to vote on the question of taxation nor to participate in the benefits for which the tax is levied.18 Persons may also become estopped from denying the constitutionality of a statute, by participating in the procurement of its passage, by acquiescing in it after its passage, or by accepting benefits under it, although it may be invalid as to all other persons.19 And an individual has no right to complain that a law is unconstitutional after he has endeavored to take the benefit of it to the injury of others.20 But taxpayers, citizens of the state, may maintain a bill quia timet to restrain the executive officers of the state from funding the public debt under an act which is unconstitutional and void. 21

SAME-NECESSITY OF DECISION.

36. The question of constitutionality will not be decided unless it is imperatively necessary to the right disposition of the case.

Courts are not eager to annul acts of the legislature. A becoming respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government will make them loath to adjudicate the grave question of the constitutional validity of a statute, and they will not do so when the matters or questions presented by the record do not require it.22 The decision of a case will be rested on grounds which do not involve a determination as to the validity of the statute, if there be any such in the case. It is only when the question of the power of the legislature under the limitations of the constitution is the very gist and marrow of the case that the courts will give their judgment on this point. And if a judgment on the question of constitutionality was not necessary to the determination of the particular case, it will usually be regarded as obiter dictum and not as concluding the question. As a corollary to the foregoing rule, it may be stated that the courts will ordinarily refuse to decide upon the constitutionality of

18 Norman v. Boaz, 85 Ky. 557, 4 S. W. 316. 19 Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.) 230.

20 Hansford v. Barbour, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 515.

21 Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121.

22 Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Hopson v. Murphy, 1 Tex. 314.

a statute except when the decision is necessary to the final disposition of the case. That is, they will not allow the question to be raised, or will not determine it, upon preliminary, provisional, or collateral proceedings, such as motions for a preliminary injunction, motions to strike out pleadings, hearings concerning costs, or the like. 23

SAME-CONSTRUCTION.

37. Unconstitutionality will be avoided, if possible, by putting such a construction on the statute as will make it conform to the constitution.

The courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it the force of law, if this can be done without extravagance. They may disregard the natural and usual import of the words used, if it is possible to adopt another construction, sustaining the statute, which shall not be strained or fantastic. In so doing, they construe the act in accordance with the presumed intention of the legislature. For the law-making body is always presumed to have acted within the scope of its powers.24

SAME-EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION.

38. Courts will be influenced, but not bound, by a long. and uniform construction of a statute, with respect to its constitutionality, by the other branches of the government.

While the courts are to determine for themselves all questions of constitutionality which come properly before them, yet it is proper and usual for them to show much respect to the decisions of the executive and legislative departments, made for their own guidance, upon the same questions, especially when such decisions have been acquiesced in and acted upon for a long period of time.25

28 Deering v. Railroad Co., 31 Me. 172; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583. 24 Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 484; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376; Roosevelt v. Godard, 52 Barb. 533; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433; Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 5 Sup. Ct. 125.

25 Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299.

SAME-PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY.

Strongisl

[known to the Caw]

39. Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature.

Legislators, as well as judges, are bound to obey and support the constitution, and it is to be understood that they have weighed the constitutional validity of every act they pass. Hence the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute; every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute, not against it; and the courts will not adjudge it invalid unless its violation of the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, complete, and unmistakable.26

SAME-REFERENCE TO JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE.

40. The journals of the legislature may be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the act was passed in due form; but no evidence will be received to contradict the journals.

A statute may be unconstitutional for lack of compliance with the forms prescribed by the constitution in the process of its enactment. If it is shown to the court that the legislature has neglected or violated its duty in any of these particulars, the act must be pronounced invalid. And for this purpose, the court may go behind the enrolled or printed bill and examine the journals of the two houses. But the act will not be adjudged void unless the journals affirmatively show a lack of compliance with such forms.27

26 Tonnage Tax Cases, 62 Pa. St. 286; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Stewart v. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9.

27 Prescott v. Illinois Canal, 19 Ill. 324; Common Council of Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787. Compare Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. And see infra, p. 296.

SAME-MOTIVES OF LEGISLATURE.

41. The motives of the legislature, in passing a particular measure, cannot be inquired into, nor can it be shown that it was procured by fraud or bribery.

28

The constitutionality of a statute is a bare question of legislative power, and any inquiry as to the motives operating on the minds of the legislators, in voting for the measure, is entirely incompetent. The validity of a statute does not in the least depend on the considerations which induced the legislature to enact it. Evidence to establish fraud, bribery, or corruption against the members of the legislature, as a ground for setting aside the statute, is not admissible. The courts are not made guardians of the morals of the legislators, nor are they at liberty to impute to them any improper motives.2 Nor can it be shown that deception or suppression of the truth was practiced upon the legislature to induce the passage of the act. Thus, an inquiry as to whether a land grant was obtained by a railroad company by false representations to the legislature would indirectly interfere with the power of the legislature to enact such laws as it may deem best for the general good. The courts will therefore presume (whatever may be averred to the contrary) that no general statute is ever passed either for want of information upon the part of the legislature or because it was misled by the false representations of interested parties.2

29

SAME-POLICY OF LEGISLATION.

42. A statute cannot be declared void on considerations going merely to its policy or propriety.

The courts have nothing whatever to do with the policy, expediency, wisdom, or propriety of acts of the legislature. Such matters

28 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S. W. 364; Parker v. State, 132 Ind. 419, 31 N. E. 1114; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121; Jewell v. Weed, 18 Minn. 272 (Gil. 247).

20 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 143. And see Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 651, 27 Pac. 1089.

are questions for legislative determination, but do not belong to the judiciary. Consequently, if a given statute does not violate any provision of the constitution, and is within the general scope of legislative power, the courts cannot adjudge it void merely because it appears to them to be impolitic, unjust, improper, absurd, or unreasonable. To do so would not be an exercise of the judicial functions, but an usurpation of legislative powers.30

SAME-NATURAL JUSTICE.

43. A statute cannot be declared invalid because it is opposed to the principles of natural justice or the supposed spirit of the constitution.

It has sometimes been held that if a statute, in the judgment of the court, was contrary to the principles of natural justice, or the general spirit of the constitution, or the maxims of republican government, or the principles of right and liberty supposed to lie at the base of all institutions in a free country, it was the duty of the court to pronounce it invalid.31 But the prevailing opinion at the present day is that there is no such power in the courts. The legislature of a state possesses the power to pass any and every law, on any and every subject, which does not amount to an encroachment upon the province of either of the other departments and is not in conflict with the express terms of either the federal or state constitution. Consequently, one who objects to the validity of an act of the legis lature must be able to point out the specific prohibition, requirement, or guaranty which it violates. If this cannot be done, the act is valid. Natural justice, the principles of republican government, and

30 Angle v. Railway Co., 151 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 240; Merchants' Union Barb Wire Co. v. Brown, 64 Iowa, 275, 20 N. W. 434; People v. Common Council of Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.

31 Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. And see Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay (S. C.) 93, 98; People v. Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452. In Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, it was said: "The power of the legislature is not unlimited. They cannot entirely disregard the fundamental principles of the social compact. Those principles underlie all legislation, irrespective of constitutional restraints, and if the act in question is a clear violation of them, it is our duty to hold it abortive and void."