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to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, and all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or works of science or art is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.

"Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under military necessity are not to be retained.

"While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expense of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

"Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given.

"All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, on the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American forces, Correspondence relating to War with Spain I. 159.

As a matter of power, it is within the legitimate function of the War Department to establish and maintain its own telegraph line between Santiago and Havana, Cuba, and to transmit private messages over it, although the transaction of business of that nature may be in conflict with the vested rights of the International Ocean Telegraph Company. In the maintenance and operation of such line the military officers of the United States in Cuba are exercising a war power under a military occupation of territory wrested by arms from a belligerent. The question whether the business of the International

H. Doc. 551-vol 7-18

Ocean Telegraph Company is thereby injuriously affected in contravention of its concession is one, the authority to determine which ist not vested in the Attorney-General.

Syl., Griggs, At. Gen., March 18, 1901, 23 Op. 425.

For a report on the draft of a proposed order of the military government of Cuba authorizing the organization of railroad companies in the island and the construction, maintenance, and operation of railroads there, see Magoon's Reports, 391.

As to the exercise of the pardoning power under the military government in New Mexico and the orders of the military government of Cuba relating to the exercise of the same power under that government, see Magoon's Reports, 501.

After the raising of the siege of Peking, Aug. 14, 1900, a number of foreigners began to take possession of and to endeavor to purchase much of the burned and abandoned property in what was necessarily to be the future legation quarter. As Peking was not a treaty port where foreigners might buy land at will, and as there was danger that the entire Chinese-owned property in the quarter mentioned would be preoccupied so that the legation grounds could not be extended, the diplomatic body on Nov. 6, 1900, resolved and announced "that no purchase of ground from the Chinese since the commencement of the siege, in the quarter occupied by the legations, will be of any value without the consent of the foreign representatives." The Government of the United States, while recognizing the "exceptional character" of this resolution, considered it to be "justified in view of the inconvenience that might result from permitting foreigners to speculate in land intended to be occupied by the foreign legations, taken in conjunction with the fact that Peking is not a treaty port where foreigners may purchase land at will." As to its application, the American minister was instructed: "The Department would enjoin the withholding for the present of authorization of the acquisition of the land in question by private individuals. As regards bona fide purchases made before the action taken by the foreign representatives, it may be necessary to inquire into the circumstances of such purchases, before dispossession is resorted to, if that should ultimately prove necessary."

Mr. Hill, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Rockhill, special comr. to China, May 3, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, App., p. 100.

Mr. Conger in a report of March 4, 1901, in regard to the resolution, said: "On November 6 the allied powers, through their representa tives, gave the notice embodied in the resolution quoted above. This was a restriction or qualification of private ownership and a limitation of the right of alienation which, during the military occupation, the dominant powers had a right to exercise, and no transfers within the time designated could be valid as against the United States or other powers represented here. The restriction was authorized by

public law and necessary to prevent the acquisition of the property needed by private individuals for speculative or other purposes. It does not imply the forcible acquisition of property for legation purposes by the United States; but is a precautionary measure against the vesting of intermediate rights." (For. Rel. 1901, App., p. 97.) See, also. Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Rockhill, special comr. to China, Aug. 3, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, App., p. 241.

26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, and they may expel every one who declines to do so. But whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives."

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, War of the Rebellion, Official Records, series 3, III. 151.

"39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the war--such as judges, administrative or political officers, officers of city or communal governments are paid from the public revenue of the invaded territory until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue it. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped."

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, War of the Rebellion,
Official Records, series 3, III. 152.

"ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

"The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.”

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. II. 1821.

"ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The
Hague, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. II. 1821.

2. CIVIL WAR CASES.

§ 1144.

See supra, § 22.

Where the President, at the close of hostilities, appointed a military governor of one of the States, the people whereof had been in rebellion against the United States, held, that such appointment did not change general laws of the State then in force for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, nor remove from office those who were at the time engaged by law with public duties in that behalf.

Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U. S. 188.

A commanding general of the Federal forces at Memphis, in 1862, had the right to collect rents belonging to a citizen who had remained within the lines of the enemy, and hold them subject to such disposition as might thereafter be made of them by the devisions of the proper tribunals.

Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U. S. 612.

January 1, 1856, one citizen of Virginia gave to another in payment for certain lands eight bonds secured by mortgage and payable, one on the first of January in each year from 1857 to 1864, inclusive. All payments of principal and interest up to and including January 1, 1861, were made presumably in lawful money. The payments due in 1861 and 1862 were made in Confederate treasury notes, which at the time constituted the principal if not the only circulating medium of the locality. The payments due in 1863 and 1864 were made in what was commonly called Virginia money; that is to say, Virginia bank notes issued prior to the civil war. The payments up to January 1, 1861, inclusive, were made to the mortgagee; those due after that time were made to his personal representatives, the mortgagee himself having died; and in every case the bond so paid was delivered up. When the last bond was paid the personal reprepresentatives of the mortgagee gave a written order to the trustee in the mortgage or deed of trust directing the release of the lien created by that instrument. The trustee accordingly made a deed of release, which was subsequently recorded. In 1880 one of the children of the mortgagee brought suit to compel the payment "in good, lawful money" of such of the bonds as had been paid in Confederate notes and Virginia money, and in support of the action alleged that the obtaining of the bonds from the personal representatives of the mortgagee was done in execution of a fraudulent scheme on the part of the mortgagor to pay them off with "worthless, or next to worthless Confederate money." Held, that the whole transaction was conducted in good faith and with full acquiescence of all the parties,

and that the children of the mortgagee, by having accepted and acquiesced in it for so long a time, had, independently of any statute of limitations, and apart from any question as to the legality of the payment of the bonds in Confederate money or Virginia bank notes, forfeited their right to invoke the aid of a court of equity.

Washington v. Opie (1892), 145 U. S. 214.

A sale of a railroad under the provisions of the general improvement law of Florida (act of Jan. 6, 1855), made during the war of the rebellion by the persons acting as governor and officers of the State, in their capacity as ex officio trustees of the general improvement fund, must be recognized as valid, under the settled doctrine that the act of the rebellious States in their individual capacities--executive, legislative, and judicial-so far as they do not tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority or the constitutional rights of citizens, are to be treated as valid and binding.

Johnson v. Atlantic G. & W. I. Transit Co., 156 U. S. 618, 15 S. Ct. 520.

An officer in the United States Army, assigned to the command of
a military district, had no authority, as military commander, to issue
an order to the sheriff of the county, requiring him to place a person
in possession of a plantation and personal property which were, at
the time, in the possession of another person. But where he issued
such an order on the application of H., who claimed to be the true
owner of the property, and was sued by W., who was dispossessed by
the execution of the order, for damages for such dispossession, it was
held that he could justify under such order if H. was the true owner
and was entitled to the possession.

Whalen v. Sheridan, 17 Blatchf. 9.

A decree in an attachment case, begun in the South during the war by seizure of property and publication of notice, is void as against a loyal citizen, and can be impeached collaterally.

Dorr v. Gibboney, ? Hughes, C. C. 382.

The appointment of an administrator, though made during the war between the States, is valid.

Allen v. Kellam, 69 Ala. 442.

During the late war the State of Mississippi levied a tax on land for military purposes. Held, that an executor paying such a tax upon land of his testator should be reimbursed, although the tax would now be considered as invalid, and, if a sale of the land had been made therefor, it would not be upheld.

Hudson v. Gray, 58 Miss. 882.

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