conference by a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Governments present and voting shall enter into force six months after the date on which the Secretary-General notifies the Contracting Governments of the amendment adopted. (4) The Secretary-General shall notify promptly all signatory Governments of the adoption and entry into force of any amendment under this Article. § 4 Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of $5 Executive Agreements $6 Implementing Agreements Chapter 6 STATE TERRITORY, JURISDICTION AND $1 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES State Territory and Territorial Jurisdiction U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions Puerto Rico On March 18, 1974, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, in Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 493 F.2d 1064 (1974), that under the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. 731 et seq., new Federal legislation requires no prior consent by Puerto Rico. The case involved the applicability to Puerto Rico of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 651-678, which, in terms, is made applicable to Puerto Rico. The appellant argued that subsequent to the advent of Commonwealth status, Congress lacked power unilaterally to make new statutes applicable to Puerto Rico. With respect to the political status of Puerto Rico, the Court said: * The present political status of Puerto Rico stems from Public Law 600, enacted by the Congress of the United States in 1950 "in the nature of a compact," and approved by the people of Puerto Rico in referendum in 1951. Pursuant to this law the people of Puerto Rico adopted a Constitution in 1952 and the Congress of the United States approved that Constitution and repealed part of the old Organic Act (the Jones Act of 1917). The remainder of the Organic Act was renamed the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. § 731b et seq. Section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. §734, provides in relevant part that: "The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter provided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States. . . ." Caribtow does not allege that the Occupational Safety and Health Act is "locally inapplicable" in the sense meant in § 734. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of the fostering of the safety of workers as being other than supportive of the cultural and legal heritage of Puerto Rico. Section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act provides unquestionably that federal legislation requires no prior consent of Puerto Rico. Nothing in the language or in the legislative history can realistically support any other conclusion. Furthermore, the provision was, in identical terms, part of the Organic Act; and under those Acts no such prior consent was ever required. The fact that the Commonwealth now possesses its own Constitution, and is governed with the consent of its inhabitants, does not establish that it is now so independent of the federal government that it may ignore or nullify national legislation and exert powers in this regard that are denied to the states, each of which also possesses a constitution and a republican form of government. What is determinative here is that application of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to Puerto Rico is fully consistent with the "compact.' * The Court cited its holding in Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68 (1958) that the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act was applicable to Puerto Rico. Appellant argued that this and other cases were distinguishable in that they all dealt with laws enacted prior to 1952 and thus only supported the proposition that statutes in effect in Puerto Rico prior to the "compact" remained in effect subsequently. In response to this argument, the Court said: ** passing the practical difficulty of distinguishing an "amendment" from a "new law," there are a number of reasons why the distinction proposed is of no substance. First, as we have noted, the legislative history of Section 9, and its prior existence in the Organic Acts of 1900 and 1917, militate against such an interpretation; and the language of its exceptions clause, "except as hereinbefore or hereinafter provided," also indicates that Section 9 is fully prospective. Secondly, no reason has been advanced why finding applicability to Puerto Rico of post-1952 legislation would do violence to the underlying reasoning of the cases dealing with pre-1952 legislation, nor can we think of any. Finally, to limit the cases in the way suggested by Caribtow, in the light of the clear language of Section 9, on which they were grounded, cannot be contemplated where no authority or persuasive reasoning or policy can be found to support such a result. With respect to statutes specifically exempting Puerto Rico from their coverage, the Court said: Caribtow seeks to draw from a few congressional enactments that have specifically exempted Puerto Rico from coverage, or have made coverage optional with the Puerto Rican legislature, the general principle that Congress lacks power to do otherwise. This argument conveniently overlooks the fact that many more acts of Congress have been passed since 1952 either without such an exemption or with specific provisions making them applicable to the Commonwealth. The fact that certain laws exclude Puerto Rico from the scope of their operation indicates no more than that Congress thought them "locally inapplicable" or otherwise inappropriate for the Commonwealth. And provision that a federal program operate in a jurisdiction only with the consent of that jurisdiction is not unique in Puerto Rico. The Occupational Safety and Health Act is one of those pieces of legislation which the Congress can make and has made applicable to the Commonwealth explicitly, and with no provision for prior local consent. That it has done and may again do otherwise with other legislation is beside the point. One final point deserves some discussion, 48 U.S.C. § 751, part of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, provides that the Interstate Commerce Act and the Safety Appliance Act shall not apply to Puerto Rico. Caribtow argues that this provision means that all enactments dealing with interstate commerce cannot apply to the Commonwealth, and that, since the Occupational Safety and Health Act is phrased primarily in terms of interstate commerce, the ban contained in § 751 extends to it. But § 751 does not in terms or by any reasonable implication mean any more than what it clearly says: that two particular laws shall not operate in Puerto Rico. Footnotes omitted. * ** The first Circuit Court of Appeals also decided, on March 18, the case of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Security National Life Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 336 (1974), involving the question of the applicability of the National Labor Relations Act to Puerto Rico. The respondent was found by an Administrative Law Judge of the NLRB to have violated the Act, and the Judge's decision was affirmed by the Board. Respondent argued, inter alia, that the Board lacked jurisdiction to move against it because in doing so it applied the Act to Puerto Rico and thereby violated the "compact" defining Puerto Rico's political relationship with the Federal Government. The Court said, in part: * The question of the power of the Congress to apply national legislation to Puerto Rico after 1952 is dealt with in Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 493 F.2d 1064, decided by us this day. In that case we found that laws of general applicability enacted after 1952 may be applied to Puerto Rico in conformity with Public Law 600, which established the legal framework for Commonwealth status, and which was adopted by the people of Puerto Rico "in the nature of a compact." This case presents a simpler issue. It has been held many times that laws in force prior to 1952 remained operative in Puerto Rico under the terms of section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, which provides in pertinent part that, "The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in |