of it is a very low and base one. It is not the instinct which was felt by the men who, at very great risk, enforced, for example, the blockade which saved this Union; it is not the instinct which has usually prevailed among sailors of the navies of self-respecting nations. It is a faulty reasoning and an instinct which must be extirpated, and fortunate it is that we are at last about to do our share to that end. The PRESIDENT. Are there any other remarks to be made on this subject? (No response.) The PRESIDENT. If not, the meeting will stand adjourned until ten o'clock to-morrow morning, at this place. (Whereupon, at ten o'clock P.M., the meeting adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at ten o'clock at the same place.) SECOND SESSION Friday, April 27, 1917, 10 o'clock a.m. The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Everett P. Wheeler, a member of the Executive Council). The Society will please come to order. (On motion, duly seconded, it was unanimously ordered that a cablegram be sent to President Bustamante, of the Cuban Society of International Law, in reply to the cablegram of the Cuban Society received the day before.1) Mr. STERLING E. EDMUNDS. I have a resolution which I should like to present to the meeting, if it is in order. The CHAIRMAN. You may read the resolution. Mr. EDMUNDS. (Reading.) Whereas, the Government of the United States is now undertaking the raising of large armies from among our citizens; and, Whereas, the legal training of these of our citizens in military and international law is peculiarly necessary in this war, which is essentially one for the vindication of law; and, Whereas, the usual educational facilities of the Government of the United States may not be adequate to so large an added task; therefore, be it Resolved, that the American Society of International Law offers to the Government of the United States the services of its members as instructors in such branches of law in any manner in which their services may be desired. I wish to say, in justification of this resolution that the War Department has called for the training, according to the announcement I saw, of 10,000 reserve officers in camps throughout the United States; that the primary purposes of the Government, or the primary work the Government will do with respect to these men is to give them military training, and that by reason of the necessity of vindicating law, it seems quite an important task that these men should be equally trained in sound and correct principles of the laws of war, as well as international law. 1 For the cablegram sent pursuant to this motion see page 41, infra. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the practice of the Society has been to refer all resolutions to the Executive Council, but, after conference with some of our members, it has seemed to me that it would be appropriate to ask unanimous consent to have this resolution put to vote at once. The Chair hears no objection. The Chair will put the question upon the resolution and the preamble that have been read. All in favor of the preamble and resolution that have been read will say "Aye." (The resolution and preamble were unanimously adopted.) The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other business now, excepting the order of the day? The SECRETARY. I think not, sir. The CHAIRMAN. The next in order is a paper by Mr. Charles Cheney Hyde, of the Chicago Bar, Professor of International Law in Northwestern University, the subject being "Attacks upon Unarmed Enemy Merchant Vessels." ATTACKS ON UNARMED ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS ADDRESS BY CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Of the Chicago Bar, Professor of International Law in Northwestern May a belligerent warship lawfully attack at sight an unarmed enemy merchantman? It may occasion surprise that a speaker before the American Society of International Law should venture to raise such an inquiry at such a time. The writer shares, however, what is doubtless the view of all here present, that a belligerent warship normally lacks that right. While such a vessel may lawfully attempt to gain control of or destroy all enemy ships not exempt from capture, the law of nations is vitally concerned with the processes employed. It does not sanction the needless sacrifice of life or property. It is still worth while to observe how the immunity of the merchantman from attack at sight has developed, and again, what conduct, if any, on the part of such a vessel subjects it to treatment such as may be lawfully accorded a public armed ship. Finally, it is important to consider whether the equities of the merchantman are restricted by reason of the nature and limitations of the fighting craft of the enemy. Long before the European War, nations were agreed that unarmed enemy merchant vessels were in general not subject to attack at sight, and that if they were guilty of no improper conduct, the propriety of attack or destruction was dependent upon the giving of opportunity for the removal of persons on board to a place of safety. Such respect for human life was, moreover, broadly acknowledged without discrimination. between carriers of passengers and freight, and irrespective of the nationality of the persons involved. In days when privateering flourished the unarmed merchantman was a thing unknown. Ships of commerce did not put to sea without substantial armament. This at times sufficed to enable the possessor to offer prolonged resistance and positive danger to any type of vessel encountered. Consequently there was no reason to deal lightly with a vessel itself capable of initiating hostilities, and possibly alert to do so whenever favorable opportunity presented itself. Dictates of humanity could only urge restraint when at least, apart from other considerations, the merchantman ceased to be a source of danger to the naval forces of the enemy. The earliest instructions to American privateers, dated April 3, 1776, authorized the commanders by force of arms to "attack, subdue, and take all ships and other vessels" belonging to the inhabitants of the enemy's country. There was no suggestion that any ships belonging to them should be treated with leniency. As doubtless the entire merchant marine of the enemy was armed, at least defensively, it was logical that the instructions should place all enemy vessels in the same category. The instructions of President Madison to American privateers issued in 1812, stated that "towards enemy vessels and their crews, you are to proceed, in exercising the rights of war, with all the justice and humanity which characterize the nation of which you are members." No discrimination was, however, made in respect to any class of enemy ships, and doubtless none was thought of. With the abandonment of privateering and the confining of hostilities to public vessels specially adapted for war, the arming of merchantmen became increasingly infrequent because of the helplessness of such vessels in engagements with a warship, which was the only type of craft from which acts of aggression were to be anticipated. The latter, moreover, with its vast preponderance of offensive power and defensive strength, found the merchantman a negligible danger and regarded it rather as an object of prey. Thus the very weakness of the latter became a safeguard, and the unarmed merchantman gained the right to be called upon to surrender before attack. Although useful to its own state as a carrier of articles needed for the prosecution of war, the enemy merchantman did not lose the right to demand a signal to surrender before being attacked. Respect for humanity still outweighed the claims of military necessity, a fact which neither the writings of publicists nor the naval codes of maritime Powers purported to deny. At the present time an unarmed enemy merchant vessel, such as a trans-Atlantic liner of great tonnage and high speed, although designed and employed primarily for the transportation of passengers and mail, is still capable of rendering incidentally substantial military service as a carrier of war material. Its speed may enable the vessel to outdistance any pursuer and to keep beyond the range of a signal to stop. Wireless telegraphic equipment may offer means of summoning aid whenever needed. The instant destruction of the ship without warning may thus offer the sole means of preventing its escape and the delivery of contraband articles at their destination. The success of the voyage, despite its principal purpose, may serve to prolong the war by adding to the resources of the state to which the vessel belongs. It is not believed, however, that the indirect harm to be wrought in consequence of escape equals that to be anticipated from the deliberate disregard and destruction of the lives of the occupants of the ship. Claims of military necessity still fail to turn the scales of justice. The unarmed freighter, not so given over to the transportation of war material as to be deemed primarily an instrument of belligerent service, is believed to be entitled to similar treatment. A total absence of passengers does not deprive officers and crew of safeguards which are fairly due noncombatants. Nor does the smallness in number of the individuals whose lives are at stake weaken the equities of the occupants of the ship, unless it is bent on an essentially hostile mission. The slower speed of the vessel as compared with that of the passenger liner, lessens, moreover, the chances of its escape in case of pursuit. Doubtless the peculiar occupation or sinister conduct of an unarmed merchantman may so strengthen the equities of an enemy warship as to cause the claims of military necessity to outweigh every other consideration. The cases falling within this category do not, however, weaken the principle that the carrier is normally exempt from attack at sight, or that the enemy vessel which fires upon it without warning assumes the burden of showing that its victim has forfeited the right to exemption from such treatment. The question presents itself whether the right of exemption is forfeited by the attempt of the merchantman to escape capture. All will agree that any form of resistance by such a vessel destroys its immunity. This is true when, for example, an unarmed surface craft attempts to ram its assailant. It is also true, according to the Department of State, when an |