THE movement for peace was at its crest, and President Wilson

was apparently sanguine that his efforts in furthering it were on the eve of bearing fruit, when Great Britain planned tr extend her blockade of the German coast in the North Sea. She enlarged the dangerous area which hitherto only barred the entry of German naval forces south into the Straits of Dover and the English Channel by cutting off the German North Sea coast altogether, in order to prevent the egress and ingress of German sea raiders by the northward route and to curtail the chances of the kaiser's warships making successful forays on the English coast. The significance of this action was not seen until it became known that Great Britain had discovered that Germany, while seemingly occupied with peace, was preparing a warning to neutrals of her intention to establish a deep-sea blockade of the entire British and French coasts. By extending the mined area round the German coast Great Britain sought to counteract and anticipate the new German project, the aim of which was to starve the British Isles by a bitter and unrestrained submarine war on all ships. The British warning of the extended dangerous area came on January 27, 1917. Germany announced her new policy four days later, proclaiming that it was in retaliation of Great Britain's latest attempt to tighten her strangle hold on German food supplies. But there was overwhelming evidence the German Chancellor himself provided it-that the German plan had been matured long in advance of Great Britain's course, and that the peace overtures had really been made by Germany in order that their certain rejection could be seized upon as a justification for the ruthless sea warfare projected.

It was hard to believe that the German autocracy could be so colossally stupid as to force America to join in the war on the side of the Allies. Yet it was so. On January 31,

1917, the German Government announced the withdrawal of its pledges to the United States not to sink merchant ships or liners without warning. The Administration realized that a crisis had come in the relations between the United States and Germany.

Germany found occasion in her note of renunciation to link its purport with that of the President's address delivered to the Senate nine days previously. In its exalted sentiments she gave a perfunctory and manifestly insincere acquiescence by way of prefacing familiar reproaches to the Allies for refusing to accept her peace overtures. In rejecting them, she said, the Allies had disclosed their real aims, which were to "dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.”

Germany was poignantly grieved by the continuance of the war, not solely because of fear of this supposititious dismemberment, but because "British tyranny mercilessly increases the sufferings of the world, indifferent to the laws of humanity, indifferent to the protests of the neutrals whom they severely harm, indifferent even to the silent longing for peace among England's own allies. Each day of the terrible struggle causes new destruction, new sufferings. Each day shortening the war will, on both sides, preserve the lives of thousands of brave soldiers and be a benefit to mankind."

Anything to end the war, was Germany's slogan. Because of the sufferings of the German people "a new situation" had been created which forced her to "new decisions." Because of the sufferings of other nations, and the Entente Powers' refusal to make peace at her bidding, she thus announced her resolve: "... The Imperial Government, in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people, is now compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal."

The Imperial Government furthermore hoped that the United States would "view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist on their part to prevent further misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life."

The "new situation" as presented to the United States was that within a barred zone Germany had drawn round the British and French coasts, extending from the Shetlands as far south as Cape Finisterre, and to the west some 700 miles into the Atlantic, and also in the Mediterranean, all sea traffic would be stopped on and after February 1, 1917, and that neutral vessels navigating the proscribed waters would do so at their own risk. The only exception made was a "safety lane" permitted for one American vessel a week with identifiable markings to sail to and from Falmouth through the Atlantic zone (the United States Government to guarantee that it did not carry contraband) and another safety lane admitting sea traffic through the Mediterranean to Athens. All other vessels would be sunk without regard to the pledges Germany made to the United States. Germany thus practically shut off American traffic with Europe in pursuance of her new sea warfare against her enemies.

The edict was extended to hospital ships on the charge that the Allies used them for the transportation of munitions and troops. The charge was denied by the British and French Governments; but frightfulness admitted of no truth nor acceptance of denials of German charges, obviously made deliberately to justify barbarities, and so hospital ships, with their medical and nursing staffs and wounded, were to be sunk whenever found by submarines.

The real attitude of Germany toward her withdrawn pledges to the United States was betrayed by the German Chancellor in addressing the Reichstag Committee on Ways and Means. He revealed that the pledges were merely a temporary expedient, made to fill up a gap until more submarines were available. It appeared that in March, May (when Germany surrendered to the American demands), and in September, 1916, the question of unrestricted warfare was not considered ripe for decision-that is, Germany was not ready to defy the United States. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg thus defined the situation:

"I have always proceeded from the standpoint of whether U-boat war would bring us nearer victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that was calculated to shorten the

war constitutes the most humane policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and swift victory, I said then they must be employed. This moment has now arrived. The moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake the enterprise.'

What changes, he asked, had come into the situation? A firm basis for success had been established by a considerable increase in submarines; poor harvests confronted England, France, and Italy, who would find their difficulties unbearable by an unrestricted submarine war; France and Italy also lacked coal, and the submarines would increase its dearth; England lacked ore and timber, her supplies of which would be diminished by the same means; and all the Entente Powers were suffering from a shrinkage in cargo space due to the submarines. With the bright prospect of success afforded by the supposed plight of the Allied Powers, Germany, he indicated, was prepared to accept all the consequences that would flow from the unrestricted submarine warfare decided upon.

So was President Wilson. The German Chancellor made it clear that after Germany gave her solemn pledge on May 4, 1916, not to sink ships without warning, she had occupied the intervening months in feverish preparations to break it and to tear up the pledge like a scrap of paper and throw it to the winds. On the Chancellor's own words Germany had been convicted of a breach of faith.

The President considered the crisis for three days. There was no question of the United States tolerating Germany's disavowal of her unlawful blockade of American trade with the belligerent countries. The only questions to be decided were whether to warn Germany that a rupture would follow her first act hurtful to American life or property; to demand the withdrawal of her decree by an ultimatum; to wait until she committed some "overt act" before taking action; or whether to cease diplomatic relations without any parley at all.

The last-named course was determined upon. On February 3, 1917, President Wilson addressed the two Houses of Congress in