing it was not within reach; but she was anxious to preserve friendly relations with the United States, although daily flouting it in her conduct of the submarine war. Her peace move was therefore shown to have had a double edge. It postponed, but did not avert, a final crisis with the United States, and that, indeed, might well have been its initial aim in view of the foredoomed futility of its ostensible object. Certainly President Wilson espoused the peace proposal for the same reason; but, as shown in the following chapter, the efforts of both were in vain. The real climax was to come after all.