the case of a donatio mortis causâ would necessitate a retransfer to the donor should he recover. And there is also, as regards some kinds of property at all events, a second class of cases, in which the transaction is sufficiently effected by an inchoate or incomplete delivery or transfer, such as would not be sufficient in the case of an ordinary gift, and as in the case of a donatio mortis causâ requires something further to be done by the legal personal representatives of the donor after his death. The recent case of In re Wasserberg, illustrates the latter class of case. Wasserberg was the owner of certain bonds to bearer which he kept in the custody of his bank in a locked box; of which he kept the key. Being about to undergo a serious operation, he gave his wife a list of the bonds, and also his bunch of keys containing the key of the locked box, and told her to lock them up together, which she did. He had previously on the same day expressed his desire that his wife should have the bonds in the event of his death. Sargant, J., held that the delivery of the key transferring to the wife a partial dominion over, or part of the means of getting at the bonds, though not a sufficient delivery to support a gift inter vivos was, under the circumstances, a sufficient delivery to effect a donatio mortis causâ.

Alien enemies' right of action.-The effect of the Imperial Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, and the Aliens Restriction Order, 1914, is that an alien registered in the United Kingdom under those Acts, not only has license to remain in the United Kingdom, but is forbidden to leave it without special permission. The same is the effect of the Dominion Order in Council of October 28th, 1914, which amongst other things, provides that-No alien of enemy nationality shall be permitted to leave Canada without an exeat from a Registrar of Alien Enemies.' The recent case of Thurn and Taxis (Princess) v. Moffit,' decides that an alien enemy, or, in this particular case, an alien's enemy's wife-may, under such circumstances, maintain an action in the Courts. Sargant, J., in delivering judgment says: "There certainly seems to be a general impression that during the continuance of a state of war an alien enemy as such is not entitled to any relief at law as a plaintiff in the Courts of this Country. The law applicable to the circumstances is, in my

84 L. J. Ch. 214, [1915] 1 Ch. 195. '84 L. J. Ch. 220, [1915] 1 Ch. 58.

opinion, correctly stated in Hall's International Law (6th ed.), p. 388, as follows:- When persons are allowed to remain, either for a specified time after the commencement of war, or during good behaviour, they are exonerated from the disabilities of enemies for such time as they in fact stay, and they are placed in the same position as other foreigners except that they cannot carry on a direct trade in their own or other enemy vessels with the enemy country.'

Covenant in restraint of trade.-Goldsoll v. Goldman,8 was an appeal from the judgment of Neville, J., noted supra pp. 169-170. The only point raised on the appeal was whether the covenant entered into by Goldman in restraint of trade was wider than was reasonable and necessary for the plaintiff's protection, and if so, whether it was severable and was valid in so far as necessary for the plaintiff's protection. In the result the judgment of Neville, J., was affirmed in so far as it limited the area of restraint to the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, discarding the limitation to foreign countries. "That such a covenant is severable in this respect has been decided by authorities nearly 200 years old": per Cozens Hardy, M.R. The judgment below, however, was varied by discarding that part of the restraint which related to real jewellery, and confirming the restraint to imitation jewellery. "Then comes the question whether the doctrine of severability is applicable to this part of the covenant. In my opinion it is, and the covenant is good in so far as it purports to restrain the covenantor from carrying on business in imitation jewellery:" per Cozens Hardy, M.R., at p. 230. Kennedy and Swinfen Eady, L.JJ., concurred with the Master of the Rolls.

Sale of land free from incumbrance followed by payment into Court. In re Wilberforce's Trusts,-apparently a case of first impression,-is a decision on the construction of sec. 5 of the Imperial Conveyancing Act 1881,-our R. S. O. 1914, ch. 109, sec. 21-which provides that: "Where land subject to an incumbrance, whether immediately payable or not, is sold by any Court or out of Court. . . . The Court may on the application of any party to the sale, direct or allow payment into Court . . . of such amount as,

when invested in securities approved of by the Court, the Court considers will be sufficient by means of the income thereof to keep down or otherwise provide for that charge; and in any other case of capital money charged on the land, of an amount sufficient to meet the incumbrance and any interest due thereon. 'Sargant, J., decides that when payment into Court is made under this section, the charge or incumbrance does not become extinguished as against the purchase money received by or on behalf of the vendors, but the purchase money remains liable to make up any deficiency that may arise owing to the money paid into Court proving inadequate to meet the charge or incumbrance in full when it falls due. At p. 258 he says: "No doubt by the mere substitution of money for land, the chargee is to some extent prejudicially affected, because it is more difficult to trace money than to trace land; but, in a case where as in this case, the purchase money, for the land remains and can be traced, I see no reason why I should relieve the vendors of the land and their successors in title from the obligation which they, as owning the land were under . . and cast the loss which has occurred in the interval, through the depreciation of investments, upon the chargees, who had nothing whatever to do with a sale, which was the result of a purely voluntary act on the part of the vendors." He also holds that in such cases, the amount to be paid in to meet the incumbrance is not necessarily merely the bare amount of the capital charge, but the Court may direct payment into Court of such amount as, when invested in government securities (our Act says-securities approved by the Court') it considers will be sufficient to meet the capital charge and interest thereon.

Personal liability of solicitors for goods ordered on behalf of client.-Wakefield v. Duckworth and Co.,10 has a special interest to solicitors, inasmuch as the Court decided in it that a firm of solicitors who had ordered certain photographs from the plaintiff, a photographer, for the purpose of litigation in which they were acting for a client, were not liable to pay the photographer's bill. The grounds of the decision are clearly put in the following passage from the judgment of Lord Coleridge:—

10 84 L. J. K. B. 335, [1915[ 1 K. B. 218.

"There is no question that the plaintiff knew that the defendants were solicitors acting on behalf of a client, and that being so, apart from any other considerations, they were agents acting on behalf of a principal. Prima facie in such a contract the plaintiff would have to have recourse to the principal and not the agent. It is said, however, that in the present case the mere fact that the solicitors by their partner gave the order made them personally responsible. That is not so. There are certain exceptional cases in which, although one party to a contract knows that the other is a solicitor, acting for a client, yet the solicitor is personally responsible, for instance, in cash transactions, where it is to be assumed that the solicitor has no authority to pledge the credit of his client. The present transaction was not a cash transaction in that sense, although no doubt an action would lie for the price of the photographs as soon as they were delivered. The bill was an ordinary one for photographs sent in by the plaintiff to the partner who ordered them."

Negligence of Servant.-Ricketts v. Thos. Tilling, Ltd," calls for a word of notice. A motor omnibus was being driven by the conductor, who was not authorised to drive, and sitting beside him on the box was the proper driver. The conductor being inexperienced and incompetent to drive, the motor omnibus mounted the pavement and killed a man, in respect of whose death the conductor was afterwards convicted of manslaughter, and injured several others. One of those thus injured brought this action against the omnibus company for damages for personal injuries. The trial judge entered judgment for the defendant on the ground that there was no evidence that the conductor had any authority from the defendants to drive the omnibus. The Court of Appeal granted a new trial. All the judges concurred in their reasons, which are well indicated by the following passage from the judgment of Buckley, L.J., (p. 346):-"Where the act which was the immediate cause of the accident was done by a person who prima facie ought not to have done it, then, if, as in Beard's Case,12 it was done not by reason of any negligence on the part of the person authorised to do it, the person must prove that the person who did the act was in doing it the agent of the defendant; but if the facts are that the 11 84 L. J. K. B. 342, [1915] 1 K. B. 644.

12 [1900] 2 Q. B. 530.

servant authorised to do the act was present at the doing of it, it is then a question for the jury whether the accident was due to the negligence of that servant in not performing his duty, or whether, he having discharged his duty, the accident was due to the negligence of the man who was immediately doing the act."

Juror conversing with third parties pending verdict.The King v. Ketteridge,13 is a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal affirming the proposition that if a juror after the judge has summed up in a criminal trial separates himself from his colleagues and, not being under the control of the Court, converses or is in a position to converse with other persons, it is an irregularity which renders the whole proceedings abortive. It is not necessary or relevant to consider whether the irregularity has in fact prejudiced the prisoner, and the only course open to the Court is to discharge the jury and commence the proceedings afresh. The Court refused to consider an explanatory statement which we were told had been made by the juror, which they held could clearly not be admissible evidence.

Stoppage in transitu. Reddall v. Union Castle Mail S. S. Co. Ltd.,1 also requires notice, which cannot be better done than in the words of the headnote: A purchaser of goods consigned them to a destination abroad, the transit being in several stages. At the end of one of such stages he intercepted the goods, and they thereafter remained in the custody of the carriers, who charged him warehouse rent in respect of them. The unpaid vendors having claimed to stop the goods in transitu, Bailhache, J., held that the original transit had been terminated by the purchaser, and the right of the vendors to stop the goods in transitu was therefore lost.

'To be retained' written by drawer on face of cheque.In Roberts and Co. v. Marsh,15 the short point was whether the fact that the words 'to be retained' had been written across the face of the cheque by the drawer of it prevented it being an unconditional order to pay within the meaning of

13 84 L. J. K. B. 352, [1915] 1 K. B. 467.

1484 L. J. K. B. 360.

15 84 L. J. K. B. 388, [1915] 1 K. B. 42.