ment, or for damages for breach-may not remain and yet the goods cease to be comprised in a hire purchase agreement, but I do say that when any right in respect of the goods, remains, which can only be claimed under the operative agreement, so long the goods are comprised in a hire purchase agreement within the meaning of the section. It seems to me that this is the sense and intention of the statute. Here it is necessary for the furnishing company to have recourse to the license contained in this hire purchase agreement in order to get the benefit which they seek, and this furniture, therefore, remains comprised in the agreement."

CANADIAN CASES.

A. H. F. L.

Trading Corporation -Libel.-In Price v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co, it was held by the Supreme Court in one of its rare moods of unanimity that where a libel conveys imputations calculated to injure a trading corporation in respect of its business, the corporation can maintain an action for damages. Duff, J., in the course of his remarks, agreeing that the jury had been misdirected, and that there should be a new trial, said: "The defence of justification fails unless the defendant justifies every injurious imputation which the jury find to be conveyed by the publication. The defence of fair comment fails unless the jury find that the imputation, although defamatory and not proved to be true, was made fairly and bonâ fide as the honest expression of the opinion held by the defendant, and is in the opinion of the jury warranted by the facts in the sense that a fair-minded man might on those facts, hold that opinion. It is also essential to this defence (as regards imputations which the defendant fails to prove to be warranted in fact) that he must have stated them not as facts but as inferences from other facts."

Contract-Breach-Substantial or Nominal Damages.The strongly contested case of Wood v. The Grand Valley R. W. Co., has now gone through its fourth Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Division of Ontario ordering a reference to determine the amount of damages affirmed. It will be remembered that in that case the Grand Valley Rail

way Co. and P., its president, induced certain persons to subscribe for bonds of the company. The inducements held out to the purchasers, who were all interested in the town of St. George, was that P. and the Railway Company. would, in consideration of this purchase, procure an extension of the Railway Company's system to St. George, and give St. George the benefit of competitive freight rates, by a through traffic arrangement with the Canadian Pacific Railway. Interest was paid on the bonds for five years when payments ceased. The work was commenced but never completed. The plaintiffs sued, claiming a return of their money as on a total failure of consideration; and in the alternative for damages for breach of contract. It was evident that they could not succeed on the first count; but the trial judge (26 O. L. R. 441), held that they were entitled to substantial damages, and gave judgment for $10,000 (the par value of the bonds) and directed a return of the bonds on payment. This judgment was varied in the Divisional Court (27 O. L. R. 556), but in the Appellate Division it was held that the purchasers were all entitled to substantial damages; and a reference was ordered as to the amount. The Supreme Court (Fitzpatrick, C.J., Davies, Anglin and Brodeur, JJ., Idington, J., dissenting) affirmed this decision. In the opinion of Davies, J., the case came quite within the reasoning and the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Chaplin v. Hicks. There the plaintiff was one of the competitors for a prize. A breach of contract deprived him of all chance of obtaining the prize. It was held that he was entitled to recover substantial, and not merely nominal damages, although it was clearly impossible to estimate with anything approaching mathematical accuracy the damages sustained.

Private International Law.-In the case of Canadian Pacific R. W. v. Parent, Duff, J., and Anglin, J., gave expression to opposite opinions on the applicability of Machado v. Fontes. The action was brought in the Province of Quebec by the widow of the deceased who had been killed in the Province of Ontario. Duff, J., said:

"It is not, as I understand it, disputed that if these alleged contracts would be no answer to the respondent's

[1911] 2 K. B. 786.

(1915) 51 S. C. R. 234. Supra p. 531.

[1897] 2 Q. B. 231.

action in Ontario, she is entitled to recover in these proceedings; and as in my opinion the defence based on these contracts fails, it will not be necessary to consider the possible rights of the respondents on the opposite hypothesis. I will only observe that to me it is not obvious that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Machado v. Fontes furnishes the rule of decision governing the Courts of Quebec in similar cases; or that article 1076 C. C. has any application where the wrong from whic. death results, as well as the death itself, occur outside the Province of Quebec."

Anglin, J., held that although no action would have been maintainable in Ontario, for it would have been barred by the contract signed by the deceased, (thus differing from the rest of the Court), nevertheless in Quebec where there is no 'rule of law giving the representatives a right of action only if the deceased himself would have had such right, the action would lie; for, applying Machado v. Fontes, though the wrongful act had been committed in Ontario it was of a class actionable in Ontario.

7

Mortgage-Part of Principal Postponed-Foreclosure as to part.-Thomson v. Willson," shews the danger of pushing an unreasonable doctrine, even though apparently supported by dicta of considerable antiquity, into a Court which has power to overrule them. In this case it was contended on the authority of Cameron v. McRae, that where any part of moneys due under a mortgage cannot be recovered (by reason of an agreement postponing repayment of $1,000 until a certain infant should come of age), no proceedings for foreclosure of any part of the mortgage debt can be taken. The Supreme Court, varying the judgment of the Appellate Division (31 0. L. R.) held that the acceleration clause did not apply to the $1,000; but that the postponement of the time for payment of this portion of the mortgage debt did not disentitle the mortgagee to his remedy of foreclosing for the balance due.

License to go on Premises-Breach of Contract—Damages. It does not take long for an English case laying down a new principle to be followed in this country. In Barns

. (1915) 51 S. C. R. 307.

13 Gr. 311.

8

well v. National Amusement Co., the plaintiff purchased a ticket and was entering the theatre when he was compelled to leave by a constable acting under orders from the defendants. It was held, following Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.' that he was entitled to remain, and that the damages awarded, $50, were not excessive. McPhillips, J.A., dissented, distinguishing the above mentioned case, and expressing his full agreement with the dissenting judgment of Phillimore, L.J.

Negligence of Police Officer-Action against Municipal Corporation. In Gibney v. Town of Yorktown and James Reid,10 we have a case in which action was taken against a Municipal Corporation for the negligence of a Police Officer. There was no new law laid down in the case; which is noted here simply because it illustrates a rule of law sometimes overlooked by the profession. The Police Officer in question, who was Constable and Town Marshal and also occupied several other positions of like nature for the Town of Yorktown, in pursuing his duties was endeavouring to capture a dog running at large in the town. Being unable to do so he fired a pistol shot at it. The shot struck the pavement and was deflected, striking the infant plaintiff and inflicting injury. The learned judge found that there was negligence on the part of the defendant in discharging a loaded pistol in the streets of the town where people were passing from time to time. Following McCleave v. City of Moncton," he found, however, that the Town itself was not liable; for Police Officers can in no respect be regarded as agents or officers of the City. Their duties are of a public nature. Their appointment is devolved on cities and towns by the legislature as a convenient mode of exercising a function of government, but this does not render them liable for their unlawful or negligent acts. Like cases are Wishart v. City of Brandon,12 and Haford v. New Bedford.13 See Pon Yin v. City of Edmonton. In the result judgment was given against the Police Constable for doctor's bills, nursing attendance and medicine amounting to $205, and for damages to the infant

14

plaintiff $200. The action was dismissed against the Town of Yorktown with costs.

Forged Transfer-Certificates of Title issued thereon.Brown v. Broughton,15 is an important decision of a judge of first instance on the question whether a good and indefeasible title can be transmitted to an innocent party for value by a forged transfer under the Manitoba Real Property Act, (known in Ontario as the Land Titles Act). Curran, J., after a discussion of English and Australian decisions, has adopted the contention of the district registrar, namely, that as the system provided by the Act is one of guaranteed title, a certificate of title even though obtained by the registration of a forged transfer constitutes a good root of title, and that the rights of innocent third parties defendant upon it will prevail as against the deprived owner. The result sounds a little startling. It reverses one's ideas of the law of property. The owner has now everything to lose, and the third party everything to gain. Reliance is placed on what is obviously no more than a dictum in Gibbs v. Messer.16 It is true that in such a case there is usually the assurance fund to fall back on. Curran, J., discusses the question of indemnifying the owner from this source; but, with respect, why should it not be the innocent third party who is to be indemnified? It will be a state of law requiring legislative amendment if owners can be thus deprived of property to which even sentimental considerations and old associations have caused them to become attached; and if lucky strangers are "in the twinkling of an eye" to become the owners of other men's homes.

16 (1915) 31 W. L. R. 583.
16 [1891] A. C. 248.

L. D.