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not allow her to have a fleet there. That was an encroachment upon her sovereignty; and, therefore, in 1870 Russia seized the opportunity and denounced that treaty, and we know what happened in the Conference of London. If we will keep away from the question of sovereignty, I think the neutralization of the small states will be a great benefit. We have an example in the neutralization of Corfu. In this war the neutrality of Corfu has been violated; at least the Central Powers accused the Allies of it and they said that Greece had violated her own neutrality of Corfu, and that "we have the same right to violate the neutrality of Corfu."

I have expressed the hope, and I suppose many will agree with me, that Constantinople will be a neutralized city, and that the Bosphorus will be neutralized for the benefit and happiness of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN. Who will be the next to favor us?

Senator LA FONTAINE. I would like to make one observation. I think there is a kind of misunderstanding about the value of the word "neutralization." When a league of nations is organized, as most of us have in mind, the league will have as its first aim to guarantee the integrity and independence of all the nations included in the league. Otherwise, the league cannot succeed, because, if within the league one member can attack another member, the league will be futile. I feel that the situation is absolutely the same, if you say that states are neutralized, or are members of a league to enforce peace, or a league to restore order, which is, in my opinion, the true term which should be used.

Now, the question before the small neutralized states is, to consider if they should be obliged to help in the restoration of internatio 1 order. Mr. Wicker said that each of the states should maintain some fortresses and even have a small army. Now what would be the limit of such a force? I think that a small state, such as Belgium, for instance, and Switzerland, in such a scheme, which would admit that war is possible inside of the league, would not be willing to arm in only some small proportion. They would try to arm as strongly as possible, as Switzerland has done and as Belgium was doing when the war broke out. So I feel that the small states will not be satisfied with such a scheme, if behind the idea of Mr. Wicker is the proposition that war is possible inside of the league.

As to the participation of small nations in the force of constraint in a world organized for peace, I believe that such small states s ould take their part in it. Why should they have all the advantages, and none of the burdens at all, or a very small portion of the burdens? I think that

the peace of the world.

the small states are willing to do their share. I, as a Belgian, feel very strongly that my small country will give its share for the maintenance of We feel that we will have great advantages from the League of States. Belgium has had already a great many advantages from the peace which she enjoyed during the last century. As you know, Belgium is the fifth nation in the commerce of the world. We have big international interests, and we are prepared to pay the price for the advantages obtained.

I have given some thought to the possibility of the organization of a force of constraint all over the world, not having in mind one army and one navy, but rather a combination of armies and navies of the world. If trouble arises in South America, certainly nobody would expect Belgium or Holland or Scandinavia to send their troops or their navies so far from their own shores. I think some organization can be perfected by which the forces to be used under such circumstances would be the forces of the neighbouring states; but, nevertheless, in a case of that kind, the cost of such measures as might be necessary should be divided among all the nations and not borne alone by the acting nations, because it would be in the ultimate interest of all. As individuals, we are interested in the result of a lawsuit before a court among people whom we do not know at all, merely because the principles involved are those which may be applied to our own case eventually, and I think that we should all take the same position in this matter of a world force. The smallest state is interested that justice should be done, and why should not the small state pay its share in proportion to the advantage which it enjoys? Such an arrangement will be a very potent argument against any discrimination, such as was attempted in the nomination of judges by the big states at the Second Peace Conference. Otherwise, we will have the same situation and the same feeling of the big Powers opposing their forces against the small Powers. I think we must all try to avoid such a disaster, and to place all nations in the same position, and to consider that they have the right to fight for justice - the small and the large alike just as the poorest and most humble man in the world has as much right as the billionaire to see that justice is done in the administration of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. The subject is still open, and others are invited to speak.

Mr. DENYS P. MYERS. Mr. Chairman: I have noticed that in the discussion of neutralization this morning there has evidently been no examination of the reason why. Now, neutralization has seemed very

attractive, but I believe that, politically, it has occurred not exactly for some reasons that we might conclude as entirely meriting applause. Some years ago there was an attempt to adopt the idea of neutralizing everything as a general policy for securing peace, which led me, as an official of the World Peace Foundation, to an examination of neutralization, and I tried to give some attention to its political origins. The conclusion that I reached, from a considerable study of the records, was that neutralization on the part of the neutralizing states has, for the most part, been a dishonest procedure. Let us put it this way: A and B want to take C's watch; neither of them has quite the effrontery to be seen doing it, and they closely observe each other for a chance to get it on the quiet, but they do not find the opportunity; so they make a virtue of necessity, and they both come together and agree, sub rosa, in their own minds, that because neither can get it, neither will take it. I believe that that motive has been substantially the political impetus behind neutralization. It evidently was in the case of Belgium. The surrounding countries were unwilling that any particular one should acquire Belgium in the 30's. I believe in the records there was considerable discussion on that point. It was rather obviously the case with Switzerland. It seems to have been the case with Luxemburg. It was again rather obviously the case with the Suez Canal, though there they were perhaps moved by different considerations. The point I want to make is this: that if it is true that that is the political reason which has caused neutralization for the most part, neutralization is a purely negative thing. While it may have an interesting bearing, once it is in existence, its real purpose has been negative, and any negative proposition in international affairs, is, I venture, a very weak reed on which to build something positive.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gammans.

Mr. NELSON GAMMANS. Mr. Chairman, the preceding speaker has presented to you the proposition that the sanction for the enforcement of Fermanent neutralization is likely to be lacking because of the motives of guaranteeing Powers, since if those Powers have made the guarantee merely to keep territory neutralized until they themselves feel in a position to seize it, they will not extend aid to the neutralized state for the benefit of that state.

What sanction there is behind neutralization is lessened with the extension of the system of territorial neutralization. The larger the number of neutralized states, the smaller the number of guaranteeing Powers. The existence of guaranteeing Powers is necessary for the existence of a sanction.

Were neutralization extended to include the territory of all Christendom, there would be no sanction for the enforcement of the system of neutralization, since there would be no guaranteeing Powers.

A solution of the problem, preferable to neutralization, is action by neutral states, either formally or informally, but preferably formally in a league of peace, in stepping in and punishing the aggressor. I would make some clear test to determine who is the aggressor. I would say, for instance, that the first nation to cross the boundary line is the aggressor. Such a rule would put a premium upon a state's keeping its troops on its own side of the line, and suffering a temporary disadvantage, in the hope and expectation that other states would step in to uphold its side of the conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we to have any further expression of views on this subject?

Admiral COLBY M. CHESTER, U. S. N. The speaker who has preceded me, has recalled to my mind an incident relating to the subject of neutrality, which it might be well to mention here. I have been employed in the undertaking of the Government of the United States to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama for a number of years, and my experience there has convinced me that the maintenance of neutrality of any country, or of nations, must be dependent upon a force of some kind. In carrying out the treaty of 1846, concluded between the United States and New Granada, now Colombia, in which we bound ourselves to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, against threatened attack, in the interests, not only of Colombia but of all the nations of the world, it was always necessary to have a force near at hand to enforce the mandates of the treaty. The matter was made more difficult, perhaps, by the fact that in undertaking this obligation we at the same time engaged to uphold the sovereignty of Colombia, and this was, at first construed as applying to assaults upon her integrity by her own people. Fortunately for this country, however, the policy of the government was established as far back as the year 1865, by my old Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, who, at the time refused to acquiesce in an agreement made between the American Minister at Bogotá and the Colombian Government, in which our country was made a party to a conflict between it and a revolutionary party in the State of Panama, as it would be an unwarranted interference in the political affairs of a foreign nation not called for by the treaty. "The gist of the whole matter," wrote Admiral Pearson, "is that the United States guarantees the former (Colombia)

the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus, with the view that the free transit. from one sea to the other may not be interrupted or embarrassed, etc." Thus was established the fact that our country's obligation to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus rested on a broader basis than the simple protection of Colombia's welfare. We were to uphold the interests of all the states of the world which might desire to use the isthmian route for their commerce. Admiral Pearson further emphasized his interpretation of the treaty by announcing that, "Should an armed force from without the limits of the United States of Colombia land at either end of said transit with a view to preventing the running of the railroad, or should any force whatever assail such road or the transit of passengers thereon, then the United States naval force here would prevent any such molestation to the utmost extent of its power." The strong words of the Admiral would, however, been as chaff thrown to the winds but for the presence of a naval force under his command which would be able to enforce them. As it was in this case, so must it ever be necessary to maintain an armed force of some kind to support the demands of treaties or conventions, by whomsoever made, otherwise they will become "scraps of paper."

The policy established by Admiral Pearson was later approved by the then Secretary of State, Mr. William H. Seward, and has been the rule governing the United States naval officers, who have mainly had charge of Isthmian diplomacy ever since. For nearly half a century many perplexing questions concerning the construction to be placed upon the treaty of 1846, have had to be met by naval officers stationed on the Isthmus, and many times has it been necessary to use the naval forces under their control in maintaining neutrality, in the present Canal Zone, not only against revolutionists which threatened governmental authority, but against the Colombian Government itself.

As has been well said by one of our speakers, the question of what force shall be used to uphold the neutrality of nations must depend not only on the large states, but the smaller ones as well; but as Mr. Hill told us, it will be a very difficult matter to adjust the proportion of representation, between the small and large countries forming "The Council of Nations" which must settle the matter. I, for one, should regret very much to see such representation based on that old practice in vogue before the Civil War in the United States, when the slaves were given a one-third vote, to be used at the discreation of the masters to reach conclusions on public questions, something of the kind, it seems to me, having been suggested here to-day, for that will bring in racial difficulties that will be embarrassing to all concerned. A better course to pursue, I think,

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