in a note states that this had been the uniform holding in the courts of Pennsylvania. Hoare v. Allen, Supreme Court of Pa., 1789, 2 Dall. 102. This principle was affirmed in the case of Foxcraft and Galloway v. Nagle, Supreme Court of Pa., 1791, 2 Dall. 132. See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177. See Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 4313. There should be no abatement of interest on a judgment during the war, the counties in which the plaintiff and defendant respectively lived being judicially known not to be in territories which were hostile to one another. Kent, Paine & Co. v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485. 3. JUDICIAL REMEDIES. (1) SUSPENSION AND REVIVAL. § 1139. An alien enemy is not permitted to sue. Wilcox . Henry, 1 Dall. 69; Matthews r. McStea, 91 U. S. 7; Sanderson . Morgan, 39 N. Y. 231; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124; Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137; Grinnan v. Edwads, 21 W. Va. 347; Haymond v. Camden, 22 W. Va. 180; Sturm . Flemming, 22 W. Va. 404; Stephens v. Brown, 24 W. Va. 234. This rule obviously does not operate as to alien enemies who are by treaty permitted to continue their residence and business, on condition of observing the laws. The existence of war does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent power from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property, in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process; and where an alien enemy is thus sued, he may defend himself in the action. McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259; United States v. Shares of The right to sue revives after peace. Hanger . Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Stiles v. Eastley, 51 Ill. 275. See, also, Citizens of the loyal States were not prevented from suing citizens of the Confederate States in the Federal courts in those States as soon as such courts were opened. Before any official proclamation of the end of the civil war was made courts of the United States were held in the several States which had been engaged in rebellion, and their jurisdiction to hear and determine the cases brought before them as well before as after such proclamation is not open to controversy. Masterson v. Howard, 18 Wall. 99. As to the time when the civil war ceased in different places, see infra, § 1163. The fact that a defendant in a suit, during the war, left the State and joined the United States Army, affords no ground for maintaining a bill to reverse the proceedings had in the suit during his absence. Rodgers and Smith v. Dibrell, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 69. (2) SUSPENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. $1140. The treaty of peace with Great Britain prevents the operation of the statute of limitations of Virginia on British debts which were incurred before the treaty. Hopkirk . Bell, 3 Cranch, 454. Where a citizen of a State adhering during the war of the rebellion to the national cause brought suit, after the war, against a citizen residing during the war within the limits of an insurrectionary State, it was held that the period during which the plaintiff was prevented from suing by the state of hostilities should be deducted from the time necessary to bar the action under the statute of limitations. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532. See, also, The Protector, 12 Wall. 700; Semmes r. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 150; Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177; University r. Finch, 18 Wall. 106. 4. LICENSES. § 1141. Licenses are sometimes granted by a belligerent State to its own citizens, to those of the enemy, or to neutrals, to carry on a trade which is interdicted by the laws of war. Such documents must be respected by the officers and tribunals of the State under whose authority they are issued, though they may be considered by the adverse belligerent as a ground of capture and confiscation. They are to be construed fairly but strictly. Licenses are general and special. A general license relaxes the exercise of the rights of war, generally or partially, in relation to any community or individuals liable to be affected by their operation. A special license is one given to individuals for a particular voyage for the importation or exportation of particular goods. Licenses to trade must, as a general rule, emanate from the supreme authority of the State. But there are exceptions to this rule, growing out of the particular circumstances of the war in particular places. Thus, the governor of a province, the general of an army, or the admiral of a fleet, may grant licenses to trade within the limits of their own commands. But such licenses afford no protection beyond the limits of the authority of those who issue them. Halleck, Int. Law (3d ed., by Baker), II. 343 et seq. See, as to licenses to trade, The Sea Lion, 5 Wall. 630; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73; United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 Fed. Cases, 292. "I have to acknowledge the receipt or your letter of the 9th instant, in which you state that you desire, as counsel for the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, to obtain from this Government authority for your company to apply to the Spanish Government for a license that will enable it to protect its real estate and other assets in Spain. "In this relation, the Department desires to refer to Article XIII. of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, October 22, 1795. "The provisions of the article are as follows: "For the better promoting of commerce on both sides, it is agreed, that if a war shall break out between the said two nations one year after the proclamation of the war shall be allowed to the merchants in the cities and towns where they shall live, for collecting and transporting their goods and merchandises; and if anything be taken from them or any injury be done them within that term, by either party, or the people or subjects of either. full satisfaction shall be made for the same by the Government." of "If the obligations of this article, which expressly refer to a state of war, were recognized by the Spanish Government, it is probable that they would be so construed as to accomplish, for the present, the object which you desire to attain, so far at least as the protection any personal property is concerned. The Department, however, is advised that the Spanish Government has, as its public proclamations imply, declared all the treaty stipulations between the two countries, even though such stipulations expressly refer to a state of war, to be annulled by the existing hostilities. "In this position the Government of the United States does not acquiesce; and while it considers the action of the Spanish Government as releasing it from any obligation to observe the stipulations in question, it is unwilling to lend any countenance to that Government's contention. With this reservation, however, it is not disposed, in such a case as is now presented, to stand in the way of its citizens obtaining, by special license of the Spanish Government, the protection which the treaty was designed to secure to them. The Department therefore grants the request of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States for permission to obtain from the Spanish Government a license which will enable the company to protect its assets in Spain. It is, however, to be understood that this permission is granted upon the condition that the company will perform its duties as a citizen of the United States and confine itself in its action in Spain to the protection of its legitimate interests, and that the permission is revocable at the will of this Government." Mr. Moore, Assist. Sec. of State, to Messrs. Alexander and Green, May 19, 1898, 228 MS. Dom. Let. 586. 5. INTERFERENCE WITH MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. § 1142. In the summer of 1893, in view of political disturbances, the Government of Brazil prohibited the use of cipher words in commercial messages sent to that country. The minister of the United States at Rio was instructed to try to have the restriction removed altogether, but, if this was impossible, as a last resort to suggest the expedient of lodging the cipher codes with the Government. The interdiction was subsequently removed. After the revolt of the squadron under Admiral Mello, telegraphic communication for commercial purposes was altogether prohibited, but the restriction was almost immediately modified so as to allow messages to be sent in plain language, with the visé of the minister of the treasury. For. Rel. 1893, 38-39, 41-43, 49-50, 62, 145. During the war between the United States and Spain, a censorship was established, under General A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer, of cable messages sent from the United States. No cipher messages were permitted to pass without special authority in each case; but such authority was given for the messages of diplomatic representatives officially addressed and signed. In this relation, however, it was observed that, "should the exigencies of war require, this Department could oppose no objection to the complete prohibition of all cipher messages, whether of foreign representatives or others." Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of War, April 27, 1898, 228 MS. See, also, Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of War, April 27, 1898. The censorship was suspended on the signing of the armistice of August 12, 1898. (Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hay, ambass. to England, tel., Aug. 15, 1898, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XXXII. 625.) By the Universal Postal Convention of Vienna, Art. IV., which was in force during the war between the United States and Spain, "the right of transit" of the mails was guaranteed "throughout the entire territory" of the countries forming the Universal Postal Union, of which both the United States and Spain are members. No international discussion as to the disposition of mails arose during the war in question. The stipulation just quoted was, however, said "to insure the safe transit under any conditions of closed mails passing from one country of the Postal Union to another country of the Union," but to have "no bearing on mails passing from one post-office to another post-office in the same country." Mr. Smith, Postmaster-General, to Sec. of State, June 1, 1898, MS. Misc. Let. Regulations adopted by China during the war with Japan, which required all ships entering the port of Shanghai, after seven o'clock at night, to anchor outside the harbor until the following morning, were considered as being "in the nature of a defensive measure to which objection could not well be taken." Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, jr., chargé, No. 951, Sept. 28, 1894, MS. Inst. China, V. 95. "In respect to the extinguishment of lighthouses, the Department is of opinion that such a measure, where it is fraught with danger to foreign vessels navigating the waters adjacent to the coast, may be resorted to only when there is good ground to believe that the lights would facilitate an impending attack at a particular point.” Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, jr., chargé at Peking, Sept. 28, 1894, MS. Inst. China, V. 95. X. MILITARY OCCUPATION. 1. OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND ITS ADMINISTRATION. See supra, § 21. § 1143. "Some doubt has been suggested whether Santa Cruz, while in the possession of Great Britain, could properly be conBelligerent occupa- sidered as a British island. But for this doubt there tion De facto can be no foundation. Although acquisitions made during war are not considered as permanent until confirmed by treaty, yet to every commercial and belligerent purpose, government. |