States for cooperation on civil uses of atomic energy will be involved in such use. The effect of the protocols is to maintain IAEA safeguards over nuclear materials and equipment supplied by the United States under its bilateral agreements for cooperation as required by the NPT.

Protocols were entered into with Australia (TIAS 7865; 25 UST 1325; entered into force July 10, 1974); Iran (TIAS 7829; 25 UST 853; entered into force May 15, 1974); Thailand (TIAS 7849; 25 UST 1178; entered into force June 27, 1974) ; and the Republic of Viet-Nam (TIAS 7780; 25 UST 178; entered into force Jan. 9, 1974). Agreements were also signed with South Africa (TIAS 7848; 25 UST 1175; entered into force June 28, 1974) and Spain (TIAS 7856; 25 UST 1261; entered into force June 28, 1974) in order to extend coverage of earlier trilateral agreements between those countries, the United States and the IAEA to the 1974 bilateral agreements between the United States and those countries on cooperation in civil uses of atomic energy.

On September 17, 1974, a message from President Ford was presented to the 18th session of the General Conference of the IAEA. With respect to IAEA safeguards, President Ford said:

The Agency exercises important responsibilities in carrying out safeguards in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which I regard as one of the pillars of United States foreign policy. I wish to reaffirm my government's offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. This offer will be implemented when safeguards are being broadly applied under the Treaty in other industrial states. Our offer was made in order to encourage the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to other nations that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

*

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1843, Oct. 21, 1974, p. 552.

On September 17, Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the General Conference, made a statement which included the following on safeguards:

1. Conditions for export. Some of the major nuclear-exporting countries, including the United States, have reached agreement on procedures and criteria that serve as minimum common standards for implementation of the requirements of article III.2 of the NPT, which calls for IAEA safeguards in connection with nuclear materials and equipment exported to non-nuclear-weapon states. Furthermore, the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. have agreed, beginning October 1, to report to the IAEA detailed infor

mation on their export and import of nuclear materials to and from non-nuclear-weapon states.

We recognize that many nations have well-trained scientists and engineers capable of applying or developing sophisticated nuclear technology for military as well as for peaceful purposes. It is to their great credit that so many of these nations have chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Tape [Gerald F. Tape, U.S. representative to the IAEA] emphasized at the June Board of Governors meeting, the use in or for any nuclear explosive device of any material or equipment subject to an agreement with the United States for cooperation for civil uses of atomic energy is precluded. We intend to maintain this policy, and we believe that other exporting countries share the view that explicit agreements and effective verification are essential.

2. Control of the fuel cycle. With the proposed and planned sale of reactors to countries in regions throughout the world, including areas that are politically troubled, questions have been raised about the impact of such sales on proliferation. If each country that moves into nuclear-generated electricity is faced with the necessity to develop its own means of handling the spent fuel, then each country will have to develop the technology for this purpose. As an alternative, the establishment of internationally approved facilities to handle all the spent fuel arising from power reactors may be helpful to participating countries. It may also be reassuring to the rest of the world.

Attention must be directed to the different types of fuel cycles as well. In the United States our experience has been mainly with the light water reactor using low-enriched uranium. Cycles using natural uranium and heavy water moderation, uranium and thorium, highly enriched uranium, or uranium and plutonium each will require careful analysis to provide the best safeguarding methods and most efficient handling. Each fuel cycle has different degrees of vulnerability and should be analyzed from that point of view also. In such analyses the member states and the staff of the IAEA could make great contributions. The United States is committed to such efforts on a national basis and will be pleased to participate in international activities in this area.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Id., pp. 555–556.

On October 21, 1974, Senator Stuart Symington, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly First Committee, made a statement to the Committee on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related nuclear energy issues. With respect to international safeguards. Senator Symington urged a strengthening of the system. He said, in part:

The interests of nuclear exporters and importers alike would be served by a system which provided confidence that nuclear tech

nology was not being misused. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses of nuclear technology should not impede the full exploitation of its peaceful potential. The realization of peaceful benefits should be facilitated by a broad international commitment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities.

We should step up our efforts to improve the effectiveness, and achieve the broadest possible acceptance, of IAEA safeguards. In this connection, let us note that in his message to the recent IAEA General Conference President Ford reaffirmed the U.S. offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards to demonstrate our belief that there is no threat to proprietary information and no risk of suffering commercial disadvantage under NPT safeguards.

Nuclear exporters should make special efforts to ensure that their transfers of nuclear materials and equipment do not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities. The U.S. will shortly approach the principal supplier countries with specific proposals for making safeguards more effective.

One of the problems to be faced in the years ahead is the challenge of meeting rapidly increasing demands for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing services without undermining safeguards. An alternative to developing national facilities for these services one which would be both economical and conducive to effective safeguards might be the establishment of multinational plants capable of satisfying world demands.

Press Release USUN-140 (74), Oct. 21, 1974, p. 6; U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1998, Oct. 21, 1974, pp. 32–33.

Physical Security

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 1974, said that the United States "will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer."

Senator Symington, in his statement to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on October 21, 1974 (see above, p. 573), said that while physical security "must be the primary responsibility of national governments, we believe the world community can play an important role." He referred to Secretary Kissinger's statement of September 23, and added that the United States agreed with the recommendation made by the IAEA Director-General, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, "that the IAEA should prepare itself to be a source of advice and assistance to nations that wish to improve their physical security practices."

For the text of Secretary Kissinger's statement, see the Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1842, Oct. 14, 1974, pp. 498-504. The above-quoted por

tion is at p. 501. Senator Symington's statement is at Press Release USUN-140 (74), Oct. 21, 1974, p. 7, and at U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1998, Oct. 21, 1974, pp. 33-35.

Congressional Role

Public Law 93-485 (88 Stat. 1460), approved October 26, 1974, amends subsection 123d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2153, to enable Congress to concur in or disapprove international agreements for cooperation with respect to certain nuclear technology. Subsection 123d. is revised to read as follows:

d. The proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the approval and determination of the President, if arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., or 144 c., or if entailing implementation of sections 53, 54, 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that may be capable of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear material for use in connection therewith, has been submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee and a period of sixty days has elapsed while Congress is in session (in computing such sixty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days), but any such proposed agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation: Provided, That prior to the elapse of the first thirty days of any such sixty-day period the Joint Committee shall submit a report to the Congress of its views and recommendations respecting the proposed agreement and an accompanying proposed concurrent resolution stating in substance that the Congress favors, or does not favor, as the case may be, the proposed agreement for cooperation. Any such concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) within twenty-five days and shall be voted on within five calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine.

The 1974 amendment also states that it is to apply to proposed agreements for cooperation and to proposed amendments to agreements for cooperation hereafter submitted to the Congress.

See House Rept. No. 93-1149, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1974; Senate Rept. No. 93-964, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1974. Both reports indicated that this legislation was thought desirable in light of the President's announcements on June 14 and 17, 1974, to enter into cooperative nuclear power agreements with Egypt and Israel. See above, pp. 570-571. Under the 1974 amendment, each House of the Congress has an opportunity to express its favor or disfavor of any such proposed agreement within the 60-day statutory period for congressional consideration which, until passage of the amendment, was applicable solely to military agreements. Adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance

that Congress does not favor a proposed agreement would legally bar its execution.

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Communications and Transportation

Ocean Transportation

The Federal Supply Service of the General Services Administration issued new regulations, effective February 11, 1974, concerning ocean transportation. Added to 41 CFR § 5A were new subsections dealing with the use of privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels, shipments by foreign-flag vessels in Cuban or North Viet-Nam trade, and contractor charter party agreements.

The new §5A-19.108-1 provides that it is the policy of GSA to transport, to the greatest extent possible, all ocean shipments, whether in- or out-bound, by privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels. The section also provides that unless the shipping activity authorizes to the contrary, any contract under which (1) commodities may be procured and (2) the contractor arranges for ocean transportation, is to contain the following provision or appropriate modification (included in GSA Forms 1246 and 1424):

Use of U.S.-Flag Commercial Vessels

Any equipment, materials, or commodities required under this contract which are to be transported on ocean vessels shall be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels. When such vessels are not available the Contractor must obtain the approval of the Contracting Officer to use foreign-flag vessels. The contract price shall be adjusted to reflect any difference in transportation charges when such foreign-flag vessels are authorized. A copy of the ocean bill of lading covering each shipment shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer.

The new § 5A-19.108-50 provides, in part, that no ocean shipment of material to or from the United States is to be arranged by GSA on a foreign-flag vessel which has been listed in the Federal Register by the Maritime Administration as having called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963, or at a North Viet-Nam port on or after January 25, 1966, unless an exception has been made by the Secretary of Commerce. The section also provides that if a country or its designee receiving an Agency for International Development shipment specifies an ineligible vessel, the Office of Transportation and Public Utilities, Central Office, is to nominate an eligible vessel. In addition, all contracts which may cause the contractor in the performance thereof to procure ocean transportation for any shipment to or from the