this troubled area of the world. These arrangements can, and should. be modernized, but this must be done only with the cooperation of all the parties directly concerned.

U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.2032, Dec. 2, 1974, pp. 83-92; Press Release USUN-183 (74), Dec. 2, 1974. For the Report of the First Committee, see U.N. Doc. A/9973, Dec. 16, 1974. The vote on the alternative draft resolution, sponsored by Algeria and other countries, was 48-48-38. For the full text of the 1973 consensus statement by the General Assembly, see U.N. Doc. A/9341, Nov. 27, 1973, and the 1973 Digest, Ch. 14, § 5, pp. 524–525.

Peacekeeping Guidelines

On November 19, 1974, Joseph M. Segel, Alternate U.S. Representative to the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly, made a statement to the Special Political Committee with respect to peacekeeping guidelines. Mr. Segel said, in part:

One of the fundamental questions facing the Special Committee [on Peacekeeping Operations] is the degree of generality, or of detail, to be reflected in such guidelines. My government continues to believe that the ability of the Security Council to operate flexibly during crises enhances its capability to meet the problems unique to each operation. The establishment and functioning of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East demonstrates that detailed peacekeeping guidelines, agreed in advance, are not required to mount a successful operation. The U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), modified to meet new conditions, has provided similar lessons. These two operations, tailored as they are to conditions in each area, underscore the importance of not losing flexibility.

Clearly, the central purpose to be served by agreed guidelines is to outline the division of responsibilities between the principal U.N. organs involved in peacekeeping, especially the Security Council and the Secretary-General. If peacekeeping operations are to be launched promptly and managed effectively, it is essential that general responsibilities be appropriately delineated. But it is also essential to provide for the practical and efficient resolution of rapidly changing daily operating problems.

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this connection, it is responsible for authorizing peacekeeping operations and bears the ultimate responsibility for the direction of each operation. We believe that in exercising this general responsibility the Security Council should, in the formula proposed for Article 1 of the draft guidelines, "determine the purpose and mandate of a peacekeeping force, its approximate size, and duration of its existence and manner of its termination, and such other matters as it considered necessary in establishing the purpose and terms of the mandate."

In order to accommodate views that envisage broader immediate responsibilities for the Security Council, the United States is now prepared to include among the Council's responsibilities approval of the peacekeeping force commander and of the composition of the force. In both cases, the Secretary-General would make the initial recommendations. these are significant concessions. We hopeindeed we expect that they will be reciprocated in the same spirit of accommodation.

Once the operation is underway, the Security Council might best exercise its continuing responsibilities by such measures as requiring regular reports from the Secretary-General on the conduct of the operation and reviewing periodically the work of the peacekeeping force. If a need to do so is perceived, the Security Council might also establish an advisory or consultative committee, perhaps under Article 29 of the Charter, to assist in its work.

Within the overall mandate established by the Security Council, we believe the Secretary-General should be assured sufficient discretion to enable him, and the force commander responsible to him, to effectively carry out their responsibilities in directing the actual activities of the force, without day-to-day intervention by the Security Council. The Secretary-General's responsibilities should certainly include taking decisions on administrative and logistical questions, since his primary concern is to see that the operations authorized by the Security Council are managed properly and efficiently.

In this connection, the Secretary-General must have at his disposal integrated and efficient military units. While due regard should be paid to achieving adequate geographic representation in the composition of the force, we believe that more attention should be paid to creating a force that can successfully carry out its mission. The composition of the force should thus take into consideration the nature of the dispute, where the force will serve and the views of the host countries. It is, therefore, necessary that both the Security Council and the Secretary-General maintain sufficient freedom of action concerning the selection and composition of the force's components to ensure that the highest possible professional standards may be achieved.

The guidelines might constructively include provisions enabling the Secretary-General to make standby arrangements for future peacekeeping operations, including model agreements with hosts and troop contributors, a continuing inventory of troop offers, facilities or services that member nations would make available, and a roster of potential commanders.

.. it cannot be denied that differences, some fundamental but others less difficult, still exist over the nature and scope of peacekeeping guidelines. The United States continues to believe that the work underway to reconcile these differences is significant and that an agreed set of general principles can be developed by the Special Committee. We do not exclude the possibility that some differences will not be fully resolved in the negotiations to establish initial guidelines. However, if not, they can be left to ad hoc resolution by the Security Council, as problems arise and as we have done to

date, with the hope that later agreement will permit us to further improve the guidelines. Moreover, we believe the guidelines should remain flexible enough so that they may evolve as we gain experience.

Press Release USUN-173(74), Nov. 19, 1974, pp. 1-3. The U.N, summary of the statement is at U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.935, Nov. 22, 1974, pp. 10-12. The 1974 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is at U.N. Doc. A/9827, Oct. 31, 1974. On Dec. 4, 1974, the General Assembly passed Res. 3239 (XXIX), taking note of the Special Committee's Report, and requesting the Committee and its Working Group to renew efforts to reach agreement on guidelines and to report to the Assembly at its 30th session.

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Military Sanctions

Arms Control and Disarmament

Strategic Arms

The United States and the Soviet Union, on July 3, 1974, signed a Protocol to the 1972 Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The text of the Protocol is as follows:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republies on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of antiballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: The United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III (b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to by the Standing Consultative Commission during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its component in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III (b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article III

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

See also Dept. of State Press Release, No. 280, July 3, 1974; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1831, July 29, 1974, pp. 216–217.

On July 3, 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed two protocols on the Standing Consultative Commission which was established on December 21, 1972 (TIAS 7545; 24 UST 238). The protocols, which are concerned with dismantling procedures for replacement missiles under the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (TIAS 7504; 23 UST 3462) and the 1974 Protocol to the 1972 U.S.U.S.S.R. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems have not been made public. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in a press conference on July 3 at Moscow, said the following concerning the two protocols:

*

... two protocols will be signed on the Standing Consultative Commission and we will certainly make diplomatic history because it will be the first time that secret agreements are publicly signed. The agreements are being kept secret at the request of the Soviet Union because they involve dismantling procedures for replacement missiles under the interim agreement and the ABM agreement. However, they will be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees upon our return to the United States.

Let me say a word about the Standing Consultative Commission. The Standing Consultative Commission was created in the 1972 agreement, in order to implement the provisions for replacement or destruction of weapons under the two agreements on defensive and offensive weapons.

There is a protocol for defensive weapons, because the United States will have to dismantle some deployments that have taken place at a site which under the agreement we can no longer maintain and the Soviet Union will have to dismantle 15 ABM launchers and associated radars on their test ranges.

Secondly, there is a protocol for offensive weapons which discusses dismantling and replacement procedure under the provisions of the interim agreement where all land-based missiles can be traded in for modern sea-based missiles and where older submarine-launched nuclear missiles can be traded in for newer submarine-launched seabased missiles.

It must be understood that it was the assignment from the beginning of the Standing Consultative Commission to work out precise provisions for replacement and dismantling, that for that purpose they had to go into greater technical detail than was the case in the agreement and that two protocols will be signed, one to implement the defensive provisions, the other to implement the offensive provisions.

They break no new ground, they change no provisions. If I may say so, they close no loopholes, they deal only with the technical implementation of agreements previously reached. They will be submitted to congressional committees. They are not policy documents. They are technical documents, in implementation of the 1972 agree